State v. Fisher

ELDRIDGE, Judge. We granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this criminal case to review the holding by the Court of Special Appeals that the postponement of the defendant Fisher’s trial, beyond the 180-day time period prescribed by Maryland Code (1957, 1996 RepLVol.), Art. 27, § 591, and ²⁹⁹ Maryland Rule 4-271, was in violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271. 1 James Quinn Fisher was charged, by an information filed in the Circuit Court for Washington County, with distribution of crack cocaine, possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of crack cocaine. Fisher’s attorney entered his appearance on July 10, 1997. Therefore, the 180- ³⁰⁰ day period under § 591 and Rule 4r-271 for trying the case would expire on January 6, 1998.

Fisher’s attorney also filed on July 10, 1997, a request for a jury trial. The case was set for trial on December 2,1997, before the Honorable Frederick C. Wright III. Judge Wright is the circuit administrative judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit and the county administrative judge for Washington County. Fisher’s trial was scheduled after a jury trial in another case before Judge Wright on December 2nd.

Apparently the attorney for Fisher believed that Fisher would waive his right to a jury trial, would plead guilty and that, therefore, the trial would not take very long. The jury trial preceding Fisher’s scheduled trial did not conclude until about 2:00 p.m. on December 2nd, and Fisher’s case was called for trial at that time. The prosecuting attorney stated that it now appeared that Fisher wanted a jury trial, and the prosecutor began to ask for a postponement when Judge Wright interrupted and asked Fisher’s attorney about the matter. Fisher’s attorney indicated that he had “certainly [been] recommending” a plea of guilty, that he had been talking to Fisher, and that “I’ve run out of energy to talk to him further” at that time.

The defense attorney went on to indicate that Fisher wanted to plead not guilty and wanted a jury trial, although “[t]here’s always a chance in the future this will work out.” The docket entries show that Judge Wright granted a motion by the prosecuting attorney to postpone the case so that it could be tried before a jury. The case was re-scheduled for trial on February 17, 1998, which was 42 days beyond the expiration of the 180-day period prescribed by Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 4-271. When the case was called for trial before Judge Wright on February 17th, Fisher’s attorney moved to dismiss the charges because Fisher was not tried within the 180-day period set forth in § 591 and Rule 4-271. The prosecuting attorney responded as follows: “My notes indicate good cause was found by your Honor to continue that matter.

It was a normal N.T.F. docket with ³⁰¹ twenty-some case[s] on it. We tried one until three o’clock in the afternoon. Just could not get to more than one. “My notes indicate good cause ... your Honor found good cause. Obviously that’s the reason why it was set when it was set.” Judge Wright then denied the motion to dismiss, pointing out that he was the administrative judge and thus authorized to grant postponements in criminal cases, that he had granted the prosecution’s motion to postpone the case, and that he had “found good cause to continue the case.” After the denial of the motion to dismiss, Fisher waived his right to a jury trial, pled not guilty, and consented to be tried on an agreed statement of facts.

At the conclusion of the trial, Fisher was found guilty on all charges and was sentenced to imprisonment for nine years. Fisher appealed, raising the following two issues as set forth by the Court of Special Appeals: “I. Did the trial judge err by failing to dismiss the charges based on a violation of the 180-day rule either because good cause for the postponement was never found or because there was a two-month delay between the motion to continue and the actual trial date?

II

Did the trial judge err by failing to determine whether appellant’s waiver of his constitutional right of confrontation was knowing and voluntary before proceeding by means of a plea of not guilty upon an agreed statement of facts?” The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, reversed and directed that the case be dismissed because Fisher was not tried within 180 days and the case was not postponed beyond the 180-day time period in accordance with § 591 and Rule 4-271. The Court of Special Appeals initially stated as follows: “The lower court made no express finding of good cause at the December 2, 1997 proceeding; however, the court apparently postponed appellant’s trial because of an overcrowded docket in which the case could not be called until ³⁰² approximately two o’clock, when it was too late to obtain a new jury array. Additionally, appellant’s brief states that, prior to the hearing, ‘it appeared that a guilty plea had been discussed but that [ajppellant wanted a jury trial.’ ” The intermediate appellate court, after reviewing the December 2, 1997, proceedings, reiterated that “[t]he testimony reflects that the trial judge never found or discussed good cause for postponement.” After discussing the requirements of § 591 and Rule 4-271, namely that postponements of circuit court criminal cases must be done by the administrative judge or his designee and must be supported by good cause, the Court of Special Appeals concluded as follows: “While the determination of good cause is a discretionary matter rarely subject to reversal upon review, when an administrative judge fails to find good cause on the record, there is no determination for us to review. The court below had broad discretion to find that the late time of day and its overcrowded docket constituted good cause for postponement.

Unfortunately, even if there was good cause for the postponement, the trial judge failed to articulate what it was. The judge should have made a finding of good cause on the record, and this error was an abuse of discretion that prejudiced appellant because his case was postponed improperly beyond the 180-day limit. Consequently, ... dismissal is the appropriate remedy. Having concluded that the lower court’s failure to find good cause for postponement was an abuse of discretion, it is unnecessary for us to review whether the length of delay was inordinate.” In light of its holding, the Court of Special Appeals also found it unnecessary to reach the second issue presented by Fisher concerning waiver of the right of confrontation by proceeding upon an agreed statement of facts.

