State v. Parker

⁵⁸¹ KARWACKI, Judge. In this case we review the grant of post-conviction relief on January 22, 1992, to Anthony Patrick Parker, who pleaded guilty to second-degree murder on November 10, 1983, pursuant to a plea agreement. The facts of this case were set forth in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in State v. Parker, 93 Md.App. 597 , 613 A.2d 1020 (1992): “After the appellee [Parker] was formally charged with murder and other related counts arising from an incident that occurred at the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in Baltimore County, a plea bargain was struck between the appellee and the prosecution and memorialized in writing. Under the terms of the agreement, the appellee was to plead guilty to one count of bank robbery in federal court and accept a sentence of twenty years, the sentence to be served in the federal correctional system.

In exchange therefor, the prosecution agreed to bind itself to a recommendation that Parker not receive more than a twenty year prison term for his plea of guilty to any ‘and all charges arising out of the aforementioned Coca-Cola robbery-homicide.’ The prosecution also agreed to make a recommendation that Parker’s Maryland sentence be made to run concurrently with his federal sentence. A clause in the written plea agreement specified that the contents of the writing represented the only agreements made between the parties. “On May 3, 1984, the appellee appeared before Judge Cullen H. Hormes in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for sentencing upon his conviction for second degree murder. Parker was sentenced to the Maryland Division of Corrections for a period of twenty years, the sentence to run concurrently with the appellee’s federal sentence.[ 1 ] ⁵⁸² The sentencing court stated, T understand the State’s Attorney will make arrangements so that he will serve his time in the federal institution.’ “The prosecutor remarked that he would alert the Commissioner of Corrections that ‘the time is to be served in the federal institution.’ The sentencing court commented that it understood that fact to be part of the plea agreement. The court then remarked that the commitment record should perhaps reflect that the appellee’s Maryland sentence was ‘to be served with or at the federal institution.’ The notation so appeared on the commitment records.

A detainer was then lodged by the Baltimore County Police Department and forwarded to the warden of the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. “On April 1, 1991, the appellee was paroled on his federal sentence and, pursuant to the detainer lodged by the Baltimore County Police Department, was remanded to the custody of the Maryland Division of Corrections to complete the balance of his Maryland sentence. Thereafter, the appellee wrote to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County requesting that he be released from his Maryland sentence. In his response, Judge James L. Smith, Jr.[ 2 ] informed the appellee that he would have to be paroled by the Maryland parole authorities and that ‘the circumstances that you have been paroled by the federal prison system, would not bind the Maryland Department of Corrections. You would still have to be paroled by the Maryland authorities on the concurrent sentence which Judge Hormes imposed.’[ 3 ] ⁵⁸³ “In response to the appellee’s filing a petition for post-conviction relief, a hearing was conducted.

At the hearing, the appellee maintained that, because Judge Hormes indicated that the appellee’s concurrent Maryland sentence was to be served in federal prison, the sentencing judge necessarily intended that when Parker was paroled upon his federal sentence he would thereby be paroled from his Maryland sentence. The appellee admitted, however, that Judge Hormes never pnce stated to him that upon completion of Ms federal sentence he would not be obligated to complete the balance of his Maryland sentence, should there be any time left to serve on the Maryland sentence. The hearing concluded with the post-conviction hearing judge holding the matter sub cuña until review of the transcript of the original sentencing proceeding could be had. “The post-conviction hearing court subsequently granted the appellee’s petition for relief, ordering the State to release the appellee from the custody of the Division of Corrections.” 93 Md.App. at 599-601 , 613 A.2d at 1021-22 (footnote omitted). The State appealed the ruling of the post-conviction court to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the lower court misconstrued the legal effect of multijurisdictional sentences.

The State maintained that the concurrent nature of the state and federal sentences did not require that the two sentences also be coterminous. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, and in affirming the post-conviction hearing court’s judgment, it relied on Gantt v. State, 81 Md.App. 653 , 569 A.2d 220 (1990), as had the hearing court. On the basis of Gantt , the intermediate appellate court in the instant case reasoned that “parolees, though released from federal confinement, are still serving their prison term ‘on the outside’ ” and concluded: “[Parker’s] federal sentence ends when his parole ends, which happens to be coterminous with his Maryland sen ⁵⁸⁴ tence. In short, because [Parker’s] term of parole from his federal sentence is twenty years and his Maryland sentence was to run concurrently to his federal term, serving the balance of his twenty years on parole will satisfy his Maryland sentence.” Parker, 93 Md.App. at 603 , 613 A.2d at 1023 .

