State v. Haas

Marbury, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. These two appeals were taken by the State of Maryland from two orders passed by the Criminal Court of Baltimore (Chief Judge Smith), one on the petition of appellees, Haas and Hatgimisios, and the other on the petition of appellees Vicks and Langham. All of the appellees were indicted in connection with the same alleged crime of murder and arson. The Haas-Hatgi ⁶⁶ misios petition alleges in some detail that these petitioners were subjected to a series of questionings and examination by the Police Department of Baltimore City and were denied the right to communicate with their counsel; that they finally had to proceed through writs of habeas corpus to enforce the latter right, and they ask that the statements made by them to the police be exhibited and made available to their counsel of record.

This petition was demurred to, the demurrer was overruled, then an answer was filed, and the Court ordered that the prayer of the petition be granted but that the execution of its order should • be stayed, pending final action by this Court to which an immediate appeal was taken. The petition of Vicks and Langham asked for an order directing the Police Commissioner to promptly furnish counsel of record with copies of any statements claimed to have been made by either of these petitioners during the time they were in the custody of the Police Department and before they were placd in the Baltimore City Jail. After an answer was filed, an order was passed that counsel be permitted to copy the statements of each of the petitioners, or that copies be promptly furnished their counsel of record, irrespective of whether the statements were signed, or in writing, or oral. An appeal from this order was taken by the State.

The Haas-Hatgimisios case is No. 114, and the Vicks-Langham case is No. 115 in this term. In the Vicks-Langham case, copies of the statements asked for have already been furnished to counsel. Any question involved in this case is moot. It was not the intention of the people of this State in establishing this court through the several constitutional enactments, that it should write treatises on the law.

Its duty is to decide bona fide cases and disputes between parties. As there no longer exists any dispute in the Vicks-Langham case, it is not within our power to make a decision in that case which will bind any of the parties to it, or accomplish any purpose in it. For that reason, the appeal in No. 115 will be dismissed without any further discussion. ⁶⁷ In the Haas-Hatgimisios case, the State is in possession of what it claims to be signed confessions by each of these appellees, and as the operation of the order of the lower court was stayed, these confessions have not been furnished to the appellees or their counsel. As a result, there is a judicial question presented, namely, the right of the court below to pass such an order.

Before considering this, however, there are some preliminary matters which must be disposed of. No trial has yet been had in the case, and no final judgment has been rendered. The appeal is therefore from a preliminary order passed during the conduct of a criminal case. The State has recognized this difficulty in its position, and has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to bring up the record and have it passed upon.

The appellees have moved to dismiss this petition and have also asked the court to dismiss the appeal, both because it is premature and because the order appealed from is one whose passage is in the discretion of the court, and therefore not reviewable. This court has appellate jurisdiction only, and is not authorized to issue writs of certiorari except in aid of that jurisdiction, or as a statutory method of exercising that jurisdiction. Code Art. 5, sec. 104; State v. Depew, 175 Md. 274 , 1 A. 2d 626 . If we have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in this case, then there is no occasion for the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

The entire record is before us and we can pass upon all questions ready for our consideration. On the other hand, if an appeal does not lie then we have no power to originate a proceeding here by the writ of certiorari. This subject has been fully discussed in Hendrick v. State, 115 Md. 552 , 81 A. 18 , and State ex rel. City of Baltimore v. Rutherford, 145 Md. 363 , 125 A. 725 .

The petition for the writ of certiorari will be dismissed. The question whether the appeal is premature has been settled in the case of Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430 , 157 A. 723 , where the court dismissed a petition as upon a writ of error to have a reversal by this court of the trial ⁶⁸ court’s selection of a place for the trial of a cause. In so doing, the Court said: “But action upon that question at this stage of the cause seems clearly barred by the rule that this court cannot take up cases from the trial courts piecemeal. Its jurisdiction is limited to the reviewing of final actions of the trial court.” The State points out that in spite of the dismissal of the petition in the Lee case, the court did review the question for the benefit of the trial court and indicated in no uncertain terms what it thought the lower court should do.

It asks that we do the same in this case because of the importance of the question and because the State has no way of bringing it up after final judgment. If the appellees secure the copies of the confessions they desire and are subsequently tried and acquitted, there can be no appeal by the State. State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 ; State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167 , 28 A. 2d 829 ; State v. Lingner, 183 Md. 158 , 36 A. 2d 674 . The only way the question might be raised would be by an order of a trial court refusing to grant such relief as is asked in this case, and a subsequent conviction.

In such a case, a convicted party could appeal and raise the question. That situation, however, applies to a great many preliminary matters in criminal cases, and, of itself, it is not sufficiently important for us to disregard the long-established rule above quoted. The appeal in No. 114 must also be dismissed. We have occasionally given our views on the questions raised in a dismissed appeal because of the great public importance of the issue involved.

