State v. One Hundred & Fifty-Eight Gaming Devices

MURPHY, Chief Judge. This case involves a number of devices seized as illegal “slot machines” under the provisions of ch. 617 of the Acts of 1963, as amended by ch. 280 of the Acts of 1981, now codified as Maryland Code (1982 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 264B. I Section 264B makes it a criminal offense after a date not here relevant “to locate, possess, keep, maintain or operate any slot machine within this State.” The statute defines a “slot machine” as: “Any machine, apparatus or device ... that is adapted for use in such a way that, as a result of the insertion or deposit therein, or placing with another person of any piece of money, coin, token or other object, such machine, apparatus or device is caused to operate or may be operated, and by reason of any element of chance or of other outcome of such operation unpredictable by him, the user may receive or become entitled to receive any piece of money, coin, token or other object representative of and convertible into money, irrespective of whether the ⁴⁰⁷ said machine, apparatus or device may, apart from any element of chance or unpredictable outcome of such operation, also sell, deliver or present some merchandise or money or other tangible thing of value.” Ch. 617 of the Acts of 1963 — the original enactment prohibiting slot machines in Maryland — contained the following uncodified provision as § 2 of the Act: “[T]he intent of the legislature in the enactment of the aforegoing act is expressed as not intending to apply to the machine, apparatus or device commonly known or colloquially referred to, as ‘pinball machine,’ so long as said machine, apparatus or device does not permit any compensation, remuneration, recompense, reward, repayment or winnings beyond an automatic replay of a game or games mechanically provided upon said machine.” Paragraph V of § 264B, as originally enacted by ch. 280 of the Acts of 1981, made special provision for “antique” slot machines as follows: “It shall be a defense to any prosecution under paragraph III of this section if the defendant shows that the slot machine is an antique slot machine and was not operated for gambling purposes while in the defendant’s possession. For the purposes of this paragraph, a slot machine is an antique slot machine if the defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it was manufactured prior to 1941.

Whenever this defense is offered, no slot machine seized from any defendant shall be destroyed or otherwise altered until after a final court determination including review upon appeal, if any, that the defense is not applicable. If the defense is applicable, the slot machine shall be returned pursuant to provisions of law providing for the return of property.” 1 ⁴⁰⁸ II The State seized the devices in question on December 30, 1980 from the commercial warehouse premises of Willow Enterprises, Inc. Willow’s president, Louis Wilner, was convicted of unlawfully possessing slot machines in violation of § 264B. He did not appeal. On October 13, 1981, the State initiated an in rem proceeding in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for forfeiture of the seized devices.

At trial, the State introduced a number of devices, which it claimed were representative of all of the devices that had been seized. The circuit court (Wray, J.) in a memorandum opinion found that certain of the devices, e.g., the Sircoma Draw 80 Poker machines equipped with a “knock-off” switch or meter, were illegal slot machines because they were “presently adapted to register rewards obtained by chance and to facilitate undetectable human payoffs of items with value.” The court also found that other devices 2 “with payoffs other than free plays” were illegal slot machines subject to forfeiture. Another device found by the trial court to be an illegal slot machine was a so-called Delta Red, White and Blue machine “with the knockoff switch and other devices with provisions to facilitate house payments.” Moreover, the court declared a number of console machines to be illegal slot machines. 3 It found, however, that a Delta machine “without a knockoff switch,” as well as all similar free-play devices, was not a slot machine under the statutory definition. The court held that an inoperable Bally slot machine (a conventional “one-arm bandit”), as well as all like inoperable devices and parts adaptable for slot machine usage, was not a slot machine within the contemplation of the statute.

It also held that a number of partially dismantled devices met the definition of a slot machine and were ⁴⁰⁹ subject to forfeiture. Finally, the court concluded that a number of other devices manufactured prior to 1941, and not operated for gambling purposes while in the owner’s possession, were not subject to forfeiture because such devices were “antique” slot machines exempt under § 264B(V). The State appealed. It claimed that the trial court erred in not finding the inoperable devices and the free-play devices without knock-off switches or meters to be illegal slot machines and in ordering the return of the “antique” slot machines.

