State v. Suddith

Dissenting Opinion by ELDRIDGE, J., which BELL, C.J., joins. I disagree with the majority’s decision that the evidence was sufficient to convict the respondent, a passenger in the motor vehicle, of possessing the heroin, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia found in the vehicle. When the actual facts of this case are objectively examined, the majority’s decision amounts to a holding that the mere presence of contraband anyplace in a motor vehicle is sufficient to convict any passenger of knowingly possessing such contraband. This is contrary to our prior cases and, more importantly, violates the federal and state constitutions.

Instead, I fully concur with Judge Greene’s holding for the Court of Special Appeals “that the mere presence in a vehicle of drugs and paraphernalia, without more, is insufficient to establish a nexus between the passenger, the drugs, and the paraphernalia. Here, the evidence was not sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that appellant knew that the drugs and paraphernalia were in the vehicle or that appellant exercised any dominion or control over the drugs and paraphernalia.” ⁴⁴⁸ The majority’s decision that sufficient evidence supported the respondent’s convictions for knowingly possessing contraband is based upon an erroneous factual inference constructed by the majority. The majority finds that the jury “could, reasonably infer that it was inconceivable, given the quantity of contraband found inside the vehicle, that all of the contraband was concealed from respondent’s view before the vehicle flipped over three times.” (Opinion at 436). The majority points to no actual evidence at the trial which would support this inference.

Instead, the majority states that such an inference would be based on the jury’s “own experience and common sense.” (Ibid.). A reasonable person’s “experience and common sense” would be to the contrary. The vehicle involved, a Ford Explorer, is a very large sports utility vehicle. It is common knowledge that such vehicles have numerous compartments in the “passenger” area. 1 Many of these compartments have covers or are structured so that the contents are not readily visible to passengers. 2 The Ford Explorer in this case rolled over three times!

It is entirely conceivable, and in fact it is likely, that all of the contraband was in various compartments and fell out of the compartments when the vehicle rolled over three times. A Ford Explorer is a very large, heavy, motor vehicle; it is classified as a truck. When such a vehicle rolls over three times, covers of compartments are likely to come open, and the contents of the compartments will obviously become “scattered throughout the vehicle.” (Ibid.). Moreover, based upon the facts in dozens of cases which have come before this ⁴⁴⁹ Court, controlled dangerous substances carried in motor vehicles are usually concealed in compartments or otherwise hidden.

They are not in the passengers’ “view.” (Id. at 436). The inference drawn by the majority is directly contrary to “experience and common sense.” (Ibid.) The majority repeatedly relies on the fact that, after the vehicle rolled over three times, the contraband “was found strewn throughout the inside compartment of the vehicle” or “scattered throughout the vehicle” or “found strewn throughout the passenger compartment,” etc. (Id. at 436, 438, 440, 443, 444). There is utterly no evidence, however, concerning the location of the contraband before the Ford Explorer rolled over three times. Common sense and experience, upon which the majority purports to rely, teaches that it is more likely than not that the contraband was concealed prior to the vehicle rolling over three times.

The majority’s contrary finding is simply irrational. The majority opinion also states that the United States “Supreme Court’s holding” in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. ---, 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003), “is relevant to the case at bar.” (Opinion at 443). In my view, the Pringle opinion has little or no relevance. The issue in Pringle was whether, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, there was probable cause to arrest a front-seat passenger in an automobile when cocaine was hidden behind the back-seat armrest and $763.00 of rolled-up cash was in the glove compartment directly in front of the passenger.

A majority of this Court, in an excellent and thorough opinion by Judge Cathell for the Court, held that there was no probable cause to arrest the passenger. Pringle v. State, 370 Md. 525 , 805 A.2d 1016 (2002). The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “Pringle’s arrest ... did not contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Maryland v. Pringle, supra, 540 U.S. at ---, 124 S.Ct. at 802 , 157 L.Ed.2d at 777 . 3 The Supreme Court in Pringle emphasized the ⁴⁵⁰ difference between the Fourth Amendment’s “probable-cause standard” and “the quanta ... of proof appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings.... ” 540 U.S. at ---, 124 S.Ct. at 800 , 157 L.Ed.2d at 775 (some internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also relied upon, inter alia, the fact that “Pringle and his two companions were in a relatively small automobile” and the fact that there was a large quantity of “cash in the car.” 540 U.S. at ---, 124 S.Ct. at 801 , 157 L.Ed.2d at 776-77 .

