State v. Dett

WILNER, J. The issue before us is whether, in an action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (Md.Code, §§ 12-101 through 12-110 of the State Government Article), the State may be found liable for false imprisonment, negligence, or violation of the plaintiffs rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights when (1) the plaintiff is arrested and brought to a State detention facility by a police officer in the mistaken belief that the plaintiff is the person against whom an arrest warrant has been issued, (2) the detention facility learns through its own investigation that the plaintiff is probably not the person named in the warrant or in an implementing commitment order issued by the local sheriff and there is no other legal basis for holding the plaintiff, and (3) the detention facility nonetheless continues to detain the plaintiff for a ⁸⁵ significant period of time. We shall answer that question in the affirmative. BACKGROUND At approximately 5:00 in the afternoon of Friday, March 7, 2003, respondent, Evelyn Yulonda Dett, was stopped for a traffic violation by Baltimore City Housing Authority police officer Darven Moore. A presumably routine background check by Officer Moore revealed the existence of an outstanding warrant for the arrest of Vanessa Hawkins “AKA Evelyn Dett.” The warrant was issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on July 31, 2002, for violation of probation (VOP).

Although Ms. Dett protested that she was not Vanessa Hawkins, it is not clear, as there is no statement from Officer Moore in the record, if the officer made any further investigation to determine whether Ms. Dett was, in fact, the person named in the warrant. The warrant, No. 802134014, identified Ms. Hawkins as a black female born July 11, 1963, with a “SID” number of 381961. A SID (State Identification) number is a unique number directly linked to an individual’s fingerprints. Because of that link, no two persons should have the same SID number; nor, if the proper procedures are followed, should a person ever have more than one SID number. 1 The warrant directed any law enforcement officer to apprehend Ms. Hawkins and commit her to the Baltimore City Jail—now known as the Baltimore City Detention Center—pending a hearing on the VOP charge, permitted her to post bail in the amount of $10,000, identified Tobi Thomas as the responsible Division of Parole and Probation agent, and gave a telephone number and address where that agent could be reached.

How much of that information was known by Officer Moore is not clear. ⁸⁶ Obviously in the belief that the person stopped was, in fact, the person named in the warrant, Officer Moore delivered Ms. Dett to the Baltimore City Central Booking and Intake Center (CBIC) at 5:50 p.m. CBIC is a facility operated by the Division of Pretrial Detention and Services of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS). Within the next hour, Ms. Dett was “booked,” photographed, and fingerprinted. By 6:35 p.m., CBIC had received, or become aware of, a commitment order issued by the Baltimore City Sheriff to the Warden of the Baltimore City Detention Center, directing the warden to receive into his custody the body of Vanessa Hawkins, identified as a black female born July 11, 1963, with a SID number 381961, “committed to await further action of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.” Pursuant to that order, entries were made in the CBIC log, “DO NOT RLSE SUBJECT BOOKED ON CIRCUIT CT # 802134014.” Presumably in conformance with the commitment order, all of the CBIC records identify Ms. Dett as Vanessa Hawkins.

The inmate file created by CBIC is in the name of Vanessa Hawkins. At 6:44 p.m., Ms. Dett’s fingerprints were sent to the Central Records unit which, within about a half hour, responded with a SID number of 2413966. That number, of course, was different from the SID number on both the warrant and the commitment order. The response, along with an “ID Completed Flag,” was placed into the Vanessa Hawkins inmate record at 7:22 p.m.

Ten minutes later, Ms. Dett was placed in a group cell at CBIC, where she remained until early the next morning, when she was transferred to the Detention Center. 2 At some point during the evening, the discrepancy in SID numbers was noted. Debora Driver, the Director of Central Records for CBIC, sent a “SID Problem Form” to the shift commander. The form stated as its subject, “SID PROBLEMS,” noted the two SID numbers, and explained that ⁸⁷ “defendant has 2 SID # s—Commitment has been entered into the system under 2413966. I contacted fingerprint who insisted that this is the correct #. 1 spoke to Ada who said that they could not do anything until Monday 3/10/03.” Copies of that form were placed in both the inmate file and a “Sid Problem binder.” At or about the same time, Ms. Driver prepared and filed a “Problem Paperwork Notice,” again noting that “defendant has 2 SID # s,” that the problem would keep her from bevng released, and asking “Please clarify with fingerprint the correct # to be used.” The record does not indicate who “Ada” was, but, in its brief in this Court, the State acknowledges that the person or persons contacted by Ms. Driver were “fingerprint technicians at the Criminal Justice Information System” (CJIS), also a unit and operation of DPSCS.

