State v. Smith

State of Maryland v. Lamont Smith, No. 30, September Term, 2023, Opinion by Booth, J. ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE UNDER DECLARATION AGAINST PENAL INTEREST—The Supreme Court of Maryland has established a process for admitting certain types of hearsay statements that fall within a particular hearsay exception that is commonly known as the “declaration against penal interest.” State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467 (1996). Under that process, when a proponent seeks to admit presumptively inadmissible hearsay statements that comprise an extended narrative or interview, a trial court must conduct a “parsing analysis” in which the court must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each single declaration or remark. The test for admissibility that the trial court must apply “to each statement within a declaration is whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s circumstances would have believed the statement was adverse to his or her penal interest at the time it was made.” Id. at 492 . A trial court may not simply admit the extended narrative or interview in toto without determining that each statement contained therein was self- inculpatory as to the declarant.

PRESERVATION FOR APPELLATE REVIEW—Where the State sought to admit a 55-minute interview by law enforcement of an individual under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3), and the trial court failed to undertake the parsing process required by Maryland case law in order to admit this particular type of hearsay evidence, defense counsel sufficiently preserved the defendant’s objections for appellate review. Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No.: C-22-CR-19-000554 Argued: May 6, 2024 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 30 September Term, 2023 STATE OF MARYLAND v. LAMONT SMITH Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Biran, J., dissents.

Filed: August 13, 2024 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2025.02.25 14:03:20 -05'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk This Court has established a process for admitting certain types of hearsay statements that fall within a particular hearsay exception that is commonly known as the “declaration against penal interest.” State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467 (1996). 1 Under that process, when a proponent seeks to admit presumptively inadmissible hearsay statements that comprise an extended narrative or interview, a trial court must conduct a “parsing analysis” in which the court must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each single declaration or remark. The test for admissibility that the trial court must apply “to each statement within a declaration is whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s circumstances would have believed the statement was adverse to his or her penal interest at the time it was made.” Id. at 492 . A trial court may not simply admit the extended narrative or interview in toto without first determining that each statement contained therein was self-inculpatory as to the declarant. The trial court’s analysis of each statement “can be a fact-intensive inquiry,” which requires careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved. 2 This may be especially true when a proponent seeks the admission of an extensive narrative or interview containing many individual statements. 1 Although Matusky is our most recent case on this topic, as discussed herein, we first addressed the parsing analysis in State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3 (1987).

And thereafter, the United States Supreme Court adopted a similar approach for admitting this type of hearsay evidence under the federal rules of evidence in Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994). In Matusky, we adopted Williamson and reconciled it with Standifur. 2 Williamson, 512 U.S. at 604 (cleaned up). In this case, the State sought to admit law enforcement’s extensive interview of Mr. Tony Blake (the “Blake Interview”) as a declaration against penal interest in the criminal trial of the Respondent, Mr. Lamont Smith. The interview is 55 minutes long, contains approximately 250 questions from law enforcement to Mr. Blake, and Respondent is mentioned or referenced approximately 88 times.

In seeking its admission, the State acknowledged that some statements contained in the Blake Interview were inculpatory solely as to the Respondent. However, the State urged the trial court to admit the Blake Interview in its entirety because the statements “were so interwoven” that they could not be separated. At the pre-trial hearing, defense counsel objected on several grounds, including disputing that all of the statements were self-inculpatory to Mr. Blake. Defense counsel also disagreed with the State’s “interwoven” theory of admissibility.

After hearing arguments of counsel, the circuit court ruled that the entirety of the Blake Interview was admissible. In doing so, however, the court failed to conduct the parsing analysis required by Matusky. Instead, it treated the interview as a single statement and ruled that it was admissible as a declaration against penal interest. Thereafter, the Blake Interview was admitted at trial and published to the jury over defense counsel’s objection.

Respondent was found guilty on multiple charges involving possession and conspiracy to distribute controlled dangerous substances (“CDS”). On appeal, Respondent argued that the trial court erred in admitting the entire Blake Interview without undertaking the admission process required by Matusky. The State maintained that the Appellate Court could not consider Respondent’s argument because defense counsel did not identify, and request specific redactions of, the 2 inadmissible statements contained within the interview. The Appellate Court rejected the State’s argument and determined that Respondent had adequately preserved his objection to the trial court’s failure to undertake the process required by Matusky.

Smith v. State, 259 Md. App. 622 (2023). That court held that the trial court erred in admitting the entire Blake Interview into evidence, and vacated Respondent’s convictions. Id. at 673 . We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari to answer one question: whether the Appellate Court erred in holding that Respondent adequately preserved his objection to the trial court’s failure to undertake the process required under Matusky for the admission of this particular type of hearsay evidence.

For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that the Appellate Court did not err. On the record before us, we determine that Respondent made sufficient objections to preserve his argument that the trial court failed to undertake the process for admission that is unique to this particular type of hearsay evidence. I Background In the early morning hours of August 9, 2019, law enforcement raided a home in Salisbury, Maryland on suspicion that it was housing a drug trafficking operation. Upon entering the home, officers discovered, among other things, a large amount of CDS, and arrested the residents of the home, Mr. Blake and Mr. Dwight Woods.

They also arrested Respondent, who claimed he was an overnight guest. For approximately one month prior to the raid, the home had been placed under surveillance after receiving information that it was being used for heroin sales. Detective 3 Michael Kirkland, 3 working undercover, made four purchases of CDS from Mr. Woods in July and August 2019. The State charged Respondent in a 42-count indictment with various drug related offenses, including counts of being a drug kingpin to distribute heroin and fentanyl; counts of conspiracy to possess and distribute large amounts of heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and alprazolam; and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition.

The State also brought charges against Mr. Woods but not against Mr. Blake, who was terminally ill and required medical care and supervision. Respondent was acquitted or found not guilty of 30 counts, including all of the drug kingpin charges, but he was convicted of counts for possession and conspiracy to possess heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and alprazolam. The court sentenced Respondent to an aggregate of four years in prison in May 2022. A. The Blake Interview Sergeant Tyler Bennett and Sergeant Jordan Banks 4 conducted an interview of Mr. Blake at his home on August 27, 2019—18 days after the raid.