From this decision, the State sought certiorari from this Court. We granted the State’s petition on February 11, 1993, and we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I Before turning to the merits of the case, we must first address a motion to dismiss filed by Parker. In his motion, Parker advised- us that he was found to have violated the conditions of his federal parole.

His parole was revoked in August, 1993, and he is currently incarcerated in a federal prison in Georgia. 4 Parker asserts that because the sole issue before this Court is the effect of his federal parole on his concurrent Maryland sentence, the revocation of parole renders the matter moot. We do not agree. We have stated often that the test for mootness is “whether, when it is before the court, a case presents a controversy between the parties for which, by way of resolution, the court can fashion an effective remedy.” Adkins v. State, 324 Md. 641, 646 , 598 A.2d 194, 197 (1991); Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 375 , 564 A.2d 395, 397 (1989); State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 79-82 , 553 A.2d 672, 675-77 (1989). Limited exceptions to this doctrine exist, however, and even if no controversy exists at the precise moment of review, a case -will not be deemed moot if the controversy between the parties is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-400 , 95 S.Ct. 553, 557 , 42 L.Ed.2d ⁵⁸⁵ 532, 540-41 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 , 93 S.Ct. 705, 713 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 161 (1973); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 565 , 510 A.2d 562, 566-67 (1986) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).

See also Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus Contractors Ass’n, 286 Md. 324, 328 , 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979); Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md.App. 755, 758 , 471 A.2d 1115, 1117 (1984). In Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 , 96 S.Ct. 847 , 849, 46 L.Ed.2d 850 , 353 (1975), the Supreme Court made clear that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine was limited and in the absence of a class action, it was applicable only where the following two elements combined: (1) the challenged action was too short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. Weinstein concerned a prisoner’s challenge to the procedures of the North Carolina Board of Parole. The prisoner had been released by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, and in the absence of a demonstrated probability that the prisoner would again be subject to the Board’s supervisory power (thus meeting the second prong of the test), the Court dismissed the challenge as moot.

In contrast to that case, both of the elements necessary to make this case capable of repetition are present in the case sub judiee. This case centers on the effect of Parker’s federal parole on his concurrent Maryland sentence. Because his parole was revoked after we issued our writ of certiorari but before the case was argued, there can be no question that the action was too short in duration to be fully litigated. The second prong of the test is likewise met, as there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would again be subject to the same action.

Unlike Weinstein v. Bradford, here it is entirely reasonable to expect that the federal government might again parole Parker before the expiration of his sentences. 5 In this ⁵⁸⁶ event, the same parties would again find themselves in identical circumstances. 6 The case is clearly “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” and it is therefore not moot. The motion to dismiss is denied. II Turning to the merits of this case, we note that the post-conviction hearing judge ordered Parker’s release based primarily on the reasoning adopted by the Court of Special Appeals in Gantt v. State, supra. The intermediate appellate court likewise relied primarily on Gantt in affirming the post-conviction judge in the instant case.

The lower courts’ reliance on Gantt is error. Gantt v. State concerned a challenge to the imposition of a 15-year sentence, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence from which Gantt was then on parole. The Court of Special Appeals had affirmed the imposition of a consecutive sentence, concluding that “a person who is on parole is actually serving a sentence outside the prison walls.” Id., 81 ⁵⁸⁷ Md.App. at 660, 569 A.2d at 223 . The court did not stop there, but went on to state: “Sentencing judges should be cognizant of the possibility that if the parole authorities (especially in foreign jurisdictions) do not revoke his parole — or until they do — such a defendant given a consecutive sentence to be served upon the termination of an earlier sentence may well remain free from physical restraint until the conclusion of that prior sentence or until a retake warrant is issued by the Department of Parole and Probation.” Id., 81 Md.App. at 661 , 569 A.2d at 224 .

It is this last passage that has been the cause of misunderstanding in the instant case. The Gantt court was correct in its statement that parole constitutes service of the sentence beyond the prison walls, but this characterization, while correct, is incomplete. Parole may well constitute the service of a sentence, and it has been held that a parolee may be considered “in custody” for purposes of asserting standing in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 , 83 S.Ct. 373, 377 , 9 L.Ed.2d 285, 291 (1963).

Yet, parole is fundamentally different in nature from actual service within the prison walls. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a parolee has a liberty interest in continued freedom that an inmate does not possess: “The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and Mends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.

