Maryland case law › State v. Ghingher

State v. Ghingher

165 Md. 330 (1933) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: Affirmed✓ Good law
SummaryThe State of Maryland and the State Roads Commission petitioned for a writ of mandamus against Ghingher, the receiver of the Union Trust Company, seeking priority for deposits made by the State Roads Commission in the failed bank under section 71-G of the Emergency Banking Act (chapter 46 of the Acts of 1933). The petition was grounded on the theory that the deposits were 'moneys of the State' within the meaning of section 3 of article 6 of the Maryland Constitution, and therefore entitled to priority over other deposits. The trial court dismissed the petition, denying the claimed priority. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (per curiam) affirmed. The court did not decide whether the deposits were actually moneys of the State, because it found that under either alternative, the result would be the same based on three companion cases decided the same day: Ghingher, Receiver, v. Pearson, Mayo
Questions presented
  • Whether the deposits made by the State Roads Commission in the Union Trust Company are moneys of the State, within the meaning of section 3 of article 6 of the Constitution, and therefore entitled to priority under section 71-G of the Emergency Banking Act.
📖 Open the full case in RecordCite — full opinion, AI chat, highlights & citator →

The opinion was delivered per Curiam. Whether or not the deposits made by the State Roads Commission in the Union Trust Company are moneys of the State, within the meaning of section 3 of article 6 of the Constitution, need not be and is not now determined, since the decision of this court in the appeals (advanced) of Ghingher, Receiver, v. Pearson, of Baltimore v. Pearson, and of Pearson v. Ghingher, Bank Commissioner, being, respectively, 331 Nos. 14, 15 and 16 of the October Term, 1933, 165 Md. 273 , 168 A. 122 . If these deposits are not such moneys of the State, the decisions in Nos. 14 and 15 deny them priority over other deposits within the meaning of section 71-G of the Emergency Banking Act (chapter 46 of the Acts of 1933). On the other hand, if such deposits are moneys, of the State, the decision in No.. 16 determines that no priority exists within the meaning of section 71-G. As the petition of the State and the State Roads.

Commission for a writ of mandamus was grounded on the theory of a priority under section 71-G, and this was denied by the trial court in its dismissal of the petition, the judgment will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.