At Respondent’s criminal trial, a redacted version of the Blake Interview was played and published to the jury over the objection of defense counsel. The State explained at trial that the recording was “not the full continuous interview” because the State had excised portions that it believed “wouldn’t have been relevant[.]” Defense counsel agreed that “[t]he stuff [the State] 3 Detective Kirkland is with the Ocean City Police Department’s Narcotics Unit. Ocean City’s task force assisted the Wicomico County Sheriff’s office “as needed” for undercover police work. 4 As of July and August 2019, Sergeant Bennett and Sergeant Banks were employed by the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office. 4 redacted was stuff that really legitimately, it just shouldn’t come in because it just had nothing to do with this[,]” but maintained that he did not think “any of it is relevant.” Sergeant Bennett and Sergeant Banks began the conversation by telling Mr. Blake that they wanted to talk to him about the case that he was “involved in as a co- defendant[.]” Mr. Blake was seated and wearing nothing but a blanket. The interview was recorded on the body camera of one of the officers.

The officers informed Mr. Blake that the interview was being recorded and read him his Miranda rights. Mr. Blake confirmed that he understood those rights and verbally waived them because he was physically unable to sign a statement. The interview is difficult to follow because of Mr. Blake’s declining health, his generic use of the word “him” to refer to both Respondent and Mr. Woods, and the fact that Mr. Blake was describing the drug distribution operation at different points in time without clarifying the time frame to which he was referring. What is very clear, however, is that the officers’ primary purpose in conducting the interview was to obtain information pertaining to Respondent’s involvement in the drug operation.

Throughout the interview, the officers repeatedly redirected Mr. Blake to questions involving Respondent’s participation in the criminal enterprise. In total, over the course of the approximately 55-minute interview, the officers and Mr. Blake made approximately 88 references to “Mont” or “Lamont” on the redacted version of the Blake Interview that was introduced by the State. 5 5 Respondent is referred to as “Lamont” and “Mont” in the interview. 5 The very first question the officers asked Mr. Blake was: “[s]o what’s going on with Mont?” One officer asked, “[w]hose stuff is it in the house - - that was in the house?” to which Mr. Blake replied, “[t]he boy, Shamir[,]” 6 referring to Mr. Woods. Mr. Blake repeatedly asserted that the drugs seized on the day of the raid belonged to Mr. Woods, and that Mr. Woods “leaves late at night” and “[b]rings it down”; whereas Respondent’s “involvement” was that “[h]e just knows about it.” Mr. Blake stated that “[a]t first” he worked for Respondent, but that Respondent “fell back because he’s ready to start a family with his wife and get married.” The officers asked Mr. Blake about the operational details of the drug enterprise when he first became involved. According to Mr. Blake, for a period of “[c]lose to a year,” Respondent provided him with a cell phone.

Mr. Blake’s duties were to answer the phone, arrange deliveries, and drive to meetings where he would exchange drugs for money. Respondent lived near Baltimore City and would visit Salisbury a few times a week. During these visits, Mr. Blake would give Respondent the proceeds from the drug sales, less expenses and his salary, and Respondent would supply Mr. Blake with new drugs that were prepackaged and ready for sale. Mr. Blake explained that in recent months, he turned money over to, and accepted new drugs from, Mr. Woods, rather than from Respondent.

Mr. Blake stated that because of his deteriorating health, and the fact that he had become “too slow,” Mr. Woods had “demoted” him to having almost no role in the enterprise. Mr. Blake stated that, within 6 Throughout the interview, Mr. Woods is referred to as “Shamir” and “Samir.” 6 the last two months before the raid, Respondent would visit to “take care of [him]” and to “take [him] to the hospital” for medical treatment, and that this was his only interaction with Respondent. Despite being cooperative throughout the interview, Mr. Blake’s answers were often unintelligible, and his narrative was confusing, which prompted the officers to say, “it doesn’t make any sense[,]” or “your story makes no sense”: [SGT. BENNETT]: But how much did he give you at a time here to sell; is what I’m asking?

MR. BLAKE: Which one? [SGT. BENNETT]: Lamont. MR.

BLAKE: Like 15. [SGT. BENNETT]: So he came daily because you said you sold ten a day rough sometimes. MR. BLAKE: No. He would - - when he come down on the weekends, that’s when he would bring to me.

But whenever the boy, Shamir, had, was already down here. [SGT. BENNETT]: Was already stored here? MR. BLAKE: I don’t know where he had it at. [SGT.

BENNETT]: So it doesn’t make any - - it doesn’t make any sense. MR. BLAKE: I told the dude it’s over at Pemberton (phonetic) somewhere but I don’t know where. [SGT. BENNETT]: So he would bring 15 - - it doesn’t make any sense.

Who - - so - - how does the organization work? Who’s in charge? 7 MR. BLAKE: The boy, Shamir, has the stuff. Mont knows the people. [SGT.

BENNETT]: Okay. MR. BLAKE: When he brings it down, he takes it to Pemberton but I don’t know which - - [SGT. BENNETT]: So Mont takes it to Pemberton?

MR. BLAKE: No, the boy - - [SGT. BANKS]: So Samir is his transportation? MR.

BLAKE: - - (indiscernible) - - he’s claiming that he’s - - Shamir has the stuff. [SGT. BENNETT]: This whole conversation makes zero sense. I’m getting - *** [SGT. BENNETT]: I’m getting - - I’m getting a little bit frustrated.

The lack of clarity in Mr. Blake’s responses was heightened by the officers’ attempts to redirect him from the manner in which the enterprise had worked in the past to the present operations. For example, as reflected in the above-described exchange, immediately after Mr. Blake explained the salary he earned from the Respondent at the beginning of the enterprise, one of the officers asked Mr. Blake to clarify “how does the organization work? Who’s in charge?” Mr. Blake responded, “[t]he boy, Shamir, has the stuff. Mont knows the people.” In another instance, Sergeant Banks redirected: [SGT.] BANKS: Mont called the shots and then when you started your - - what happened when your medical health went down?

