State v. Standifur

McAULIFFE, Judge. This case presents the question of whether a declaration against the penal interest of an unavailable witness, offered by the State against the accused in a criminal trial, is sufficiently reliable to qualify under the common law exception to the hearsay rule and to satisfy the Confrontation ⁶ Clauses of the Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Rights of Maryland. The Appellees, Larry Ramoun Standifur and Colonel Hillard Henry, were indicted on various, criminal charges as accomplices in the same criminal episode, but were tried separately. Henry was tried by the Circuit Court for Cecil County and was convicted of housebreaking and of theft over $300.00.

Standifur was convicted of the same offenses by a Cecil County jury. The facts that led to the convictions are as follows: The home of Lynn and Dale Jackson was broken into on September 2, 1983. The items of personal property stolen from the residence included two shotguns, one of which was a Winchester Model 97 pump shotgun. On January 5, 1984, Trooper Robert Faul of the Maryland State Police recovered the Winchester Model 97 shotgun from the Bel Air Gun Exchange.

The proprietor of the gun shop told Faul the gun had been purchased from Bruce A. Burkett, whose name appeared on the exchange slip. The next day Burkett told Faul he had purchased the shotgun from James Clyde Richard, nicknamed “Sly,” for $75.00 on October 17, 1983. Burkett said the purchase occurred at the home of a mutual friend, and that he had not previously been acquainted with Sly. Troopers Faul and Dickson, together with Sergeant Schulz, then proceeded to Sly’s apartment in Harford County to question him about the gun.

When the officers arrived at Sly’s apartment, Sly attempted to flee via a rear balcony but Sergeant Schulz caught him and returned him to the apartment. According to Faul, Sly then produced a key, opened the door to the apartment and invited the police inside. Sly explained that he fled because he was on probation and believed the police might have come to serve indictments alleging drug activities on his part. Faul assured Sly he was not there about drug charges or a violation of probation, but rather about a gun that Sly had allegedly sold to Burkett.

The troopers did not place Sly under arrest, nor did they advise him of his Miranda rights. ⁷ Sly told Faul that he had purchased the gun in the Washington Park area of Aberdeen, Maryland after being approached by Colonel Henry. He said that Henry, Standifur, and a third man, Henderson, drove up in a green and white Volkswagen van which Standifur was driving. Sly said Henry showed him two shotguns, and Sly purchased the Winchester for $30.00. Sly told Faul he normally would not have bought the gun because he had a limited amount of cash that he intended to use to buy heroin, but he feared Henry would have taken the money in any event because Henry “had a history of such stuff.” Sly said Henry told him they had obtained the shotguns in Pennsylvania.

Sly told Faul he suspected the guns had been stolen. He said it was common knowledge that Henry, Standifur, and Henderson were stealing to support their drug habits. Sly then voluntarily accompanied the troopers to the Bel Air Barrack where Faul took a written statement from Sly concerning the shotgun. The details of this statement coincided with those of the earlier oral statement, except that in the written statement Sly said of the shotgun that “I bought it in good faith and I sold it in good faith.” At the trials of Henry and Standifur, Burkett testified that he purchased the Winchester shotgun for $75.00 from a man called Sly and received a handwritten bill of sale from him.

When the gun developed mechanical problems, Burkett sold it to the Bel Air Gun Exchange. Winfred Henderson testified against both Standifur and Henry, pursuant to a plea agreement Henderson had reached with the State. He testified that Henry, Standifur and he broke and entered the Jackson’s home and stole some guns, jewelry and a stereo amplifier. According to Henderson, the three drove to the Jackson home in a green and white VW van owned by Henderson’s sister, who was also Standifur’s girlfriend.

He said that Henry sold the shotgun to a man named Sly for $30.00 at Washington Park while he and Standifur sat in the van. ⁸ At an evidentiary hearing held at each trial the State sought to introduce through Trooper Faul the oral statements Sly had made concerning his purchase of the gun. At each trial, Faul testified out of the hearing of the jury concerning the State’s efforts to locate Sly and the fact that he could not be found. At Standifur’s hearing, the assistant state’s attorney proffered the testimony of Faul concerning the contents of Sly’s oral statement and the circumstances under which it had been received, and pointed out that the statement had been admitted in Henry’s trial. At each hearing Faul’s written notes of Sly’s oral statement and a copy of Sly’s written statement were received and considered by the trial judge. 1 In Henry’s case, Judge Donaldson Cole found that Sly’s statement was a declaration against penal interest because Sly suspected the gun was stolen at the time he made the statement.

Judge Cole also noted that the statement was corroborated by other evidence produced by the State. Relying on Jacobs v. State, 45 Md.App. 634, 415 A.2d 590 , cert. denied, 288 Md. 737 (1980), and Agnew v. State, 51 Md.App. 614 , 446 A.2d 425 (1982), the trial judge ruled the statement admissible. Similarly, in Standifur’s case Judge E.D.E. Rollins concluded that Sly’s statement was trustworthy and ⁹ important evidence, and admitted it as a declaration against penal interest. The Court of Special Appeals reversed both convictions.

In Standifur v. State, 64 Md.App. 570 , 497 A.2d 1164 (1985), the court held the trial judge erred in finding that a person in Sly’s position would probably have perceived the disserving nature of his oral statement. The intermediate appellate court also suggested that the facts were insufficient to permit a determination as to Sly’s state of mind at the time he made the statement, and particularly as to whether Sly had a probable motive to falsify his statement. Henry’s case was decided on the same grounds in a separate unreported opinion. We granted the State’s petition for certiorari in each case and consolidated the cases for this appeal.

