State v. Priet

Murphy, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole issue in these consolidated criminal cases is whether guilty pleas were accepted in violation of that part of Maryland Rule 731 c which requires questioning of the ²⁶⁹ defendant on the record to determine that the plea is voluntarily entered, "with understanding of the nature of the charge.” Maryland Rule 731 c provides: "The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first questioning the defendant on the record to determine that the plea is made voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. The court may accept the plea of guilty even though the defendant does not admit that he is in fact guilty if the court is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. . ..” In each case, convictions entered upon guilty pleas were reversed by the Court of Special Appeals on the ground that the requisite inquiry contemplated by the rule to determine whether the defendant understood "the nature of the charge” to which he pled guilty was not made. In so concluding, the Court of Special Appeals placed reliance upon our decision in Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444 , 408 A.2d 1302 (1979), a case mandating reversal of a conviction for failure to comply with the requirements governing the waiver of the right to trial by jury, as prescribed by Maryland Rule 735 d. 1 We granted certiorari to consider whether the intermediate appellate court properly interpreted and applied the provisions of Rule 731 c in reversing the convictions in these cases.

I The Priet Case After waiving the reading of the multi-count indictment, Priet, through his counsel, pleaded guilty in the Circuit ²⁷⁰ Court for Baltimore County to robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon. Before accepting the plea, the trial judge (Hormes, J.) questioned Priet at length. He ascertained from Priet’s personal responses to his questions that the defendant was nineteen years old and had a ninth grade education; that he was not then under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any medication; and that he had been in a mental institution for evaluation on two recent occasions. The trial judge said to Priet: "Now, you are asking us to enter a guilty plea to the charge of robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, are you not?” Priet replied, "Yes, sir.” The trial judge then told Priet that upon conviction for the offense, a sentence of twenty years could be imposed.

Priet said he understood. Judge Hormes advised Priet in detail of the various constitutional and statutory rights that he would be waiving if his guilty plea were accepted. Priet said he understood. Judge Hormes then told Priet that if his guilty plea were accepted, there would be no trial but that a "statement” would be read into the record.

Again Priet said he understood. Judge Hormes asked Priet whether his plea was "voluntary,” of his "own free will and without any conditions” and entered because he was "in fact guilty.” Priet responded affirmatively to each of these questions. The trial judge next asked Priet whether, except for the plea agreement, any promises or inducements had been made to him in return for his guilty plea and whether he had been threatened, intimidated, or forced into pleading guilty. Priet responded in the negative.

In response to further questions from the court, Priet acknowledged that he had discussed his guilty plea with his attorney, as well as the relevant facts of the case and possible defenses to the crime. At this point in the dialogue, Judge Hormes said that he was satisfied that the plea was voluntary. The prosecutor then read an agreed statement of facts to the court. It disclosed that Priet and a companion had entered a 7-11 Store and, at the point of a fourteen-inch bayonet, and in the presence of store employees, had taken money from the store’s cash register, together with a traveler’s check and a cigarette coupon.

The statement indicated that Priet was subsequently appre ²⁷¹ hended with the fruits of the crime in his possession, and that eyewitnesses would identify Priet as one of the robbers. The court thereafter entered a verdict of guilty, and sentenced Priet to ten years’ imprisonment. In reversing Priet’s conviction, the Court of Special Appeals said that the record "shows no discussion with the appellant as to the nature of the charge,” as required by Rule 731 c. Priet v. State, 45 Md. App. 1, 3 , 410 A.2d 1107 (1980).

It pointed out that in Countess v. State, supra, we said that Rule 735 required that the inquiry whether the defendant had waived a jury trial must be on the record; that the inquiry must be personally addressed to the defendant and his responses recorded; that it was not sufficient that counsel simply report to the court that he advised the defendant of the information necessary for an effective election; and that the court must know what is told the defendant to be able to evaluate his responses to the information imparted. The court held that our reversal in Countess for violation of Rule 735 required, by analogy, that Priet’s conviction be reversed for violation of Rule 731 c "because the judge did not inquire on the record of the defendant whether he understood the charges to which he pled guilty.” 45 Md. App. at 3 . Noting a similarity of language between Rule 731 c and 735 d, the Court of Special Appeals said: "There is no reason to require a less strict rule when the issue is the acceptance of a guilty plea than when the issue is the waiver of a jury trial. More constitutional rights are waived by a guilty plea than just the right to a jury trial.

A defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to any trial as well as several other constitutional rights.” 45 Md. App. at 3-4 . The court explained that its reversal of Priet’s conviction for non-compliance with Rule 731 c was supported by cases interpreting similar language in Rule 11 of the Federal ²⁷² Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2 citing primarily McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 , 89 S. Ct. 1166 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969), for the proposition that under the federal rule "the trial judge must personally determine whether the defendant understands the nature of the charges.” 45 Md. App. at 5 . The Pincus Case After the first degree murder indictment was read to Pincus, his counsel, as a result of plea negotiations with the State, entered a plea of guilty in the Criminal Court of Baltimore to second degree murder. Before accepting the plea, the trial judge (Karwacki, J.) extensively questioned Pincus.