Who took over your spot when your health went down south. When your health started getting bad? Who took your spot? 8 [MR. BLAKE:] Shamir. [SGT.] BANKS: Okay. [MR.

BLAKE:] I mean, he’s the one that’s been bringing down. [SGT.] BANKS: He’s been transporting it for Mont down here. MR. BLAKE: Yeah. [SGT.] Banks: Okay. [SGT. BENNETT]: So Mont - - so what I’m asking is, Mont’s still at the top.

MR. BLAKE: No, he dropped out because he’s getting ready to get married. Mr. Blake then continued to clarify that, previously, Respondent “was top[,]” but “He dropped down. Samir took over” because Respondent was getting married and “[s]o he said he wasn’t going to do nothing else.” Sergeant Bennett then asked: [SGT.] BENNETT: How long ago was that?

MR. BLAKE: I was demoted. [SGT.] BENNETT: How long ago was that? MR. BLAKE: What?

That Shamir took over? [SGT. BENNETT]: Uh-huh. MR. BLAKE: The trip was like one (indiscernible) the plans for the trip.

So it’s been about two and half, three months. Just before this. [SGT. BENNETT]: Well, this was only - - this was less than a month ago. This was only three weeks ago. 9 Sergeant Bennett continued to press Mr. Blake about Respondent’s role in the enterprise, and eventually narrowed his questions to the few weeks leading up to the raid—during the time in which the house was under surveillance.

However, Mr. Blake appeared unable to follow the questions: [SGT. BENNETT]: Okay. But you know that Mont and Samir and you, up until a few weeks ago, all sold heroin, correct? MR.

BLAKE: No. I stopped. [SGT. BENNETT]: Up until a few weeks ago, you all sold heroin, correct? So it shouldn’t be that big of a surprise if there was heroin when a search warrant was done on Samir and Mont. MR.

BLAKE: No. What I’m saying is I didn’t know it was here because Mont was saying he was leaving to go out of town. [SGT. BENNETT]: I get that. In the State’s motion to admit the interview at trial, the State noted that “[a]t the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Blake suffered a health complication and was transported to the hospital in an ambulance.” B. The State’s Motion to Admit the Blake Interview The State filed a motion to introduce the Blake Interview based upon Mr. Blake’s unavailability under Md. Rule 5-801(a)(4) due to his “failing health,” explaining that it would be “infeasible to transport Mr. Blake to court from his assisted care facility.” The State argued that the Blake Interview, although hearsay, should be admitted under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) as a “statement against interest,” because it “so tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the 10 declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true.” The State contended that Mr. Blake’s testimony was “material” to Mr. Smith’s prosecution. The State also argued that “Mr. Blake’s statement is undoubtedly against his penal interest[]” and that “a reasonable person in his situation would have perceived his statements to be against his interest at the time.” The State further contended that the “corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement,” and that extrinsic evidence supported “Mr. Blake’s telling of events.” In its written motion, the State acknowledged that the court was required to “parse the whole of the statement into its individual, inculpating parts, and other such closely related collateral statements[.]” (Citing State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467 (1996)).

However, the State claimed that “the statements that contain inculpating statements relating to Mr. Blake are so interwoven with the statements that inculpate [Respondent] that they cannot be severed.” The State further contended that the “collateral portions of the statement that are so closely related to the inculpating excerpts” were “equally trustworthy” such that they were “correspondingly admissible” under Rule 5-804(b)(3). Defense counsel filed a response opposing the admission of the Blake Interview into evidence. Defense counsel first contended that the State failed to prove that Mr. Blake was unavailable. Defense counsel also argued that the claimed “interwoven” statements were not against Mr. Blake’s interest and criticized the prosecution for “attempting to . . . get statements made by [Mr. Blake] that implicate [Respondent] into evidence as if they are statements against interest.” The defense also parsed one of Mr. Blake’s statements to illustrate that the statements were not “so interwoven” and were 11 indeed severable and inadmissible: “For instance, if the witness made a statement that he sold $1,000 worth of [h]eroin a week and that heroin was supplied to him by the defendant, the statement against interest is the witness selling heroin and making . . . $1,000, not that the defendant provided it to him.” Defense counsel also pointed out that the statement was vague as to the relevant timeline of events and that counsel would not have the opportunity through cross- examination to show the jury that Mr. Blake was “lessening his involvement in an attempt of not getting charged in this case at the expense of” Respondent.

The court held a hearing on the State’s motion on September 14, 2020. At the hearing, the court asked whether the entire statement was against Mr. Blake’s penal interest, stating, “the issue here is the part of the statement – I mean part of the nuance here is the part of the statement that implicates [Respondent], not the statement where, in effect, [Mr. Blake] implicates himself, correct?” The prosecutor agreed that “there are definitely parts of the statement that are . . . solely against [Respondent’s] interest,” but argued that “in a lot of portions of the interview . . . the statement is against both their interests simultaneously and they are so interwoven that you couldn’t possibly separate the two.” In arguing for admission of the entire interview, the prosecutor relied upon Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 , 605–07 (1994). 7 The prosecutor noted that, as in that case, Mr. Blake was “describing the drug trafficking 7 We discuss Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) in detail infra. 12 organization in excruciating detail. And when you are not the controller or the top level of the drug trafficking organization and you describe its inner workings you necessarily must inculpate other individuals and that is what occurred[.]” The State recognized that “[t]he issue predominantly that Your Honor has to parse out is to whether or not the statements are solely against [Mr. Blake]’s interest. And when they implicate [Mr. Smith] they are not so divorced from those statements, and I don’t think they are divorced.

