State v. Matthews

State of Maryland v. Kirk Matthews, No. 15, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Biran, J. EXPERT WITNESSES – ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY – MARYLAND RULES 5-702 AND 5-403 – REVIEW FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony of the State’s photogrammetry expert witness. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to exclude the expert testimony, the expert opined that a person shown carrying a shotgun in an image captured by a video camera was approximately 5’8” plus or minus two-thirds of an inch. The expert acknowledged that she was unable to calculate the effect of certain variables on the degree of uncertainty of the height measurement.

The Court held that the unknown degree of uncertainty with respect to the expert’s conclusions went to the weight of her testimony, not its admissibility. The expert’s methodology was reliable and there was no analytical gap in her testimony. The trial court acted within its broad discretion in concluding that, despite the unknown degree of uncertainty in the height measurement, the expert’s testimony would assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in deciding a fact in issue in the case. Therefore, the expert testimony was admissible under Maryland Rule 5-702.

The Court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling with respect to Maryland Rule 5-403, concluding that the probative value of the expert testimony was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. C-02-CR-17-002275 Argued: November 1, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 15 September Term, 2021 STATE OF MARYLAND v. KIRK MATTHEWS *Getty, C.J. *McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Biran Wilner, Alan M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Biran, J. Watts, J., dissents.

Filed: June 22, 2022 *Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior Judges, participated in the hearing and Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials conference of this case while active members of Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. this Court; after being recalled pursuant to 2023-01-17 16:22-05:00 Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, they also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Gregory Hilton, Clerk In Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020), this Court adopted the analysis set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. Our decision in Rochkind generated substantial comment from the Maryland bar.1 It was unclear to some commentators how trial courts would interpret Rochkind and how, if at all, Rochkind would change the dynamics of litigation in Maryland.2 The case presently before us provides the first opportunity for us to address, post-Rochkind, whether a trial court erred in deciding the admissibility of expert testimony. Kirk Matthews, the Respondent here, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of murder and related charges in connection with the shooting deaths of Linda McKenzie and Leslie Smith in the early morning on June 1, 2017.

Evidence collected at the crime scene indicated that the shooter used a 12-gauge shotgun to kill McKenzie and Smith. Video footage obtained from a nearby home security camera showed a person carrying a shotgun a few minutes after the shootings. The suspect’s face was indiscernible in the video. Prior to Matthews being charged in the killings, the investigating police officers attempted to determine the height of the person shown in the video footage.

To that end, 1 See, e.g., Derek Stikeleather, It’s Official: Maryland Accepts Daubert as Controlling Law for Admitting Expert Testimony, Maryland Appellate Blog (Aug. 31, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/A342-NSSL; William Sinclair, Weird Science: Maryland’s New Test for the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, Maryland Business Litigation Lawyer Blog (Oct. 1, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/49A5-N9Z4. 2 See, e.g., Ronald V. Miller, Jr., Maryland Dumps Frye-Reed for Daubert: Rochkind v. Stevenson, Maryland Injury Lawyer Blog (Sept. 16, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/MA76-L6LB (posing the question whether the adoption of Daubert in Maryland is a “big deal”). they enlisted the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Using a technique known as “reverse projection photogrammetry,” FBI scientists determined that the person shown carrying the shotgun was approximately 5’8” tall, plus or minus two- thirds of an inch. However, the FBI scientists noted in the report detailing their analysis and findings that, due to several variables, “the degree of uncertainty in this measurement could be significantly greater.” Police measured Matthews’s height as approximately 5’9”. Prior to Matthews’s trial, his attorneys moved to preclude the State from introducing expert testimony from the FBI scientists who had conducted the reverse projection photogrammetry analysis.

The defense argued that, given the unknown degree of uncertainty that applied to the FBI’s height measurement, the jury should not be permitted to hear expert testimony concerning the FBI’s analysis. After holding a hearing on the defense’s motion, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the State would be permitted to introduce the challenged expert testimony. One of the FBI scientists testified at Matthews’s trial, consistent with her report, that the subject shown in the video was approximately 5’8” plus or minus two-thirds of an inch. The expert stated that she could not scientifically quantify several variables that might lead to a higher degree of uncertainty than plus or minus two-thirds of an inch.

However, she explained why she nevertheless believed that her height measurement was reasonably accurate. Defense counsel cross-examined the expert at length about the variables that could lead to the higher degree of uncertainty. The jury found Matthews guilty of two counts of second-degree murder and several related charges. Matthews appealed. 2 The Court of Special Appeals reversed Matthews’s conviction, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the expert testimony.

The intermediate appellate court reasoned that the inability of the expert witness to provide a margin of error that accounted for several potential variables rendered the height measurement unreliable and therefore inadmissible under Maryland Rule 5-702 and Rochkind. The State petitioned this Court for further review. As we explain more fully below, after Rochkind (as it was before Rochkind) it is the rare case in which a Maryland trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit or deny expert testimony will be overturned. This is not one of those cases.

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that Matthews’s convictions be reinstated. I Background A. The Double Homicide Early on June 1, 2017, police responded to the area of Scott Town Road in Shady Side, Maryland, based on a 911 call involving the sighting of a man armed with a shotgun and gunshots having been fired. The officers eventually discovered the bodies of Linda McKenzie and Leslie Smith in a dirt clearing off Scott Town Road. The cause of death for each victim was multiple shotgun wounds to the upper extremities, at close range.

