State v. Smith

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge, Specially Assigned. We hold in this appeal that a commissioner of the District Court of Maryland has the power to issue a statement of charges. I A civilian applied to the District Court of Maryland for a statement of charges. The application alleged that Janet Smith had stolen the applicant’s bicycle, valued at $150.

The applicant signed the application in the presence of the commissioner and affirmed that the allegations were true. The commissioner issued a statement of charges which charged Smith with the theft of the bicycle having a value of less than $300 in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 342. He then issued a warrant for the arrest of Smith.

The warrant was duly executed and Smith was taken into custody. When the case came on for trial in the District Court, Smith demanded a jury trial, thereby depriving the District Court of jurisdiction. Md.Code (1973, 1984 Repl. Yol., 1985 Cum.Supp.) § 4-302 (e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

At arraignment in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City Smith made an oral motion to dismiss the statement of charges on the ground that the commissioner had no power to issue it. After receiving written memoranda and hearing oral argument, the court granted the motion and dismissed the statement of charges “without further prejudice to the prosecution.” The State appealed. Smith prayed that we issue a writ of certiorari before judgment by the Court of Special Appeals. The petition presented one question: ⁴⁹² Did the trial court correctly rule that District Court commissioners do not have the power to issue statements of charges?

We granted the petition and ordered the issuance of the writ. Smith then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal was “not specifically provided for by law____” We denied the motion. Smith renews the motion in her brief. The motion is again denied.

II As Smith reads the opinion of the circuit court, one of the grounds of its decision to dismiss the charging document was that the issuance of a statement of charges by a commissioner of the District Court violates the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. She claims that the State did not challenge this conclusion. She urges that the State has therefore waived any objection thereto. She asserts: Because that conclusion, alone, supports the dismissal of the court below of charges against [Smith], the other issues raised by [the State] in this case need not be reached by the Court and for the Court to do so would be to render an advisory opinion.

She declares that “[t]he writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted because [the State] has failed to challenge the holding of the court below that the United States Constitution precludes District Court commissioners from issuing statements of charges and warrants of arrest.” We think that a fair reading of the court’s opinion indicates that the court did call upon the due process clause of the federal constitution. In doing so it relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 , 92 S.Ct. 2119 , 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972) and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , reh. denied, 404 U.S. 874 , 92 S.Ct. 26 , 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971). Although the State does not pinpoint due process as such in its brief, it ⁴⁹³ discusses Shadwick and Coolidge in arguing that the lower court’s conclusions, in reliance on those cases, were incorrect. We think that the State has mounted a challenge to the conclusions reached by the court below, on the basis of due process, sufficient to preserve the matter for appellate review.

Accordingly, we refuse to dismiss the writ of certiorari. Ill When the trial judge decided that a commissioner of the District Court “has no constitutional power to issue and sign a ‘Statement of Charges’,” he said, in rendering the judgment, that the reason the power was lacking was because such a power cannot be necessarily implied in the power to issue warrants of arrest contrary to the constitutional mandate of separation of powers in Maryland, and that such a confluence of powers would violate the principle of a ‘neutral and detached judicial officer’ as required by due process of law. Smith reads this as advancing three reasons why the power to issue statements of charges will not bear constitutional scrutiny: 1) the Constitution of Maryland does not empower a commissioner to issue a statement of charges; 2) the doctrine of separation of powers forbids that function; 3) the exercise of the function violates the due process clause of the federal constitution. We accept Smith’s reading of the opinion as to the reasons on which the judgment was bottomed and approach our review of the propriety of the holding accordingly.