Though the State properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison... ⁵⁸⁸ Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600-01 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494-95 (1972). The fundamental difference between parole and incarceration is further illustrated by the fact that, in many jurisdictions, a parolee may be denied credit for time spent on parole (“street time”) if parole is subsequently revoked. See id. (if parolee is returned to prison, he usually receives no credit for time “served” on parole); Dulier v. State, 789 P.2d 372, 374 (Alaska App.1990) (“a prisoner who remains ‘in custody" for the purpose of maintaining the parole board’s jurisdiction over him may still be deemed ‘at liberty’ for denying credit [for parole not successfully completed]”); Segarra v. State, 430 So.2d 408, 410-11 (Miss.1983); David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Authority of United States Parole Commission to Credit Time Spent on Parole (“Street Time”) Toward Sentence to be Served after Revocation of Parole, 63 A.L.R.Fed. 328 (1983).

Literal interpretation of the language of Gantt would also render meaningless the notion of “constructive parole,” instead requiring intermittent incarceration. If a prisoner is sentenced to consecutive sentences, that individual may be constructively paroled from one sentence so that he or she may begin serving the subsequent sentences. See, e.g., Hines v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 142, 148-49 , 420 A.2d 381, 383 (1980); 59 Am.Jur.2d, Pardon and Parole, § 73, at 60 (1987) (release from one prison may constitute a parole even though a prisoner is immediately sent to another prison under a detainer). Under the Gantt rationale, this prisoner would be released on parole into the community until the termination of the first term, re-incarcerated for service of the second term, released on parole until the termination of that term, etc. This result, far from efficient, can frustrate the punitive purposes of the criminal justice system.

Although a sentence continues to be served whether within prison walls or without, it is clear that parole is different in nature from, and serves a purpose different from that - of, incarceration. To treat the two identically in the context of multiple sentences, as the language of Gantt requires, is ⁵⁸⁹ overly simplistic and may compel a result which is at odds with the principle of dual sovereignty. The illogic of the reasoning of Gantt is illustrated by the hypothetical example of a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in Jurisdiction A and a consecutive sentence of 20 years imprisonment for armed robbery in Jurisdiction B. We will suppose that the prisoner serves 25 years in prison and is granted parole on the life sentence in Jurisdiction A. The literal language of Gantt would prohibit the robbery sentence in Jurisdiction B from beginning until the termination of the life sentence in Jurisdiction A, since the prisoner is effectively serving his term of life imprisonment in Jurisdiction A ‘on the outside.’ Only when that term is complete (i.e., when he dies) would Jurisdiction B be able assert its jurisdiction over the prisoner. Thus, the language in Gantt effectively deprives Jurisdiction B of its ability to punish one who has broken its law.

We will assume further that this same prisoner, while on parole from his life sentence in Jurisdiction A, commits an additional crime in Jurisdiction C for which the punishment is ten years imprisonment. Such a crime may well constitute a parole violation in Jurisdiction A, and we may expect the parole authorities in Jurisdiction A to revoke the prisoner’s parole, but they cannot be compelled to do so. If the parole authorities do not act, the prisoner continues to serve his life sentence from Jurisdiction A ‘on the outside,’ and regardless of whether the sentencing judge from Jurisdiction C deems his sentence concurrent or consecutive to the previous sentences, the prisoner is effectively beyond the reach of the correctional authorities in Jurisdiction C. Like Jurisdiction B, Jurisdiction C is deprived of its ability to punish one who has broken its law. This result violates the principle of dual sovereignty, a fundamental element of the structure of our government. 7 ⁵⁹⁰ We discussed the principle of dual sovereignty at length in Evans v. State, 301 Md. 45 , 481 A.2d 1135 (1984), cert. denied sub nom.

Grandison v. State, 470 U.S. 1034 , 105 S.Ct. 1411 , 84 L.Ed.2d 795 (1985). We there quoted from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131-32 , 79 S.Ct. 676, 682 , 3 L.Ed.2d 684, 691-92 (1959), which in turn quoted the following passage from Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852): “An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law. 14 How., at 19 [ 14 L.Ed. at 309 ]. Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either.

The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both. 14 How., at 20 [ 14 L.Ed. at 309 ]. That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other.” Evans v. State, 301 Md. at 52 , 481 A.2d at 1138 .

Evans concerned state and federal prosecutions for offenses which arose from a single act, namely, the shooting of two individuals. If the dual sovereignty principle will permit successive prosecutions for the same act, it cannot require one jurisdiction to suspend the enforcement of its laws simply because another jurisdiction has already taken action against the same perpetrator. More than a century ago, this Court stated: “[i]f a party has committed a crime against the laws of two States we can perceive no good reason why he should not be punished in both States; and Mr. Bishop in his work on ⁵⁹¹ Criminal Law, sec. 136, very justly says, ‘to let Mm go free of punishment for the felony which he has committed against our laws because he had before committed a similar felony against the laws of another country, is to suffer foreign laws to suspend the action of our own.’ ” Worthington v. State, 58 Md. 403, 410 (1882), quoted in Evans, supra, 301 Md. at 57 , 481 A.2d at 1141 . See also United, States v. Eastman, 758 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir.1985) (federal sentence that provided it would run consecutively to any state sentence subsequently imposed, if given effect, would “preempt the right of the state to apply its own laws on sentencing for violation of state criminal laws”).

