State v. Rivenbark

ELDRIDGE, Judge. Under a well-established exception to the hearsay rule, a co-conspirator’s statements made while the conspiracy is in effect and in furtherance of its aims are admissible against fellow conspirators. Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17, 20 , 63 A. 96, 97-98 (1906); Bloomer v. State, 48 Md. 521, 531 (1878). The principal question in the present case concerns whether, after the conspirators have attained their central ¹⁵⁰ objectives, there is an implied subsidiary conspiracy of concealment during which one co-conspirator can continue to bind his confederates with hearsay declarations.

The pertinent facts are as follows. Early on the morning of May 24, 1981, Katherine Buress was beaten to death after intruders bound her hands and feet with shoestrings. Mrs. Buress, a widow, lived alone and was known to possess many large diamonds. For several months, the murder remained unsolved.

Then, in September 1981, Shirley Wilson informed the police that Ronald Johnson, her boyfriend and Mrs. Buress’s nephew, had committed the murder. Later, the authorities began to suspect that Johnson had acted in concert with the defendant, Billy Rivenbark. According to Wilson’s trial testimony, on several occasions in May 1981, Johnson and Rivenbark discussed Mrs. Buress’s diamonds as well as the possibility of robbing a drug dealer’s house. On May 23, 1981, the day before his aunt was murdered, Johnson had demanded that Wilson find him a ski cap, scissors, and a pair of gloves.

Johnson used the scissors to cut holes in the ski cap. At about midnight on the night of May 23rd, Rivenbark roused Johnson, and the two left together. Johnson returned at about 4:00 a.m. After some questioning, he told Wilson that something had gone wrong, that someone had gotten hurt, but that he had his alibi.

Throughout the night and during much of the next day, Johnson periodically dialed a telephone number, listened, and then hung up. At about 4:00 p.m., he indicated to Wilson that the police had found Mrs. Buress’s body. He then explained that he and Rivenbark had intended to burglarize Mrs. Buress’s house, but that their plan had gone awry. Mrs. Buress had discovered them.

Then, to coerce her into revealing the location of her diamonds, Rivenbark had brandished a .22 caliber pistol and ordered Johnson to hit her. Johnson refused and argued with Rivenbark, thus revealing his identity to his aunt. ¹⁵¹ Also on the day after the murder, Wilson met with Rivenbark, who told her: “We got our alibis____As long as everyone stays cool everything will be fine.” Rivenbark suggested that he and Johnson should not see each other for a while and instructed Wilson to tell Johnson “to make sure the stuff was gone.” After receiving this message, Johnson brought a brown bag from his car. Wilson discovered that the bag contained a pair of shoestrings, the ski cap with holes cut out, and a pair of bloody gloves—the same pair that she had given to Johnson the day before. Johnson ordered Wilson to place the bag in a white, plastic bag, which was taken out with the next morning’s trash.

In the months following, Johnson continually beat Wilson to prevent her from disclosing her knowledge of the crime. Because of these beatings, Wilson left Johnson in September 1981, filed assault charges against him, and disclosed to the police his role in Mrs. Buress’s death. The police did not immediately arrest Johnson, so he was not aware that he had become a murder suspect. In November 1981, the police persuaded Wilson to meet with Johnson while wearing a bodywire.

The purpose of the meeting ostensibly was to discuss the assault charges pending against Johnson; however, Wilson managed to elicit from Johnson numerous statements in which he inculpated both himself and Riven-bark in Mrs. Buress’s murder. Shortly after the meeting, Rivenbark and Johnson were charged in the Circuit court for Baltimore County with murder and related offenses. The State introduced Johnson’s November 1981 statements at the separate trials of Johnson and Rivenbark. Johnson was convicted, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.

Johnson v. State, No. 858, September Term 1982 (filed February 3, 1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 48 , 468 A.2d 1013 (1983). Rivenbark was convicted of first degree murder and burglary, but the Court of Special Appeals "eversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of accomplices. Rivenbark v. State, 58 Md.App. 626, 636-637 , 473 A.2d 1329, 1334 (1984). ¹⁵² At Rivenbark’s second trial, the State again introduced Johnson’s recorded statements made to Wilson in November 1981. The jury again found Rivenbark guilty of first degree murder and burglary. 1 Rivenbark was sentenced to imprisonment for life on the murder conviction and twenty years concurrent on the burglary conviction.

The Court of Special Appeals again reversed the murder conviction, but it affirmed the burglary conviction. The intermediate appellate court held that Johnson’s statements were erroneously admitted against Rivenbark. The court rejected the State’s arguments that, as a matter of law, every conspiracy contains an implied, subsidiary conspiracy of silence, and that Johnson’s recorded statements were made during the pend-ency of such an implied conspiracy. Rivenbark v. State, 66 Md.App. 378, 388-389 , 504 A.2d 647, 652 (1986).

The appellate court seemed willing to accept the proposition that, after attainment of the conspiracy’s central objectives, certain concerted acts of concealment might yield an “actual” conspiracy of silence; however, the court concluded that in this case any such conspiracy had ended long before Johnson made the challenged statements. 66 Md.App. at 389 , 504 A.2d at 652-653 . The Court of Special Appeals also held that Rivenbark had effectively appealed only his murder conviction. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed Rivenbark’s burglary conviction. 66 Md.App. at 390 , 504 A.2d at 653 . Both the State and Rivenbark filed petitions for writs of certiorari.

We granted both petitions. I. This Court has never considered whether every criminal conspiracy includes, by implication, a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal evidence of the substantive offense that the ¹⁵³ conspirators agreed to commit. 2 Relying on decisions from other jurisdictions, the Court of Special Appeals rejected this theory. In reaching its decision, however, the court recognized that some courts had reached a contrary result. The leading case. in support of the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion is Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 , 69 S.Ct. 716 , 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949).