(1) The circuit court determined, and Smith argues, that the Maryland Constitution does not empower a commissioner of the District Court of Maryland to issue a statement of charges. ⁴⁹⁴ (a) The Constitution The District Court of Maryland came into being through the passage of a constitutional amendment proposed by Acts 1969, ch. 789, ratified 3 November 1970, and designated as §§ 41A-41I, Art. IV of the Maryland Constitution. 1 Section 41G requires that there “be district court commissioners in the number and with the qualifications and compensation prescribed by law,” and spells out their authority in these terms: Commissioners may exercise power only with respect to warrants of arrest, or bail or collateral or other terms of pre-trial release pending hearing, or incarceration pending hearing, and then only as prescribed by law or by rule. (b) The Statute The constitutional amendment was implemented by legislation enacted in 1970 and 1971 which established the District Court of Maryland. With respect to the commissioners required by the Constitution, the law, as it is now in effect, declares that “[t]here shall be in each county, at all times, one or more commissioners available for the convenience of the public and police in obtaining charging documents, warrants, or criminal summonses and to advise arrested persons of their rights as required by law.” Md.Code (1973, 1984 Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.1985) § 2-607(c)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 2-607(c)(l) provides that “[a] commissioner shall receive applications and ⁴⁹⁵ determine probable cause for the issuance of charging documents.” Subsection (c)(2) designates further duties: A commissioner shall advise arrested persons of their constitutional rights, set bond or commit persons to jail in default of bond or release them on personal recognizance if circumstances warrant, and conduct investigations and inquiries into the circumstances of any matter presented to him in order to determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of a charging document, warrant, or criminal summons and, in general, perform all the functions of committing magistrates as exercised by the justices of the peace prior to July 5, 1971.

(emphasis added) (c) The Rules The 1970-1971 legislation was promptly implemented by rules adopted by this Court. Under those rules Chapter 700 of the Maryland District Rules govern the procedure in the District Court and before District Court commissioners in all criminal proceedings. MDR 701. Definitions were set out in MDR 702.

Commissioners and District Court judges were considered to be “judicial officers.” Id. at § f. “ ‘Charging document’ means arrest warrant, summons to a defendant, statement of charges, citation, or criminal information.” Id. at § a. “Citation” was defined in section c. The other four charging documents were not defined. The court’s functions with respect to a charging document, set out in MDR 706, generally could be exercised either by a District Court judge or a commissioner; the Rule speaks in terms of a “judicial officer.” An application for an arrest warrant or summons had to be made in writing and signed by the applicant upon oath before a judicial officer. MDR 706, § a.

An arrest warrant was to have been issued upon the application (except where a summons is required or permitted, id. at § c2.) if it appears to “the issuing officer” that there is “probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.” Id. at § cl. “Whenever a ⁴⁹⁶ defendant is arrested without a warrant, the officer in whose custody the defendant is placed for charging shall promptly prepare, or shall supervise the prompt preparation of, a statement of charges against the defendant.” Id. at § c3. The defendant was given a copy of the warrant or the statement of charges. Id. at § d. Except for the command in a warrant to arrest the defendants and the command in a summons for the defendant to appear in court, the required contents of a warrant, a summons and a statement of charges were identical.

Each of them was required by MDR 706, § e to contain: (1) the name of the defendant, or, if his name is unknown, any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty; and (2) a. plain, concise and definite statement of essential facts constituting each offense charged, and each formal charge placed against the defendant; and (3) the identity of the person upon whose application the charging document has been issued; and (4) the date, time and place of execution or service, when such_has been made; and (5) the, signatures of the officers issuing and executing the warrant or serving the summons, or the officer preparing the statement of charges____ The sixth item required in a warrant, a summons and a statement of charges was a statement addressed to the person arrested or summoned informing him of his right to a lawyer and his entitlement to be taken before a judicial officer. MDR 709 provided for the prompt appearance of a defendant before a commissioner or a District Court judge, and prescribed the duties of the judicial officer at that initial appearance. A determination of the defendant’s eligibility for pre-trial release under MDR 777 (Bail and Pretrial Release) was included as a duty. MDR 709, § c.

By order dated 31 January 1977, the Court of Appeals approved and adopted, effective 1 July 1977, a revision of Chapter 700 (Criminal Causes) of the Maryland Rules and ⁴⁹⁷ the Maryland District Rules recommended by the Court’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure in its Fifty-Third Report, together with amendments made thereto by the Court. The rules recommended by the Committee were the product of a project that began in September 1973 “with the goal of reviewing and redrafting the rules in light of the numerous dramatic changes to criminal law in the last decade and to bring the rules into the Twentieth Century.” Fifty-Third Report, supra at p. 1. MDR 701 reminded that the new rules, like the former rules, were to be “construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” We turn to those Maryland District Rules as revised, which relate to commissioners. Definitions were set out in MDR 702.