Trails of blood leading from the road to the location of McKenzie’s and Smith’s bodies indicated that they had been shot on Scott Town Road and then dragged into the clearing. Ballistics 3 evidence indicated that the shooter used a 12-gauge shotgun, but the murder weapon was never recovered. McKenzie and Smith were romantic partners, but McKenzie was angry at Smith on the evening of May 31, 2017. McKenzie and Smith separately drove to Scott Town Road that night.

After Smith arrived at the dead-end area at the west end of Scott Town Road, McKenzie chased Smith back up Scott Town Road in a pickup truck, with Smith driving a white Saturn sedan in reverse. Shortly after the two vehicles passed the intersection of Scott Town Road and Nick Road, the car Smith was driving backed into a ditch and came to a stop on Scott Town Road near the intersection of Shady Side Road. That occurred at 11:08 p.m. At approximately 11:57 p.m., police arrived on the scene.

The car was removed from the ditch, and at 12:08 a.m. on June 1, Smith pushed the car down Scott Town Road along with a man named Joseph Tongue; they placed the car in the driveway of the home that belonged to Tongue’s grandmother on Scott Town Road just west of the intersection of Nick Road. The police then left the scene.3 After the car was removed, Smith and McKenzie remained in the vicinity of Scott Town Road. Smith and McKenzie were shot in quick succession on a stretch of Scott Town 3 Neither Smith, McKenzie, nor Tongue was in possession of a valid driver’s license when police arrived on the scene. For that reason, the officers did not allow any of them to operate the Saturn after it was removed from the ditch.

Thus, Smith and Tongue pushed the car down Scott Town Road to Tongue’s grandmother’s house, with someone (possibly McKenzie) at the wheel, steering. 4 Road that lies to the west of Nick Road shortly before 12:39 a.m. At trial, no witness testified to having seen the shootings.4 B. The Video Footage of the Suspect Having received a 911 call that included a report of shots being fired, police officers returned to Scott Town Road at approximately 12:43 a.m.; they subsequently discovered the bodies of McKenzie and Smith in a clearing off Scott Town Road to the west of Nick Road. Later in the morning on June 1, officers obtained video footage from two security cameras affixed to the home located at 1291 Scott Town Road, a short distance from where the shootings occurred. While those cameras did not record the shootings, they did capture relevant events before and after the shootings.

Before the shootings, the video footage showed McKenzie chasing Smith in their respective vehicles. Shortly after the shootings, the cameras captured several people quickly walking west on Scott Town Road, away from the scene of the crime, as well as a car backing down Scott Town Road, also away from the crime scene. A few minutes later, one of the cameras recorded an individual cutting across the front yard of 1291 Scott Town Road. The individual shown in that footage carried what appeared to be a shotgun.

The suspect’s facial features and race were completely indiscernible, due to the video being captured at night and the significant distance between the camera and the suspect. However, it was clear that the suspect was wearing a cap or some other kind of head covering. 4 However, as discussed below, multiple witnesses who were near the scene of the crime provided evidence, some of it conflicting, about what they saw and heard before and after the murders. Several of these witnesses had taken drugs or consumed a substantial amount of alcohol in the hours leading up to the killings. 5 C. The FBI’s Analysis of the Video Footage The Anne Arundel County Police Department (“AAPD”) sought to determine the height of the person pictured in the video carrying a shotgun. On June 23, 2017, a request to determine the height of the individual was submitted to the Forensic Audio, Video and Image Analysis Unit of the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory.

According to a December 5, 2017 report written by Kimberly A. Meline, a forensic scientist in that unit, the FBI received a DVD containing four videos and 13 still images. Meline wrote that “[t]he video files were processed for images best depicting the subject,” and “[o]ne image depicting the questioned individual was selected for photogrammetric analysis.” Meline reported that, after conducting a reverse projection photogrammetry analysis on site at 1291 Scott Town Road on November 28, 2017, “[t]he vertical distance from the ground to the top of the headwear of the questioned individual was determined to be approximately 5’8”, +/- .67”.” The report then provided a qualification: “However, due to the subject to camera distance, the resolution of the imagery, the unevenness of the landscape, and the body position of the subject, the degree of uncertainty in this measurement could be significantly greater.” D. The Pretrial Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony In the meantime, on September 29, 2017, a grand jury returned an indictment in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County charging Matthews with murder and related offenses. On August 3, 2018, Matthews filed a pretrial motion to exclude expert testimony regarding the FBI’s photogrammetric analysis. Matthews contended that exclusion of such 6 expert testimony was warranted, among other grounds, under Maryland Rules 5-7025 and 5-4036 and under the Frye-Reed7 standard for admissibility of expert testimony.

The State filed a response asserting that photogrammetry is a generally accepted methodology and that “concerns about the validity of the experts [sic] conclusions … should be presented to the jury through cross examination regarding the margin of error, environmental factors 5 Maryland Rule 5-702 provides: Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony. 6 Maryland Rule 5-403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 7 The Frye-Reed standard for admissibility of expert testimony applied in Maryland courts at the time of Matthews’s trial. “Frye” came from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), in which the D.C. Circuit announced a then-new evidentiary standard by which the admissibility of expert testimony involving a scientific principle or discovery turned on the “general acceptance” of such evidence “in the particular field in which it belongs.” “Reed” came from Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), in which this Court adopted the Frye standard for use in Maryland courts. After Reed, the rule in Maryland for the next 42 years was that, “before a scientific opinion will be received as evidence at trial, the basis of that opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the expert’s particular scientific field.” Id. at 381 . We decided Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020), abrogating the Frye-Reed standard, while Matthews’s appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals. 7 and degree of uncertainty in the measurement, as well as presentation of contrary expert testimony.” On September 21, 2018, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Matthews’s motion to preclude the expert testimony.

