State v. Cook

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge, Specially Assigned. I Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 591 provides: (a) The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court: (1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of: (1) The appearance of counsel; or (ii) The first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court, as provided in the Maryland Rules; and (2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those events. ⁹⁵ (b) On motion of a party or on the court’s initiative and for good cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date. (c) The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementation of this section in circuit courts. The Court of Appeals responded to the invitation to adopt rules to implement the section.

Now designated as Maryland Rule 4-271 (formerly Rule 746 and originally Rule 740), it prescribes in relevant part: (a) Trial Date in Circuit Court. — (1) The date for trial in the circuit court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213, and shall be not later than 180 days after the earlier of those events. When a case has been transferred from the District Court because of a demand for jury trial, and an appearance of counsel entered in the District Court was automatically entered in the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-214(a), the date of the appearance of counsel for purposes of this Rule is the date the case was docketed in the circuit court. On motion of a party, or on the court’s initiative, and for good cause shown, the county administrative judge or that judge’s designee may grant a change of a circuit court trial date.[ 1 ] We have addressed the statute and rule in over a dozen opinions, starting with State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 , 403 A.2d 356 , on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334 , 403 A.2d 368 (1979). We fleshed out, from time to time, the provisions of the statute through the principles of statutory ⁹⁶ interpretation and applied the rule implementing the statute, as construed, to a variety of factual circumstances.

We summarize the highlights of our opinions. We determined § 591 to be “plainly a declaration of legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges; its enactment manifested the legislature’s recognition of the detrimental effects to our criminal justice system which result from excessive delay in scheduling criminal cases for trial and in postponing scheduled trials for inadequate reasons.” Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 108 , 442 A.2d 550 (1982), quoting Hicks 285 Md. at 316 , 403 A.2d 356 . We declared that the statute and rule were not meant to supersede the constitutional rights to a speedy trial; they “were not intended to be mere codifications of constitutional speedy trial analysis.” Goins, 293 Md. at 109 , 442 A.2d 550 . We warned that, although “ ‘Rule 746 [ (now Rule 4-271) ] stands on a different legal footing than the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, we intend no departure from the established law’ concerning the State’s ‘Sixth Amendment obligation’ to bring the defendant to a speedy trial.” Id. at 110 , 442 A.2d 550 , quoting Hicks 285 Md. at 320 , 403 A.2d 356 .

We emphasized that “[t]he purpose of the rule is to promote the expeditious disposition of criminal cases,” Rosenbach v. State, 314 Md. 473, 479 , 551 A.2d 460 (1989), that is “to operate as a prophylactic measure ‘to further society’s interest in the prompt disposition of criminal trials,’ ” Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 460 , 474 A.2d 502 (1984), quoting from State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 456 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984). See State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 657 , 516 A.2d 965 (1986). In short, the adoption of the rule “was intended to ‘put teeth’ into the statutory requirements governing the assignment of criminal cases for trial.” Frazier 298 Md. at 427 , 470 A.2d 1269 , quoting Hicks 285 Md. at 318 , 403 A.2d 356 . In our opinion on the motion for reconsideration in Hicks, we resolved once and for all any doubt that the trial date ⁹⁷ requirement of Rule 4-271 is mandatory and that dismissal is ordinarily the appropriate sanction for violation of that requirement. 285 Md. at 334-335 , 403 A.2d 356 .

We made clear, however, that while the 30-day provision with respect to setting the trial date was mandatory for those involved in setting the trial date, dismissal is not the appropriate sanction for violation of the 30-day provision. Id. at 335 , 403 A.2d 356 . Nor is dismissal of the criminal charges appropriate “where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of [the rule].” Id. As we have seen, § 591 and Rule 4-271 each temper somewhat the 180-day requirement.

The statute provides in subsection (b): On motion of a party or on the court’s initiative and for good cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date. Except for the substitution of two words of no substantive significance, the rule tracks the language of the statute regarding the change in the trial date. See Frazier, 298 Md. at 427-428 , 470 A.2d 1269 . We pointed out in Frazier that “a postponement of the trial date must be made or approved by the administrative judge or a judge designated by him and only for good cause shown.” Id. at 426 , 470 A.2d 1269 (emphasis added).

