State v. Geddes

Stockbridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The traverser, [Robert E. Geddes, was indicted by the Grand Jury of Baltimore City, on the charge of violating the provisions of the Code of Public General Laws in regard to insurance brokers, in that he had acted as such a broker without having procured the license required under sections 218 and 219 of Article 23 of the Code. The indictment contained six counts, each charging the offense in varying language, by which it was sought to set out the different acts done or supposed to have been done by the traverser, any one of which would amount to a violation of the statute. The indictment and each count of it was demurred to.

The Criminal Court of Baltimore City overruled the demurrer as to the first count, but sustained it as to the remaining five counts. The case proceeded to trial on the first count and Hr. Geddes was acquitted. The State then appealed, thus bringing up for review the correctness of the ruling of the trial Court with regard to the five counts, the demurrer to which was sustained.

The first count is not before us for consideration, and if it were the traverser concedes that the count was good and properly charged an offense under the statute. The fifth count may be equally readily disposed of. Section 218 of the Article embodies the following definition of who is to be regarded as an insurance broker: “Whoever, for compensation, acts or aids in any manner in negotiating contracts of insur ¹⁶⁸ anee, or re-insurance, or placing risks or affecting insurance or re-insurance for a person other than himself, and not being a duly appointed solicitor agent or officer of the company in which such insurance or re-insurance is effected, shall be 'deemed an insurance broker within the meaning of this article.” The important element is the “negotiating contracts” of insurance. There may be and doubtless are many acts done in and about the making out, and delivering of policies, collecting premiums thereon, or giving notices in connection therewith of a purely clerical description, but so long as they do not relate to the negotiation of the contract, they do not come within the terms of the act.

In the fifth count it was charged that Geddes was a clerk for hire of the firm of Turner & Thomas, who were licensed insurance brokers, and that while so employed and acting in pursuance of the instructions of said firm did deliver to James S. Francis a policy of insurance previously effected by said firm and collect the premium due on the policy, which premium Geddes handed over to said firm. Conceding that the traversed had done every act set forth in this count, none of them amounted to the negotiation of a contract, or even aiding therein, and the demurrer to this count was therefore properly sustained. The second count sets out that Geddes was employed by Turner & Thomas as a solicitor of insurance to be placed through that firm of brokers, and inducing persons who might be desirous of placing insurance to do so through such firm, and that for such services Geddes was paid a commission on the business he brought in to the firm of Turner & Thomas. Stated in simpler terms the charge here was that the traverser was the procurer, or procuring cause as it is some times expressed of business for his employers.

If now he was the means through which the business was obtained, he was certainly an aid in the negotiation of the contracts, even though the insurance policies were issued by a company or companies for which Turner & Thomas were not the agents. The ¹⁶⁹ statute does not make it necessary that a person to be a broker shall be the sole intermediary between the insured and the -company issuing the policy; one who “aids” in the negotiation falls within its terms, and therefore he who brings the person desiring insurance and the