While Matthews did not dispute that photogrammetry was a generally accepted methodology, he challenged its application in his case. The State called Meline as a witness at the hearing. She was accepted as an expert in “photogrammetry and reverse projection photogrammetry.” Meline explained that “[p]hotogrammetry is just a very long word that means we’re trying to make measurements in photos.” She further testified that there are two basic forms of photogrammetry: (1) reverse projection photogrammetry, which requires going to the place where the questioned image was created and “duplicating the imaging conditions that captured the original scene in order to make a measurement”; and (2) analytical photogrammetry, which relies on software to make measurements based on the image itself, and does not require going to the scene. According to Meline, software-based photogrammetry is less accurate than reverse projection photogrammetry.

Meline testified that she analyzed the home surveillance video taken on the night of the homicides, which depicted a walking individual, to determine “which specific frame of the video would be most conducive for photogrammetric analysis” for height. Meline was able to identify “one image that would be within a reasonable margin of error in order to complete photogrammetric analysis.” That image became what Meline referred to as the “questioned image.” Meline then described how she and a colleague went to 1291 Scott 8 Town Road on November 28, 2017, and conducted the reverse projection photogrammetry analysis. First, Meline located and identified the camera that had captured the questioned image. Using that same camera to conduct the reverse projection photogrammetry analysis allowed Meline to “mimic any lens distortion that’s inherent to the image.” She then examined live footage “to ensure alignment of stationary items within both the foreground and the background of the image to make sure that that camera was still in the same position.” After confirming this alignment, she walked to the location where the suspect was pictured standing in the questioned image, placed a height chart at that spot, and then “completed overlays of [her]self in position as well as the subject in the image … to make sure that [they] were standing in the same location.” Meline explained that she then created an “overlay” of the questioned image and the height chart to measure the height of the individual in the image.

To indicate the height, she superimposed a yellow arrow “at the top of the headwear of the questioned individual and where it aligns on the height chart that was placed in the position the subject was standing.” The height thus indicated was 5’8.” Meline also took measurements to estimate “the uncertainty or the error” associated with her height estimate based on the resolution of the questioned image and the positional accuracy of the height chart. She explained that the image resolution affects how much the estimated height changes for every pixel by which her placement of the yellow arrow was mistaken, and here, one pixel represented 0.53 inches. She further explained that quantifying “positional accuracy” involves using planar geometry to calculate how much 9 the height would change, assuming a standard three-inch error in the placement of the height chart, and here, based on the distance from the camera to the ground (110”) and the distance of the subject from the camera (62’), a three-inch error in the placement of the height chart would alter the height by 0.133 inches. Based on those two calculations, Meline determined that the margin of error of her height measurement was plus or minus two-thirds of an inch.

Thus, Meline opined that the suspect’s height, as measured from the ground to the top of their headwear, was 5’8” plus or minus two-thirds of an inch. Meline also captured images of herself beside the height chart at the scene to provide an additional known height value. She explained that [t]he purpose of doing that is essentially as a double check of my measurement. And so when I’m standing in the location of the individual you can see that I’m attempting to mimic the position of both the feet as well as essentially how the person is standing so that I can double check the measurement that I calculate against my own known height and determine whether it appears to be reasonable based on those factors.

When asked what Meline was “able to determine in terms of … the subject’s height in comparison to [Meline’s] height,” Meline stated that “[t]he subject’s height appeared to be slightly shorter than my own height based on overlay of myself in that same scene against the questioned image.” Meline testified that, “depending on which footwear [she is] wearing,” her height is “between five-nine and a half and five-ten.” Meline opined that her estimate of the height of the subject was within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Meline further testified that she was never told Matthews’s height. 10 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Meline about the qualifying statement in her report that “the degree of uncertainty in this measurement could be significantly greater” based on several variables, including “the subject to camera distance, the resolution of the imagery, the unevenness of the landscape, and the body position of the subject.” Meline testified: “I don’t have a scientific way of quantifying how those dimensions had an effect on my measurement and consequently I wanted in an abundance of caution to mention them.”8 Defense counsel asked Meline, “you’re familiar with the 2009 report on forensics from the National Research Council” which “discussed a need for any scientific report to include clear characterizations on the limits of the analysis that was done; is that accurate?” Meline replied: “Certainly,” which is “why I included the calculable uncertainty as well as the incalculable uncertainty.” The following exchange then occurred: [Defense Counsel]: Okay, which means ultimately we don’t know how uncertain this result is? [Meline]: I would say that I have some indication based on the overlay of my own, myself in that similar position with the image of the questioned individual and knowing that the questioned individual appeared to be slightly shorter than I, myself, am that I have some indication as to the 8 Defense counsel also asked Meline about an email that Meline’s assistant, Jenna Walker, sent to an FBI special agent in September 2017, when authorities were considering whether to go forward with a reverse photogrammetric analysis to ascertain the suspect’s height. In the email, Walker stated that, based on the “subject to camera distance, resolution and adequate lighting to view the subject head-to-toe in an upright position,” as well as other factors, “[w]e have estimated that … you are looking at [an error rate] range of +/- close to 3”.” Meline noted in her testimony at the motions hearing that Walker provided this plus-or-minus three-inch figure before the reverse photogrammetric analysis was conducted and, therefore, it was “not based on any specific measurements done at the scene” and was “no more than an estimate.” 11 uncertainty with the method. However, there are factors in here that I cannot calculate. …. [Defense Counsel]: [A]s here where the conditions are far from pristine, [the] margin of error is going to become greater it stands to reason, right? [Meline]: It does.

