State v. Pitt

BELL, C.J. The plea agreement plays a crucial role in the administration of both this State’s and the nation’s criminal justice system. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 692-693 , 357 A.2d 376 (1976). Indeed, courts have stated that plea agreements “eliminate many of the risks, uncertainties and practical burdens of trial, permit the judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their resources on those cases in which they are most needed, and further law enforcement by permitting the State to exchange leniency for information and assistance.” Id. at 693 , 357 A.2d at 381 . See also Brady v. United States, 397 ⁶⁹⁹ U.S. 742, 752, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1471 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 758 (1970), People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227 , 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 , 318 N.E.2d 784 (N.Y.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 (1975).

Therefore, this Court has held that “plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid in the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.” Id. at 693, 357 A.2d 376 , 357 A.2d at 381 . Plea agreements account for the disposition of an overwhelming percentage of all criminal cases. See J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas §§ 1.02, 1.03, 1.07(2) (1975), A. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L.Rev. 931 (Summer 1983) (commenting that in some jurisdictions where plea bargaining has been prohibited, guilty pleas still account for a high percentage of felony convictions), S. Creaton, Plea Agreements: Progressing the Fight Against Crime or Bribing Witnesses?, 5 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 37 (2000) (stating that plea bargains continue to increase in usage, accounting for an overwhelming percentage of guilty pleas in criminal cases), B. Kleinhaus, Two Masters: Evaluating Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, The Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 Fordham L.Rev. 2711 (May 2005) (stating that ninety-six percent of all federal criminal convictions result from a plea agreement by the defendant); see also State v. Rodriguez, 125 Md.App. 428, 446 , 725 A.2d 635, 644 (1999).

Plea bargains aid the system because the number of cases that go to trial are reduced, thus, preventing the courts from becoming flooded and overcrowded. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 , 92 S.Ct. 495, 498 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 432 (1971) (“If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities”). In Maryland, Md. Rule 4-243 prescribes the procedures to be followed and the conditions to be observed regarding plea agreements. Section (a) of that Rule, as relevant, provides: “(a) Conditions for Agreement. ⁷⁰⁰ “(1) Terms.

The defendant may enter into an agreement with the State’s Attorney for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on any proper condition, including one or more of the following: “(A) That the State’s Attorney will amend the charging document to charge a specified offense or add a specified offense, or will file a new charging document; “(B) That the State’s Attorney will enter a nolle prosequi pursuant to Rule 4-247(a) or move to mark certain charges against the defendant stet on the docket pursuant to Rule 4-248(a); “(C) That the State’s Attorney will agree to the entry of a judgment of acquittal on certain charges pending against the defendant; “(D) That the State will not charge the defendant with the commission of certain other offenses; “(E) That the State’s Attorney will recommend, not oppose, or make no comment to the court with respect to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action; “(F) That the parties will submit a plea agreement proposing a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action to a judge for consideration pursuant to section (c) of this Rule.” Section (c) addresses the effect of a plea agreement and, in some circumstances, its disposition. It provides: “(c) Agreements of Sentence, Disposition, or Other Judicial Action. “(1) Presentation to the Court. If a plea agreement has been reached pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(F) of this Rule for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which contemplates a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action, the defense counsel and the State’s Attorney shall advise the judge of the terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge may then accept or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve the agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection until after ⁷⁰¹ such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as the judge directs. “(2) Not Binding on the Court.

The agreement of the State’s Attorney relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action is not binding on the court unless the judge to whom the agreement is presented approves it. “(8) Approval of Plea Agreement. If the plea agreement is approved, the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition more favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the agreement. “(4) Rejection of Plea Agreement. If the plea agreement is rejected, the judge shall inform the parties of this fact and advise the defendant (A) that the court is not bound by the plea agreement; (B) that the defendant may withdraw the plea; and (C) that if the defendant persists in the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the sentence or other disposition of the action may be less favorable than the plea agreement. If the defendant persists in the plea, the court may accept the plea of guilty only pursuant to Rule 4-242(c) and the plea of nolo contendere only pursuant to Rule 4-242(d). “(5) Withdrawal of Plea.

