State v. Luckett

BARBERA, Judge. We decide in this case whether a confession that Respondent Terris Terrell Luckett gave to the police complied with the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County ruled that the police did not comply with the requirement of Miranda that a suspect be properly advised of the right to counsel that attends custodial interrogation. The Circuit Court granted Respondent’s motion to suppress the statement he gave to the police following what the court ruled was a constitutionally defective advisement.

The State challenged the Circuit Court’s ruling by filing an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Maryland Code (2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-302(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Upon its independent review of the suppression ruling, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court that the police had violated Miranda and affirmed the suppression order. State v. Luckett, 188 Md.App. 399 , 981 A.2d 835 (2009).

We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. We now affirm that judgment. I. Respondent stands charged by indictment with two counts each of first-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He filed a motion to suppress three statements he had made to the police, only the ³⁶⁴ last of which is the subject of this appeal.

The four-day hearing on the suppression motion was followed by the Circuit Court’s issuance of a written opinion denying the motion as to the first and second statements and granting the motion with respect to the third statement. We adopt portions of the Court of Special Appeals’ recitation of the facts underlying the crimes, the suppression motion, and the Circuit Court’s decision: 1 On August 2, 2007, Tunja Luckett, Respondent’s wife, was found dead of a gunshot wound at the couple’s Fort Washington home. On that same day, John Scales was shot to death at his barbershop in Clinton. On August 3, charges were filed against Respondent, charging him with both murders.

Respondent himself, however, was not yet apprehended. On August 4, Prince George’s County Police Officer Stephen Fox responded to the Southern Avenue Metro Station, where Respondent had reportedly leaped backward from the Metro platform directly into the path of an oncoming train. Respondent was pulled from the tracks and rushed by helicopter to the Prince George’s County Hospital. Both legs were crushed and, in the course of two operations over the next two days, both of Respondent’s legs were amputated.

In his meticulously thorough 14-page Opinion of the Court, [the suppression hearing judge] began with a summary that made this bizarre string of events comprehensible. The state essentially alleges that Mr. Luckett believed that his wife was having an affair with his son’s football coach. Mr. Luckett is alleged to have killed his wife and after doing so, gone to the football coach’s place of business, a barber shop, and proceeded to kill the football coach on August 2, 2007. On August 4, 2007 having what can best be described as “shooter’s remorse,” Mr. Luckett ³⁶⁵ attempted to take his life in two ways.

First, he slit his wrists. Failing in that attempt, Mr. Luckett went to a Metro station a little after two in the afternoon and threw himself in front of a moving Metro train. The First Statement to Officer Fox When he first arrived at the hospital, Respondent spontaneously spoke to Officer Fox, who had accompanied him to the hospital from the Metro station. Respondent volunteered to Officer Fox that he had not meant to kill his wife but that he had meant to kill Scales, because he believed that Scales was having an affair with his (Respondent’s) wife.

Respondent referred to Scales as his “enemy” and said that he had wanted to kill Scales for eight and a half months. Respondent further stated that after he shot Scales, he threw the gun out of the car window. He also stated that after the shootings, he tried to slit his wrists because he did not want to go to jail. [The Circuit Court] ruled that Respondent’s statements to Officer Fox were totally spontaneous and were not in response to any interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, therefore, did not apply.

Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 520-22 , 974 A.2d 991 (2009). The judge ruled: There is no evidence that either officer interrogated or came close to interrogating Mr. Luckett in any way. These statements were volunteered by Mr. Luckett. “Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 . The correctness of that ruling is not before us on this appeal.

The Second Series of Statements to Detective Selway On the next day, August 5, Detective Brian Selway, of the Homicide Division, took over the duty of being posted as guard at Respondent’s hospital room. He came on duty at 7 A.M. Respondent awoke between 10:15 and 10:20 A.M. ³⁶⁶ and immediately started talking. [The] Opinion of Court again well summarized Detective Selway’s initial concern and his observations with respect thereto[:] Det. Selway was concerned with Mr. Luckett’s level of alertness and asked him questions such as who the President of the United States was and what the Detective’s first name was. Answering correctly, Det.

Selway observed Mr. Luckett to be alert and responsive. Mr. Luckett also answered questions of hospital personnel and was aware of his surroundings. Selway watched as Mr. Luckett joked with the hospital staff when they came into the room to monitor his medicines. Through the conversation Mr. Luckett revealed that he was aware an arrest warrant had been issued for him.