Willow cross-appealed. It contended, among other things, that the trial court misconstrued § 264B in not exempting all free-play devices from the statutory definition of a slot machine. The Court of Special Appeals decided the cross-appeals in State v. 158 Gaming Devices, 59 Md.App. 44 , 474 A.2d 545 (1984). It first noted that the seized devices were of various makes, models and designs, describing them as follows: “[M]ost of the seized devices incorporated ‘free play’ or ‘game credit’ features that rewarded the successful player with ‘free’ replays, which were registered on a three or four digit meter attached to the machine.

The player was able to use the free plays by activating a ‘play’ button on the machine. “Many of the alleged gaming devices were adapted with a ‘knock-off switch’ and a ‘knock-off meter.’ The switch and meter enabled the machine owner to remove game credits from the machine while maintaining a tabulation of the total free plays actually won. A number of the seized devices had not yet been fitted with the knockoff switches or meters, but unattached meters were found at Willow’s premises. “Forty-eight of the devices seized were Delta ‘Red, White and Blue’ machines that issue stamps printed with randomly selected numbers. If the numbers on the stamps issued by the machine correspond with numbers ⁴¹⁰ on a chart that was placed on top of the machine, the player wins replays, coupons or merchandise. “The remaining devices were a variety of ‘one-arm bandits’ which are activated by a player’s depositing a coin in a slot and pulling a handle. The handle rotates reels which spin and then stop, revealing a combination of symbols, numbers, words or colors.

If the combination of the reels corresponds with one of the predetermined winning combinations, the machine releases the ‘payoff’ into a coin tray located on the lower front of the machine. With the exception of the one-arm bandit devices, none of the gaming machines had the capability of directly paying off to the player. The other devices required a third party to redeem ‘free games’ for something of value that was more tangible.” 59 Md.App. at 48-49 , 474 A.2d 545 (footnote omitted). In considering the State’s right to institute forfeiture proceedings against the seized devices, the court concluded that property which is subject to forfeiture is characterized as either contraband per se or derivative contraband.

The former, the court said, is property that is inherently illegal while derivative contraband is property that may be legal or illegal to possess, depending upon the circumstances. 59 Md.App. at 50 , 474 A.2d 545 . The court opined that the devices seized from Willow “may or may not have a lawful, useful purpose” and were therefore not contraband per se. Id. It determined, however, that the devices would be forfeitable as derivative contraband under common law principles if the State showed by a preponderance of the evidence “that the owner or user of the seized items intended the property to be used illegally and that the items were procured, held or used for an unlawful purpose.” Id. at 53 , 474 A.2d 545 .

After reviewing the legislative history underlying the enactment of § 264B and our decision in Clerk v. Chesapeake Beach Park, 251 Md. 657 , 248 A.2d 479 (1968), the court held: ⁴¹¹ “[T]he classification of a device as illegal under § 264B depends on its potential for valuation of aggregated free plays ‘won’ on a game of chance.” 59 Md.App. at 57 , 474 A.2d 545 (footnote omitted). It said that the existence of the so-called knock-off switch was not “determinative of whether a device is classified as an illegal slot machine under § 264B.” Id. Explaining, the court said: “Knock-off switches are usable for purposes other than gambling. If, for instance, a player after accumulating a great number of ‘free plays’ becomes bored with the game, or for any other reason walks away from the machine, it is unreasonable to expect the merchant to allow other persons to utilize the accumulated ‘free plays.’ The owner should have some way of removing the ‘free plays’ from the machine, hence the knock-off switch.

The knock-off meter, on the other hand, may be indicative that the machine is a gambling device. The knock-off meter is, in effect, an accounting of the ‘free plays’ and may disclose to the owner of the machine that the degree of difficulty in ‘winning’ is too great or too little. “When a device contains an odds mechanism, a method of releasing free plays, and a knock-off meter, the potential for valuating aggregate free plays exists and the machine is illegal under § 264B.” Id. at 57-58, 474 A.2d 545 (footnote omitted). The Court of Special Appeals also determined that certain of the devices seized, having been manufactured prior to 1941, were antique slot machines exempt from seizure under § 264B(V); that a number of inoperable devices, which were merely adaptable, but not actually adapted for use as slot machines, were not within the statutory definition; but that partially dismantled devices meeting the statutory definition were illegal slot machines and, therefore, subject to forfeiture. The court remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of an order consistent with the principles set forth in its opinion. ⁴¹² The State’s petition for certiorari, which we granted, raised two questions: (1) Whether a gambling device that meets the statutory-definition of “slot machine” — and, as such, is subject to an unqualified statutory prohibition against its possession for any reason is contraband per se; and (2) Whether a gambling device that operates on principles of consideration, chance, and reward as specified in the governing statutory prohibition nevertheless does not violate the statute absent the existence of certain additional mechanisms.