If the defendant withdraws the plea and pleads not guilty, then upon the objection of the defendant or the State made at that time, the judge to whom the agreement was presented may not preside at a subsequent court trial of the defendant on any charges involved in the rejected plea agreement.” It is well settled in Maryland that “plea agreements are at times entitled to judicial enforcement.” Brockman, 277 Md. at 694 , 357 A.2d at 381 . See Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 488, 845 A.2d 1215, 1222 (2004) (holding that where the defendant has not received the benefit of a plea bargain to which he is entitled, the defendant ordinarily may elect to have the bargain specifically enforced or withdraw the guilty ⁷⁰² plea), Jackson v. State, 120 Md.App. 113, 133 , 706 A.2d 156, 166 (1998) (holding that enforcing pleas maintains the interest of the courts in sustaining the credibility of the plea bargaining process and the indispensable role that it plays in the management of an otherwise overwhelming caseload). In fact, our cases, and those of the Court of Special Appeals, make clear that we adhere to, and apply the teachings of, Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 , 92 S.Ct. at 499 , 30 L.Ed.2d at 433 , that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” See, e.g., Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249, 253-255 , 322 A.2d 527 (1974) (holding that when a defendant’s guilty plea rests in part on the prosecution’s promise not to make any recommendation as to sentencing or disposition, and the State violates its promise, the accused has a remedy, he or she may elect to have the guilty plea vacated or allow it to stand and have the agreement enforced at re-sentencing), State v. Bittinger, 314 Md. 96, 101-102 , 549 A.2d 10, 12 (1988) (holding that a defendant successful in challenging the plea must realize that the remedy is ordinarily to place the parties in their original position). The enforceability of the agreement is not the matter at issue in this case; it presents a question involving the admissibility Of statements made by the accused during his plea negotiations.

Such statements generally are inadmissible. Md. Rule 5-410; 1 ⁷⁰³ Fed.R.Evid. 410; 2 see e.g., Elmer v. State, 353 Md. 1 , 724 A.2d 625 (1999) (discussing the application of Md. Rule 5-410), see also United States v. Sockwell, 699 F.2d 213 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied 461 U.S. 936 , 103 S.Ct. 2106 , 77 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983). There are exceptions, however, one of which this Court has recognized. In Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552 , 515 A.2d 1157 (1986), where the plea agreement, which the defendant breached, provided ⁷⁰⁴ that the defendant’s inculpatory statements would be used against him in such an event and the government neither rescinded nor breached the agreement, we held those statements were admissible against the defendant.

Id. at 580 , 515 A.2d at 1171 . On the other hand, in Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58 , 522 A.2d 917 (1987), where the State repudiated the plea agreement, despite recognizing that the State’s “repudiation of the plea agreement----was not improper,” id. at 71 , 522 A.2d at 923 , given the defendant’s failure to pass a polygraph examination, which the trial court concluded was a part of the agreement, id. at 70-71 , 522 A.2d at 923 , the Court reached the opposite conclusion; we held that the inculpatory statements made by the defendant to a grand jury pursuant to the plea agreement were inadmissible at trial. Id. at 82 , 522 A.2d at 928 . The Allgood plea agreement did not contain the provision that was in the plea agreement at issue in Wright , specifying that, in the event of breach, the inculpatory statements could be used against him at trial.

The plea agreement sub judice does. Consequently, we must resolve the proper balance when the defendant breaches the plea agreement and the State, in response, rescinds the agreement. A. Charles Pitt (“Pitt”), the respondent, was arrested on an arrest warrant, prior to the search of his residence pursuant to a search and seizure warrant, issued in connection with the investigation of a burglary of a Joppa, Maryland home. At his initiation and based on his statement that he had “knowledge and information” regarding the Joppa burglary, and his expression of an interest in cutting a deal, a plea agreement was drafted, which, after the respondent was given Miranda warnings, 3 was signed by both the respondent and the lead investigating officer and later by the Assistant State’s Attorney assigned to the case.