At 10:33 A.M. Detective Selway read Respondent his Miranda warnings from the small business card he carried in his wallet---- You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have him with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before a statement is taken, if you wish.

If you decide to give a statement, you still have the right to stop at any time so you may talk to a lawyer. Respondent waived those rights by saying, “I understand.” From then until 2:20 P.M., Detective Selway simply listened as Respondent talked. Respondent reaffirmed that he believed that his wife had been having an affair with their son’s football coach. He repeated his earlier statements to Officer Fox that he did not mean to kill his wife and that he threw the gun away after shooting Scales at the barbershop.

He also told Detective Selway that he kept a journal under the mattress in his bedroom, and he asked Detective Selway to retrieve it. At approximately 2:15 P.M. a District Court Commissioner arrived at Respondent’s intensive care room. Respondent, in Detective Selway’s presence, told the Commissioner, “I know what I did was ³⁶⁷ wrong.” Respondent then asked, “Is there any way I can get off the death penalty?” The Commissioner responded that she could not give legal advice. [The Circuit Court’s] primary concern with respect to those statements was whether Respondent was in a sufficiently lucid state 1) to make a free and voluntary confession and 2) to make a free and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. [The court] found that Respondent was lucid and rational and ruled that the motion to suppress those statements would, therefore, be denied[:] [T]he Court finds Detective Selway to be believable and places great weight on his testimony. Although Det.

Selway was initially concerned about Mr. Luckett’s state of mind, he concluded [that] Mr. Luckett was lucid after asking him non-interrogational questions. The Court finds that Mr. Luckett understood what he was saying and was not improperly coerced by Detective Selway into giving these statements. The Court concludes that the statements made to Detective Selway and the statement made in the presence of the Commissioner, Detective Selway and Detective Codero was made freely and voluntarily. The Third Statement to Detective Barba This appeal by the State is taken only from [the Circuit Court’s] decision to suppress a third statement, given by Respondent to Detective Matthew Barba on August 13, 2007.

Detective Barba briefly visited Respondent in his hospital room on August 8, identified himself as the lead investigator in the two homicides with which Respondent was charged, dropped off a business card, and said that he would be back on another day. Detective Barba returned on August 13 with audio/video equipment and a technician with the hope of conducting a videotaped interview with Respondent. Luckett, 188 Md.App. at 405-09 , 981 A.2d at 838-41 . The Circuit Court recited in its written opinion what happened next: ³⁶⁸ On August 13, 2007, at 12:35 p.m.

Detective Barba along with Michael Coatley, an audio technician, arrived at Mr. Luckett’s hospital room. After identifying himself Detective Barba stated that Mr. Luckett immediately engaged in conversation with him asking him if he had found the tapes. Detective Barba was unsure as to what Mr. Luckett was asking. Barba indicated that he would “help him out” but that he needed to get a waiver first.

Barba advised Luckett that he had certain rights. Mr. Luckett asked about his kids, his mother and grandmother. With equipment set up, at approximately 12:52 p.m. Detective Barba began reading Mr. Luckett his rights under Miranda v. Arizonal:] DETECTIVE BARBA: Like, like I said, I’m not here, I’m here to help.

MR. LUCKETT: Whatever you need. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. I’m going to explain everything to you okay, um, I’m Detective Barba, okay, I introduced myself last week.

I’m Detective Barba of the Prince George’s County Police Department, okay. MR. LUCKETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BARBA: I’m going to read you your rights for this particular interview— MR.

LUCKETT: Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA:—that we’re going to have, okay. MR. LUCKETT: Yes.

DETECTIVE BARBA: You do have rights. I’ll also explain that we have audio and video on right now, you do understand that? MR. LUCKETT: Yes.

DETECTIVE BARBA: Right? Okay. Now I’ll read everything just like were, just call [sic] like Miranda rights. Okay.

MR. LUCKETT: Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA: If you don’t understand anything that I’m saying to you, stop me. ³⁶⁹ MR. LUCKETT: Okay.

DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay, I have no problem with that all right. Now I’m going to read everything verbatim, okay. MR. LUCKETT: Yes.

DETECTIVE BARBA: And we’ll go from there. All right, this is an advice of rights and waivers form, right here okay. MR. LUCKETT:— DETECTIVE BARBA: I’m going to show it to you afterward.

