Maryland case law › State v. Mayor of Baltimore

State v. Mayor of Baltimore

296 Md. 67 (1983) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedEldridge✓ Good law
HoldingThe State and the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Baltimore sued Baltimore City under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, seeking a declaration that the City is liable for unpaid criminal court costs incurred when an accused is acquitted or otherwise favorably disposed of, and…

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this case.to determine whether Baltimore City is liable for unpaid criminal court costs incurred when an accused has been relieved of the obligation to pay the costs because of his indigency or because of a disposition of criminal proceedings in his favor. In 1973 and 1974, Baltimore City (the City), without objection, paid to the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Baltimore (now the Circuit Court for Baltimore City) 1 69 approximately $152,000 for criminal court costs 2 incurred between July 1,1972, and July 1,1973. As a result of a 1974 audit by the Legislative Auditor which criticized his billing practices, the Clerk submitted to the City bills for criminal court costs for fiscal year 1974 totaling $154,266.

Following an opinion by the Baltimore City Solicitor, the City refused ’ o pay the bills for the fiscal year 1974 criminal court costs. In response the State Comptroller rendered an opinion stating his view that the City was liable for all of the billed criminal court costs, and the Comptroller then withheld $119,490 owed to the City by the State in connection with other matters. Subsequently, the Maryland Attorney General also issued an opinion on the question of liability for these costs. See 60 Op.

Att’y Gen. 63 (1975). From 1974 until the present time, the City has continued to dispute responsibility for over $2 million in criminal court costs billed to it by the Clerk. In December 1979, the State and the Clerk filed this action in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, 3 pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 4 in which they sought a declaration of City liability for the criminal court costs and an order to require the City to pay these costs. The City denied liability and prayed for an order requiring the State to pay the $119,490 withheld by the State Comptroller.

In a stipulation of facts the State admitted its obligation to pay the $119,490 withheld by the Comptroller. The trial court, in February 1982, issued a memorandum opinion and a declaratory judgment. The court declared that 70 the City was not liable for the payment of criminal court costs incurred from July 1,1973, to the time of the judgment, and it ordered the State to pay to the City the $119,490 withheld by the Comptroller. The State and the Clerk took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

Prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals, the State and the Clerk filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. I Preliminarily, it would be useful to review the historical development of liability for the payment of criminal court costs. First we shall discuss liability for the costs when the criminal charges are disposed of favorably to the accused. Then we shall discuss liability when an accused is convicted but unable to pay for the costs of the proceedings.

A. By Ch. 11 of the Acts of 1781, the Maryland General Assembly required the counties to pay the State for the costs and fees of criminal proceedings in their respective county courts if an accused was acquitted, or if the charges were otherwise disposed of in his favor, or if he was convicted and fined an amount not exceeding one shilling. 5 In the preamble to this statute, the Legislature deemed it "unjust and oppressive” to require an accused to pay for the costs of the proceedings under the circumstances specified. 6 71 Although the "one shilling” standard has been changed to fifteen cents, and the references to the "county courts” and the "general court” have been deleted, the 1781 statute has remained substantially unchanged since its enactment. Presently codified in Maryland Code (1957,1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 38, § 4A, 7 the statute now provides: "§ 4A. Party acquitted not liable for costs; exception as to Baltimore City.

No person who may be prosecuted for any misdemeanor or offense and discharged by the court on submission, or fined not exceeding fifteen cents, or prosecuted for any crime and acquitted on trial by jury, shall be burdened with the payment of any costs or fees accruing on such prosecution, but all such costs and fees, with the legal costs of the party accused, shall be paid by the county; and no person taken upon any warrant or capias on presentment where no bill of indictment is found shall be liable to pay or give security for costs, but such costs shall be paid by the county. The mayor and city council of Baltimore shall not, however, be liable in any such cases tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore 72 City for the appearance fees allowed by law to the attorney for the traverser.” 8 The above-quoted statute has been discussed by this Court on only a few occasions. In Schamel v. Washington County, 83 Md. 128, 130 , 34 A. 839 (1896), this Court stated that the statute required "that the County Commissioners [of Washington County] must pay all witnesses before justices of the peace ... summoned on behalf of the defendant where the defendant has been discharged, or punished only by a fine of fifteen cents, or acquitted....” Baltimore City’s statutory liability for costs when defendants were acquitted, when the charges were otherwise disposed of in their favor, and when the defendants were fined less than fifteen cents, was again recognized by this Court in M. & C. C. of Balto. v. Pattison, 136 Md. 64, 66 , 110 A. 106 (1920). There the Court pointed out that the City had conceded liability following the clerk’s institution of a claim for the costs, and the Court indicated that this concession was required by what is now Art. 38, § 4A.

B. In addition to liability for costs and fees when criminal proceedings are disposed of in favor of the accused, the City and the counties have been held liable to the State for criminal court costs and fees when a defendant is convicted but indigent and thus unable to pay the costs and fees in criminal proceedings. 73 At issue in M. & C.C. of Balto. v. Pattison, supra, was the obligation of the City to the State for costs and fees when indigent defendants are convicted. With respect to these costs, the City was not obligated by statute to reimburse the State. Nevertheless, the Court held that the City was liable for the costs and fees of the proceedings when indigent defendants were convicted, stating (M. & C.C. of Balto. v. Pattison, supra, 136 Md. at 68 ): "[T]he right of the clerk to collect from Baltimore City and the counties, respectively, accounts like the present one for fees in criminal cases, has been so long and so universally recognized and acted upon as to become a part of the common-law of the State.” By Ch. 576 of the Acts of 1924, the General Assembly attempted, inter alia, to change the common law rule recognized in Pattison , although only for Baltimore City. This Court in Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639 , 128 A. 759 (1925), held Ch. 576 unconstitutional in its entirety because the method used violated Art. Ill, § 52, of the Maryland Constitution.

The Court made it clear, however, that the holding in Pattison could be changed by a properly drawn statute. 147 Md. at 648 . Nevertheless, the General Assembly has not directly addressed the matter since the O’Conor case. II We shall now turn to the grounds relied upon by the trial court and the City for the position that the City is not liable for any of the criminal court costs billed by the Clerk. A. First, the trial court held that Code (1957), Art. 36, § 12(d)(2), later transferred to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Code by Ch. 684 of the Acts of 1974, and currently codified as § 7-202 (b) of the Courts and 74 Judicial Proceedings Article (1974, 1980 Repl.

Vol.), governed this dispute and exempted the City from liability for payment of both types of criminal court costs in question. Subsection (b) of § 7-202 states that a county or Baltimore City is exempt from the fees provided "by this subtitle” unless the county or Baltimore City consents. Section 7-202 provides as follows: "§ 7-202. Court fees.

(a) Determination by State Court Administrator; uniformity; collection by clerks. — The State Court Administrator, shall determine the amount of all court costs and charges for the circuit courts of the counties and the courts of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City with the approval of the Board of Public Works. The fees and charges shall be uniform throughout the State. The Comptroller of the State shall require clerks of court to collect all fees required to be collected by law. (b) Officials exempt from fees. — The clerk may not charge any county or Baltimore City any fees provided by this subtitle, unless the county or Baltimore City first gives its consent.

(c) Fees for other services. — The clerk is entitled to a reasonable fee for performing any other service that is not enumerated in this subtitle or in §§ 3-501 through 3-503 of the Real Property Article of the Code. (d) Parties aggrieved by fee. — If a party in a proceeding feels aggrieved by any fee permitted under this subtitle or by §§ 3-501 through 3-503 of the Real Property Article of the Code, he may request a judge of that circuit court to determine the reasonableness of the fee.” In our view, however, subsection (b) applies only when the City or counties are parties to proceedings. 75 Subsection (b) exempts the City and the counties only from a "fee provided by this subtitle,” and the subtitle obviously is referring just to fees paid by parties to the proceedings. Section 7-201, the first section in the subtitle, states generally that no case may be docketed "unless the plaintiff or appellant pays the required fee.” Section 7-202 (d) specifically refers to "parties” and "party.” Furthermore, the fees referred to in this statute are for "services” provided to litigants, including the City and counties, by the state judicial machinery. § 7-202 (c). When what is now § 7-202 (b) was first enacted in 1943, the Legislature clearly expressed the intent that it apply only when the subdivisions themselves were provided a service.

Ch. 984 of the Acts of 1943

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