Willow did not file a cross-petition for certiorari. Ill Placing reliance upon the legislative history of § 264B, the State contends that the mere possession of slot machines prohibited by the statute is illegal, whatever the circumstances of their use or intended use, and because such devices cannot be used for any legitimate purpose, they are subject to summary forfeiture as contraband per se. The State claims that a device, other than a true free-play pinball machine, is illegal under the Act if it (1) requires consideration such as money or a token to operate; (2) operates by reason of any element of chance; and (3) entitles the player to receive a reward, whether monetary or representative of or convertible into money, such as free plays. This is so, the State maintains, without regard to the device’s mechanical, technological or stylistic design features.

Accordingly, the State concludes that the Court of Special Appeals erroneously distinguished between legal gaming devices and illegal slot machines — not on the basis of whether the devices operated on the § 264B principles of consideration, chance and reward — but rather on the presence of various features, such as odds mechanisms, knockoff switches and meters, that are nowhere referred to in the statute. ⁴¹³ The State says that the devices in question are activated either directly or indirectly by the insertion of coins or some other payment of consideration and operate exclusively on the principle of chance. As to the latter element, the State maintains that an individual’s skill is totally irrelevant to the game’s outcome, unlike some video arcade games such as pac-man and some pinball machines, where manipulation of levers, buttons or control sticks enables a skillful player to win free games. The last element — the concept of a reward representative of or convertible into money — is also present, the State claims, because each of the seized devices offers some form of remuneration to the player, either by means of a coin chute, a redeemable token or game credits that can be used for further games or clandestinely converted into cash. 4 The State argues that, under Maryland case law, free games constitute a “thing of value,” representative of or convertible into money within the contemplation of § 264B. It contends that the legislature did not intend to restrict the reward element of § 264B only to devices that offer some tangible object of value; otherwise, the express exemption for free play pinball machines would not be necessary.

That free plays have intrinsic value, according to the State, is evident from the fact that the proprietor is manifestly concerned with the number of free plays won since the player may continue to operate the device without paying— to the proprietor’s obvious financial detriment. The State sees free plays as the functional equivalent of the “coin, token or other object” otherwise necessary under § 264B to activate the machine or the mechanical payoff chute. As none of the seized devices were free play pinball machines, the State urges that the statutory exemption for such devices is plainly inapplicable. ⁴¹⁴ Willow acknowledges that the seized devices are coin activated and operate on the basis of chance. It says that the main issue is simply whether a free play itself is a thing of value within the ambit of § 264B.

If it is, Willow concedes that the devices are illegal slot machines and subject to summary forfeiture as contraband per se. Willow contends, however, that a free play is not a thing of value under Maryland law and that consequently § 264B does not prohibit any free-play devices. The exemption in § 264B for free-play pinball machines, according to Willow, encompasses any and all free-play devices and not just pinball machines. Willow acknowledges, however, that devices which operate on the principles of consideration and chance and which reward a successful player with free plays may be illegal under § 264B if the devices possess features designed to promote and facilitate gambling, and free plays are redeemable for value.

Willow thus appears to have accepted the intermediate appellate court’s determination, from which it did not appeal, that devices equipped with odds mechanisms, knock-off switches and meters are illegal slot machines under § 264B. IV In determining the intention of the legislature in enacting § 264B, the most frequently used document is the Report of the Slot Machine Study Committee appointed by Governor Tawes in 1962, sometimes referred to as the Emory Commission after its chairman, Richard W. Emory. The committee in a report to the Governor, dated January 12, 1963, noted that its study encompassed all gambling devices and machines which have been legalized by local law. It reviewed the history of pinball and other coin-operated devices in Maryland.