Upon further questioning concerning the scientifically unquantifiable variables, Meline explained why – despite those variables – she considered her height measurement to be accurate within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. She stated that “the body position of the individual is the factor that [she was] most concerned about,” which is why she is “so careful when it comes to image selection and trying to … use an image that depicts the individual from head to toe in as upright of a position as possible.” In response to defense counsel’s question, “would you agree that how someone wears a head covering even if you knew what it was could impact the reported height of an individual?”, Meline stated, “I would, which is why when I report a measurement I report that measurement as a measured distance from the ground to the top of the headwear of the individual.” Defense counsel also asked, “Can you tell us exactly how you located where the bottom of the foot would be for that individual?” Meline replied, “[W]e indicated where the back of the heel was and then essentially worked from there on the left foot.” Matthews called two witnesses in support of his motion, including Robert Sanderson, who was accepted as an expert in photogrammetry. Sanderson disagreed with Meline’s opinion that the suspect’s height could be reliably estimated as 5’8” +/- .67”. With 12 respect to the body position of the subject, Sanderson did not seriously quarrel with Meline’s contention that the questioned image captured the subject in a position that was conducive to photogrammetric analysis, referring to the questioned image as “a correctly selected frame.” However, according to Sanderson, other factors made the questioned image unsuitable for analysis.

These included “whether or not you could see things in it, most notably the feet and the top of the headwear. The unevenness of the landscape which is a strong issue here, because when you don’t have the footwear and you can’t see where whatever footwear the person had on contacted the ground because of vegetation or unevenness, you have a variable there that is not really quantifiable.”9 The State recalled Meline as a rebuttal witness. With respect to foot placement, Meline testified: So what I did was I actually start by placing myself right on the height chart. And we saw that in the video that we showed earlier this morning.

So essentially what I do is I align my leg and my foot with what I can see in the video in order to show that the foot where all the weight of the individual was balanced is in the proper location. And then I actually do the same to the best of my ability with the right leg where you can see that the right leg was slightly forward as Mr. Sanderson testified, so that you could see the knee of the right leg. I make sure that both of those legs match up, and then based on the stature that I have … I place the height chart to within the center of gravity of the individual, again to make sure that it’s going to the best of my ability through the top of their head so that I can make an accurate measurement. 9 Matthews’s other witness at the hearing was a private investigator who described the area of Scott Town Road as “swampy” and the terrain of 1291 Scott Town Road as “uneven.” 13 The prosecutor then asked: “[I]n talking about foot placement and terrain, what’s the best way for you to see how the ground would affect that measurement?” Meline replied: “To go to the scene.” On cross-examination, Meline stated that, “with the exception of the possibility of changes in the terrain between June and November, I would say that my ability to stand where the individual was standing tells me what the terrain was like.” Defense counsel followed up: “So you wouldn’t be aware of what kind of minor changes in terrain there might have been within that time?” Meline responded, “No, ma’am.” Defense counsel asked Meline if “at the end of the day this is not an opinion that is offered with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty with respect to the 0.67-inch degree of uncertainty?” Meline replied: “The 0.67 as well as the five-foot-eight were both offered with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. However, I mentioned that the 0.67 does not incorporate all areas of potential uncertainty.” Meline acknowledged that she could not quantify the overall margin of error based on the variables that were not calculable.

On redirect examination, the prosecutor and Meline had the following exchange: [Prosecutor]: You cannot scientifically say a quantification, but you testified earlier that that means you cannot plug it into a mathematic formula, correct? [Meline]: That’s correct. [Prosecutor]: So you are able to say that you visually can indicate that your height was taller, slightly taller than the individual in the video; is that correct? [Meline]: That is correct. 14 After hearing counsel’s subsequent arguments, the trial court denied Matthews’s motion to exclude Meline’s testimony. Addressing the defense’s argument under Maryland Rule 5-403, the court stated that the “potential height of the individual in question is of value, and the information is probative.” The court continued: So the question in my mind is whether or not [the probative value] is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury…. [A]ll evidence is prejudicial, … [t]he question is whether or not it is … [u]nfairly prejudicial. [The evidence] does have … certainly a qualifier as [defense counsel] correctly points out. But it is right there, available to the jury, available for cross-examination, there is a conclusion that is reached. It is clear.

It is concise. It is not confusing. It was not particularly confusing to the Court to see it. When you look at the photos, and you look at the overlay, and you look at all the images, it – it’s something that is clear to your eye, and then is explained by an expert, and there are mathematical calculations, but in addition to that, as to the – the second sentence, if you will, of the opinion regarding the potential of uncertainty, that is clear as well, and it is particularly stated, and it is available to the Defense for cross-examination, and, quite candidly, I find it very easy to understand. … I do not find it unfairly [prejudicial].

I do not find that it confuses the issues, and nor do I find that it would be misleading to the finder of fact[.] Thus, the trial court declined to exclude Meline’s testimony under Rule 5-403. With respect to Rule 5-702, the trial court found that Meline was qualified as an expert based on knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in the relevant area. The court further found that Meline’s testimony about the use of reverse-photogrammetric analysis to calculate the height of the individual captured in the surveillance video was appropriate in Matthews’s case. Finally, the court found that “based on all of the information presented, … there is a sufficient factual basis for her to testify, to support her testimony, as to the opinion that she indicated that she would express.” Thus, the trial court 15 denied Matthews’s motion and ruled that the State would be permitted to introduce Meline’s expert testimony concerning reverse projection photogrammetry and her height measurement of the person shown in the questioned image.