Instead of involving the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” standard, the present case involves the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a criminal conviction. This case presents issues under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, independently, under Articles 23 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 4 Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the principles set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , ⁴⁵¹ 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the evidence was insufficient to sustain the respondent’s convictions for possession of heroin, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia. Moreover, quite apart from any decision under the federal constitution, I would hold, under Articles 23 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and this Court’s prior cases, that the evidence was clearly insufficient to sustain the convictions for possession of controlled dangerous substances and drug paraphernalia. Thus, in White v. State, 363 Md. 150 , 767 A.2d 855 (2001), this Court unanimously held that the presence of controlled dangerous substances and drug paraphernalia in the trunk compartment of a motor vehicle was insufficient to convict a passenger in the vehicle of possession.

In the case at bar, prior to the vehicle rolling over three times, the controlled dangerous substances and the paraphernalia may well have been in one or more of the Ford Explorer’s covered compartments. I fail to perceive any meaningful distinction between the trunk of an automobile and a covered compartment in a sports utility vehicle. Consequently, the majority’s decision in the present case cannot be reconciled with the decision in White. See also, e.g., State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 550-551 , 823 A.2d 664, 677-678 (2003) (“[T]he knowledge of the contents of the vehicle can be imputed to the driver of the vehicle” but not a passenger, because “owners/drivers and passengers of vehicles are to be treated differently”); Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 5 , 796 A.2d 821, 822 (2002) (The defendant may not be found guilty of possessing controlled dangerous substances and drug paraphernalia “by virtue of having been staying in a house and having been present in the dwelling’s basement in which drugs were located inside drawers which were open or partially open”); Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 459 , 697 A.2d 462, 465-466 (1997) (Evidence “that Taylor was present in a room where marijuana had been smoked recently, that he was aware that it had been smoked, and that Taylor was in proximity to contraband that was concealed in a container belonging to another * * * does not support a rational inference that [Taylor] had possessed the marijuana” as “[possession requires more than being in the presence of ⁴⁵² other persons having possession; it requires the exercise of dominion or control over the thing allegedly possessed”); Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 415-416 , 564 A.2d 414, 418 (1989) (“Merely sitting in the backseat of the vehicle, Livingston did not demonstrate ... that he possessed any knowledge of, and hence, any restraining or directing influence over ... marijuana seeds located on the floor in the front of the car”); Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 651 , 547 A.2d 1041, 1047 (1988) (“The accused, in order to be found guilty [of possessing a controlled dangerous substance], must know of both the presence and the general character or illicit nature of the substance”); State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591 , 463 A.2d 872 (1983); Garrison v. State, 272 Md. 123 , 321 A.2d 767 (1974).

As earlier stated, the majority’s decision in the case at bar amounts to a holding that the mere presence of contraband in a motor vehicle is sufficient to convict any passenger of knowingly possessing that contraband. In light of today’s decision, no one should get in someone else’s motor vehicle without searching it — thoroughly. And, to be on the safe side, the searcher should probably use a drug-sniffing canine. Chief Judge BELL joins this dissenting opinion. .

The majority’s opinion refers to "the passenger compartment” of the Ford Explorer. (Opinion at 436). Of course, there is no "trunk” in a vehicle such as this. The entire inside of the vehicle constitutes one large continuous area, divided only by the seats. .

Although I have never owned a Ford Explorer, I am familiar with one which is owned by a former law clerk of mine. This Ford Explorer has fourteen separate compartments inside of the vehicle, eight of which have covers. Some of the covers will pop open when the vehicle goes over a small bump. Some of the remaining six compartments are structured so that a passenger would not easily see the contents unless the passenger was searching the compartments. .

The issue before this Court in Pringle concerned the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and we are, of course, bound by the United ⁴⁵⁰ States Supreme Court's holding under the federal constitution. No issue under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights was raised in Pringle. If, in the future, an issue under Article 26 is presented under a similar fact situation, this Court would not be bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Pringle. As Judge Marvin Smith stated for this Court in a case involving Article 26, Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 322 , 430 A.2d 49, 55 (1981), "although a clause of the United States Constitution and one in our Declaration of Rights may be 'in pari materia,' and thus 'decisions applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases involving the other, we reiterate that each provision is independent, and a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other.’ ” See also Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621 , 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002) ("[W]e have ... emphasized that, simply because a Maryland constitutional provision is in pari materia with a federal one or has a federal counterpart, does not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or applied in the same manner as its federal counterpart.”) .

Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights provides as follows: “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights, inter alia, provides for "the Court ... [to] pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.” CATHELL, Judge. On March 5 and 6, 2002, Robert Eric Suddith, respondent, was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and was convicted of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. On April 24, 2002, the trial judge sentenced respondent to four years of incarceration for the possession of heroin conviction and a concurrent sentence of four years of incarceration for the possession of cocaine conviction. The trial court additionally noted that “based on the jury’s conviction of possession of paraphernalia, the sentence is suspended generally on that count.” 1 ⁴²⁷ Respondent filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

On April 1, 2003, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court’s rulings. The Court of Special Appeals held, based in part on our decision in Pringle v. State, 370 Md. 525 , 805 A.2d 1016 (2002), “that the mere presence in a vehicle of drugs and paraphernalia, without more, is insufficient to establish a nexus between the passenger, the drugs, and the paraphernalia.” The intermediate appellate court went on to state that the evidence was insufficient to support the inferences that respondent either exercised control over the contraband or knew that the contraband was in the vehicle. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court and on June 19, 2003, this Court granted the petition. State v. Suddith, 376 Md. 49 , 827 A.2d 112 (2003).

In its brief, the State presents one question for our review: “Did the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly hold that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of a passenger of a stolen vehicle for possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia, where the drugs and a large quantity of items associated with drug use were strewn throughout the vehicle as a result of the vehicle’s flipping three times following the driver’s loss of control while fleeing from police?” We answer petitioner’s question in the affirmative and reverse the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. We hold that the jury’s inferences from the evidence presented were reasonable and thus sufficient to sustain respondent’s convictions for possession of heroin, cocaine and drug paraphernalia. I. Facts At approximately 8:40 p.m. on October 18, 2001, Fred Rosario, an officer with the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department, observed a Ford Explorer being driven with its headlights off and he attempted to stop the vehicle. At this time, the Explorer fled the scene, which initiated a high-speed pursuit by the police.

During the chase, Officer Rosario recognized that the Explorer matched the description ⁴²⁸ of a sports utility vehicle that recently had been carjacked and reported stolen. The high-speed chase was recorded by a video camera located within Officer Rosario’s police cruiser. The Explorer fled through the streets of the District of Columbia and into Maryland, where the chase concluded after the driver of the Explorer lost control of the vehicle and it flipped over three times before stopping. The officers on the scene of the crash apprehended four persons from the Explorer, including respondent, the driver and two other passengers. 2 As none of the four occupants of the Explorer claimed ownership of the vehicle and the vehicle was confirmed as stolen, all four were arrested for the theft of the Explorer.

The Explorer was then searched incident to the arrest of its occupants. The following items were discovered strewn about in the interior passenger compartment of the stolen Explorer: eleven green bags containing heroin; one green bag containing crack cocaine; nine bags containing a white powdery residue; three clear bags containing drug paraphernalia; one box of cigarette rolling papers; two empty green bags; one marijuana pipe; several metal bottle caps; one used roll of aluminum foil; nine bottles of clear liquid; twenty-five syringes; and four bottles of bleach. After being read their Miranda rights, all of the occupants denied knowledge of the drugs and who was the driver of the vehicle. A search incident to arrest of respondent revealed that respondent was carrying $220 in cash. 3 While drugs were found scattered throughout the vehicle, no drugs were found on respondent’s person.

Testimony of Trooper Barrett elicited that all of the above-mentioned items recovered were commonly used in the drug trade. A forensic chemist for the State identified the substance found in the eleven green bags as heroin and the substance within the individual green bag as ⁴²⁹ cocaine. To conserve resources, several of the items with residue were not analyzed for possible drug content. At trial, respondent moved for a judgment of acquittal based, inter alia, on an argument that the State did not meet its “burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt” that respondent knew of or possessed the contraband.

The trial court, in response, stated: “Well, I think the issues that you raised are fact driven and must be determined by the fact finder. So as to a matter of law, I would deny the defense motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all of the evidence, finding that the issue is — one of the issues raised by the defense are issues of fact that must be determined by the fact finder.” The jury found respondent guilty on the charges of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.

II

Standard of Review The standard of review for an appellate court’s review of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction was summarized recently by this Court in the case of State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533-34 , 823 A.2d 664, 668 (2003), when we said: “The standard for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 569 (1979); Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 12 , 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002); White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 162 , 767 A.2d 855, 861-62 (2001); State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478-79 , 649 A.2d 336, 337-38 (1994). Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.’ State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 , 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998). See McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474 , 701 A.2d 675, 685-86 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151 , 118 ⁴³⁰ S.Ct. 1173 , 140 L.Ed.2d 182 (1998) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478 , 649 A.2d at 337 ); Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580 , 583 A.2d 1037, 1040-41 (1991); Wright v. State, 312 Md. 648 , 541 A.2d 988 (1988). ‘We give “due regard to the [fact finder’s] findings of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.” ’ Moye, 369 Md. at 12 , 796 A.2d at 827 (quoting McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474 , 701 A.2d 675, 685 (1997) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478 , 649 A.2d at 337 )).