A District Court commissioner was still embraced within the meaning of “judicial officer.” MDR 702, § f. “ ‘Charging document’ means a written accusation alleging that a defendant has committed an offense.’ Id. at § a. Expressly included in the definition is “a citation, an information, a statement of charges and a traffic adjudication docket.” Id. “Arrest warrant” and “summons,” which were included as charging documents in the former rules, were not mentioned. The Committee explained in its report to the Court of Appeals: The Committee had great conceptual difficulty with summonses and warrants in the District Court because in current practice these documents are, at times, used, as charging documents. The problem was solved by separating charging documents from warrants and summonses in the Rule, and requiring a copy of the charging document to be attached to the warrant or summons as the case may be.

Fifty-Third Report, supra at p. 5. Each of the charging documents were defined, “citation” in § c, “information” in § e, “statement of charges” in § i, and “traffic adjudication docket” in § k. “Statement of charges,” as defined in § i, “means a charging document in which the accusation is made by a peace officer or other person.” “ ‘Warrant’ ⁴⁹⁸ means a written order by a judicial officer directed to a peace officer commanding him to arrest the person named in it or to search for and seize property as described in it.” Id. at § m. Under the revised rules the required contents of a charging document remained essentially the same as they were under the former rule. Compare the 1977 version of Rule 711 with the 1971 version of Rule 706, § e.

MDR 711, § b2 commanded that “[a] statement of charges shall be signed by the peace officer [who files it] or by the judicial officer who files it, authorizing the filing of the charging document.” (Emphasis and brackets in original). MDR 710 prescribed the use of a charging document. Section a flatly declared that “[a]n offense shall be tried only on a charging document.” Section d authorized an offense to “be tried upon a statement of charges filed pursuant to section a or b of MDR 720____” MDR 720 set out the procedure for the issuance of a statement of charges after an arrest and before an arrest. Section a provided for the issuance of a statement of charges after arrest in this fashion: When a defendant is arrested without a warrant, the officer who has custody of the defendant shall forthwith cause a statement of charges to be filed against the defendant.

For the purpose of considering pretrial release of the defendant, the officer shall at the same time, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, file a verified statement of facts showing probable cause that the defendant committed the offense charged. Section b dealt with the issuance of a statement of charges before arrest: Upon a written application made therefor, a judicial officer may file a statement of charges against a defendant. The application shall contain a verified statement by a peace officer or a statement by a person, signed before the judicial officer under oath, which shows probable cause that the defendant committed the offense charged. When a statement of charges was filed with the court, a judicial officer was required to issue a summons or an ⁴⁹⁹ arrest warrant as appropriate, MDR 720, §§ c and e, except when the defendant was in custody for the same offense.

Id. at § hi. A copy of the statement of charges was to be attached to the summons and to the warrant, §§ c and d, and the summons or warrant and the statement of charges had to be served upon the defendant by a peace officer. Id. at § d. A warrant was executed by the arrest of the defendant.

Id. at § f. “A defendant who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall be taken before a [commissioner or District Court judge] without unnecessary delay____” MDR 723, § a. The procedure required of the judicial officer at the defendant’s initial appearance was prescribed in MDR 723, § b at subsections 1-6. The duties of the judicial officer included determining the defendant’s eligiblity for pretrial release, subsection 3 and, in connection therewith, when a defendant was arrested without a warrant, determining whether there was probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an offense. MDR 723, § b4.

Effective 1 July 1984, the Court of Appeals meshed, in major part, the two sets of rules which governed the courts of general jurisdiction and the Maryland District Court. With respect to criminal causes, it rescinded Chapter 700 in each of the Maryland Rules of Procedure and the Maryland District Rules and substituted for them rules under Title 4, Criminal Causes, of the “Maryland Rules.” The rules in Title 4 govern procedure in all criminal matters in both the circuit courts and the District Court, except as otherwise specifically provided. Rule 4-101. The new rules effect no changes from the rules as revised in 1977 which are relevant and material to matters of concern on this appeal.