You want to move your thing up a little bit? MR. LUCKETT: Yeah, let me see that. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay.

This is—rights and waivers form. MR. LUCKETT: I understand[.] DETECTIVE BARBA: For our Prince George’s County Police Department. Today’s date is August 13, 2007 and the time is 12:52, okay.

Um, I am now going to read you your rights under the law. If you do not understand something that I say to you, please stop me and I’ll explain them to you, okay? MR. LUCKETT: Yes.

DETECTIVE BARBA: You have the right to remain silent, if you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can be used against you in court. MR. LUCKETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay.

You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are asked any questions to have a lawyer present with you while you’re being questioned, that’s about this case specifically. MR. LUCKETT: Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA: Like I said, if we want to talk about the Redskins, you don’t need a lawyer for that because it does not concern—okay.

Uh, if you want a lawyer and cannot afford, uh, a lawyer will be provided with you at not [sic] cost, in a public defender, things ³⁷⁰ [sic]—or you can get a private attorney. If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer, you still have the right to stop answering questions at any given time. MR. LUCKETT: Okay.

DETECTIVE BARBA: Now, you understand that? Do you understand these rights? MR. LUCKETT: Yes.

DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay—that’s you understand just check yes and then initial if you understand those rights. MR. LUCKETT: Just check yes? DETECTIVE BARBA: If you understand the rights that I’m giving you.

MR. LUCKETT: Yeah. DETECTIVE BARBA: And then initial. Okay.

Have you been, uh, do you want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer present? And that could be the verbal one. We’re not [background noise] written, normally I would take a written one, part of it will be a verbal that would be us discussing the incident back and forth, do you want to do that[?] [Crosstalk] MR. LUCKETT: I’m sorry, if I say yes, we’re going to discuss the incident right?

DETECTIVE BARBA: Mm-hmm. MR. LUCKETT: Would I be setting myself up? MALE VOICE: Huh?

MR. LUCKETT: Would I set, would I be setting myself up? MALE VOICE: You— MR. LUCKETT: I mean I’m, I’m looking toward you for answer you know what I’m saying?

MALE VOICE: Now which is—would he be asking you.[ 2 ] ] ³⁷¹ DETECTIVE BARBA:— MR. LUCKETT:—we’re, we’re going to discuss the case— DETECTIVE BARBA: You— MR. LUCKETT:—without my lawyer. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay, if we discuss any matters outside of the case, you don’t need a lawyer present at all period, okay.

MR. LUCKETT: So— DETECTIVE BARBA: We can talk about anything but the case— MR. LUCKETT: So I won’t be hurting myself. DETECTIVE BARBA: If we talk about anything but the case, okay.

MR. LUCKETT: Mm—hmm. DETECTIVE BARBA: I’m just letting you know that you do have rights okay. MR.

LUCKETT: Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA: When we are discussing matters of the case, when I ask you something specifically— MR. LUCKETT: Mm—hmm. DETECTIVE BARBA:—or if you tell me something specifically, you have a right to have a lawyer present here, okay?

MR. LUCKETT: Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA: What you’re doing here is that you are giving up a right to having a lawyer present to tell me your side, okay. MR.

LUCKETT: Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA: You don’t have to do that, Okay. ³⁷² MR. LUCKETT: Right. DETECTIVE BARBA: But for me to be able to present your side— MR.

LUCKETT: Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA:—along with everything else that I’ll be presenting— MR. LUCKETT: Mm—hmm. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay, then that goes on my integrity.

MR. LUCKETT: All right, I know what you’re saying. DETECTIVE BARBA: I’m going to give the full version of what’s going on. MR.

LUCKETT: Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. Do you understand that? MR.

LUCKETT: Correct. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. So you understand that you do have rights. MR.

LUCKETT: Right. DETECTIVE BARBA: You don’t have to talk to me. MR. LUCKETT: Correct.

DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. Do you want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer present? MR. LUCKETT: Yes.

At the end of that discussion, Respondent gave a lengthy statement describing his belief that his wife had been having an affair with Mr. Scales, his activities during the months leading up to the murders, and the murders themselves. Respondent repeated his earlier statements to the police that he did not mean to kill his wife but he did intend to kill Mr. Scales. Respondent said that he knew what he had done was wrong, and he was willing to “accept my punishment and be accountable for my actions.” He stated that he hoped Detective Barba would not “throw the book at me.” ³⁷³ In its written opinion, the Circuit Court set forth Respondent’s arguments for why the videotaped statement to Detective Barba should be suppressed: Mr. Luckett’s counsel argues that Detective Barba’s advice is defective in two respects: 1. The five-word statement of “you don’t need a lawyer” is false and not a correct statement of the law. 2.