He ascertained from Pincus’ personal responses to his questions that the defendant was nineteen years old, had a seventh grade education, and had spent a year in a mental institution. Judge Karwacki asked Pincus whether he understood that he had entered a plea of guilty "to a charge that you murdered one Robert Alverson on September 30, 1979, here in Baltimore.” Pincus said he understood and in response to further questions from the court he said that he had participated in the murder. The court thereafter advised Pincus with considerable specificity concerning constitutional and other rights that he would be waiving by pleading guilty. Pincus said he understood.

The court then directed the prosecutor to read the plea agreement aloud and asked Pincus to "listen carefully.” After the agreement was read, Pincus said that he understood that under its terms he would be subject to imprisonment for up to fifteen years, and also understood that it was for the judge to make the ²⁷³ determination as to sentence. Judge Karwacki then elicited further responses from Pincus, showing that the plea was free and voluntary and was not entered as a result of any threats. The prosecutor then asked Pincus whether in answering "Yes” to the court’s questions he understood what the trial judge "was talking about or did you answer 'Yes’ for any other reasons?” Pincus replied, "Basically because I understood all the questions.” The prosecutor then asked Pincus whether he understood the difference between first and second degree murder. Pincus replied that he did and that he had taken the difference in punishment into consideration in pleading guilty to second degree murder.

At the court’s request, the factual basis for Pincus’ plea was thereafter read into the record. It disclosed that the victim and Pincus were neighbors in an apartment house; that Pincus became annoyed with the victim’s banging on his door, trying to sell him things; that Pincus let the victim enter and then stabbed him repeatedly with a knife, after which the victim died. The court concluded that there was a factual basis for the plea and that it was entered freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of its consequences. The court thereupon accepted the plea to second degree murder.

Relying upon Priet and Countess , the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, reversed Pincus’ conviction for failure to comply with Rule 731 c, stating that "there is nothing on the record to show that the trial judge inquired of the defendant whether he understood 'the nature of the charge’ to which he pled guilty.” Pincus v. State, No. 813, September Term, 1979 (Court of Special Appeals, filed February 29, 1980). The Vandiver Case Vandiver entered an Alford-type 3 guilty plea in the Criminal Court of Baltimore to the charge of robbery. Before the ²⁷⁴ plea was accepted by the court (Howard, J.), Vandiver’s counsel questioned him extensively, ascertaining from Vandiver’s responses that he was eighteen years old, had a seventh grade education, was not then under the influence of narcotics or alcohol, and had never been a patient in a mental institution. Vandiver acknowledged in response to counsel’s question that he had discussed "the elements of robbery” with him and understood "what the offense of robbery consist, what burden the State would have to prove” to obtain a conviction for robbery.

He said he understood that robbery was punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and that by pleading guilty, he would be giving up a number of constitutional rights, which his counsel enumerated. Vandiver acknowledged that he had not been threatened or promised anything to plead guilty, except for the plea agreement reached with the prosecution. At the conclusion of this dialogue, the court said that the plea was voluntary, and a statement of stipulated facts was then read into the record. It showed that Vandiver and a companion accosted the victim near her house, threw her to the ground, and took her purse containing a number of valuable items.

As a result of descriptions given of the robbers, Vandiver was apprehended and the stolen items were found in his possession. He was identified by the victim and an eyewitness to the robbery as one of the robbers. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, concluded that Rule 731 c had been violated because there was no showing on the record that Vandiver understood the nature of the offense to which he pled guilty. It reversed •Vandiver’s conviction, citing Priet and Countess as authority.

Vandiver v. State, No. 743, September Term, 1979 (Court of Special Appeals, filed February 22, 1980). II In determining whether there was compliance with Rule 731 c in these cases, it is important to review the state of the Maryland law prior to July 1,1977, the date upon which the ²⁷⁵ rule became effective. Consistent with the requirements of due process, the decisions of this Court have always required that a guilty plea, to be valid, must be entered voluntarily and intelligently. Hudson v. State, 286 Md. 569 , 409 A.2d 692 (1979); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103 , 361 A.2d 113 (1976); Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1 , 73 A. 637 (1909).

