State v. One 1976 Dodge Motor Vehicle

⁴⁸⁴ WEANT, Judge. In October of 1984, appellant, the State of Maryland, filed a Petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for Forfeiture of a 1976 Dodge Motor Vehicle. The forfeiture petition was dismissed pursuant to the motion of Steven Stagmer, the registered owner of the automobile. The State now complains as follows: I. The trial court erred in imposing a “de novo” or “independent” determination regarding the sufficiency of the article 27, § 297(F)(1) decision by the police commissioner to recommend forfeiture instead of reviewing that decision on a “clearly erroneous” or “abuse of discretion” standard.

II

The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for forfeiture where sufficient evidence was presented to support the police commissioner’s recommendation for forfeiture.

III

The trial court committed reversible error when it denied appellant’s counsel any opportunity to present argument in a civil non-jury forfeiture proceeding. Unlike the State, Mr. Stagmer apparently does not consider the loss of a nine-year old vehicle momentous; he has abstained from opposing the State’s appeal. I. Appellant’s first claim of error invites us to hold that, when faced with a forfeiture petition under Md.Ann. Code art. 27, § 297 (1982 Repl. Vol. and 1985 Cum.Supp.), a circuit court is empowered to determine Only “whether the police commissioner abused his discretion or was clearly erroneous in recommending forfeiture____” Our reading of art. 27, § 297 convinces^ us, however, that the statute contemplates á trial de novo.

Section 297(j) requires the circuit court to hold “a full hearing”; in addition, it sets out the specific actions that the court shall take once it has determined that a motor vehicle should or should not be forfeit ⁴⁸⁵ ed. For us to construe § 297 as saying that the circuit court should act in an appellate capacity, as the State urges, would insert words “with a view toward making the statute express an intention which is different from its plain meaning,” Montgomery County v. Fulks, 500 A.2d 302, 305 (Md. Court of Special Appeals 1985); we decline to do so. We are prompted to reject the State’s proposed standard of review for the further reason that it would, in effect, allow forfeiture proceedings to be brought and finally decided in favor of seizure within the executive branch of this State. Such a construction raises serious due process concerns and, absent a clear statement from the