I think in the majority of the spots in the interview the part where the declarant, Mr. Blake, inculpates himself cannot be divorced from his statements inculpating [Mr. Smith].” Again invoking Williamson, the State argued that “[j]ust because you name somebody else for doing wrong doesn’t, as Justice Scalia said, magically transform it into something that is not admissible.” The State identified examples of evidence that it intended to submit at trial to corroborate the statements in Mr. Blake’s interview, including that: (1) an “undercover officer did four controlled buys” with Mr. Woods, one of which was allegedly arranged by an individual who identified himself as “Mont,” which corroborated Mr. Blake’s assertion that Respondent was still involved after Mr. Woods had taken over the operations; (2) Mr. Woods stated that he traveled out of town to obtain more narcotics, which “corroborate[d] what Mr. Blake said” about Mr. Woods being the one who brought the drugs to Salisbury; and (3) “[t]he car utilized to conduct the undercover buys of [CDS] belong[ed] to Mr. Blake,” which was consistent with Mr. Blake’s statement that Mr. Woods used his car to complete the transaction. 13 At the hearing, defense counsel continued to object to the Blake Interview coming into evidence. Defense counsel challenged the prosecution’s assertion that Mr. Blake’s statements were self-inculpatory and attacked the overall trustworthiness of the Blake Interview on the basis that it was so “ambiguous” and “confusing” as to not be probative. Defense counsel argued that the events described by Mr. Blake were unconnected to a timeframe and described in a sequence in which “Mr. Woods took over the drug operation from” Respondent, who “got out of the business when he got engaged” and was “no longer doing it[.]” Defense counsel asserted that cross-examination of Mr. Blake would be necessary to sort out the timeframe, particularly as to when Respondent withdrew from the organization, stating: “I have no concept of if [the events described] happened a week before, if that happened three months before, [or] if that happened a year before. . . . If I had the ability to cross-examine [Mr. Blake,] we might very well find out that that happened a year ago.” Referring to the statements in the Blake Interview, defense counsel also disputed the “State’s argument that it is so interwoven, [Mr. Blake’s] own inculpating himself and his inculpating my client[,]” as to be admissible under the declaration against interest exception.

The court asked defense counsel if he considered the Blake Interview to be exculpatory of Respondent. Counsel admitted that “I spent a lot of time going back and forth as to whether I should just allow this in,” but explained that overall, the interview was problematic because of the confusing timeframes. 14 After hearing arguments of counsel, the court granted the State’s motion to admit the Blake Interview into evidence as a declaration against penal interest. The court had no trouble determining that Mr. Blake was unavailable. 8 The court stated that “the bigger question is whether under 5-804(b)(3) his statement should be admissible at trial.” In explaining its ruling, the court stated: I don’t question whether or not his statement is a statement against interest, I also don’t necessarily question the reliability of it. I do think the sort of interesting segue obviously is obviously whether or not that statement that then ties in [Respondent] should be admissible at his trial . . . .

I have looked, I know my law clerk has looked, I think the State and [defense counsel] have looked to find a Maryland case on point and I don’t think any of us have been successful. [The State] cited to the Williamson case, which I have not reviewed for this case but I have reviewed previously. The Court would note that Justice Scalia’s concurrence does seem to be on point. So the Court is going to grant the State’s request to allow the statement to be heard. C. Jury Trial Respondent’s jury trial occurred over two days in April 2022.

Given that the only issue before us pertains to the State’s assertion that the Appellate Court incorrectly decided a preservation issue, we provide only a cursory overview of the evidence for context. Detective Kirkland testified that, as an undercover officer, he made four controlled purchases of heroin from Mr. Woods in July and August 2019. He initiated the first 8 The circuit court explained that “in my review of [Mr. Blake’s] health conditions or his physical condition on the video as well as [the assistant state’s attorney’s] proffer of [Mr. Blake’s] current physical condition, as well as the list of the medical conditions that he’s suffering from as well as his placement in the assisted living sort of facility indicate his unavailability for trial.” 15 transaction by calling a phone number and arranging the purchase with Mr. Blake and Mr. Woods. The purchase occurred in a bathroom at a grocery store.

For the second purchase, Detective Kirkland called the same phone number, but this time a “different male” answered the phone and said that “his name was Mont,” and instructed him to call a different number for Mr. Woods. Detective Kirkland called the number and arranged a purchase from Mr. Woods inside Detective Kirkland’s car at a nearby gas station. Thereafter, Detective Kirkland arranged two more purchases with Mr. Woods. Sergeant Bennett testified concerning the investigation into the drug operation and identified the targets of his investigation as Mr. Blake, Respondent, and Mr. Woods.

He testified concerning the circumstances surrounding the Blake Interview. Defense counsel noted a standing objection to Sergeant Bennett’s testimony about the content of the interview and objected again when the State introduced the Blake Interview into evidence. Defense counsel’s objections were overruled, and the Blake Interview was admitted into evidence and published to the jury. 9 9 The State also introduced the testimony of five other witnesses. Detective Burley Williams and Sergeant Banks, both with the Wicomico County Sherriff’s Office, testified about their participation in the surveillance of the enterprise, corroborated Detective Kirkland’s testimony concerning the purchases, and established the chain of custody for the purchases that were sent for laboratory analysis.

On the second day of trial, the State called Detective Andrew Riggin, who testified that he obtained the search and seizure warrant and then conducted the raid on the house. His testimony primarily related to the layout of the house and the items that were seized. He also testified that during the surveillance, he saw Respondent at the house approximately four times, but that he saw Mr. Woods and Mr. Blake there more often. Jessica Bullis, a forensic chemist, testified that she performed the laboratory testing of the suspected narcotics received from the controlled purchases and that her testing revealed the presence of heroin and fentanyl.

She also identified the CDS that were seized in the raid, which 16 After the State rested, Respondent moved for a judgment of acquittal as to all counts. The circuit court granted the motion as to counts 6 (conspiracy to distribute fentanyl), 21 (possession of more than 28 grams of heroin), 22 (possession of more than 5 grams of fentanyl), 23 (conspiracy to possess more than 28 grams of heroin), 24 (conspiracy to possess more than 5 grams of fentanyl), and 25 (conspiracy to possess more than 28 grams of heroin), but denied the motion as to the remaining counts. Respondent testified in his own defense. He testified that he had known Mr. Blake since the early- to mid-1990s and that they were friends.