Under that agreement, the respondent ⁷⁰⁵ committed “fully and truthfully [to] disclose to the State any and all knowledge and information he may have concerning the investigation [of the Joppa burglary]” and, upon his complete and truthful cooperation, the State agreed to schedule a bond hearing, at which it would recommend personal recognizance for the respondent and, subsequently, to nol pros all charges against the respondent arising from the investigation. The agreement also specifically provided that, in the event of the respondent’s breach, by knowingly withholding evidence from the State or by being less than completely truthful, the State could “prosecute [the respondent] for any offenses in which the State agreed not to prosecute in exchange for cooperation by [the respondent] with the investigation.” It also permitted the State to “use against [the respondent] in all prosecutions the information and documents that he has disclosed to the State during the course of his cooperation.” After the plea agreement was executed, the respondent provided the State with information implicating an acquaintance, Jerome Bagley (“Bagley”), whom he indicated purchased a cellular phone, using a checkbook stolen in the burglary, and had a gold watch from the burglary hanging from the rear view mirror of his automobile. He also informed the State that Bagley had purchased other items with the stolen checks and pawned jewelry, the origin of which he claimed not to have known. Additionally, he accompanied the police to Bagley’s home, where a sketch of the watch hanging from the rear view mirror was made, and identified by the victims.

With this information and corroboration of some of it, the police obtained and executed an arrest warrant for Bagley and a search & seizure warrant for his home. After Bagley was questioned, the lead investigator became concerned that the respondent “may not have told us everything as he was required to do by the agreement. He may have knowledge concerning where the property was and additional information concerning the burglary.” When the respondent was confronted with this concern and requested to ⁷⁰⁶ submit to a polygraph test, 4 the respondent immediately acknowledged that he had not disclosed everything. Moreover, he admitted committing the burglary, with an accomplice.

Nevertheless, the respondent stated that “he wanted to keep his earlier deal,” adding that “he knew more information, but he was going to hold back and he wanted us to honor this deal.” Having been informed of the foregoing, the Assistant State’s Attorney considered the appellant’s contract “null and void due to him not completely disclosing the information.” That conclusion was communicated to the respondent by the lead investigating officer, who informed him that the agreement had been terminated. All of the respondent’s statements to the police with respect to the burglary investigation were admitted at his trial and he was subsequently convicted of first degree burglary, theft over $ 500, and malicious destruction of property. The respondent noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgments of the Circuit Court for Harford County. Pitt v. State, 152 Md.App. 442 , 832 A.2d 267 (2003).

The intermediate appellate court concluded that, although inducements in the context of plea agreements are proper, “when the State rescinded the plea agreement, statements obtained under it immediately lost their voluntary status and became inadmissible at trial.” Id. at 458 , 832 A.2d at 277 . It relied largely on Wright and Allgood . We granted the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari in order to address, and clarify, the admissibility of statements made during plea negotiations when the plea agreement contains a provision making such statements admissible at trial in the event of breach. State v. Pitt, 378 Md. 617 , 837 A.2d 928 (2003).

We shall affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court. ⁷⁰⁷ B. The State claims that neither Wright nor Allgood are directly on point and, thus, are wholly inapplicable. Indeed, it says, they are factually distinguishable from the case sub judice — in Wright , the defendant rescinded the agreement, here, it was the State; in Allgood , the plea agreement did not contain the clause present in Wright , permitting the state to use the inculpatory statements made pursuant to the agreement in the event of breach, in this case, it does. Consequently, the State submits, neither Wright nor Allgood or their combination requires the result reached by the Court of Special Appeals. The State further argues that the pertinent inquiry in resolving the issue of the admissibility of statements made during plea negotiations or in reliance on a plea agreement should be which party breached, rather than which party rescinded, the agreement.

