State v. Minster

COUCH, Judge. The issue here is whether we should abrogate the common law rule of “a year and a day”, which bars a prosecution for murder when the victim dies more than a year and a day after being injured. Inasmuch as we believe this issue is more appropriately addressed by the legislature, we shall not abrogate the common law rule. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment filed against the appellee, Larry Edmund Minster.

The facts in this case are undisputed. On July 8, 1982, Minster shot the victim, Cheryl Dodgson, in the neck. As a result of the shooting, Ms. Dodgson became a quadriplegic. Minster was charged in Prince George’s County Circuit Court with attempted first degree murder, assault with intent to murder, assault and battery and use of a handgun in a crime of violence.

He was brought to trial in April of 1983. Minster was convicted of attempted first degree murder and the use of a handgun in a crime of violence. He was ²⁴² sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for attempted murder and received a 10 year concurrent sentence for the handgun violation. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction in an unreported per curiam opinion, Minster v. State, No. 940 (Md.Ct.Spec.App., Aug. 29, 1983). 1 On October 3, 1983, Ms. Dodgson died from injuries the State contends resulted directly from Minster’s actions on July 8, 1982 one year and eighty-seven days before the victim’s death.

One month after Ms. Dodgson’s death, Minster was indicted for first degree murder. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County dismissed the indictment because the death of Ms. Dodgson occurred more than a year and a day after the shooting. Judge Johnson [the trial judge] noted that State v. Brown, 21 Md.App. 91 , 318 A.2d 257 (1974), which held that the year and a day rule was valid in Maryland, barred the indictment. The State appealed the dismissal to the Court of Special Appeals.

We granted certiorari prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals in order to address an issue of public importance. The State’s issue is simply stated: should the prosecution of Minster for the murder of Cheryl Dodgson be barred by the year and a day rule. 2 It argues that the common law rule is now archaic and, in light of medical advances in life-saving techniques, there is no sound reason for retaining the rule today. Minster argues that there are legitimate justifications for the rule’s continued application; moreover, because of the number of alternatives available to replace the year and a day rule, a change in the rule should be left to the legislature. ²⁴³ In Brown, supra, this identical issue came before the Court of Special Appeals. Chief Judge Orth, writing for that court, extensively surveyed the history of this ancient rule, and in order to avoid repetition of what has been well stated before, reference is made to his review.

See Brown, supra, 21 Md.App. at 92-95 , 318 A.2d at 258-60 . The Court held that the rule was part of our common law and, although no Maryland case had previously addressed the issue, the rule was “in full force and effect in Maryland.” Brown, supra, 21 Md.App. at 97 , 318 A.2d at 261 . In addition, “if change is to be made in the rule it should be by the General Assembly because expression and weighing of divergent views, consideration of potential effect, and suggestion of adequate safeguards, are better suited to the legislative forum.” Id. [footnote omitted]. We are in accordance with this view.

We agree with Minster that there are a number of sound justifications for retaining this rule. As Chief Judge Orth stated in Brown , “[a]bolition of the rule may well result in imbalance between the adequate protection of society and justice for the individual accused, and there would remain a need for some form of limitation on causation.” Brown, supra, 21 Md.App. at 97 , 318 A.2d at 261 . Justice Musmanno, who dissented from the judicial abrogation of the rule in Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501 (1960), stated this concern more fully: “Dorothy Pierce, the alleged victim, died of pneumonia. It is possible, of course, that her weakened condition, due to the alleged hurt received thirteen months before, made her more susceptible to the attack of pneumonia.

On the other hand, there is the likely possibility that the pneumonia had no possible connection with the injury allegedly inflicted by the defendant. Suppose that the pneumonia occurred two years after the physical injury, would it still be proper to charge the defendant with murder? If a murder charge can be brought two years after a blow has been struck, will ²⁴⁴ there ever be a time when the Court may declare that the bridge between the blow and death has now been irreparably broken? May the Commonwealth indict a man for murder when the death occurs ten years after the blow has fallen?

Twenty years? Thirty years? One may search the majority opinion through every paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase and comma, and find no answer to this very serious question. The majority is content to open a Pandora’s box of interrogation and let it remain unclosed, to the torment and possible persecution of every person who may have at one time or another injured another.

I don’t doubt that an ‘expert’ of some kind can be found to testify that a slap in the face was the cause of a death fifteen years later. If there is one thing which the criminal law must be, if it is to be recognized as just, it must be specific and definitive.” Id. at 199-200 , 166 A.2d at 519-20 . We are reminded of the oft-cited explanation for the rule’s existence: “[I]f he die[d] after that time [of a year and a day], it cannot be discerned, as the law presumes, whether he died of the stroke or poison, etc. or of a natural death; and in the case of life, the rule of law ought to be certain.” 3 Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England at 52 (1797) [emphasis added]. In addition, a person charged with attempted first degree murder (as was the case here) can be sentenced to life imprisonment, Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 412, 644A.

See Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124 , 482 A.2d 474 (1984). Moreover, a sentencing judge may always consider the seriousness of the injury to, or the subsequent death of, the victim. Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1984 Cum.Supp.), Art. 41, § 124(c). The only additional conceivable punishment a first degree murder conviction entails is the death penalty.

We do not believe this distinction is a ²⁴⁵ sufficient reason to rescind a common law rule which has existed for over seven hundred years. 3