It observed that the provisions of ch. 11 of the Acts of 1937 (Extraordinary Session) permitted the issuance of a statewide license for a “pin ball machine or game played with balls and plungers ... or any other machine or device so constructed or devised to make the result of the operation depend in whole or in part upon the ⁴¹⁵ skill of the player____” This law authorized “playing for a premium, trophy or prize, in merchandise only, for high score or skill in the operation thereof.” According to the committee report, ch. 11 was a Depression era revenue raising measure. It was repealed by ch. 8 of the Acts of 1939. The report next pointed out that the legislature, at its 1939 session, refused to enact another statewide licensing law for “pinball and other coin operated machines.” It did, however, pass local laws for Anne Arundel, Charles, Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties. These measures, however, were vetoed by then Governor O’Conor.

In 1941, pinball and slot machine laws were passed in Anne Arundel and Garrett Counties but were again vetoed by the Governor. Public local laws legalizing slot machines were subsequently enacted for Anne Arundel County (ch. 321 of the Acts of 1943), Calvert County (ch. 13 of the Acts of 1948, Extraordinary Session), Charles County (ch. 678 of the Acts of 1949) and St. Mary’s County (ch. 32 of the Acts of 1947, Extraordinary Session). In Calvert, Charles and St. Mary’s Counties, the legalized devices consisted of any “mechanical or electrical amusement devices which require the insertion of a coin or token for their operation and which offer an award ... based in whole or in part upon chance or [the operator’s] skill.” In Anne Arundel County, any “amusement device” was legalized, as well as commercial bingo. 5 The public local law applicable to each of these Southern Maryland counties exempted the legalized devices from the State’s gambling laws. The committee noted that the Federal Gambling Devices Act of 1962 ( 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1177 ), amending the Johnson Act of 1951, enlarged the definition of gambling devices to include “free-play” slot machines.

The need for this legislation was set forth in a congressional report, quoted in the Emory Commission Report (p. 10), as follows: “ 'New gambling machines have been developed which are controlled by syndicated crime, but which are not ⁴¹⁶ subject to the provisions of the Johnson Act because they are not coin-operated, do not pay off directly or indirectly, and do not have a drum or reel as in the conventional slot machine. Principally they are pinball machines which afford players an opportunity if certain combinations are achieved to register a great number of free games, in some instances up to 999 free games. These machines usually have a mechanism whereby the player can change the odds merely by inserting more money into the machine or increase the number of balls that can be played by inserting more money. These free games can be played off or they can be eliminated from the machine by pressing a button or lever.

The number of accumulated free games eliminated from the machine are recorded by a meter and payment to the player for the number of free games canceled is made by the proprietor of the establishment where the gambling machine is located or by his agent. “ ‘The committee bill broadens the definition of the term “gambling device” in the Johnson Act so as to include such pinball machines and any other mechanical devices which are designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling and which when operated may deliver as a result of the application of an element of chance any money or property, either directly or indirectly. “ ‘Pinball and other machines, intended for amusement only, which award a limited number of free plays that are not convertible to money or other things of value, are not covered by this legislation.’ ” The committee report observed that the 1962 Federal Act “makes the possession of any machine which may be used as a gambling device illegal without requiring proof of cash pay-offs.” Among several exceptions was one for a “marble machine (a so-called pinball machine) ... which is not designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling, and (A) which when operated does not deliver as a result of the application of an element of ⁴¹⁷ chance, any money or property or (B) by the operation of which a person may not become entitled to receive, as the result of the application of an element of chance, any money or property.” In its report, the Emory Commission noted a distinction between “free-play” gambling devices and “free-play” amusement devices, stating that the former required a $250 annual tax stamp while the latter required only a $10 annual tax stamp. According to the committee report, the difference between the two types of machines resided in their construction and operation. It said (at p. 11): “If the machine has an odds mechanism, provision for releasing free plays and a meter for recording free plays released, then it is a gambling device. If the machine does not have such gambling features, its use for gambling is not considered practicable even though it may award free games in a limited number.” In this regard, the committee report referred to federal tax regulations, describing a “free play” gambling device required to have a $250 gambling tax stamp, as follows (p. 12): “ ‘A machine which is operated by means of the insertion of a coin, token, or similar object and which, even though it does not dispense cash or tokens, has the features and characteristics of a gaming device whether or not evidence exists as to actual payoffs. “ 'A pinball machine equipped with a push button for releasing free plays and a meter for recording the plays so released, or equipped with provisions for multiple coin insertion for increasing the odds.’ ” In the course of its report, the committee noted that, in addition to the statutes in Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles and St. Mary’s Counties, laws existed licensing “free-play” pinball and console machines in Baltimore City and ten ⁴¹⁸ other counties. 6 These laws, the committee reported, made no distinction between the free-play machines classified by the federal government as gambling devices and amusement-type free-play machines.