They were, in other words, CJIS, and State, employees. Prior to Ms. Dett’s transfer to the Detention Center, CBIC became aware of other discrepancies, beyond the two SID numbers. An Offender Booking Information Report in the CBIC file shows a birth date of February 6, 1962, for the Vanessa Hawkins supposedly being held by CBIC—which, in fact, was Ms. Dett’s actual birth date—whereas both the VOP warrant and the sheriffs commitment order show a birth date of July 11, 1963 for the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the warrant and commitment order. At 6:19 a.m. on March 8, CBIC sent an inquiry to CJIS to identify the person with SID number 2413966, and the response came back “No exact matched record on file.” CBIC immediately sent another request to CJIS to identify the person with SID number 381961.

At some point not later than 11:22 a.m., CJIS reported that SID number 381961 was that of Vanessa Ann Hawkins, alias Evelyn Y. Dett. The response also showed two Social Security numbers, neither of which matched that of Ms. Dett, and two dates of birth, one matching the date on the commitment order for Vanessa Hawkins and one being that of Ms. Dett. The response revealed as well an FBI number, fingerprint ⁸⁸ information, eight prior contacts that Vanessa Hawkins had with CBIC, and a height and weight for Vanessa Hawkins that were slightly, but not significantly, different from those of Ms. Dett. The prior CBIC contacts that were listed included the date and CBIC case number for each contact.

Despite these unexplained inconsistencies—the different SID numbers, the non-matching Social Security numbers, the different dates of birth, the discrepancy in height (two inches)—and the additional information that could have led to some clarification (the probation officer’s number, the FBI number, the prior CBIC contact information) no further effort was made over the weekend to investigate whether the person being held, Ms. Dett, was, in fact, the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the warrant and commitment order. At some point on Monday, March 10, CBIC received a response from a Tracey Powell to the Problem Papeiwork Notice sent by Ms. Driver on March 7. Ms. Powell stated that “these are two different people. Correct SID #2413966 for Vanessa Hawkins DOB 2-6-1962.

SID # 381961 belongs to Evelyn Dett who used Vanessa Hawkins as AKA. DOB 7-11-63.” CBIC responded: “[Y]ou still did not tell us which SID is correct for Vanessa Hawkins born 2-10-62 # 2413966 is that the correct SID # also the DOB on the release is for the inmate w/DOB of 7-11-63, but uses the DOB of 2-6-62. We need to have the lady fingerprinted again since the release had the DOB different from what is on the offender booking sheet.” The record does not reveal any response to that communication. Nothing more was done on March 10 to resolve the issue.

CBIC had a photograph of Ms. Dett, which presumably was taken when she was booked on March 7. At some undefined point, either CBIC or the Detention Center received a copy of a photograph of the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the warrant and commitment order and had the SID number 381961. The women depicted in the two photographs are somewhat similar but by no means identical in appearance. ⁸⁹ At 10:27 a.m. on March 11, 2003, the Central Records Office of the DPSCS Division of Pretrial Detention and Services, which operates both CBIC and the Detention Center, sent a request to “Bonnie” in the Circuit Court for a “court seal + true test” for Vanessa Hawkins, SID 992413966. Within an hour, the sheriff sent to the Warden of the Detention Center an order to release “Vanessa Hawkins” with SID number 2413966, noting “WRONG DEFENDANT.” The record does not reveal the basis on which the sheriff reached that conclusion.

Upon receipt of that directive, the Detention Center promptly commenced the process for releasing Ms. Dett. She was, in fact, released at 1:00 p.m. She had remained in detention for three full days and the better part of a fourth. In April, 2003, Ms. Dett filed a claim with the State Treasurer under the Maryland Tort Claims Act.

When that claim was rejected, in October, 2003, she filed this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State, DPSCS, the DPSCS Division of Pretrial Detention and Services, CBIC, the Detention Center, and the DPSCS Division of Parole and Probation for false imprisonment, violation of her rights under Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, and for failing to follow the proper processing procedures. No answer was ever filed to the complaint or amended complaint. Rather, the State, for itself and the various State units, responded with a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they had legal justification to detain Dett by virtue of her arrest and the commitment order from the sheriff. They argued that, notwithstanding Ms. Dett’s protest that she was not the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the VOP warrant and commitment order, the defendants had no obligation to conduct any investigation to determine whether they were holding the right person, but that, in any event, they did conduct some kind of investigation and released her upon order of the sheriff to do so.