In Krulewitch , the Supreme Court held that a co-conspirator’s statement is inadmissible unless it was made before the attainment of the conspiracy’s central objective or “main aim.” 336 U.S. at 443-444 , 69 S.Ct. at 718-719 , 93 L.Ed. at 794-795 . Underlying this decision was a concern that a contrary ruling would lead to an intolerable expansion of the co-conspirator exception. Krulewitch had been charged with a Mann Act violation and with conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. One and one-half months after he had allegedly transported the complaining witness from New York to Florida—indeed, after the witness had returned to New York—she met with Krulewitch’s co-conspirator.

The co-conspirator urged the witness not to talk with government agents until she had consulted a lawyer, and to “[b]e very careful” about what she said. In addition, the co-conspirator stated: “ ‘It would be better for us two girls to take the blame than [Krulewitch] because he couldn’t stand it____’ ” Id. at 441 , 60 S.Ct. at 717, 93 L.Ed. at 793 . Writing for the Court, Justice Black rejected the Government’s argument that, even after conspirators have attained their central objectives, an implicit, subsidiary phase always survives, with concealment ¹⁵⁴ as its sole objective. Such a rule, Justice Black observed, would automatically create a further breach of the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence. “For,” he continued, “plausible arguments could generally be made in conspiracy cases that most out-of-court statements offered in evidence tended to shield co-conspirators.” 336 U.S. at 444 , 69 S.Ct. at 719 , 93 L.Ed. at 794-795 .

Justice Jackson, in an often cited concurring opinion in Krulewitch , found it “difficult to see any logical limit to the ‘implied conspiracy,’ either as to duration or means.” 336 U.S. at 456 , 69 S.Ct. at 724 , 93 L.Ed. at 800 . He explained: “Conspirators, long after the contemplated offense is complete, after perhaps they have fallen out and become enemies, may still incriminate each other by deliberately harmful, but unsworn declarations, or unintentionally by casual conversation out of court.” Ibid. And, he added, “If the law implies an agreement to cooperate in defeating prosecution, it must imply that [the agreement] lasts as long as prosecution is a possibility, and prosecution is a possibility as long as the conspiracy to defeat it is implied to continue.” Ibid. For several decades, the Supreme Court has adhered to the rule and rationale of Krulewitch.

See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 , 94 S.Ct. 2253 , 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 , 77 S.Ct. 963 , 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 , 73 S.Ct. 481 , 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953). Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which embodies the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, is consistent with Krulewitch. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note. Additionally, a significant number of state courts have elected to follow Krulewitch and to reject the theory of an implied, subsidiary conspiracy of concealment.

See, e.g., State v. Yslas, 139 Ariz. 60, 63-64 , 676 P.2d 1118 , 1121-1122 (1984); Smith v. State, 6 Ark. App. 228, 232 , 640 S.W.2d 805, 808 (1982); People v. Saling, 7 Cal.3d 844, 853-854 , 500 P.2d 610, 616 , 103 Cal.Rptr. 698, 704 (1972); Napier v. Commonwealth, 515 S.W.2d 615 , 616 ¹⁵⁵ (Ky. 1974); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 40-41 , 308 A.2d 300, 316 (1973). See also State v. Tilley, 292 N.C. 132, 141 , 232 S.E.2d 433, 440 (1977) (“absent special allegation and proof, the courts will not allow into evidence statements that were made after the attainment of the criminal project on the theory that there existed a secondary and continuing conspiracy to conceal the fact of the first crime”); State v. Davis, 19 Or.App. 446, 450 , 528 P.2d 117, 119 (1974) (holding admissible statements made in connection with affirmative acts of concealment only if such acts directly relate to the disposition of the fruits or the concealment of the traces of the crime, and only if the conspirators initially contemplated performing such acts). On the other hand, some courts have admitted co-conspirator’s statements made after the conspirators had achieved their main aim but in connection with an attempt to conceal evidence of the substantive offense.

See, e.g., Carter v. State, 106 Ga. 372, 376-377 , 32 S.E. 345, 347 (1899); State v. Waterbury, 307 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Iowa 1981); State v. Emory, 116 Kan. 381, 384 , 226 P. 754, 756 (1924); Commonwealth v. Stuart, 207 Mass. 563, 567 , 93 N.E. 825, 826 (1911); People v. Mol, 137 Mich. 692, 707 , 100 N.W. 913 , 918 (1904); State v. Strait, 279 S.W. 109 , 114 (Mo.1925); State v. Arnold, 84 Mont. 348 , 361-362, 275 P. 757 , 760 (1929); Crew v. State, 100 Nev. 38, 46 , 675 P.2d 986, 991 (1984); State v. DeRighter, 145 Ohio St. 552, 558-559 , 62 N.E.2d 332, 335-336 (1945); State v. Crabtree, 655 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983). See also 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 430 (12th ed. 1955); 3 Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, § 864 (5th ed. 1957). Cf People v. Meagher, 70 Ill.App.3d 597, 603-604 , 26 Ill.Dec. 800, 804 , 388 N.E.2d 801, 805 (1979) (“a conspiracy includes subsequent efforts at concealment, but only if those efforts are proximate in time to the commission of the principal crime”). The cases adopting the theory of an implied subsidiary conspiracy to conceal, however, fail to recognize that, in virtually every case, conspirators will attempt to conceal their offense.

As Justice Jackson pointed out in Krule ¹⁵⁶ witch, these attempts at concealment will continue as long as prosecution is a possibility, and prosecution is a possibility as long as the attempts at concealment continue. Thus, under these decisions, virtually