We think this is such a case, evidenced by the fact that not only are the Attorney General and the State’s Attorney of Baltimore City urging the decision, but we have been asked by the State’s Attorneys of thirteen of the twenty-three counties to permit them to intervene as amici curiae. The larger number of these officials have adopted the State’s brief in this case, but five of them have filed separate briefs of their own. In view, therefore, of the extensive ⁶⁹ interest shown by the prosecuting officers of the State, and of the request of the Attorney General, we have determined to express our views upon the question involved in the Haas-Hatgimisios appeal. This question is not nearly so broad as some of the counsel involved attempt to make it.

It is simply: Did the Criminal Court have power in its discretion to require the State to furnish counsel for appellees with copies of the written confessions which the State had obtained from these appellees and which the State could presumably use in the trial? We are not concerned here with questions involving books, papers, documents, or tangible objects obtained from, or belonging to, the defendants, or obtained from others by seizure or by process, which are the subject of the Federal Rule for Criminal Procedure No. 16, 18 U. S. C. A. following section 687. Nor are we concerned with memoranda, oral statements made by a defendant or statements made by other defendants to an indictment or by prosecution witnesses. There is no occasion, and, in our opinion, it would be improper for us to lay down a general rule covering all possible cases.

So many varieties of situations may arise that this Court should not attempt to imagine them all, and to pass upon them without full and complete argument in each differing case. We therefore confine ourselves to the single issue presented on this appeal as outlined above. The State earnestly contends that no such power exists at common law, either in civil cases or in criminal cases, and that, while the right of discovery has been given in civil cases by statute and by the rules of this court, the latter were passed in pursuance of an act which specifically denied the right of this court to make rules in criminal cases. It may be here observed that while this statement is correct, the constitution of the State has since been amended, and the right to make rules in criminal cases (although not yet exercised) has been given this court in broad terms by section 18A of Article IV.

It is further urged that while the precise ques ⁷⁰ tion has not been presented to this court, there has been an intimation of it in search-warrant cases where the court refused to approve the practice of the making of a motion by an accused to refrain from using certain articles seized by the police, and directing their return. The Court said: “Such practice is founded upon no statute of this State, nor is it supported by precedent to justify its propriety. And we may add that we see no reason for adopting it and thus compelling the State’s witnesses in advance of a trial upon its merits to disclose to the prisoner the information which they possess pertaining to this case, which information is certain to be developed during the progress of the trial.” Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52 , 195 A. 324, 326 . This quotation, in part, was repeated in a later case with the explanation and addition: “The statement was intended as an adjudication in effect excluding the practice from the courts of the State.

And proceeding contrary to it in the present case was an error requiring a reversal of the judgment.” State v. Mariana, 174 Md. 85 , 197 A. 620 . But these two cases refer to entirely different situations from the one before us, and in no sense control our conclusion here. As authority for the contention that at common law there was no right of inspection of documents before trial of the accused, the State cites Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. VI, sec. 1859g; Rex v. Holland, 4 Durn & East (Eng.) 691, 4 Term Rep. 691, 100 Eng.

Reprints 1248; People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of New York, 245 N. Y. 24 , 156 N. E. 84 , 52 A. L. R. 200; People v. Bermijo, 2 Cal. 2d 270 , 40 P. 2d 823 ; Currie v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 653 , 279 S. W. 834 ; State ex rel.

Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384 , 135 N. W. 1128 , Ann. Cas. 1913D, 343; State v. Yeoman, 112 Ohio St. 214 , 147 N. E. 3 ; State v. Dallao et al., 187 La. 392 , 175 So. 4 ; People v. Parisi, 270 Mich. 429 , 259 N. W. 127 ; Davis v. State, 99 Tex. Cr. R. 517 , 270 S. W. 1022 ; State v. Kupis, Del. O. & T., 7 W. W. Harr. 27, 179 A. 640 ; Santry v. State, 67 Wis. 65 , 30 N. W. 226 ; Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. ⁷¹ 458, 2 S. E. 2d 293 ; State v. Livsey, et al., 190 La. 474 , 182 So. 576 ; People v. Parkinson, Gen.

Sess., 43 N. Y. S. 2d 690; Commonwealth v. Giacomazza, 311 Mass. 456 , 42 N. E. 2d 506 ; State v. Furthmyer, 128 Kan. 317 , 277 P. 1019 ; Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495 , 66 N. E. 2d 814 . This formidable array of authorities supports the common law theory, but the effect is somewhat diminished by a careful examination when the precise question before us is considered. The early English case of Rex v. Holland, supra, was an application by one indicted to inspect the evidence contained in a report of a board of inquiry of the East India Co. which he expected to be produced against him at his trial. Lord Kenyon, C. J., held that there was no principle or precedent to warrant the granting of the application and “* * * if we were to grant it, it would subvert the whole system of criminal law.” Ashhurst, J., in the same case, said that it was never conceived to be necessary or fit that a defendant should receive intelligence of the particular evidence by which the charge against him was to be made out.

Buller, J., said that the court had no discretion but must proceed