The fundamental rule outlined in our cases is that "a plea of guilty may be entered under circumstances showing a voluntary desire on the part of the accused to do so, with an intelligent understanding of the nature of the offense to which he is pleading guilty and the possible consequences of such a plea.” See, e.g., James v. State, 242 Md. 424, 428 , 219 A.2d 17 (1966). It was the law of this State, prior to the adoption of Rule 731 c, that no "specific ritual” was required to be followed by the trial judge "in order to satisfy himself of the voluntary character of the plea and of the fact that the defendant understands the nature and effect of a plea of guilty.” Id. at 428 . In Owens v. State, 243 Md. 719 , 222 A.2d 838 (1966), the Court said that it was the duty of the trial judge to ascertain that the guilty-pleading defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of a guilty plea. In discharging this duty, the trial judge is not required, we said, "ritualistically and personally [to] advise the accused of these matters,” it being sufficient if the defendant is "made aware of the consequences of his guilty plea regardless of the source whence the information comes.” Id. at 721 .

Davis v. State, supra, decided in 1976 (a year prior to the effective date of Rule 731 c), addressed the question "of what information the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires state trial courts to obtain from defendants who plead guilty to criminal charges in order to ensure that the record reflects that they do so voluntarily and intelligently.” 278 Md. at 104 . In that case Judge Digges, for the Court, carefully analyzed the cases bearing on the issue and in particular focused upon whether Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S. Ct. 1709 , 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), required that trial judges, ²⁷⁶ before accepting a guilty plea, must specifically inform the accused on the record that by pleading guilty he was waiving his constitutional rights against compulsory incrimination, to have a jury trial, and to confront his accusers. We concluded that Boykin did not, as a matter of due process, require trial judges to enumerate and obtain a specific on-the-record waiver of these constitutional rights "or go through any particular litany, before accepting a defendant’s guilty plea.” Id. at 114. We said that Boykin required only that the record disclose that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly in order to accord with due process requirements.

We noted that North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), decided after Boykin , stated that "The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” In determining whether there was compliance with this standard, we observed that courts usually looked to the "totality of the circumstances as reflected in the entire record.” 278 Md. at 109 . We held that Davis’ guilty plea, considered on the record taken as a whole, was voluntary and intelligent and therefore was in conformity with the requisite constitutional standard. We concluded our opinion with this statement: "Beyond the constitutional minimum inquiry, however, we encourage trial judges to engage those persons seeking to enter guilty pleas in a dialogue as detailed as time, resources and circumstances permit. Such an on-the-record colloquy should insure beyond cavil that the plea is properly entered, and thus insulate it from successful direct or collateral attack.

For suggested approaches, see, e.g., Call v. McKenzie, W. Va., 220 S.E.2d 665, 670-71 (1975); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial Judge § 4.2 (Tent. Draft, June 1972); Bishop, Guilty Pleas in Wisconsin, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 631 , ²⁷⁷ 654-58 (1975); Bishop, Waivers in Pleas of Guilty, 60 F.R.D. 513 , 532-38 (1974).” Id. at 118.

Rule 731 c, adopted against the background of these cases, plainly comports with the constitutional requirement that guilty pleas must be voluntarily and intelligently entered. The Attorney General argues on behalf of the State that the rule represents nothing more than a codification of the existing law of due process as applied to the voluntariness of a guilty plea. Nothing in the rule, he suggests, requires the trial judge to go through any particular litany before accepting a tendered guilty plea. The Attorney General maintains that the requirements for the waiver of a jury trial, as specifically delineated in Rule 735, and applied by us in Countess , are wholly unrelated to the procedure mandated by Rule 731 c for the taking of guilty pleas.

The State points out that the requirements of Rule 735 governing the waiver of a jury trial are contained in the verbiage of the rule itself and required thereby to be expressly imparted to the defendant to afford him a basic understanding of the nature of a jury trial. Those advisements, as summarized in Countess, supra, 286 Md. at 455, require that the defendant be told "that he has the right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the court without a jury; that whether trial is by a jury or by the court, his guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt; that in a jury trial all 12 jurors must agree that he is so guilty but in a court trial the judge may so find.” The Court of Special Appeals erred in each of these cases, it is argued, when it equated the strict requirements of Rule 735 for a knowing and voluntary waiver of a jury trial with the requirement of Rule 731 c that a guilty-pleading defendant be advised of the "nature of the charge” against him. We are urged to conclude that a case-by-case analysis of the totality of the circumstances, rather than a ritualistic recital of the technical elements of the crime, should determine whether, in compliance with Rule 731 c, the defendant was advised of and understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. ²⁷⁸ The appellees argue that in view of our language in Davis we intended in adopting Rule 731 c to go beyond the constitutional due process standard. They argue that the requirements of Rule 731 c must be interpreted in light of both the Supreme Court due process cases involving guilty pleas and the federal cases interpreting Fed. Rule Crim.