The prosecutor confirmed with the trial court that Meline would be permitted to “say that visually I am 5’10”, I was on the video, and the person visually … was shorter than she was, in that position.” E. The Trial Matthews’s jury trial began on October 16, 2018. In her opening statement, the prosecutor explained that locals call Scott Town Road the “Lane.” They refer to the dead- end section of the Lane (at its western end point) as “Down Bottom” and the section closer to the intersection with Nick Road as “Up Top.” The police know the intersection of Scott Town Road and Nick Road to be an “open-air drug market.” Indeed, earlier in the day on May 31, 2017, police had installed a pole camera near that intersection as part of an effort to investigate illegal drug sales. The State introduced footage recorded by the pole camera between 11:00 p.m. on May 31 and 2:00 a.m. on June 1, which captured events occurring in the section of Scott Town Road immediately to the east of Nick Road. The State also introduced video footage from that same three-hour period that was taken from the cameras located at 1291 Scott Town Road, including the footage of the suspect cutting through the front yard of the property at approximately 12:43 a.m. while carrying what appeared to be a shotgun.

The murders occurred in the area between the pole camera and 1291 Scott Town Road, and were not captured on any of the cameras. 16 The State called several witnesses who were blood relations or long-time friends or acquaintances of Matthews. Some of these witnesses testified that they consumed drugs and/or alcohol on the night of May 31 and into the early morning of June 1. Several were uncooperative on the witness stand and were effectively impeached by defense counsel. Still, they provided testimony that was damaging to Matthews.

For example, Richard Jackson, who had known Matthews for “20 years or so,” testified that after Smith’s car backed into the ditch, he saw McKenzie and Smith arguing before police arrived. According to Richard Jackson, at that time Matthews “was trying to have them, you know, quiet down because they were being super loud.” Smith was “running his mouth,” and Matthews said, “that’s all right, I got something for your ass or something along those lines.” Matthews then walked away. After the car was removed from the ditch and the police left the scene, Richard Jackson saw Matthews “walking down the road with a shotgun.” At that time, Matthews was on Nick Road approaching Scott Town Road, where McKenzie and Smith were. While Richard Jackson was on the stand, the State showed him the video footage taken from one of the cameras at 1291 Scott Town Road and, in particular, the footage of the man carrying what appeared to be a shotgun.

Richard Jackson testified that the person shown in that footage looked like Matthews. 10 10 On cross-examination, Richard Jackson admitted to being a drug addict and to buying (and most likely using) crack cocaine on the night of May 31. He also confirmed that, prior to trial, while he told the detectives about hearing Matthews say, “I’ve got something for you,” he only mentioned seeing Matthews with a shotgun earlier in the evening (approximately 40 minutes prior to the car going into the ditch). 17 Joseph Tongue – the person who helped Smith push the Saturn down Scott Town Road – testified that he is Matthews’s cousin. According to Tongue, after the car went into the ditch, Tongue heard McKenzie and Smith “screaming,” “fussing,” and “arguing.” Tongue told them that they needed to get their car out of the ditch before police arrived, but “the police showed up.” After the car was removed from the ditch and had been pushed down the road, McKenzie and Smith continued to argue in front of Tongue’s grandmother’s house. Tongue saw Matthews coming, and knew that Matthews “was mad.” Tongue told McKenzie and Smith to leave.

As Matthews, McKenzie, and Smith were arguing, Tongue “started walking off” and then “heard a gunshot” followed by “another gunshot.” When he looked back, he saw “Kirk [Matthews] and Linda and them,” and Matthews was holding what “[l]ooked like a gun,” “a large gun.” The prosecutor asked, “[W]hen’s the first time you saw him with a shotgun?” Tongue replied, “When he was coming around the corner.” The prosecutor asked, “[D]id you see anybody other than Kirk Matthews with a gun?” Tongue replied, “Nah.” The prosecutor asked what, if anything, Tongue heard Smith say to Matthews. Tongue replied, “You not going to shoot nobody.”11 Charles Jackson testified that he has known Matthews for about 10 years. He stated that he lives less than a mile from the Lane and went there to buy drugs. On May 31, 2017, Charles Jackson arrived at the Lane around 10:30 or 11:00 p.m., and was “Down Bottom” 11 On cross-examination, Tongue stated that he consumed alcohol and drugs on the night of the killings, including PCP, Xanax, and a pint of vodka.

He testified that he had smoked PCP every day for ten years. 18 with several others – including Matthews – when McKenzie came “speeding down there, cussing about looking for her car.” According to Charles Jackson, Matthews told McKenzie: “You’re making the lane hot. Take that shit up out of here.” Charles Jackson was also present when Smith arrived and subsequently backed the car into the ditch. After watching the video footage taken in front of 1291 Scott Town Road, Charles Jackson testified that the person shown carrying a gun “looks like” Matthews. Rico Hicks testified that Matthews is a “good friend of the family.” Rico Hicks also testified that he was on the Lane on the night of the shooting and “heard gunshots,” however, he never saw anyone with a gun and never saw who was shot.

