State v. Keller-Bee

³ HOTTEN, J. Appellee, Cynthia Keller-Bee, was taken into custody pursuant to a body attachment that was improperly issued by the District Court for Harford County. She brought suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State, alleging negligence on the part of the courtroom clerk who presented the warrant to the District Court judge for signature. The State moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting absolute judicial immunity. The circuit court denied the motion and the State appealed, presenting one question for our review: Does absolute judicial immunity bar a civil suit against the State of Maryland arising from the performance of judicial acts, where the only injury alleged is the direct and proximate result of the entry of an order by a judge of the District Court of Maryland?

For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The facts of this case are undisputed. On April 16, 2010, appellee, appeared in the District Court for Harford County pursuant to a show cause order in a civil action in which a judgment had been obtained against her. She appeared for the hearing, but the creditor-plaintiff did not and accordingly, the District Court dismissed the show cause order.

Nine months later, on January 20, 2011, the District Court issued a Body Attachment/Arrest Warrant, based on a motion for contempt by the creditor-plaintiff, for appellee allegedly failing to appear at the April 16, 2010 court date. Appellee was taken into custody on January 27, 2011. Following an appearance before a Court Commissioner, she was released on her own recognizance and instructed that she would receive notice regarding a court date to address her failure to appear. On February 4, 2011, appellee went to the District Court clerk’s office to ascertain why she was arrested.

Following an investigation by that office, it was determined that the warrant had been improperly issued. ⁴ Appellee filed a two count lawsuit against the State of Maryland on December 27, 2018. The first count alleged negligence on the part of the unidentified employee of the clerk’s office who presented the arrest warrant to the District Court judge. The second count claimed violations of appel-lee’s constitutional rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting absolute judicial immunity.

The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss following a hearing, expressing concern with the prolonged lapse in time between the April 16, 2010 hearing and the January 20, 2011 issuance of the warrant. The State noted an appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Appellee moved to dismiss the State’s appeal, which this Court denied. 1 Additional facts shall be provided, infra, to the extent they prove relevant in addressing the issue presented. STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss, “we must assume the truth of all relevant and material facts that are well pleaded and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from those pleadings.” Ronald M. Sharrow, Chartered v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins., 306 Md. 754, 768 , 511 A.2d 492 (1986). The facts we may consider are limited “to the four corners of the complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any.” Converge Servs. Grp. v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 475 , 860 A.2d 871 (2004).

See also Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1300 v. Lovelace, 441 Md. 560, 564 , 109 A.3d 96 (2015). Additionally, the party asserting judicial immunity bears the burden of establishing the claim. Simms v. Constantine, 113 Md.App. 291, 318-319 , 688 A.2d 1 (1997). ⁵ DISCUSSION a. Is the State’s appeal proper?

Upon the State’s notice of appeal, appellee filed a motion to dismiss with this Court, arguing that the circuit court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss was not an appealable order. The State responded that its appeal was permissible pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. “The collateral order doctrine is based upon a judicially created fiction, under which certain interlocutory orders are considered to be final judgments, even though such orders clearly are not final judgments. The justification for the fiction is a perceived necessity, in ‘a very few ... extraordinary situations,’ for immediate appellate review.” Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 376 Md. 53, 64 , 827 A.2d 115 (2003) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he concept [of the collateral doctrine rule] is narrow in scope.... ” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 615 , 440 A.2d 388 (1982).

In the present case, both parties rely on Dawkins, supra, in support of their respective arguments regarding the appeala-bility of the circuit court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss. In Dawkins , the plaintiff brought a tort suit against the Mayor, Police Commissioner and multiple police officers of the City of Baltimore, alleging negligence, assault, and violations of her state constitutional rights. 376 Md. at 54-55 , 827 A.2d 115 . The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting sovereign, governmental, and public official immunity. Id. at 57 , 827 A.2d 115 .

The circuit court denied the motions and the defendants appealed. Id. This Court held that the orders denying the motions to dismiss were appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The plaintiff filed for certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted in order to consider whether a defendant could appeal the denial of its motion to dismiss asserting sovereign immunity.