The motion was supported by an affidavit of Susan Murphy, an Assistant Warden of CBIC, to which various CBIC records pertaining to Ms. Dett’s detention were attached as exhibits. ⁹⁰ Ms. Murphy contended that, because the Circuit Court offices were closed by the time Ms. Dett arrived at CBIC on Friday afternoon (March 7), she “could not be released until [CBIC] received a court order releasing her from custody” and that once the CBIC staff were “satisfied that Plaintiff was not the person who was the subject of the bench warrant issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, they were able to secure an order from the Circuit Court authorizing her release.” She did not explain, nor do the documents attached to her “Declaration” explain, what CBIC or the Detention Center did “to secure an order from the Circuit Court authorizing her release.” Although she stated that, upon learning of the two SID numbers, Ms. Dett was re-fingerprinted, she did not state when that occurred, and there were no documents attached to her statement showing that a re-fingerprinting had occurred. Ms. Dett responded that, upon her protest that she was not Vanessa Hawkins, she was advised that she would be released if her SID number did not match the one listed on the bench warrant, but that, instead of being released when it became clear that the SID numbers did not match, she was sent to the Detention Center and kept there until the afternoon of March 11. She argued that the defendants did not have the right to detain her, because she was not the person who was the subject of the warrant or the commitment order. The court was not impressed.

Without a hearing and without any discovery having been taken, it granted the motion, entered summary judgment for the defendants, and subsequently denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. It concluded that the legal authority for the defendants to hold Dett pursuant to the warrant and commitment order depended on whether they had, and retained, a good faith reasonable belief that she was, in fact, the person whom the warrant directed them to detain. If, at any time, they ceased to have that reasonable belief, the court continued, they had a duty at that point to release her.

On the record before it, the court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether, at some point during the nearly four days of detention, the defendants no ⁹¹ longer entertained a reasonable belief that Ms. Dett was the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the warrant and commitment order and that, as a result, summary judgment was inappropriate. The court struck the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Dett v. State, 161 Md.App. 429 , 869 A.2d 420 (2005). We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding (1) that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the defendants lost legal justification to continue their detention of Ms. Dett, and (2) that they had an obligation to investigate whether Ms. Dett was, in fact, the person who was the subject of the warrant.

We shall affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court. DISCUSSION The State acknowledges that Ms. Dett’s actions are contingent, ultimately, on whether she was detained for any appreciable time without legal justification. Its position is that, where the detention is based on the execution of a facially valid arrest warrant, legal justification exists, even if the warrant is later determined to be invalid or the detainee is later determined to be innocent or not the person named in the warrant. When proceeding on the basis of a facially valid warrant, according to the State, there is no duty on the part of the detaining entity to investigate the nature or validity of the warrant.

Contrariwise, the State argues that it had a mandatory legal duty to hold Ms. Dett until ordered otherwise by the court. At the very least, it posits, it had a duty to hold her until it was sure of her identity and that it acted reasonably in securing her release once it concluded she was not the person named in the warrant or commitment order. Three claims were asserted in the amended complaint—false imprisonment, violation of rights guaranteed by Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, and an action captioned as being filed under the State Tort Claims Act. The Tort Claims Act does not create any independent substantive causes of action but rather, subject to the conditions and limitations stated therein, merely substitutes liability on the ⁹² part of the State for liability that otherwise would exist on the part of covered State employees and officials.

Little attention was given to that claim in either of the lower courts or, indeed, in the State’s brief in this Court. At best, the averments in the count so captioned suggest a claim of negligence, which presupposes a duty, and, under the circumstances in this case, it can easily be dealt with in the context of the false imprisonment claim. That is true as well with the claim under Article 24, which, like the false imprisonment claim, is also premised on a deprivation of liberty without legal justification. The State notes the existence of the Constitutional claim but presents its defense that there was legal justification for Ms. Dett’s detention in the context of the false imprisonment claim and makes no separate, independent argument with respect to the Constitutional provision. 3 The Court of Special Appeals essentially treated the two claims together, as so shall we.

False imprisonment is a common law tort. We have defined it as the “deprivation of the liberty of another without his consent and without legal justification.” Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 654 , 261 A.2d 731, 738 (1970); Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 264 , 761 A.2d 56, 59 (2000); Manikhi v. Mass Transit, 360 Md. 333, 365 , 758 A.2d 95, 112 (2000). There is no dispute here that Ms. Dett was deprived of her liberty for nearly four days and that the deprivation, from its inception, was without her consent.

The only issue, therefore, as to all three claims, is whether the deprivation, or any substantial part of it, was without legal justification. In ⁹³ that regard, we are mindful that the case was resolved in the trial court on summary judgment, which is appropriate only if, after viewing all of the evidence properly before the court in a light most favorable to Ms. Dett, it is clear that there is no genuine dispute of any material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. de la Puente v. Frederick Comity, 386 Md. 505, 510 , 873 A.2d 366, 369 (2005); Maryland Rule 2-501(1). As noted, both CBIC and the Detention Center are units within the DPSCS Division of Pretrial Detention and Services. Maryland Code, § 5-201 of the Correctional Services Article (CS), which