It cannot be disputed that “[f]oremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal code.” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 , 106 S.Ct. 433, 439-40 , 88 L.Ed.2d 387, 397 (1985). Yet Gantt , in its statement that, “if parole authorities (especially in foreign jurisdictions) do not revoke his parole[,] ... a defendant given a consecutive sentence to be served upon the termination of an earlier sentence may well remain free from physical restraint until the conclusion of that sentence,” essentially compels the courts of this State to delay punishment of a multi-jurisdiction offender, perhaps indefinitely, subject to the discretionary actions of parole authorities in other jurisdictions. Such a constraint on this State’s authority to punish those who break its laws diminishes a power essential to an independent sovereign. Therefore, to the extent that Gantt treats time spent on parole and time spent in prison identically in the context of multiple sentences, it is disapproved.

III Because Gantt, the primary underpinning of the decisions of both the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals, is disapproved, the focus of this case shifts somewhat from its position in the lower courts. We perceive three Issues which remain to be addressed: the authority of the sentencing judge to direct that Parker’s sentence be served in a federal institu ⁵⁹² tion; the ability of Maryland correctional authorities to reclaim custody of Parker following his release on federal parole; and the effect of the plea agreement on Parker’s sentence. Parker contends that a key element of his agreement to plead guilty to the murder charge was his understanding that he would serve his time in federal, as opposed to state, prison. Unfortunately for Parker, neither the sentencing judge nor the prosecution had any say in where Parker would serve his time.

Leaving aside for the moment the plea bargaining aspect of the case, we note that Parker was convicted (through his guilty plea) of second degree murder, an offense which requires him to be “sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 30 years.” Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 412(c). Article 27, Section 690 provides that “Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this article or any other law to the contrary, judges, in the sentencing of convicted persons for any offense for which the provisions of this article ... require[ ] the imprisonment to be served at any one of those institutions enumerated in § 689 of this article, shall in all such cases sentence such persons to the jurisdiction of the Division of Correction. All such persons shall be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction and delivered to him for imprisonment.” Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 690(b). For an excellent exposition of the history of this provision, see Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 612-18 , 579 A.2d 265, 268-71 (1990).

It is clear from this language that the sentencing judge had no authority to designate the institution in which Parker would serve his sentence, particularly when the desired institution falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government, an independent, co-equal sovereign. This is not to say, however, that the judge had no authority to order that Parker’s state sentence run concurrently with his federal sentence. To the contrary, it is well established that “[a] court has a power to impose whatever ⁵⁹³ sentence it deems fit as long as it does not offend the maximum and minimum penalties. This judicial power includes the determination of whether a sentence 'will be consecutive or concurrent, with the same limitations.” Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 70 , 400 A.2d 419, 422 (1979) (citations omitted).

Designation of Parker’s Maryland sentence as “concurrent” with his federal sentence was essentially a promise to grant him credit against his state sentence for time served in prison under his federal sentence. The Ninth Circuit has explained this well: “The fact that the sentences run concurrently merely means that the convict is given the privilege of serving each day a portion of each sentence, so that in practical effect so far as he is concerned if he serves the sentence and nothing occurs subsequent to the judgment to alter the situation he is discharged at the expiration of the maximum term imposed upon any one of the counts.... Even if the sentences were all for an equal period a pardon of the convict on all but one of the counts would not relieve him from serving the full term imposed upon the count for which no pardon was granted.” Nishimoto v. Nagle, 44 F.2d 304, 305 (9th Cir.1930), disapproved on other grounds, Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 , 68 S.Ct. 374 , 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948). Although Parker was committed to federal custody, Maryland retains penal jurisdiction over Parker, and the fact that the sentencing judge designated Parker’s sentence to run concurrently with his federal sentence does not require Maryland to forfeit its jurisdiction or authority over Parker.