There is no substantive change in the definition of a “judicial officer,” Rule 4-102(f), a “charging document,” 4-102(a), a “statement of charges,” 4 — 102(i), and a “warrant,” 4-102(7). The requirements as to the content of a charging document remain essentially the same. Rule 4-202(a). Rule 4-202(b) only clarifies what was provided by MDR 711, § b2; the new rule simply ⁵⁰⁰ states: “A statement of charges shall be signed by a peace officer or by a judicial officer.” Rule 4-201(a) perpetuates the prohibition against trying an offense on other than a charging document.

Like revised MDR 710, § d, new Rule 4-201(b) permits an offense to be tried in the District Court on a statement of charges filed as authorized. The authority is set out in Rule 4-211(b) which says in different words what was said in revised MDR 720, §§ a and b. Rule 4-211(b) reads: (1) Before Any Arrest — A judicial officer may file a statement of charges in the District Court against a defendant who has not been arrested for that offense upon written application containing an affidavit showing probable cause that the defendant has committed the offense charged. If not executed by a peace officer, the affidavit shall be made and signed before a judicial officer.

(2) After Arrest — When a defendant is arrested without a warrant, the officer who has custody of the defendant shall forthwith cause a statement of charges to be filed against the defendant in the District Court. At the same time or as soon thereafter as is practicable, the officer shall file an affidavit containing facts showing probable cause that the defendant committed the offense charged. When a statement of charges is filed, the requirements for the issuance of a summons or warrant are the same under Rule 4-212 as they were under MDR 720. As before, a copy of the charging document shall be attached to the summons or warrant, Rule 4-212(b) and (d), and as before, the warrant is executed by the arrest of the defendant.

Rule 4-212(e). The duties of a commissioner and a District Court judge upon a defendant’s initial appearance in court are the same essentially under Rule 4-213(a) as they were under MDR 723, § b. We summarize the function of a District Court commissioner with respect to a statement of charges as prescribed by the rules. A commissioner is not now, and never has ⁵⁰¹ been, required to issue a statement of charges when a defendant is arrested without a warrant.

In such circumstances, it is the obligation of the officer who has custody of the defendant to cause forthwith a statement of charges to be filed. MDR 706, § C3 (1971); MDR 720, § a (1977); Rule 4-211(b)(2) (1984). The 1971 rules did not call for the issuance of a statement of charges when a defendant was arrested under the authority of a warrant or appeared in answer to a summons. In such event he was usually tried on those documents.

It was not until the revision of the rules in 1977 that a commissioner had any function with respect to a statement of charges under the rules. But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). After an arrest, when an officer causes a statement of charges to be filed against the defendant, he shall at the same time or as soon thereafter as is practicable file a verified statement (affidavit) containing facts showing probable cause that the defendant committed the offense charged. MDR 720 a (1977).

See Rule 4-211(b)(2) (1984). The commissioner looks to the statement of charges and affidavit among other things, in determining the eligibility of the defendant for pretrial release. MDR 723, § b4 (1977); Rule 4-216(c) (1984). Before an arrest a commissioner may file a statement of charges upon written application under affidavit showing probable cause that the defendant committed the offense charged.

MDR 720, § b (1977); Rule 4-211(b)(1) (1984). It is this function of the commissioner that the circuit court held constitutionally proscribed. (d) Justices of the Peace and Committing Magistrates As we have seen, the legislature has bestowed upon commissioners of the District Court of Maryland the authority “in general, [to] perform all the functions of committing magistrates as exercised by the justices of the peace prior ⁵⁰² to July 5, 1971.” Md.Code, § 2-607(c)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Justices of the peace have been provided for, or at least referred to, in every Maryland Constitution from the first (1776) to the present (1867) until the abolition of the office by the 1970 constitutional amendment.