He explained that he knew Mr. Woods through Mr. Blake and was aware that they both sold drugs. Although Respondent admitted that he had previously been convicted of certain drug-related felonies, including heroin distribution, he consistently denied that he had any involvement with Mr. Woods’s drug sales. Respondent testified that he did not live at the house in which the raid took place, but he visited from time-to-time to take Mr. Blake to his medical appointments. He explained that he was at the house on the night of the raid because he was taking care of Mr. Blake and was going to drive his mother-in-law for a family trip.

Respondent testified that none of the ammunition or drugs that were seized during the raid belonged to him. included heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and alprazolam. Lastly, Michael Daugherty, a special investigator for the Wicomico County State’s Attorney’s Office, was qualified as an expert in drug valuation, identification, investigations, and the common practices of users and dealers of CDS and drugs. He testified to the street value of the seized evidence and to the organizational structure of the drug enterprise. 17 After the defense rested, Respondent again moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had failed to prove a necessary element of the drug kingpin charges, specifically, the threshold amount of heroin and fentanyl. The court granted the motion as to count 12 (possession with intent to distribute alprazolam), but denied the motion as to the remaining counts.

Thereafter, the jury found Respondent guilty on twelve counts—counts 30 through 33 (possession of CDS other than marijuana) and counts 34 through 41 (conspiracy to possess CDS other than marijuana). Respondent was either acquitted by the court or found not guilty by the jury of the remaining 30 counts. The court imposed four one-year sentences for the CDS possession charges (counts 30–33) to be served consecutively. Moreover, after merging the eight conspiracy convictions into four (counts 34–41), the trial judge imposed one-year sentences for each.

Since the sentences for the conspiracy convictions were to be served concurrently with the sentences for the possession convictions, however, Mr. Smith’s aggregate sentence was four years of incarceration. The court granted Respondent credit for time served from his arrest in the raid on August 9, 2019. D. The Appellate Court of Maryland Respondent timely appealed his convictions to the Appellate Court of Maryland. He argued that the trial court erred by admitting the Blake Interview in its entirety as a declaration against penal interest without undertaking the parsing analysis required by Matusky.

The Appellate Court agreed with Respondent and held that “the trial court erred by admitting the entire version of the Blake interview offered by the State under the 18 statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) without parsing the narrative and redacting those portions not genuinely self- inculpatory as to Mr. Blake.” Smith v. State, 259 Md. App. 622 , 632–33 (2022) (emphasis in original). The Appellate Court held that under Matusky, the trial court “needed to inquire whether each of the statements in the Blake Interview was truly self-inculpatory.” Id. at 633 . The court held that while some statements could be deemed equally inculpatory of Mr. Blake and Respondent, “other statements could not be considered genuinely inculpatory of Mr. Blake because they merely served to shift blame for the present workings of the enterprise.” Id. Relevant to the issue now before us, the Appellate Court rejected the State’s preservation argument. 10 While the court recognized that it is generally “the obligation of the party seeking redaction to raise the issue to the judge,” it concluded that “the present case is ultimately governed by Matusky[.]” Id. at 670–71.

The Appellate Court rejected the State’s harmless error argument and vacated Mr. Smith’s convictions. 11 10 Additionally, the Appellate Court held that Respondent waived any argument as to whether the admission of the Blake Interview violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as his objection to its admission was contained to the Maryland Rules. Smith v. State, 259 Md. App. 622 , 646–67 (2023). Lastly, the Appellate Court held that “the State presented sufficient corroborating circumstances to permit the admission of portions of the Blake Interview[,]” as required by Maryland Rule 5- 804(b)(3). Id. at 667 .

These issues are not presently before this Court. 11 On August 24, 2023, the State filed a motion for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Woodlin v. State, 484 Md. 253 (2023), which was published the same 19 Thereafter, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari asserting that the Appellate Court erred in holding that Respondent adequately preserved his objection to the trial court’s failure to undertake the process for admission of this particular type of hearsay evidence. II Standard of Review This case involves a circuit court’s admission of hearsay statements that were part of an extended narrative or interview that the State sought to introduce at trial pursuant to the declaration against penal interest exception under Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3). Our case law establishes a process that a trial court must undertake before admitting this particular type of evidence. The State contends that the Appellate Court erred in its interpretation of our case law, and in doing so, “created a new exception” to “the general rule[,]” that the State asserts arises under case law, that imposes a duty on the opponent of the admission of the evidence to request redaction in order to properly raise a “failure-to- redact” claim.

Where an issue involves the application of Maryland case law, we determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review. Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 569 (2020). day as the Appellate Court’s decision in this case. The Appellate Court denied the State’s motion. 20 III Discussion Before turning to the State’s preservation argument, we provide an overview of the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, as well as the particular process that a trial court is required to undertake when considering the statements contained within an extended interview or narrative in this context—a process that uniquely applies only to this particular type of hearsay evidence. A. Hearsay and the Declaration Against Penal Interest Exception Hearsay is “a statement,[12] other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Md. Rule 5-801(c).

Hearsay is inadmissible “[e]xcept as provided by [the Maryland R]ules or permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes[.]” Md. Rule 5-802. In State v. Galicia, 479 Md. 341, 354 (2022), we explained that the default exclusion of hearsay is premised on the theory that out-of-court statements are subject to particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he might have misperceived the events which he relates; he might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or taken out of context by the listener. And the ways in which these dangers are minimized for in-court statements—the oath, the witness’ awareness of the gravity of the proceedings, the jury’s ability to observe the witness’ demeanor, and, most importantly, the right of the opponent to cross- examine—are generally absent for things said out of court. 12 Maryland Rule 5-801(a) provides: “A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.” 21 Id.

(quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598 ). Thus, hearsay is presumptively inadmissible evidence. If, and only if, the proponent for the admission of the hearsay satisfies the requirements of one of a myriad of exceptions to the general exclusion rule, can it be admitted at trial. Curtis v. State, 259 Md. App. 283 , 314 (2023) (“It is well-established in our jurisprudence that hearsay will be excluded, unless the proponent demonstrates its probable trustworthiness by establishing that a recognized exception to the rule against admissibility is applicable.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)); see also, e.g., Md. Rules 5-802.1 through 5-804.

One such exception is the declaration against penal interest, which allows for the admission of certain out-of-court statements that have the tendency to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Even prior to the codification of the Rules of Evidence in Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure in 1994, we long recognized this exception. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446 (1983); Merrick v. State, 283 Md. 1 (1978); Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446 (1946).

This exception is based on the general premise that “persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.” State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 11 (1987) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note); see also West v. State, 124 Md. App. 147, 166 (1998) (“The rationale for admission of [declarations against penal interest] is that there is a circumstantial guarantee of sincerity when one makes a statement adverse to one’s interest.” (citations omitted)); Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 802[E] (5th ed. 2020) (“This exception is based on the 22 theory that it is unlikely that a person will make a false statement that could be used to bring about . . . a loss of liberty.”). This exception, now codified as Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3), requires the declarant to be unavailable, 13 and provides that the following is “not excluded by the hearsay rule”: A statement which was at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant’s . . . proprietary interest, so tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered in a criminal case is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. For a statement to be admissible under Rule 5-804(b)(3), the proponent of the evidence has the burden to demonstrate, and the trial court must determine that “(1) the declarant is unavailable, (2) the statement is genuinely adverse to the declarant’s penal interest, and (3) corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” Galicia, 479 Md. at 359 .

Some statements that appear to be against the declarant’s penal interest are actually ones for which the declarant may reap the most benefit—specifically, statements that inculpate both the declarant and another person. This Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that a hearsay statement that implicates a codefendant is particularly unreliable: [W]e must treat as “inevitably suspect” a statement made to persons in authority and implicating a codefendant, even though the statement also 13 A declarant is unavailable if he or she, among other things, “is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity[.]” Md. Rule 5-804(a)(4). 23 contains an admission of the declarant’s culpability . . . . A defendant implicating his confederate may do so to curry favor with the authorities, to achieve a plea bargain, to shift the blame by showing that another was more culpable, or simply to have another with whom to share the blame. Standifur, 310 Md. at 13 (quoting Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 1990 (1987)).

Because of this inherent unreliability, when determining whether a statement is sufficiently self-inculpatory to qualify under the exception, the court should consider “the content of the statement in the light of all known and relevant circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and all relevant information concerning the declarant.” Id. at 17. B. The Trial Court’s Duty to Parse Each Statement in a Narrative The United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that when a proponent seeks to admit an extended declaration or narrative under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule—such as the extended narrative in the Blake Interview—it may not be admitted without evaluating each statement and excluding those that do not inculpate the declarant. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600 (holding that, under the federal rule analogous to Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3), the trial court erred by admitting the entire declaration without determining whether each statement was inculpatory of the declarant); Matusky, 343 Md. at 485, 491 (holding that a statement-by- statement analysis was required under the common law and Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3) and adopting Williamson as a persuasive interpretation of Maryland law). As we explain below, when presented with an extended hearsay narrative, these cases require that the trial court analyze each statement to determine whether a reasonable person in the 24 declarant’s position would have believed it to be adverse to their penal interest when the declarant made it, “determin[ing] the separate admissibility of each single declaration or remark.” Matusky, 343 Md. at 492 (quoting State v. Mason, 460 S.E.2d 36, 45 (W. Va. 1995)) (cleaned up).

Although our decision in Matusky is the most recent articulation of the process that the trial court is required to undertake, we summarize cases that preceded it as we adopted the framework established in those cases. State v. Standifur In Standifur, which was decided prior to the adoption of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, we addressed the necessity of parsing each self-inculpatory part of a larger hearsay narrative for the first time. 310 Md. 3 (1987). In that case, a declarant-witness who had illegally purchased a gun that was used in a burglary gave a statement to law enforcement. Id. at 6–7.

At trial, the declarant-witness was unavailable, and a state trooper was permitted to recount his statements as declarations against penal interest. Id. at 8 . The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, and this Court affirmed that decision. Id. at 9 .

After explaining the rationale of the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, we explained that “[i]nculpatory statements may be divided into collateral and noncollateral statements.” Id. at 15 . Noncollateral statements are those “in which the facts inculpating the defendant are found in the portion of the statement directly against the declarant’s interest.” Id. at 15–16. By contrast, collateral statements are those “in which the inculpatory material is not found in the portion of the statement 25 directly against the declarant’s interest, but instead appears in another portion of the statement.” Id. at 16 . We then outlined the process for analyzing the admissibility of a hearsay statement offered as a declaration against penal interest.

Id. at 17 . In its opinion below, the Appellate Court succinctly summarized the analytical test that we set forth in Standifur, which we can summarize no better: (1) Unavailability. The trial court must find that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. (2) Penal Interest/Nature of the Statement as Whole.

The trial court— considering “the content of the statement in the light of all known and relevant circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and all relevant information concerning the declarant”—must “determine whether the statement was in fact against the declarant’s penal interest and whether a reasonable person in the situation of the declarant would have perceived that it was against his penal interest at the time it was made.” (3) Reliability. The trial court must then “consider whether there are present any other facts or circumstances, including those indicating a motive to falsify on the part of the declarant, that so cut against the presumption of reliability normally attending a declaration against interest that the statements should not be admitted.” (4) Final Inquiry/Parsing. Finally, “a statement against interest that survives this analysis, and those related statements so closely connected with it as to be equally trustworthy, are admissible as declarations against interest.”[14] Smith, 259 Md. App. at 659–60 (quoting Standifur, 310 Md. at 12, 17 ) (emphasis omitted in part) (footnote omitted). Applying this framework, this Court concluded that the 14 As we discuss herein, Matusky modified this fourth step pertaining to “collateral statements.” Under Matusky, each statement in the narrative is required to satisfy the admissibility requirements. 26 declarant-witness’s statement should not have been admitted into evidence because the evidence was insufficient to prove that a reasonable person in his position “would have understood the disserving nature of the statement[,]” and “the totality of circumstances under which the statement was made militate[d] against a finding of the requisite reliability.” Standifur, 310 Md. at 17 .