The State filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, contending that there was no violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271. Fisher filed an opposition to the State’s petition, arguing that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that the statute and rule had been violated. Fisher also filed a ³⁰³ conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, taking the position that, if we decide to grant the State’s petition, we should also review Fisher’s second argument before the Court of Special Appeals relating to waiver of his confrontation right by proceeding upon an agreed statement of facts. We have granted the State’s petition, have denied Fisher’s cross-petition, and shall summarily reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

This Court’s prior decisions clearly establish that there was no violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271 in this case. We shall remand the case to the Court of Special Appeals for that court to decide the second issue presented by Fisher concerning waiver of the right of confrontation and proceeding on an agreed statement of facts. The Court of Special Appeals in this case seemed to hold that the administrative judge, in granting a postponement of a criminal trial beyond the 180-day period, must expressly find good cause for the postponement and “articulate what it was.” The administrative judge’s failure to do this, according to the Court of Special Appeals, constituted “an abuse of discretion” and an “improper[]” postponement “beyond the 180-day limit,” thereby requiring a dismissal of the charges. This holding is contrary to several of this Court’s opinions.

Our decision in Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97 , 442 A.2d 550 (1982), is dispositive with regard to this issue. The defendant Goins had been charged with first degree rape as well as several other offenses, and the 180-day period for trying the case under Art. 27, § 591, and former Rule 746, the predecessor to Rule 4-271, expired on March 31, 1980. After some earlier postponements by the county administrative judge, a trial date of January 30, 1980, was set. On December 13, 1979, the attorney for Goins filed a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity.

On December 21, 1979, the county administrative judge signed an order directing that the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene examine Goins with particular reference to his mental condition at that time and at the time of the alleged offenses. The December 21, 1979, order further directed that the Department submit a ³⁰⁴ report to the court on or before February 8,1980. This latter portion of the order had the likely effect of postponing the January 30, 1980, scheduled trial date, although nothing was said by the administrative judge about the trial date, about a postponement, or about the requisite “good cause” for a postponement. On January 25, 1980, the Department requested a 60-day extension for completing its examination of Goins and submitting its report.

On January 29, 1980, the county administrative judge, referring to the heavy demand upon the Department for mental examinations, signed an order providing that the Department should submit a report on or before April 8,1980. Again, this order made no mention of the scheduled trial date or a postponement of the trial, and there was no express reference to “good cause” for a postponement. Nevertheless, the January 29th order had the likely effect of postponing Goins’s trial beyond the 180-day period which expired on March 31, 1980. The Department’s report was received by the court on April 10, 1980, and the case was called for trial on April 14,1980.

Before the commencement of Goins’s trial on April 14, 1980, the defense attorney moved to dismiss the charges, pointing out that the case was not tried within 180 days, and arguing that there was no postponement of the trial date beyond 180 days in accordance with § 591 and Rule 746. Both the defense attorney and the prosecuting attorney proffered to the trial judge that they had contacted the county administrative judge who stated that if he were called to testify, he would testify that, in granting the postponements to the Department for submitting its report, he did so “ “without calculating or considering the one hundred and eighty day Rule, that it was not his intention to waive the Rule, and the Rule was not taken into consideration____’ ” Goins v. State, supra, 293 Md. at 103-104 , 442 A.2d at 553 . The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss, holding that there was no violation of Art. 27, § 591, and the implementing rule. The trial judge viewed the county administrative judge’s order of January 29,1980, as an order postponing the trial date beyond the 180-day period, ³⁰⁵ and the judge further held that the order was supported by the requisite cause.

Goins was tried and convicted. Upon his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the intermediate appellate court took the position, inter alia, that “[i]t may well be in this case that Article 27, Section 591, as implemented by Rule 746, and as interpreted by State v. Hicks, [ 285 Md. 310 , 403 A.2d 356 , on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334 , 403 A.2d 368 (1979),] has been violated.” Goins v. State, 48 Md.App. 115, 121 , 425 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1981). After the issuance of a writ of certiorari, this Court disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals and “agree[d] with the trial court’s conclusion that there was no violation of § 591 and Rule 746 in this case.” Goins v. State, supra, 293 Md. at 110 , 442 A.2d at 557 . Initially, we held in Goins that § 591 and the implementing rule authorized the county administrative judge, or that judge’s designee for purposes of circuit court criminal trial postponements, to postpone a criminal trial date sua sponte, and that a motion by a party was not required.

We further held that an order by the administrative judge or designee which had the effect of postponing the criminal trial, and which was in fact supported by good cause, was sufficient for purposes of the statute and rule, regardless of whether the administrative judge viewed the action as a good cause postponement under the statute and rule. We thus held in Goins ( 293 Md. at 111-112 , 442 A.2d at 557-558 ): “The defendant relies upon the administrative judge’s statement that he issued the January 29th order without ‘calculating’ the 180-days or considering § 591 and Rule 746. However, nothing in § 591 or Rule 746 requires that the administrative judge specifically be conscious of the statute and rule. As long as the county administrative judge extends or approves of the extension of the trial date, and the order is supported by the necessary cause, the requirements and purposes of § 591 and Rule 746 have been fulfilled.” ³⁰⁶ , In State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 430 , 470 A.2d 1269, 1273 (1984), we re-affirmed the holding in Goins, stating that “when an order of the administrative judge necessarily has the effect of postponing the trial date past the 180-day deadline, and the order is supported by good cause, such order complies with §. 591 and Rule 746 regardless of whether the administrative judge was conscious of the 180-day deadline.” We also held in Frazier that the administrative judge’s determination that there is good cause to postpone the trial date is “a discretionary matter, rarely