See Milstead v. Rison, 702 F.2d 216, 218 (11th Cir.1983) (Texas did not lose jurisdiction over prisoner by surrendering him to federal authorities for service of concurrent federal sentence); Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245, 246 (5th Cir.1973) (state waives jurisdiction over prisoner by surrendering him to another sovereign only if state’s action is “so affirmatively wrong or its inaction so grossly negligent that it would be unequivocally inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice to require a legal sentence to be served in the aftermath of such action or inaction”); ⁵⁹⁴ Williams v. Department of Corrections, 438 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir.1971) (“if, on appellant’s release from federal custody, where he is now serving both federal and state sentences, time remains unserved on the California sentence, he may properly be removed to California custody”); In re Patterson, 64 Cal.2d 357, 362 , 49 Cal.Rptr. 801, 804 , 411 P.2d 897, 899-900 (1966) (California does not waive jurisdiction over prisoner who was transferred to Texas in order to serve concurrent sentences); People v. Lewis, 193 Colo. 203, 207-08 , 564 P.2d 111, 114 (1977) (transfer of prisoner to Nebraska in order that he may serve Colorado sentence concurrently does not amount to waiver of Colorado’s jurisdiction; if he is released by Nebraska authorities with time remaining on Colorado sentence, he must be returned to Colorado). Maryland also retains the independent authority to determine whether and when Parker is to be released on parole from his state sentence, regardless of any decisions that are made concerning parole from the federal sentence. See Garafola v. Wilkinson, 721 F.2d 420, 424-25 (3d Cir.1983) (“A state prison to which a federal prisoner has been parojed must make an entirely separate and independent judgment whether, under state criteria, the prisoner is entitled to state parole____ Where a prisoner has violated both state and federal law and is convicted by both forums, he has brought down upon himself the possibility of being paroled from federal prison to state prison.”), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 , 104 S.Ct. 1681 , 80 L.Ed.2d 155 (1984). See also Gerberding v. United States, 484 F.2d 1353, 1355 (8th Cir.1973) (finding “no authority or logic that the termination of one concurrent sentence terminates all concurrent sentences”).

But see Brock v. Sowders, 610 S.W.2d 591, 592-93 (Ky.1980) (time served on parole from Indiana sentence satisfies the Kentucky sentence which is to run concurrently with it, so as to prohibit Kentucky officers from detaining the convict when he is released on parole by Indiana). The case sub judice is similar to that presented to Louisiana courts in State ex rel. Bartie v. State, 501 So.2d 260 (La.App. 1 Cir.1986). Bartie had originally been convicted in Texas and ⁵⁹⁵ sentenced to imprisonment.

While serving this sentence, he was delivered to Louisiana authorities to answer pending charges on aggravated assault. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for five years, which sentence was to run concurrently with the Texas term Bartie was then serving. He was returned to Texas authorities to complete his Texas sentence. Bartie was subsequently paroled in Texas and taken into custody by Louisiana authorities to serve the time remaining on his original five-year sentence.

He claimed that he should be free from restraint by Louisiana authorities because he had been paroled from a concurrent sentence by the State of Texas. The Louisiana appellate court adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the trial court, which held: “Mr. Bartie contends that his Texas parole controls the Louisiana sentence. “Mr. Bartie is in error. He cites neither authority nor jurisprudence to support his position, and I frankly know of none. [His] sentence to the Department of Corrections for the State of Louisiana was for a period of five years. That sentence must be satisfied, either by service in Texas or Louisiana, or parole by both states.” State ex rel.

Bartie v. State, 501 So.2d at 263 . Like the Louisiana court, we can find no persuasive authority for the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that “serving the balance of his [federal sentence of] twenty years on parole will satisfy [Parker’s] Maryland sentence,” Parker, supra, 93 Md.App. at 603 , 613 A.2d at 1023 , and we disapprove of the Court of Special Appeals’ reasoning in this case. 8 To ⁵⁹⁶ hold otherwise would be to cede to the federal government one of the foremost of this State’s prerogatives of sovereignty: the power to enforce its criminal code. See Heath v. Alabama, supra, 474 U.S. at 93 , 106 S.Ct. at 439-40 , 88 L.Ed.2d at 397 . If a convict is sentenced to two separate terms of imprisonment, one in federal custody and one in Maryland custody, the designation of the Maryland sentence as concurrent may permit the prisoner to receive credit for the time he serves in federal prison.

Nevertheless, both sentences remain independent, and both sentences must be satisfied independently. The Maryland sentence, designated as concurrent, may be satisfied either by imprisonment in federal custody or in Maryland, or by parole by Maryland authorities. 9 Were it not for the fact that Parker’s sentence arose from a plea agreement, this case would be readily disposed of on the ground that parole from a concurrent federal sentence does not deprive Maryland authorities of their jurisdiction over an individual sentenced under the laws of this state. As it is, the site of Parker’s