Williamson v. United States A few years later, in Williamson v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of a codefendant’s partially self-inculpatory statement as a declaration against penal interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 512 U.S. 594 (1994). There, the declarant, Harris, was arrested after he was discovered with a large quantity of cocaine in the trunk of his rental car. Id. at 596 . During an interview with law enforcement officers, Harris indicated, among other things, that the cocaine belonged to Williamson and that Harris was simply a courier.

Id. at 596–97. Williamson was subsequently charged with various drug offenses. Id. At Williamson’s trial, Harris refused to testify and, thus, the trial court permitted one of the officers who interviewed Harris to testify as to Harris’s statements, concluding that they were admissible under Fed. R. 804(b)(3).

Id. at 597–98. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the statements were not properly admitted. Id. at 598 . The Court narrowly construed the word “statement” contained in the rule to mean “a single declaration or remark,” as opposed to an extended declaration or narrative.

Id. at 599 . The Court explained that “the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it 27 does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” Id. at 600–01. The Court went on to state that there was “no reason why collateral statements, even ones that are neutral as to interest . . . should be treated any differently from other hearsay statements that are generally excluded,” and the only consideration is whether each statement in the broader narrative is itself a statement against the declarant’s penal interest. Id.

The Court emphasized that a trial court “may not just assume[,] for purposes of” the rule, that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone else. “[T]he arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant’s statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.” Id. at 601 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986)). As applied to Williamson’s case, the Court determined that while some portions of Harris’s confession could be admissible under the Rule as sufficiently self-inculpatory, others would not be, “especially the parts that implicated Williamson, [but] did little to subject Harris himself to criminal liability.” Id. at 604 . Because the record demonstrated that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals “inquired whether each of the statements in Harris’ confession was truly self-inculpatory[,]” the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals “to conduct this inquiry in the first instance.” Id.

The Court observed that a court’s analysis of each statement “can be a fact-intensive inquiry, which . . . require[s] careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved[.]” Id. 28 Justice Scalia concurred and wrote to expound his view that the statement against penal interest exception may properly cover statements that inculpate both the declarant and co-conspirator. Id. at 605–07 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his view, a declarant’s statement is not magically transformed from a statement against penal interest into one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant names another person or implicates a possible codefendant. For example, if a lieutenant in an organized crime operation described the inner workings of an extortion and protection racket, naming some of the other actors and thereby inculpating himself on racketeering and/or conspiracy charges, I have no doubt that some of those remarks could be admitted as statements against penal interest.

Of course, naming another person, if done, for example, in a context where the declarant is minimizing culpability or criminal exposure, can bear on whether the statement meets the Rule 804(b)(3) standard. The relevant inquiry, however—and one that is not furthered by clouding the waters with manufactured categories such as “collateral neutral” and “collateral self-serving,” . . . must always be whether the particular remark at issue (and not the extended narrative) meets the standard set forth in the Rule. Id. at 606–07 (emphasis in original). State v. Matusky Following Williamson, we returned to the issue of parsing in State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467 (1996).

We adopted Williamson and reconciled it with Standifur. In that case, the respondent was charged with two counts of first-degree murder. Id. at 470 . His codefendant had previously confessed to his fiancée that the respondent committed the murder, but that he (the codefendant) was merely the getaway driver.

Id. at 471 . While the codefendant’s fiancée initially told police that the codefendant was with her for the entire day of the murder, she recanted this statement and recounted the codefendant’s statements to the police. Id. The respondent and the codefendant were ultimately charged with two counts of first-degree murder.

Id. At the respondent’s trial, the 29 codefendant asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and, thus, was an unavailable witness. Id. As a result, the trial court permitted the fiancée to testify as to what the codefendant told her about the events in question, finding that the declaration against penal interest exception applied.

Id. at 471–72. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, reasoning that the trial court should not have admitted the codefendant’s statement in its entirety because portions of the statement were not self-inculpatory, especially those which identified the respondent as the killer and discussed his motive. Matusky v. State, 105 Md. App. 389, 403 (1995). We agreed with the Appellate Court’s analysis, affirmed its decision, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Matusky, 343 Md. at 475–76, 492. In our opinion, we relied heavily upon our opinion in Standifur, re-affirming the framework that we outlined in that case. Id. at 479–83. We explained that the “final inquiry” under Standifur’s declaration against penal interest analysis requires “that the trial judge parse the entire declaration to determine which portions of it are directly contrary to the declarant’s penal interest, and which collateral portions are so closely related as to be equally trustworthy.” Id. at 482 .

Applying this standard, we held that “the trial court erroneously admitted [the fiancée]’s testimony in toto rather than analyzing the declaration statement by statement to determine whether collateral portions of [the codefendant’s] account should be redacted.” Id. at 485 . We explained that “the trial court should have redacted those portions of [the codefendant’s] declaration identifying [the respondent] as the murderer and suggesting [the respondent’s] motive for the crime” because those “portions of the declaration did not directly incriminate” him 30 and simply “serve[d] to shift blame from [the codefendant] to [the respondent].” Id. Thus, “[b]ecause the trial court failed to properly analyze [the codefendant’s] hearsay declaration,” we reversed the respondent’s convictions. Id.

Because the respondent’s trial on remand would be governed by the newly effective Maryland Rules, including Rule 8-403(b)(3), we also discussed Williamson. Although we noted that it was merely persuasive authority insofar as it interpreted federal evidentiary procedure, we “adopt[ed] it as part of Maryland law, in accord with a number of other states.” Id. at 489–90. In adopting Williamson, we recognized that our Standifur framework needed tweaking. We observed that “[t]he central distinction between the Williamson approach and our approach in Standifur is that ‘proximity’ between the self- inculpatory and ‘collateral’ portions no longer guarantee[d] admissibility.” Id. at 491 .