Using that approach, because the respondent breached the plea agreement, the State maintains, the statements are admissible. It submits, moreover, that, even if rescission is determined to be the pertinent inquiry, the respondent, by agreeing to the use of his inculpatory statements against him in the event that he breached the agreement, waived any protection pursuant to the plea agreement. The respondent rejoins that Wright and Allgood are dispositive of this ease. Therefore, he urges, because the State rescinded the plea agreement, his statements were inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief, and, therefore, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress was improper.

The starting point of our analysis is Wright and Allgood . In Wright v. State, the Court of Appeals held that when a defendant reneges on a plea agreement and the plea agreement provides for the use, by the State, against the defendant, of inculpatory statements in that event, statements he made when negotiating and performing the plea agreement were admissible against him at trial, the State having neither rescinded nor breached the agreement. 307 Md. at 584-585 , 515 A.2d at 1173-1174 . Kenneth Coley (“Coley”), one of three co-defendants charged with felony murder, premeditated first ⁷⁰⁸ degree murder, and attempted robbery, had entered into a plea agreement with the State, pursuant to which he agreed to give a full statement and testify both before a grand jury and at trial in exchange for the State’s promise to accept a guilty plea to second degree murder. He made inculpatory statements concerning his role in the charged crimes.

The plea agreement explicitly stated that if Coley broke his promise and breached the plea agreement, the State could use any and all of his statements against him at trial. Coley reneged and rescinded the agreement by pleading not guilty and choosing to stand trial. He moved to suppress all the inculpatory statements he had made, arguing that they were involuntary. Although acknowledging that he had been given Miranda warnings, Coley maintained that his plea was induced by the State’s promise to accept a second degree murder plea. 307 Md. at 579 , 515 A.2d at 1171 .

Thus, he argued, relying on the rule in Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145 , 406 A.2d 415 (1979), 5 his ⁷⁰⁹ statements made in reliance on the rescinded plea agreement were rendered inadmissible as a result of this inducement. Rejecting these contentions, the trial court denied the suppression motion and the statements were admitted at trial. This Court recognized that the circumstances surrounding Coley’s plea agreement negotiation were different from those surrounding the defendant’s confession in Hillard : “Under the principle applied in the LHillard ], if the [State] had simply told Coley that a confession and guilty plea to second degree murder would result in his not being prosecuted for first degree murder, and if Coley had confessed because of that inducement, his confession would be deemed involuntary and inadmissible at his trial. The instant case, however, involves something quite different ...

Here, the inducement by the State took the form of promises under a negotiated plea bargain agreement, made in exchange for Coley’s promises under that agreement. The agreement was sanctioned and regulated by Maryland Rule 4-243. The mutual promises were specifically authorized by Rule 4-243. The State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement.

Finally, the agreement specified that if Coley reneged, his inculpatory statements could be used against him at trial. None of the Maryland cases relied upon involved circumstances like these.” 307 Md. at 584-585 , 515 A.2d at 1173-1174 . Observing that previous Maryland decisions that held that inducements by the State were “improper” did not involve inducements that occurred during a plea negotiation, the Court held, “[i]t would be anomalous.... to hold that the State’s actions were ‘improper’ when they are expressly authorized by law (ie., Rule 4-243) and when the State neither rescinds nor breaches the plea bargain agreement.” 307 Md. at 585 , 515 A.2d at 1174 . ⁷¹⁰ Although the Court recognized that “defendants would be reluctant to enter plea bargaining agreements if the State could thereafter rescind or breach the agreements, and then use at trial the defendant’s inculpatory statement made as part of the agreement,” 307 Md. at 586 , 515 A.2d at 1174-1175 , it also saw that Coley’s plea contained an agreement that provided for such statements to be admitted at trial in the event of breach and that “the State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement.” 307 Md. at 586 , 515 A.2d at 1174-1175 . Concerned that defendants would thereby be encouraged to rescind plea agreements without justification, we declined to extend Hillard to the Coley situation, where the defendant breaches a plea agreement with a provision for the use against the defendant of any inculpatory statement by the State and the State neither breaches nor rescinds the plea agreement.