The State concedes that Sly’s statement is hearsay, but contends it was properly admitted as a declaration against penal interest. Moreover, the State maintains that because of the presence of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness the s atement also satisfies the Confrontation Clauses of the Twenty-First Article of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Respondents contend the Court of Special Appeals properly found that Sly’s statement did not constitute a declaration against penal interest. Additionally, they contend that even if the statement that Sly had purchased a gun that he suspected to have been stolen was of a disserving character, that part of the statement had an insufficient nexus with the part admitted into evidence, i.e. that Sly had purchased the gun from Standifur, Henry and Henderson.

Finally, Respondents maintain that the content of the statement and the totality of circumstances surrounding it fail to demonstrate the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness constitutionally mandated by the Confrontation Clause. This Court has recognized a declaration against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule. Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446 , 463 A.2d 822 (1983); Merrick v. State, 283 Md. 1 , 389 A.2d 328 (1978); Brady v. ¹⁰ State, 226 Md. 422 , 174 A.2d 167 (1961), aff'd sub nom., Brady v. Md., 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446 , 47 A.2d 43 (1946). See also Agnew v. State, supra, 51 Md.App. 614 , 446 A.2d 425 ; Jacobs v. State, supra, 45 Md.App. 634 , 415 A.2d 590 . 2 This case requires consideration of a specific class of declarations against penal interest—those offered by the State to inculpate a defendant in a criminal case.

A declaration against penal interest is excepted from the operation of the hearsay rule by the Federal Rules of Evidence and by a majority of the states. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: * * * * * * (3) Statement against interest.—A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a ¹¹ reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. The underlying theory of this exception is that “persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.” Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note.

The note further states: [A]ll statements implicating another person [need not] be excluded from the category of declarations against interest. Whether a statement is in fact against interest must be determined from the circumstances of each case. Thus a statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest____ On the other hand, the same words spoken under different circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying. The rule does not purport to deal with questions of the right of confrontation.

For a discussion of the legislative history see P. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)’s Penal Interest Exception, 69 Geo. L.J. 851 , 892-97 (1981); Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 Calif.L.Rev. 1189, 1191-98 (1978); Comment, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation Clause, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 159, 174-78 (1983); Weinstein’s Evidence § 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104 (1985). A majority of the states recognize the exception to the hearsay rule in their rules of evidence, most of which are patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Weinstein’s Evidence, supra, at 804-157 to 163.

A number of ¹² states recognize the exception but expressly exclude inculpatory statements that implicate third persons. Id. In United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699 (5th Cir.1978), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the requirements of the federal rule in this manner: (1) the declarant must be unavailable, (2) the statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability “ ‘that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true’; and [(3)] if offered to exculpate the accused [the statement] must be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.” (citation omitted). Standifur and Henry do not here challenge the findings of the trial judges that Sly was unavailable within the meaning of the hearsay rule.

We therefore turn to the question of whether the statement qualifies as a declaration against interest under the law of evidence of this State. The circumstances surrounding the making of the statement must be carefully analyzed to determine the likelihood that the statement was truthful. Critical to this analysis is the state of mind of the declarant at the time the statement was made. Unless the declarant then believed the statement to be against his penal interest, there is no basis for presumed reliability.

However, because of the unavailability of the declarant and other problems of proof, the party urging this exception is not required to prove the actual state of mind of the declarant but must prove sufficient surrounding facts from which the trial judge may inferentially determine what the state of mind of a reasonable person would have been under the same or similar circumstances. Although this test is essentially objective, it does envision consideration of the entire panoply of surrounding circumstances to the extent they may be known, including the age, education, background, experience and condition of the declarant. “Reasonable” as used in this context connotes a non-aberrant reaction by one in the defendant’s circumstances, rather than the expected reac ¹³ tion of a hypothetical person of reasonable intelligence or sobriety. Thus, a trial judge may be called upon to determine whether a reasonable person who is under the influence or alcohol or drugs would have understood the disserving nature of a particular statement. The statement must in fact be against the penal interest of the declarant.

It need not be a full confession but must involve substantial exposure to criminal liability. McCormick on Evidence § 279, at 825 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). That exposure, however, is only a beginning point of inquiry. The more important criterion is that a reasonable person in the situation of the declarant would have perceived the statement as disserving at the time he made it.

The fact that legal scholars may agree as to the disserving nature of a particular statement does not mean that a reasonable person in the speaker’s place would have so understood it. The declarant’s probable perception of the statement’s disserving nature forms the basis for the exception, and without it the exception cannot be utilized. In determining the probable state of mind of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant, it is perhaps as important to consider the totality of circumstances under which the statement was made as to consider the contents of the statement. If experience tells us that we may presume trustworthiness when one is recounting symptoms to a physician who is to treat him, it also tells us that we must treat as “inevitably suspect” a statement made to persons in authority and implicating a codefendant, even though the statement also contains an admission of the declarant’s culpability.

Cruz v. New York, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). A defendant implicating his confederate may do so to curry favor with the authorities, to achieve a plea bargain, to shift the blame by showing that another was more culpable, or simply to have another with whom to share the blame. In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 , 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2064 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), Justice Brennan said for the Court: ¹⁴ As we have consistently recognized, a codefendant’s confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant’s conduct or culpability because those passages may well be the product of the codefendant’s desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another. The Court quoted with approval Justice White’s observations in his dissenting opinion in Bruton that an accomplice’s confession is hearsay, subject to all the dangers of inaccuracy which characterize hearsay generally ...

More than this, however, the post-arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant’s statements about what the