And we noted that “[t]he critical order ... is the order having the effect of extending the trial date beyond 180 days.” Id. at 428, 470 A.2d 1269 . See Goins, 293 Md. at 99, 106-110 , 442 A.2d 550 . In Rosenbach , we reviewed our teachings with respect to the postponement of a trial date. We noted that nothing in § 591 or Rule 4-271(a) requires that the administrative judge specifically be conscious of the statute and rule.

As long as the county administrative judge extends or approves the extension of the trial date, and the order is supported by good cause, the requirements and purpose of § 591 and Rule 4-271(a) have been fulfilled. Nor is it essential, under the statute and rule, that the postponing ⁹⁸ judge, at the time of the postponement or thereafter, personally reset or cause the case to be reset for a particular date. The only prerequisite is that the administrative judge or that judge’s designee find good cause. Once that determination is made, the postponement is valid for purposes of the rule, subject only to the deferential review accorded the judge’s good cause finding.

Once that occurs, the question is no longer whether there was a postponement for good cause. 314 Md. at 478-479 , 551 A.2d 460 . This apercu in Rosenbach of our opinions cited Goins 293 Md. at 111-112 , 442 A.2d 550 , Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17 , 472 A.2d 444 (1984), and Frazier 298 Md. at 426, 454 , 470 A.2d 1269 . “In any event,” we held in Rosenbach 314 Md. at 480 , 551 A.2d 460 , the statute and rule do not require the administrative judge or that judge’s designee to make a specific finding that a postponement will take the case beyond the 180-day limit, or to postpone a case to some specific future date.[ 2 ] Once the postponement is deemed to be valid for the purpose of the rule (the defendant has the “burden of demonstrating either a clear abuse of discretion or a lack of good cause as a matter of law,” Rosenbach, 314 Md. at 479 , 551 A.2d 460 , quoting Frazier 298 Md. at 454 , 470 A.2d 1269 ), the issue becomes the length of the delay. A case postponed for good cause may yet run afoul of the statute and rule if, after a valid postponement, there is ⁹⁹ inordinate delay in bringing the case to trial____ The purpose of the rule is to promote the expeditious disposition of criminal cases, ... and this purpose is not served if, after a good cause postponement, nothing further is done to achieve that goal. Thus, the dismissal sanction may once again be invoked if, after a good cause postponement, trial is not begun with reasonable promptness---- But the burden of showing that the post-postponement delay is inordinate, in view of all the circumstances, is on the defendant.

Rosenbach 314 Md. at 479 , 551 A.2d 460 (citations omitted). We explained: The policy of the rule, of course, demands that both the court and prosecution take appropriate steps to assure that there is no inordinate delay____ It is for this reason that a case must be dismissed if inordinate delay is found. But this does not mean that a postponing judge must take an active part in the rescheduling of cases. It does mean that the official who undertakes to reset the case (administrative judge, designee, or CAO [Central Assignment Office, when the judge delegates the assignment of a new trial date to it]) must make certain that the commencement of the trial is not inordinately delayed.

Id. at 480 , 551 A.2d 460 . We found it to be clear, then, that the question of good cause for postponement and the question of subsequent inordinate delay are separate issues. When CAO sets a new trial date beyond the 180-day limit, the inordinate delay issue may be implicated, but that action has no bearing on the question of whether good cause existed in the original grant of the postponement. Id. “The critical postponement under the statute and rule,” we pointed out, “is the one which, in fact, carries the case beyond the 180-day limit.

Whether the delay from postponement to trial is inordinate is a question separate from whether the postponement was for good cause.” Id. at 481 , 551 A.2d 460 . ¹⁰⁰ We have had occasion to answer other questions surfacing in the turbulent wake left by Hicks. In Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 40 , 472 A.2d 452 (1984), we held that the dismissal sanction has no relevance when a case has already been postponed beyond the 180-day period and the postponement was 1) in accordance with the statute and the rule; OR 2) upon the defendant’s motion; OR 3) with the defendant’s express consent; unless the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right was denied. See State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59, 62 , 472 A.2d 465 (1984). In State v. Harris, 299 Md. 63 , 472 A.2d 467 (1984), a postponement beyond 180 days was properly ordered, but there was a delay thereafter of over three months in bringing the case to trial.