The committee report, referring to testimony before various congressional committees, concluded at p. 12 “that there are more slot machines including the ‘free play’ gambling devices licensed with the Federal government in Maryland than in any other State in the entire United States.” The committee said (p. 12) that slot machines are not limited to four Southern Maryland counties. It cited statistics showing that in Baltimore City and Baltimore County alone, there were “free play” gambling devices at 2,700 different locations in 1962, and that in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1962, there were 3,971 applications for federal gambling stamps in Maryland over and above 850 slot machine locations in the four Southern Maryland counties. But the committee said that it was unable to determine the extent to which, in Maryland, the devices classified as gambling devices under the federal law were used for gambling. It noted, however, that by enactment of the Federal Gambling Devices Act of 1962, the Congress established as national policy “the fact that these ‘free play’ slot machines are gambling devices and should be outlawed” as they are used “extensively for gambling on a far larger scale than legalized slot machines.” Report, at 13-14.

The committee concluded its report as follows (p. 14): “Any abolition of slot machines requires repeal of the local laws applicable to Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles and St. Mary’s Counties legalizing cash pay-off machines. It also requires repeal or amendment of the General Laws permitting the licensing of ‘free play’ slot machines classified by the Federal government as gambling devices, and enactment of a State law at least as strong as the Federal ⁴¹⁹ Gambling Devices Act of 1962 prohibiting any machine, ‘free play’ or otherwise, which may be used as a gambling device. Unless the problem is attacked on a state wide basis, the ‘free play’ gambling devices will invade Southern Maryland and the slot machine business will continue there, but the four Counties will have been deprived of the approximate $1,600,000 in annual revenues which they now enjoy. “Florida and New York have laws that prohibit the possession of any machine or device which, by reason of any element of chance or of other outcome of such operation unpredictable by the operator, the user may receive or become entitled to receive anything of value or otherwise or may secure additional chances or rights to use the machine. It will be noted that this is a very broad definition which prohibits the possession of even a ‘free play’ machine which the Federal government in the Gambling Devices Act of 1962 and in the revenue laws classifies as an amusement device.” The committee declined to recommend “[wjhether Maryland [should] adop[t] a law based upon Florida and New York law or upon Federal law____” It was thus for the General Assembly to delineate the devices to be encompassed by any new legislation and it responded by the 1963 enactment of § 264B.

Y The most authoritative interpretation of § 264B is found in Clerk v. Chesapeake Beach Park, 251 Md. 657 , 248 A.2d 479 (1968). That case involved a declaratory judgment action to determine whether an electrical console device and a partly mechanical and partly electrical pinball machine were illegal slot machines under § 264B. Both machines required the insertion of a coin for their operation and offered an award to the operator based in whole or in part, as to the console machine, on chance and, as to the pinball device, upon chance or skill. The award offered by each ⁴²⁰ device was “ ‘the registration upon the device of one or more free plays which may, in the option of the operator, be taken by replaying the machine or may be redeemed ... for merchandise.’ ” Id. at 659, 248 A.2d 479 .

A declaration that the devices were legal under the public local laws of Calvert County which licensed “amusement devices” was also sought. We noted in Chesapeake Beach that our earlier decision in Gaither v. Cate, 156 Md. 254 , 144 A. 239 (1929) held “in disagreement with various legislative and judicial holdings elsewhere to the contrary, that a machine adapted for gambling which ostensibly offered as a reward for playing it only additional free plays was a gambling device.” Id. [251 Md.] at 664, 248 A.2d 479 (emphasis added). We also observed that the holding in Gaither v. Cate was influenced by the statutory provision in then Code, Art. 27, § 257 (now, Code, 1982 Repl.Vol., § 246 of Art. 27) requiring that courts construe the law “ ‘relating to gambling and betting liberally, so as to prevent the mischiefs intended to be provided against.’ ” Id. After reviewing the report of the Emory Commission, the Court in Chesapeake Beach turned to the uncodified provision of § 264B which, as earlier indicated, expressly exempted devices “commonly known or colloquially referred to, as ‘pinball machine’ ” from inclusion under the statutory definition of a slot machine, where such devices did not permit any reward “beyond an automatic replay of a game or games mechanically provided upon said machine.” As to this, we said: “[T]he proper inference to be drawn from the inclusion of Section 2 in [ch. 617], legalizing only true free play pinball machines, is that the legislature believed the definition of a slot machine in [§ 264B] was broad enough to include, or to be construed as including, all machines or devices conferring upon a winning player any award, including true free play machines, as gambling devices ⁴²¹ under Gaither v. Cate, supra." Id. at 666, 248 A.2d 479 (emphasis in original).