Proc. 11, after which Rule 731 c was patterned. It is urged that Rule 731 c requires the same strict construction as Rule 735 was given in Countess ; hence, as in the waiver of a jury trial under Rule 735, which requires a basic understanding of the nature of a jury trial, so too does Rule 731 c require a "basic understanding” of the nature of the charge before a guilty plea can properly be accepted. The appellees acknowledge that Rule 731 c does not require the trial judge to recite the technical, legal elements of the crime; it does require, they urge, that the trial judge use "whatever language is most effective in the circumstances (considering the defendant’s age, education, level of intelligence) to establish the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the offense.” Appellees contend that a simple explanation of the substance of the charge would suffice to establish an accused’s understanding of the offense, but they claim that this was not done in the cases before us. The appellees rely primarily upon McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 , 89 S. Ct. 1166 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969), and Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 , 96 S. Ct. 2253 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976), both of which we discussed in Davis .

The McCarthy case involved the requirements for acceptance of a guilty plea under Federal Rule 11 (see note 2, supra). In that case, it was conceded that the trial judge did not inform the defendant, as required by the rule, of "the nature of the charge” to which he pled guilty. The Supreme Court, interpreting Rule 11, held that failure to fully adhere to the procedure prescribed by the rule required reversal to permit the defendant to "plead anew” to the charge. Id. at 463-64.

The Court observed that Rule 11 expressly directs the trial judge to determine, among other things, whether the defendant "understands the nature of the charge against him.” ²⁷⁹ The Court said that the procedure embodied in the rule was designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that the defendant’s guilty plea is truly voluntary and, additionally, to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to the voluntariness determination. The Court said that because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary "unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.” Id. at 466. Accordingly, the Court noted that Rule 11 required the district judge to satisfy himself that there was a factual basis for the plea since he had to determine that the conduct which the defendant admitted constituted the offense charged against him to which he had pled guilty. 4 This requirement of Rule 11, involving "the relation between the law and the acts the defendant admits having committed is designed to 'protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.’ ” Id. at 467. The Court recognized that the nature of the inquiry under Rule 11 would "necessarily vary from case to case,” and it declined to "establish any general guidelines other than those expressed in the Rule itself.” Id. at 467 (note 20).

In Henderson v. Morgan, supra, the defendant, described as "retarded” and of substantially below average intelligence, entered the home of a woman at night, intending to collect wages she owed to him; when she awoke and began screaming, the defendant stabbed her to death. He was charged with first-degree murder, i.e., that he "wilfully” murdered the victim, and the indictment was read to him in open court. He pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, i.e., a killing committed with a design to effect death, but without deliberation and premeditation. This charge was never formally made against the defendant and ²⁸⁰ he was never advised by his counsel or the court that an intent to cause death was an essential element of the offense.

The defendant later claimed that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered because he would not have pleaded guilty had he known that an intent to cause the death of the victim was an element of the offense of second-degree murder. The question before the Supreme Court was "whether a defendant may enter a voluntary plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder without being informed that intent to cause the death of his victim was an element of the offense.” Id. at 638 . The Court noted at the outset that the defendant’s lawyer thought manslaughter was the proper charge because the defendant did not intend to kill the victim when he entered her house with a knife. Nevertheless, prior to entry of the defendant’s guilty plea, there was, the Court observed, "no discussion of the elements of the offense of second-degree murder, no indication that the nature of the offense had ever been discussed with respondent, and no reference of any kind to the requirement of intent to cause the death of the victim.” Id. at 642-43 .

The Court considered the government’s argument that the voluntariness of the defendant’s guilty plea should not be determined by requiring "a ritualistic litany of the formal legal elements” of the offense, but rather by "the totality of the circumstances” to determine "whether the substance of the charge, as opposed to its technical elements, was conveyed to the accused.” Id. at 644 . The Court said: We do not disagree with the thrust of petitioner’s argument, but we are persuaded that even under the test which he espouses, this judgment finding respondent guilty of second-degree murder was defective.” Id. (Emphasis supplied). The Court said that "the [defendant’s] plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defen ²⁸¹ dant received 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process,’ ” citing Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329 , 61 S. Ct. 572 , 85 L. Ed. 859 (1941).

Id. at 645. As to this, the Court explained that "[ w]ithout adequate notice of the nature of the charge ... or proof that [the defendant] in fact understood the charge,” the plea could not constitute an intelligent admission of guilt. Id. The Court observed that because a jury could have found the defendant guilty only of manslaughter, a mere admission that the defendant killed the victim did not amount to guilt of second-degree murder.

The Court concluded: "There is nothing in this record that can serve as a substitute for either a finding after trial, or a voluntary admission, that respondent had the requisite intent. Defense counsel did not purport to stipulate to that fact; they did not explain to him that his plea would be an admission of that fact; and he made no factual statement or admission necessarily implying that he had such intent. In these circumstances it is impossible to conclude that his plea to the unexplained charge of second-degree murder was voluntary. "Petitioner argues that affirmance of the Court of Appeals will invite countless collateral attacks on judgments entered on pleas of guilty, since frequently the record will not contain a