We said the test was whether the defendant has met the burden of establishing that the administrative judge’s decision to postpone the trial date, and the length of delay until the new trial date, represent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 67 , 472 A.2d 467 . We found that the defendant did not meet this burden. We observed: Although the length of the delay from November 23rd to March 8th may be substantial, it is explained by the extensive proceedings and opinion on the suppression matter.

Id. “Consequently,” we held, “the motion to dismiss was properly denied by the trial court.” Id. In State v. Bonev, 299 Md. 79 , 472 A.2d 476 (1984), 13 February 1982 marked the expiration of the 180-day period. A trial date within the period, 16 November 1981, was assigned. The opinion recounts what then transpired: The case could not be reached on [the trial date assigned], however because of the unavailability of a court, and the designated administrative judge signed an order on November 16th postponing the trial date.

The order recited that the postponement was necessary “due to an excess ¹⁰¹ buildup of cases awaiting trial with no courtroom available [and] [t]here are currently 14 cases already pending on the list to be moved to the first available court.” A new trial date of February 25, 1982, was selected by the Assignment Office. The February 25th date was postponed, however, because defendant’s counsel was trying another case on that day. The case was placed on the “move list,” and a court was available for trial on March 1, 1982. Id. at 81 , 472 A.2d 476 (footnote omitted).

When the case was called for trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss on the ground that the Hicks Rule had been violated. The trial court granted the motion, and a majority of the panel of the Court of Special Appeals affirmed on direct appeal. On certiorari, we concluded, “The record in this case does not permit a conclusion that the postponement of the trial date from November 16, 1981, to February 24, 1982, represented a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. The effect of our mandate was that the case be tried.

Id. 299 Md. at 82, 472 A.2d 476 . See Frazier, 298 Md. at 461 , 470 A.2d 1269 , in which we held, as stated in Harris, 299 Md. at 67 , 472 A.2d 467 , that the unavailability of a court does not, as a matter of law, constitute a lack of good cause for postponement. In Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17 , 472 A.2d 444 (1984), the administrative judge, within the 180-day period for trial, ordered that a mental examination be performed on the defendant. When the Assignment Commissioner was informed that the examination had been completed, he set a trial date which was 24 days beyond the prescribed 180-day period.

The defendant moved to dismiss for violation of the Hicks Rule. The trial court denied the motion. Carey went to trial, was convicted, and the judgment entered was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. We held that the administrative judge’s order for a mental examination of the defendant constituted an order postponing the trial as required by the Hicks Rule.

Id. 299 Md. at 21-22, 472 A.2d 444 . The trial judge’s subsequent order, reiterating to ¹⁰² clerical personnel that a new trial date would have to be assigned because of the order for a mental examination, was not the order which effectively postponed the trial and, thus, did not have to be entered by an administrative judge. Id. We stated that “[t]he defendant introduced nothing which would have permitted the trial court to conclude that this was a clear abuse of discretion by the assignment personnel acting under the supervision of the administrative judge.” Id. at 23, 472 A.2d 444 .

And we found that “[t]he time period [of 24 days] was not so inordinately long as to create a prima facie case of undue delay.” Id. We affirmed the judgment. We remanded Mahammitt v. State, 299 Md. 82 , 472 A.2d 477 (1984), without affirmance or reversal for further proceedings. We explained: The record in this case clearly shows that the defendant was tried beyond the 180-day deadline prescribed by § 591 and Rule 746.

The record, however, establishes little else bearing upon the § 591 and Rule 746 question. Under the circumstances, and in the interests of justice, we believe that it is appropriate to invoke Rule 871 and order that the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. After receiving whatever pertinent evidence is offered by the parties regarding the issue, the trial court should determine whether there was a violation of § 591 and Rule 746 which requires the sanction of dismissal. If the court concludes that there was such violation, the charges must be dismissed.

If the court concludes to the contrary, the prior judgments of conviction should remain intact. Id. at 86, 472 A.2d 477 . In Capers v. State, 317 Md. 513, 520 , 565 A.2d 331 (1989), we proclaimed: Because of the important policy embodied in the statute and rule, the 180-day deadline which they establish may be extended only in strict compliance with their provisions. “Thus, every postponement