Rico Hicks’s testimony was impeached through the testimony of Edward Hicks – his relative12 – who testified that in the days following the shooting, Rico Hicks “told me that he seen Kirk [Matthews] shoot the – two people and then just dragged them off the road” and that “it was the worst thing he ever saw.” Crime Scene Technician Katie Ladue testified that four shotgun shells were recovered at the scene of the crime and “it did appear that [the victims] had been dragged out of the road because there was blood that trailed from an original location where there was blood pooling off to the location of the dirt area where they were found.” The State introduced crime scene photographs showing the blood trails leading from the middle of Scott Town Road to the victims’ bodies in the nearby dirt clearing. 12 Rico Hicks testified that Edward Hicks is his “uncle,” while Edward Hicks testified that Rico Hicks is his “cousin.” 19 On October 23, 2018, the fifth day of the State’s case-in-chief, the State called Steven Marchant as a witness. Marchant was a crime scene technician for AAPD in June 2017. Marchant testified that, on June 3, 2017, he executed a search warrant to obtain, among other things, Matthews’s height. According to Marchant, he “used the tape measure that we have in the van, and I ran it straight up behind the subject and then took a photograph of it.” The State introduced a copy of that photograph, which reflected that Matthews’s height was measured to be approximately 5’9”.

Later on October 23, 2018, AAPD Detective Jason DiPietro testified that he witnessed Marchant measure Matthews’s height, that “the tape was to the ground,” and that Matthews was measured at approximately 5’9” in height. The State then called Meline as an expert witness in the areas of photogrammetry and reverse projection photogrammetry. Meline testified in keeping with her testimony at the motions hearing regarding the reverse-projection photogrammetry analysis that she performed on site at 1291 Scott Town Road. Meline opined, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that the person shown in the video footage carrying what appeared to be a shotgun was 5’8” plus or minus two-thirds of an inch.

Meline also explained on direct examination that several other factors, including the unevenness of the ground and the distance of the camera from the subject, could add to the degree of uncertainty in a way she could not calculate. Defense counsel cross-examined Meline at length concerning these variables and other points. Among other things, Meline acknowledged that she could not tell what kind of head covering the subject was wearing or if the subject was wearing it high on the head or pulled down tight to the scalp. In addition, Meline conceded that she 20 could not determine what kind of shoes the person was wearing and if they contained a heel of any height.

However, Meline took issue with defense counsel’s suggestion that it was difficult to see the subject’s feet; according to Meline, “[W]e believe that we could see one foot very firmly of the individual.” And, while she again acknowledged that there were “additional considerations that may have affected uncertainty that can’t be calculated,” Meline maintained that she “still was comfortable with” her opinion that the subject’s height was 5’8” plus or minus two-thirds of an inch. After the State rested its case, the defense called several witnesses,13 including Katherine Bragg. Bragg testified that she moved to Shady Side with her husband and children in November 2016. She and her family lived at 5218 Nick Road.

Bragg testified that, on the evening of May 31, 2017, she sat outside her house and drank four or five White Russian cocktails while she waited for her husband to return home from work. At one point, she heard what sounded like a car getting stuck. Subsequently, she saw a white woman wearing “short, short shorts” walk past her house approaching Scott Town Road.14 Soon afterwards, Bragg saw a white man wearing a gray t-shirt come from the same direction as the white woman.15 After the man passed Bragg’s house, Bragg heard arguing between male and female voices. Approximately 10 minutes after that, Bragg saw a second 13 Although the defense had called Robert Sanderson as an expert witness in photogrammetry at the hearing on Matthews’s pretrial motion, the defense did not call Sanderson at trial. 14 McKenzie was wearing “short shorts” on the night of May 31-June 1, 2017. 15 Smith wore a dark gray t-shirt that night. 21 white man wearing a gray sweatshirt and jeans walk past her house in the same direction that the two prior white individuals (presumably McKenzie and Smith) had proceeded.

According to Bragg, this second white man was “thin,” “younger,” and “tall” (at least 5’11”) with blonde hair. Bragg testified that this man was carrying a shotgun, and that he “cocked” the shotgun in front of her driveway. Bragg’s husband then called 911 to report an armed man. While Bragg’s husband was making the 911 call, Bragg and her husband heard gunshots, which Bragg’s husband then reported to the 911 operator.

It was this 911 call that led police to return to the area of Scott Town Road at approximately 12:43 a.m. Bragg’s testimony was important to the defense because not only is Matthews shorter than the man Bragg described having seen with a shotgun16; Matthews is African American, whereas Bragg described seeing a white man with blonde hair carry and “cock” a shotgun in front of her house. In addition, at 56 years old in June 2017 and 240 pounds (according to his driver’s license issued in July 2016), Matthews is not someone most people would describe as “younger” or “thin.” After the defense rested, the trial court instructed the jury17 and the parties presented closing arguments. With respect to Meline’s testimony, defense counsel stated: 16 As stated above, AAPD personnel measured Matthews at approximately 5’9” on June 3, 2017.

Matthews’s driver’s license lists him at 5’6”. The record does not reflect whether Matthews was wearing shoes at the time AAPD measured his height and, if so, the heel size of his shoes. 17 Pertinent here, the trial court instructed the jurors, among other things, that “[y]ou should consider an expert’s testimony together with all the other evidence,” and “[y]ou should give expert testimony the weight and value you believe it should have. You are not required to accept an expert’s testimony even if it is uncontradicted. As with any other witness, you may believe all, part or none of the testimony of an expert.” 22 I’m not going to say a lot about it because I think it’s very simple.

Not what [Meline] does, I think she’s smart. I think she does it well. I think it’s a great tool. But at the end of the day what she is telling you is nothing. ….