We recited with approval the Delaware Supreme Court’s observations in connection with that court’s adoption of Williamson: [T]here is no theoretical basis for the admission of neutral, collateral statements. Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible. . . . A hearsay declaration is admissible, usually under a specific exception only where the declaration has some theoretical basis making it inherently trustworthy. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).

Thus, absent some special indicia of reliability and trustworthiness, hearsay statements are inadmissible. Neutral, collateral statements enjoy no such guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600 . Id.

(emphasis in original) (some internal citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083, 1088 (Del. 1994)). Instead, in parsing each constituent portion of the larger narrative, “[t]he test for admissibility to be applied to each statement within a declaration is whether a reasonable 31 person in the declarant’s circumstances would have believed the statement was adverse to his or her penal interest at the time it was made.” Id. at 492. Collateral proximity, in and of itself, no longer suffices. Against this framework, we turn to the State’s preservation argument.

C. Parties’ Contentions The State argues that the Appellate Court erred by “creating an exception” to the general rule that a defendant is required to request redaction in order to properly raise a “failure to redact” claim on appeal. The State directs the Court to treatises reflecting the general rule that when a party seeks redaction of a prior statement or piece of evidence, the party must request one where a general objection is overruled. See Lynn S. McLain, Maryland Evidence § 103:8 (3rd ed. 2013) (noting that “if one’s general objection is overruled, one must request redaction of the objectionable part, in order to complain on appeal of the court’s failure to redact”); Joseph F. Murphy, Jr. & Erin C. Murphy, Maryland Evidence Handbook § 105[B] (5th ed. 2020) (advising practitioners that “[i]f your objection gets overruled, request that the court exclude specific portions which would easily be redacted”). The State points out that this Court applied this principle in Woodlin v. State, 484 Md. 253 (2023), and the Appellate Court has applied it in Colkley v. State, 251 Md. App. 243 , 282–83 (2021), Belton v. State, 152 Md. App. 623, 634 (2003), and Williams v. State, 117 Md. App. 55, 68 (1997).

The State asserts that “[b]efore and during trial, defense counsel did not try to obtain a lesser remedy by asking the circuit court to ‘parse’ the interview and redact particular parts while admitting other parts.” The State asserts that because defense 32 counsel failed to request redaction of those portions of the Blake Interview that he contends were inadmissible, we should hold that he failed to preserve his objection to the admissibility of the Blake Interview. According to the State, the Appellate Court erred by “creating an exception to the general rule” by incorrectly interpreting Matusky as placing a duty on the trial court to parse the narrative. The State also asserts that Matusky neither said that the trial court has a duty to redact sua sponte, nor did it say that a trial court must parse the narrative upon specific request. For this reason, the State asserts that this Court should “resolve this issue the way Maryland courts have resolved similar areas of law, by requiring specific preservation in order to preserve the failure-to-redact claim for appeal.” Because defense counsel did not request that the trial court redact particular statements within the Blake Interview, the State argues that Respondent failed to preserve his objection to the trial court’s process for admitting the interview in its entirety.

Respondent argues that the Appellate Court’s opinion did not create a new preservation exception, and that it correctly recognized that the “general rule” espoused by the State does not apply because Matusky governs the admission of this particular type of hearsay evidence. Respondent points out that Matusky imposes a duty on the trial court, which requires the court to parse each statement as part of the process for determining the admissibility of hearsay statements comprising an extended narrative when considering the declaration against penal interest exception. Respondent contends that the State interjects confusion into the analysis by referring to the Blake Interview as a “statement,” as the trial court did, which makes it 33 sound like one thing to be admitted or excluded. According to Respondent, following this incorrect framework, the State erroneously characterizes this evidence, for preservation purposes, as a “statement” or a “piece of evidence” for which Respondent was obligated to seek redaction, instead of a series of statements, which, under this Court’s case law, were required to be parsed by the trial court to determine which statements were admissible.

When considered within the correct framework, Respondent asserts that it becomes clear that the cases cited by the State in support of a “general rule” governing “prejudicial details of otherwise admissible evidence, as opposed to separately inadmissible statements,” are not controlling. Respondent contends that, under the State’s argument, the Court would be creating a “new duty” upon “defense counsel to conduct the trial court’s parsing for it.” D. The Appellate Court Correctly Interpreted Our Case Law Concerning the Trial Court’s Duty to Parse an Extended Declaration Against Penal Interest We determine that the Appellate Court did not err in its analysis of Matusky, or in holding that Respondent preserved his objection to the trial court’s failure to undertake the parsing analysis required by our four-part test for determining whether this particular type of hearsay evidence is admissible. As discussed above, Matusky established a process for admission that the trial court is required to undertake when determining the admissibility of a hearsay statement pursuant to the declaration against penal interest exception set forth in Maryland Rule 5- 804(b)(3). This test is unique to this particular type of hearsay evidence.

The issue that Respondent raised before the Appellate Court was the trial court’s failure to undertake 34 the final step in the process. Specifically, when confronted with an extensive declaration, narrative, or interview involving more than one “statement,” the trial court cannot treat the declaration as a single “statement” that is to be admitted or not admitted as a whole but is required to undertake a parsing analysis. Matusky makes clear that the “trial court must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each ‘single declaration or remark.’” 343 Md. at 492 (emphasis added). In doing so, Matusky further mandates that “[t]he test for admissibility to be applied to each statement within a declaration is whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s circumstances would have believed the statement was adverse to his or her penal interest at the time it was made.” Id.

We are far from alone in imposing a duty upon the trial court to parse hearsay narratives prior to the admission of purported statements against penal interest. The federal circuits that have ruled on the issue after Williamson have held that the district court has this duty. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly