State v. McMannis

MOYLAN, Judge. The single issue presented by this application for leave to appeal by the State of Maryland is that of when is a criminal conviction and the consequences of it so final as to render any attack upon it by way of post conviction petition moot. The appellee, Richard Ray McMannis, was convicted upon a plea of guilty in the Circuit Court for Allegany County in 1970 of breaking and entering. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment, served the entire sentence, and was released.

The appellee was subsequently convicted of two other felonies, the details of which convictions are not here pertinent. Ultimately, the appellee was tried and convicted in West Virginia under that state’s Habitual Offender Statute. Because he had the prior felony convictions, including the 1970 conviction in Allegany County, on his record, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, which sentence is currently being served in the West Virginia Penitentiary. On April 5, 1984, the appellee filed a post conviction petition in the Circuit Court for Allegany County charging that his conviction upon his 1970 guilty plea was defective.

The hearing judge considered the merits of the case and agreed that the full explanation of constitutional rights required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), had not been given to the ⁷⁰⁷ appellee. Over the State’s objection that the entire case was moot, the hearing judge ruled that the appellee was entitled to a new trial. The State seeks leave to appeal that ruling. On the question of mootness, the hearing judge, in his Memorandum Opinion, ruled: “Initially, the issue of the Petitioner’s standing must be addressed.

The State maintains that Petitioner does not have standing to proceed with this post conviction petition because he is no longer under sentence for this particular offense. The statute requires that a petitioner be ‘either incarcerated under sentence of death or imprisonment or on parole or probation____’ Art. 27, Sec. 645A(a); Good v. State, 240 Md. 1 [ 212 A.2d 487 ] (1965). At first glance, it appears the State is correct in its assertion that Petitioner has no standing to proceed. However, Petitioner is presently incarcerated in the West Virginia Penitentiary under a life sentence under the West Virginia habitual offender statute, which authorizes the imposition of a life term upon a defendant who has been convicted of three felonies in the United States.

West Virginia Code, 61 — 11— 18. The conviction in question in this proceeding was the first of three felonies on which Petitioner’s life sentence was based. The Post Conviction Procedure Act was enacted to provide a comprehensive scheme to collaterally challenge the legality of incarceration upon conviction. Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19 [ 400 A.2d 406 ] (1979).

While Petitioner is not now incarcerated as a direct result of his conviction in this case, he is incarcerated as a consequence thereof. But for this underlying conviction in May, 1970 he would not have been subjected to the penalties of the West Virginia habitual offender act. The spirit, if not the letter, of the Post Conviction Procedure Act extends to a petitioner under such circumstances. Therefore, this Court believes that Petitioner is presently incarcerated under sentence for this conviction and has standing to proceed in this manner.” ⁷⁰⁸ Although the impulses of the hearing judge were generous, his logic was flawed, as he himself in part recognized when he pointed out, “The spirit, if not the letter, of the Post Conviction Procedure Act extends to a Petitioner under such circumstances.” In dealing with a limited statutory remedy, we must be concerned