Id. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the collateral order doctrine was reserved for extraordinary situations. While the ⁶ Court observed that the assertion of sovereign immunity may not be a sufficient basis to warrant appeal under the collateral order doctrine, the Court took the opportunity to comment on other forms of immunity. It opined: As a general rule, interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, public official immunity, statutory immunity, or any other type of immunity, are not appealable under the Maryland collateral order doctrine.

Whether, and under what circumstances, interlocutory orders overruling immunity defenses asserted by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Comptroller, Treasurer, Attorney General, Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, or judges as defined in Article IV, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution, are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine will have to be determined in any future cases that might arise. Id. at 65, 827 A.2d 115 . We are persuaded by the State’s argument that the Court of Appeals expressly declined to extend to judges the general rule of nonappealability of interlocutory orders overruling immunity defenses. The Court of Appeals left open the resolution of this issue for future consideration.

Under the facts presented in the instant case, we conclude that the circuit court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. As will be discussed in detail infra, Maryland Courts have clearly established that a judge is immune from tort liability for judicial acts. Appellee brought suit against the appellant based on the activity of the clerk who presented the body attachment to the judge. As the circuit court acknowledged, if the complaint had been filed against the judge, the suit would have been dismissed pursuant to absolute judicial immunity.

The harm appellee alleges emanated from the judge’s issuance of the warrant. It is this judicial function that is really the subject of appellee’s tort claim. While the Court did not resolve the issue of judicial immunity in Dawkins , it left the decision to entertain an appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss asserting judicial immunity pursuant to the collateral order doctrine to ⁷ courts to “determine[ ] in any future cases that might arise.” 376 Md. at 65 , 827 A.2d 115 . We find that the facts of this case permit our consideration of the appeal.

We find further support for our conclusion from nearby courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has extended judicial immunity to courtroom clerks because “if immunity were not extended to clerks, courts would face the ‘danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly [would] vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.’ ” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C.Cir.1993). Accordingly, the State’s appeal of the circuit court’s denial of its motion to dismiss and overruling of its assertion of absolute judicial immunity was appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. We now turn to the merits of the State’s appeal. b.

Was the State entitled to the defense of absolute judicial immunity? The State argues that the circuit court’s denial of its motion to dismiss should be reversed and appellee’s complaint dismissed because Maryland law establishes that absolute judicial immunity precludes a tort lawsuit based on an order by a judge. Appellee maintains that the court did not err because judicial immunity does not extend to the negligent acts of all employees in clerk’s office. The circuit court’s denial of the State’s motion was predicated on its concern that the clerk may not have acted under the direction of the judge because of the nine month lapse in time between the hearing and the erroneous presentment of the arrest warrant.

The circuit court appeared to understand that absolute judicial immunity applied when a clerk acts within the scope of her or his employment at the direction of a judge, but questioned whether the clerk was acting within those parameters in this instance. ⁸ We begin our discussion of the relevant case law with Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271 , 653 A.2d 436 (1995), because the facts of that case are similar to the circumstances before us. Parker was convicted of speeding and fined $150. Id. at 275 , 653 A.2d 436 . Following her failure to pay the fine, an arrest warrant was issued against her.

Id. Parker eventually appealed her conviction in the circuit court and was acquitted of the speeding offense. Id. However, following her acquittal, the Sheriff presented an arrest warrant to a circuit court judge based on her failure to pay the original $150 fine.

Id. The circuit court issued the warrant without reviewing the case file. Id. Parker was thereafter arrested and detained until she paid the fine.

She later filed suit alleging negligence, false imprisonment and false arrest, against the circuit court judge and the clerk. Id. The State filed a motion to dismiss asserting judicial immunity as to the counts against the circuit court judge and the circuit court granted the motion. Id.

Parker appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the court’s grant of the motion to dismiss holding that the circuit court judge had jurisdiction to issue the warrant and accordingly was judicially immune. Id. at 276 , 653 A.2d 436 . The Court of Appeals granted certiorari. Id.

The Court of Appeals began by exploring the