We thereafter added: “Another fair inference is that because the only deviation the legislature selected from the general definition was the true free play pinball machine, it regarded and intended to classify as slot machines any console and pinball machines that furnished gratification or reward to a winning player other than further free plays.” Id. at 666, 248 A.2d 479 . We concluded that § 264B “rejected the total ban of the New York and Florida statutes including even free play machines, and adopted the theory of the Federal statutes which classify as gambling devices pinball machines which can pay off in other than additional free plays but classify as permitted amusement devices free play pinball machines.” Id. at 666, 248 A.2d 479 . We also held in Chesapeake Beach that, to satisfy the actual legislative intention, the phrase in § 264B — “representative of and convertible into money” meant representative of or convertible into money. Id. at 667, 248 A.2d 479 .

We said: “If the phrase defining the material reward of the winner is read as money, coin, token or other object ‘representative of or convertible into money,’ as we hold it should be, it is apparent that not only the tokens which fall to a winner in the cup of the one-arm bandit but the aggregate value of the free plays won on the console or pinball machine, whether evidenced by a receipt or not, are alike ‘representative of’ money in that under the evidence they can be used to purchase beverages, food or merchandise of a specified dollar value. [Section 264B] proscribes machines or devices through the operation of which this result can occur by chance.” Id. at 668-69 , 248 A.2d 479 (emphasis added). ⁴²² Finally, we said that § 264B repealed the local Calvert County law to the extent that it permitted the licensing, possession and operation of gambling machines and devices that come within the ban of the statewide Act. Id. at 669, 248 A.2d 479 . As the free plays on both the console and pinball devices were redeemable for merchandise, we declared that they were in violation of § 264B. 7 VI Made explicitly clear in Chesapeake Beach was that the General Assembly in enacting § 264B did not adopt either the Florida or New York statutes which declared a device to be an illegal slot machine simply because, inter alia, the successful player was rewarded by “additional chances or rights to use such ... device.” 8 The omission of any such ⁴²³ language from § 264B is of obvious significance. Equally significant is the use in § 264B of the phrase, “any piece of money, coin, token or other object representative of [or] convertible into money” rather than the broader phrase in the Florida and New York statutes, “any piece of money, credit, allowance or other thing of value, or any check, slug, token or memorandum, whether of value or otherwise, which may be exchanged for any money, credit, allowance or thing of value.” (Emphasis added.) Section 264B does not, in a similar context, contain the words “thing of value” which had frequently, although not invariably, been interpreted as encompassing a free play.

See Annot., Coin-operated pinball machine or similar device, played for amusement only or confining reward to privilege of free replays, as prohibited or permitted by antigambling laws, 89 A.L.R.2d 815 (1963). Moreover, as we recognized in Chesapeake Beach, the General Assembly, in enacting § 264B, “adopted the theory of the Federal statutes.” 251 Md. at 666 , 248 A.2d 479 . We thereby expressly noted a distinction between devices constructed and designed for gambling which “pay off in other than additional free plays” and other devices, not adapted for gambling and used solely for amusement, which award free plays that are not redeemable for money or merchandise. The verbiage used in § 264B must, of course, also be considered in light of the legislature’s knowledge of the construction that the courts had previously given to the ⁴²⁴ State’s gambling laws.

Gaither v. Cate, supra, decided in 1929, involved a coin-operated slot machine which, upon activation by the insertion of a nickel and the pulling of a lever, simultaneously (a) dispensed a packet of mint wafers worth but a fraction of a nickel and (b) caused