That’s her expert opinion, but however – however, due to the … distance, the resolution of the imagery, the quality, the unevenness of the landscape, which you’ll see pictures of – it’s ditches and bumpy and grassy – the body position because no one’s a hundred percent sure what that is, the degree of uncertainty – that two-thirds one way or the other – could be significantly greater and that’s not a quantifiable number. Well, an inch, five inches? So what does that tell you? He might be five-eight based on what I know, but there’s a lot of stuff I don’t know which could significantly change that.

So what it’s telling you is nothing…. As smart as Ms. Meline is, and she certainly is, she didn’t add anything. So why is she here? To bolster a case that has no physical or forensic evidence.

To make it look like what, “We did this and she’s from the FBI and she’s really smart.” And she’s going to say all these things and it sounds important, but at the end of the day it’s telling you nothing forensically. On October 26, 2018, the jury found Matthews guilty of two counts of second- degree murder, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and related charges. The trial court subsequently sentenced Matthews to an aggregate sentence of 110 years of imprisonment, with all but 80 years suspended. Matthews appealed his convictions.

F. Appeal The Court of Special Appeals reversed Matthews’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Meline’s expert testimony. Matthews v. State, 249 Md. App. 509 (2021). In so holding, the intermediate 23 appellate court concluded that there was an “analytical gap” between the underlying data and the opinion: Ms. Meline concluded that the person in the video was 5’8” with a “calculable uncertainty” of 0.67 inches, which would seem to eliminate a taller white man as the shooter. But without shrinking from her estimate, she undermined her calculation by acknowledging that there was no scientific way to calculate the actual uncertainty, and that the margin of error could be significantly greater due to the “far from pristine” circumstances of this case…. [She] admitted that she was unable to see the individual’s feet, that the individual was wearing a head covering, and that there was “concern” about the subject not being at “full height” in the video she was measuring.

Under these circumstances, the missing input variables that had not been considered in the seemingly precise height calculation prevented a reliably accurate height calculation. Put another way, the analytical gap between the data available for reverse photogrammetry projections and the conclusion Ms. Meline offered to the jury remained unbridged. Although Mr. Matthews was able to challenge [Meline’s] conclusions by cross-examining her about the missing pieces, it should not have fallen to the jury to work through the science on its own. Id. at 543-44 .

Having ruled in Matthews’s favor under Maryland Rule 5-702, the Court of Special Appeals did not need to consider his alternative argument under Rule 5-403. However, the Court stated that “the unreliability of the height estimate resulting from this expert testimony raises serious doubt about whether the probativity of allowing it in outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice, especially where the video itself was unilluminating and the remaining testimony so equivocal.” Id. at 544 . The State filed a petition for certiorari in this Court, seeking review of the following question: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err by holding that an expert witness created an ‘analytical gap,’ and thus rendered her testimony inadmissible as a matter of law, by 24 acknowledging the limitations of her scientific methodology?” On June 22, 2021, we granted the State’s petition. State v. Matthews, 474 Md. 719 (2021).18 II Standard of Review Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision concerning the admissibility of expert testimony under Maryland Rule 5-702 for abuse of discretion.

See Rochkind, 471 Md. at 10 . Under this standard, an appellate court does “not reverse simply because the … court would not have made the same ruling.” Devincentz v. State, 460 Md. 518, 550 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Rather, the trial court’s decision must be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 563 (2018) (“An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit court.”); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 295-96 (2003) (“Abuse occurs when a trial judge exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when he or she acts beyond the letter or reason of the law.”). We also review a trial court’s ruling concerning admissibility of evidence under Maryland Rule 5-403 for abuse of discretion.

Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 673-74 (2020). 18 In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected two arguments Matthews had raised regarding other evidentiary issues. Matthews did not cross-petition this Court to review those portions of the Court of Special Appeals opinion, and as such, they are not before us. 25 III Discussion In the pre-Rochkind era, this Court frequently observed that “the admissibility of expert testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court, and its action in admitting or excluding such testimony will seldom constitute a ground for reversal.” Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 38-39 (2015) (quoting Bryant v. State, 393 Md. 196, 203 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 359 (2006); Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 659 (1992); Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 576 (1992); Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 515 (1985); Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 350 (1984). In Rochkind, even as we abrogated the Frye-Reed standard in favor of Daubert, we reiterated that a trial court’s ruling to admit or to exclude expert witness testimony “will seldom constitute a ground for reversal.” Rochkind, 471 Md. at 10 (quoting Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. at 38-39 ). We reaffirm today that, in this respect, Rochkind did not change the law in Maryland.

Post-Rochkind, it is still the rare case in which a Maryland trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit or deny expert testimony will be overturned. As we explain below, the trial court in this case did not abuse its broad discretion in admitting Meline’s expert testimony. 26 A. The Trial Court’s Ruling Under Maryland Rule 5-702 We begin our analysis of the trial court’s exercise of discretion under Maryland Rule 5-702 by reviewing the governing law. To set the stage, we discuss the evolution of federal law concerning the admissibility of expert testimony involving scientific matters. 1. The Supreme Court’s Daubert Trilogy19 For 70 years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert in 1993, the Frye “general acceptance” test was the dominant standard that courts used to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.

As noted above, this Court adopted the Frye test as the law in Maryland in Reed v. State in 1978. In Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 superseded the Frye test. At the time, Federal Rule 702 provided: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” In Daubert, the Court explained that the inquiry into admissibility of evidence under Rule 702 is “a flexible one,” and its focus “must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 . To that end, the Court interpreted Rule 702 to require a determination whether the scientific testimony at issue is “not only relevant, but reliable.” Id. at 589 .

With respect to this reliability assessment, the Court 19 See Rochkind, 471 Md. at 14 n.5 (noting that courts have referred to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), as the “Daubert Trilogy”). 27 provided a non-exclusive list of factors for federal trial courts to consider: (1) “whether a theory or technique ... can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error”; (4) “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation”; and (5) incorporating the Frye test, whether the theory or technique is “general[ly] accepted” within the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94. The Daubert analysis, according to the Court, was more flexible than the “uncompromising ‘general acceptance’ test,” id. at 596, and gave trial courts “greater discretion to admit scientific expert testimony that is relevant and founded on sound principles, even though novel or controversial.” Rochkind, 471 Md. at 14 . In 1997, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court first articulated the concept of an “analytical gap” in considering the admissibility of expert testimony.

Joiner was an electrician who developed small-cell lung cancer. Id. at 139 . During his employment, he had been exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and products derived from PCBs, which were manufactured by the defendants. Id. at 139-40 .

The plaintiff’s experts opined during their depositions that PCBs and the derivative products at issue promote cancer. Id. at 140 . They further opined that Joiner’s exposure to PCBs and their derivatives was likely responsible for Joiner’s cancer. Id.

The trial court precluded the plaintiff’s experts from testifying at trial, concluding that they had not established a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s exercise of discretion. The Court explained that none of the epidemiological studies upon which the experts relied provided a causal link between PCBs 28 and lung cancer.

Id. at 145-46 . The Court stated that “nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. at 146 . In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999), the Supreme Court extended applicability of the Daubert test to other kinds of non-scientific knowledge, including to “testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.” The Court also explained that “whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.” Id. at 153 . 2.

Maryland Rule 5-702 This Court adopted Maryland Rule 5-702 in 1994, soon after the Supreme Court decided Daubert. The Rule provides: Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and 29 (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony. Md. Rule 5-702.

Whether the third prong’s requirement of “a sufficient factual basis” has been met requires analysis of two subfactors: (1) an adequate supply of data; and (2) a reliable methodology. Rochkind, 471 Md. at 22 . Absent either of these factors, an expert opinion is “mere speculation or conjecture.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The proponent of challenged expert testimony must establish the three prongs of Rule 5-702 (including the two subfactors that make up a “sufficient factual basis”) by a preponderance of the evidence. See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 92 (2004) (explaining that the trial court generally applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making admissibility determinations); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10 (“These matters should be established by a preponderance of proof.”). 3. The Rochkind Decision In Rochkind, we abrogated the Frye-Reed general acceptance test and adopted Daubert. In so doing, we explained that “[a]dopting Daubert eliminates the duplicative analysis” that courts previously were required to undertake and instead “permits trial courts to evaluate all expert testimony – scientific or otherwise – under Rule 5-702.” Rochkind, 471 Md. at 35 (emphasis in original).

Thus, after Rochkind, Rule 5-702 is the touchstone when determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Rochkind held that, in conducting its analysis under Rule 5-702, a trial court should consider a number of factors in determining whether the proffered expert testimony is 30 sufficiently reliable to be provided to the trier of fact. Several of those factors came from Daubert itself: (1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether a theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether a particular scientific technique has a known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether a theory or technique is generally accepted. Id.

(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 ; Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee Note). We also favorably cited additional factors that other courts had applied in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable. These factors include: (6) whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying; (7) whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion; (8) whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations; (9) whether the expert is being as careful as he [or she] would be in his [or her] regular professional work outside his [or her] paid litigation consulting; and (10) whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give. Id. at 35-36 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee Note).

Having provided this non-exclusive list of factors for trial courts to consider as part of the reliability analysis inherent in Rule 5-702, we added several overarching observations. First, we noted that the reliability inquiry is “a flexible one.” Id. at 36 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 ). Second, the trial court must focus “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 31 U.S. at 595) (internal quotation marks omitted).

However, “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.” Id. (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a] trial court … must consider the relationship between the methodology applied and conclusion reached.” Id. Third, a trial court need not “admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert”; rather, “[a] court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id.

(quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).20 Fourth, “all of the Daubert factors are relevant to determining the reliability of expert testimony, yet no single factor is dispositive in the analysis. A trial court may apply some, all, or none of the factors depending on the particular expert testimony at issue.” Id. at 37. Finally, Rochkind did “not upend [the] trial court’s gatekeeping function. ‘Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 20 Even before we decided Rochkind, this Court had recognized and applied the concept of an “analytical gap” that the Supreme Court discussed in Joiner. See Rochkind, 471 Md. at 17 .

In Blackwell v. Wyeth, we stated that generally accepted methodology “must be coupled with generally accepted analysis in order to avoid the pitfalls of an ‘analytical gap.’” Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 608 (2009). We subsequently discussed the “analytical gap” concept in Chesson v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Company, stating that although “[g]eneral acceptance does not equate to unanimity of opinion within a scientific community ... [a] trial judge … cannot admit expert testimony based on scientific methodology without consideration of whether the analysis itself is flawed and posits an ‘analytical gap.’” Chesson v. Montgomery Mut.

Ins. Co., 434 Md. 346, 356-57 (2013) (quoting Blackwell, 408 Md. at 608 ). In Savage v. State, we held that the expert witness at issue in that case did not “connect the dots” between the empirical observations and his ultimate conclusions, and concluded that the existence of an analytical gap undermined the validity of the expert witness’s testimony. Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 158, 170-71 (2017) (discussing how the expert’s “analysis did not bridge the ‘analytical gap’ between the data available