We concluded that when plea agreements contain a clause that provides for statements made during plea negotiations to be used at trial in the event of a breach by the defendant and the State neither rescinds nor breaches the agreement, such statements are admissible at trial. 307 Md. at 585-587 , 515 A.2d at 1175 . In Allgood v. State, the Court held that, where the State repudiates a plea agreement, inculpatory statements made by the defendant to a grand jury pursuant to that plea agreement are not admissible at trial. Allgood was arrested and charged with, inter alia, first degree murder and robbery with a deadly weapon. He entered into a plea agreement with the State, pursuant to which, in exchange for his truthful testimony and full disclosure of what he knew of the murder, the state would pursue only the manslaughter charge against him and agree to a probationary, rather than a prison, sentence. 6 After accept ⁷¹¹ ing the plea and providing the State with information pursuant to it, the State, suspicious and concerned that Allgood was not being completely forthcoming, demanded that he take a polygraph test.

When Allgood subsequently took the polygraph test and failed, the State, deeming the plea agreement to have been breached by Allgood, 309 Md. at 64 , 522 A.2d at 920 , wrote a letter to Allgood’s attorney “to officially notify you that there is no plea agreement concerning this murder case between the State and your client, George Allgood.” (Emphasis in original). Id. Further, the letter advised: “The [State]____had discussed a plea agreement with you concerning this case which was predicated upon your client successfully passing a polygraph examination administered by Corporal Sheldon of the Maryland State Police. As you are aware, on July 3, 1984, your client took a polygraph examination and Corporal Sheldon found that your client’s answers indicated deception ...

Accordingly, your client’s failure to pass the polygraph examination is a material breach of any plea agreement and renders such agreement null and void. The State intends to call for trial this case as well as the case of the co-Defendant, Michael Walker, on Indictment Nos. 18417201-03 on September 11, 1983 in Part 3. Furthermore, the State intends to take the steps necessary to have George Allgood returned from the Navy to the ⁷¹² Baltimore City Jail pending the trial on September 11, 1984.” Id. Allgood denied breaching the agreement. 7 He moved, on the contrary, to enforce the plea agreement.

That motion was denied, and he was convicted. Comparing Coley’s situation to Allgood’s, this Court found that, “[t]he decisive difference between Coley’s situation and that of Allgood is that the defendant reneged on the agreement in the former but the State terminated the agreement in the latter. In Coley’s case, ‘the State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement.’” 309 Md. at 77 , 522 A.2d at 926 , citing Wright, 307 Md. at 586 , 515 A.2d at 1174 . In Allgood , the State flatly rescinded the agreement in a letter to defense counsel, and thereafter refused to submit the plea agreement to the trial court.

The State proceeded to try Allgood, using his inculpatory statements against him, despite his desire to plead pursuant to the agreement. The Allgood court acknowledged that the Coley plea agreement contained a provision the Allgood plea did not, it “specified that if Coley reneged, his inculpatory statements could be used against him at trial.” 309 Md. at 77 , 522 A.2d at 926 , ⁷¹³ citing Wright, 307 Md. at 585 , 515 A.2d 1157 . Nevertheless, we determined the teachings of Wright to be: “1) When statements are obtained from a defendant upon promises made him by the State by way of a plea bargain agreement, the statements, in the light of Rule 4-243, are not inadmissible per se, under the inducement doctrine, in the State’s case in chief at trial on the merits. “2) When the State rescinds, repudiates, or breaches the plea bargain agreement, for whatever reason, after the statements are so obtained, the statements, as a matter of law, are inadmissible per se in the State’s case in chief at trial on the merits.” 309 Md. at 78 , 522 A.2d at 926-27 . We explained how we arrived at that distillation: “Wright fully appreciated that promises to the defendant of the nature usually encompassed in plea bargain agreements certainly suffice to induce a statement obtained, so that, ordinarily, the inducement most assuredly would be improper.

The intervention of a plea bargain agreement, however, expressly authorized by law, serves to make the inducement proper. Thus, the plea