See Smith v. State, 210 Md. 440, 443-444 , 124 A.2d 839 (1956); Levin v. Hewes, 118 Md. 624, 638-641 , 86 A. 233 (1912); 1 G. Liebmann, Maryland Practice (District Court Law and Practice) §§ 3-9 (1976); Adkins, The District Court: Past, Present, Future, 3 Md.Bar J. (No. 4) 6, 6-8 (1971). See also Constitutional Revision Study Documents of the Constitutional Convention Commission of Maryland, at 228 and 970-973 (1968). 2 “None of the old English traditions apply to the office of justice of the peace in this State.” 3 Woelfel v. State, 177 Md. 494, 503 , 9 A.2d 826 (1939). The present Constitution gave the Governor the authority to appoint justices of the peace, subject to confirmation by the Senate; their eligibility, fitness, and qualifications were left to the Governor.

But their duties, jurisdiction, and compensation were matters for the General Assembly. Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 18-20 , 194 A. 354 (1937); Humphreys v. Walls, 169 Md. 292, 298-303 , 181 A. 735 (1935). Over 150 years ago E.H. Cummins, Esquire, who had for several years acted in the capacity of a justice of the peace in Baltimore City, felt the need for a compilation of the laws relating to the jurisdiction and duties of a justice of the ⁵⁰³ peace, which were “scattered throughout a mass of legislative provisions.” He wrote a book entitled The Maryland Justice (1825). In his discussion of “criminal process,” he said: Justices of the peace are required, on the part of the state, to assist in bringing to justice all violators of the law, and for this end are invested with very high powers.

They may cause to be arrested, examine, recognize or commit all persons charged with or suspected of any criminal act. Id. at 44. There came to be a proliferation of justices of the peace, and within their ranks the designation of selected justices with special powers. They were given various appellations descriptive of their functions, for example, justices at large, trial magistrates, police justices, magistrates for juvenile causes, and committing magistrates. 4 Committing magistrates were created by Acts 1945, ch. 777.

It directed the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to “appoint for each county in the State one or more Justices of the Peace to be known as ‘Committing Magistrates.’ and such number of justices of the peace at large in the several counties, to be designated ‘Trial Magistrates’ ____” 5 A committing magistrate had “authority, exclusive of that of ordinary justices of the peace, to issue warrants in criminal cases and to set bail or collateral and ⁵⁰⁴ commit to jail in default of the posting thereof in cases involving minor offenses.” Liebmann, supra, at § 5 at 29-30 (emphasis added). This Court said in Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. at 16-17 , 194 A. 354 that trial justices of the peace may issue warrants for offenses within their jurisdiction and in cases of felonies. In response to the request of a committing magistrate to explain the duties of that office, the Attorney General of Maryland replied that the duties of a justice of the peace, known as a committing magistrate, consisted of accepting civil and criminal cases initiated before you and immediately forwarding them to another court for trial, the issuance of warrants in criminal cases, the setting and accepting of bail or collateral and committing to jail in default of the posting thereof in cases involving minor offenses, the taking of acknowledgments on instruments, and the making of arrests for violations of the law committed in your presence. 42 Op.Atty.Gen. 264, 266-267 (1957). The Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration of the Maryland State Bar Association of 20 June 1966, recommended that a State-wide system of courts of limited jurisdiction to be known as district courts be established in Maryland.

The Committee found that arrest warrants were issued by committing magistrates, as well as by trial magistrates, judges of the people’s courts, judges of the Municipal Court of Baltimore City and judges of courts of general jurisdiction. Id. at 20-21 , 194 A. 354 . The Committee urged that judges of the proposed district court “be authorized to appoint commissioners whose duties generally would be to issue arrest warrants and to accept bail or collateral.” Id. at 21 , 194 A. 354 . 6 The Committee on ⁵⁰⁵ Judicial Administration on Establishment of a District Court for Maryland, in its report of 4 June 1963, submitted a proposed constitutional amendment to enable the creation of a District Court and proposed legislation to implement the amendment. The Committee commented that the creation of a commissioner system is “a most important part of the District Court structure.

These officials will be the committing magistrates. They will have authority to issue warrants of arrest, to commit to jail in default of bail, set bond and to exercise all of the functions of the current justices of the peace who are committing magistrates.” Id. at 13 , 194 A. 354 . The commissioner provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment and of the proposed legislation were in substance and, in large part in verbiage, the same as the amendment later ratified and the legislation subsequently enacted. Id. at Appendices A-5 and B-ll.