The offer to help in presenting the case, the promise to help and the promise to investigate are violation[s] of Hillard v. State, 141 Md.App. 199 , 784 A.2d 1134 (2001). The Circuit Court addressed the “you don’t need a lawyer” argument first: Detective Barba’s statement “you don’t need a lawyer” is not a correct recitation of the law and should never be spoken by any law enforcement officer to a person in custody under any circumstances. These words were related to Mr. Luckett two times in the videotape and according to Detective Barba, stated at least two other times. It appears from Detective Barba’s statement that he may have stated the same words before the tape was turned on as well.

Any statement that could possibly lead the defendant to misconstrue his rights under Miranda is contrary to the law requiring a knowing and voluntary waiver. The Circuit Court also noted that Detective Barba should have known that anything Respondent might say during interrogation could compromise his defense: By the ninth day of investigating this matter, Detective Barba, a seasoned Prince George’s County Officer, either knew or should have known that the defense would allege that Mr. Luckett was not criminally responsible for his actions, or that his sanity would be questioned. Any statement shedding light on his mental capacity or understanding, regardless of whether it was about this case or not, could be relevant and Mr. Luckett would have greatly benefited from a counsel. Mr. Luckett’s entire life was more or less in question at this time.

This was not simply a “domestic” case as the State believes. Much more was ³⁷⁴ riding on the questioning of Mr. Luckett at this stage of the investigation of “the case.” The Circuit Court ruled that the exchange between Detective Barba and Respondent, considered in its entirety, failed to convey to Respondent his right to have a lawyer present during the interrogation: “The Detective’s offer to help was not harmful by itself, but his statement, ‘you don’t need a lawyer,’ combined with the Detective’s other statement, without further explanatory statements from the Detective to Mr. Luckett make this advice of rights invalid.” Consequently, the court granted the motion to suppress the statement that Respondent gave to Detective Barba on August 13, 2007, on the basis that it was given in violation of Miranda . The Circuit Court did not decide Respondent’s allegation that Detective Barba’s “offer to help in presenting the case, the promise to help and the promise to investigate” was the product of one or more improper promises and thereby involuntary under Maryland’s common law. The court explained that there was no need to do so because “[t]he State has not asked that the Court make a determination of whether the statement was voluntary.” The State noted an appeal from the grant of Respondent’s motion to suppress the statement he gave to Detective Barba.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court, holding: “[Ujnder the totality of the circumstances, the unnecessarily lengthy and rambling discussion about the nature of the Miranda rights not only included specifically questionable statements of the law but utterly failed effectively to communicate the message mandated by Miranda.” Luckett, 188 Md.App. at 410 , 981 A.2d at 841 . We granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the following question: Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that Luckett’s August 13, 2007 statement must be suppressed where that holding: 1) expands the concept of “improper inducement” to include situations where the interrogator makes no offers or promises in exchange for a statement; 2) is based ³⁷⁵ upon a flatly incorrect interpretation of the record; and 3) erroneously concludes that Luckett did not knowingly waive his right to counsel[?] Upon our independent review of the facts developed at the suppression hearing, 3 we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals that Respondent’s statement to Detective Barba was obtained in violation of Miranda’s requirement that a suspect be properly advised of the right to counsel. We therefore need not address the State’s assertion that the Court of Special Appeals wrongly interpreted the record. We also need not address the State’s claim that the Court of Special Appeals wrongly “expand[ed] the concept of ‘improper inducement’ to include situations where the interrogator makes no offers or promises in exchange for a statement.” To the extent that the intermediate appellate court’s opinion can be construed as addressing the common law voluntariness of Respondent’s statement, it is dicta not necessary to the judgment affirming the Circuit Court’s order suppressing Respondent’s statement solely because it was obtained in violation of Miranda . 4 ³⁷⁶ II.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 659 (1964), provides in relevant part that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be ³⁷⁷ a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST, amend. V. “To give force to the Constitution’s protection against compelled self-incrimination, the Court established in Miranda ‘certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation.’ ” Florida v. Powell, — U.S.