The constitution submitted in 1968 by the Constitutional Convention was in tune with the Maryland State Bar Association’s proposals, giving commissioners the duties of committing magistrates including powers with respect to warrants of arrest. See Constitutional Convention Committee Memorandum No. JB-1, § 5.11 at 12-13 (prepared by the Committee on the Judicial Branch, 6 November 1967). Beyond question, justices of the peace in Maryland had the power to issue warrants of arrest. This power sifted down to those justices of the peace designated as committing magistrates, and the power was perpetuated in commissioners of the District Court by the constitutional amendment, by the enabling legislation and by the implementing rules of this Court.

(e) The Circuit Court Decision (i) The Constitution and the Statute Despite the power of a commissioner of the District Court of Maryland to issue a warrant of arrest, which we find is bestowed by constitution, statute and rule, the judge below ⁵⁰⁶ decided that a commissioner has no power to issue a statement of charges. He looked at the declaration in Art. IV, § 41G of the Constitution of Maryland that “Commissioners may exercise power only with respect to warrants of arrest ...” and saw the term “warrants of arrest” only in its literal sense. We think that it is perfectly clear that the term “warrants of arrest” encompasses “statements of charges.” Even if this were not readily apparent, as we find it to be, it would become so when the phrase “only with respect to warrants of arrest” is considered along with the phrase that immediately follows, namely “or [with respect to] bail or collateral or other terms of pre-trial release pending hearing, or incarceration pending hearing----” When all of the powers designated are considered, it is readily evident that they comprise the primary powers which were enjoyed by a committing magistrate. The judge below observed that “[t]he drafters of the Constitution did not see fit to include language in the Constitution granting commissioners the powers of the justice of the peace.” It is of no consequence whatsoever that the drafters did not expressly employ the term “justices of the peace” or the term “committing magistrates.” They enumerated with specificity the important powers of a committing magistrate as a specialized justice of the peace, even though they did not refer directly to that office by name.

It follows that when the statute speaks of “all the functions of committing magistrates as exercised by the justices of the peace prior to July 5, 1971,” the Constitution is not violated. The powers specified in the Constitution are the powers which were exercised by committing magistrates. There is no repugnancy between the Constitution and the statutes in this regard. (ii) The Constitution and the Rules This conclusion does not answer the question whether the Maryland Rules depart from the Constitution.

The Constitution speaks only in terms of “warrants of arrest;” the Rules address “statements of charges.” It is not surprising ⁵⁰⁷ that the constitutional amendment and the implementing legislation did not use the nomenclature “statement of charges,” and that the term did not appear in the proposed amendment to the constitution and in the proposed District Court Act recommended by the Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Judicial Administration on Establishment of a District Court of Maryland. See Appendix B of the Committee’s 1968 Report. The amendment as ratified and the legislation as enacted closely followed the proposals. The phrase “statement of charges” was not used in the era of justices of the peace.

A statement of charges as a “charging document” is a creature of the rules of the Court of Appeals. It is our rule that requires a judicial officer to issue and file a statement of charges. The phrase cropped up in the Maryland District Rules which implemented the legislation creating the District Court. As noted, supra, a statement of charges, along with an arrest warrant, summons, citation and criminal information, were defined as charging documents.

MDR 702, § a (1971). The necessity for an additional identifying name in the category of arrest warrant and summons is readily apparent. Both an arrest warrant and a summons were a means of bringing a defendant to trial, the former by enabling his arrest and the latter by commanding his appearance before the court. When, however, a defendant had been arrested without a warrant, neither an arrest warrant nor a summons was necessary or appropriate.

But, in such case, there was no charging document extant on which the defendant could be tried. Therefore, to bring the defendant to trial without the necessity of a State’s Attorney filing an information or a Grand Jury returning an indictment, a statement of charges was devised. It was not intended that it be a completely new creature, entirely separate and distinct from arrest warrants and summonses. This is evident from the fact that each of a statement of charges, a summons and an arrest warrant were required to contain the defendant’s name or description, a statement of the facts constituting the offenses charged, the formal charges placed against the ⁵⁰⁸ defendant, the identity of the person upon whose application the charging document was issued, the date, time and place of execution or service when made, and the name of the