See the following recent cases quoting Albrecht: Anderson v. State, 372 Md. 285, 291-92 , 812 A.2d 1016, 1020 (2002); Deese v. State, 367 Md. 293, 305 , 786 A.2d 751, 758 (2001); Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 649 , 781 A.2d 851, 880 (2001); White, 363 Md. at 162 , 767 A.2d at 861-62 . We do not re-weigh the evidence, but “we do determine whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.’ White, 363 Md. at 162 , 767 A.2d at 862 . A valid conviction may be based solely on circumstantial evidence. Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 537 , 573 A.2d 831, 834 (1990).

The same standard applies to all criminal cases, including those resting upon circumstantial evidence, since, generally, proof of guilt based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence is no different from proof of guilt based on direct eyewitness accounts.” A trial court fact-finder, ie., judge or jury, possesses the ability to “choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation” and this Court must give deference to all reasonable inferences the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether we would have chosen a different reasonable inference. Id. at 534 , 823 A.2d at 668 . 4 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 ⁴³¹ L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) (stating that the trier of fact has the responsibility “fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts”); Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 460 , 682 A.2d 248, 254 (1996) (stating “the trier of fact decides which evidence to accept and which to reject.... [I]t is the trier of fact that must draw the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom,” therefore, “absent clear error in its fact-finding, an appellate court is required, in deference to the trial court, to accept those findings of fact”) (alteration added); In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 380 , 681 A.2d 501, 505 (1996) (stating that “[i]n a criminal case, the appropriate inquiry is not whether the reviewing court believes that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, ‘whether ... any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. at 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 573 ) (alteration added); State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 590 , 606 A.2d 265, 269 (1992) (holding that, in a murder trial, intent may be inferred by the trier of fact and that such a “determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous”); McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 281-82 , 600 A.2d 430, 435 (1992) (stating that a “trial court’s findings as to disputed facts are accepted by this Court unless found to be clearly erroneous after having given due regard to the lower court’s opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses”); see also Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183 , 571 A.2d 1239, 1240-41 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76 , 89 n. 4, 771 A.2d 389 , 396 n. 4 (2001).

III

Discussion Respondent was convicted of possession of contraband, including heroin, cocaine and drug paraphernalia, as defined in Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 277(s). 5 Article 27 § 277(s) defines “Possession” to “mean ⁴³² the exercise of actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing by one or more persons.” In regard to the elements of the crime of possession, this Court has said: “[t]o prove control, the “ ‘evidence must show directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion or control over the prohibited ... drug in the sense contemplated by the statute, i.e., that [the accused] exercised some restraining or direct influence over it.’ ” McDonald , 347 Md. [452,] 474, 701 A.2d [675,] 685 [ (1997) ] (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 596 , 463 A.2d 872, 874 (1983) (quoting Garrison v. State, 272 Md. 123, 142 , 321 A.2d 767, 777 (1974))); see Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 457-58 , 697 A.2d 462, 465 (1997). Moreover, Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638 , 547 A.2d 1041 (1988), concluded that ‘an individual would not be deemed to exercise “dominion or control” over an object about which he is unaware. Knowledge of the presence of an object is normally a prerequisite to exercising dominion and control.’ Dawkins, 313 Md. at 649 , 547 A.2d at 1046 .” White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 163 , 767 A.2d 855, 862 (2001) (alterations added) (footnote omitted); see also Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 458-60 , 697 A.2d 462, 465-66 (1997). An individual’s knowledge of the contraband is a key element in finding that individual guilty of possessing it and that knowledge may be proven by inferences from the totality of the evidence, circumstantial or direct, presented to the trier of fact.

Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 14 , 796 A.2d 821, 828 (2002). It has long been established that the mere fact that the contraband is not found on the defendant’s person does not necessarily preclude an inference by the trier of fact that the defendant had possession of the contraband. Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 524-25 , 204 A.2d 516, 520 (1964), overruled in ⁴³³ part on other grounds, State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275 , 289 n. 9, 821 A.2d 922 , 930 n. 9 (2003). The State contends that, when evaluating the evidence in the case sub judiee in the light most favorable to it, “the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom support a finding that [respondent] knew of the presence of drugs and drug paraphernalia” (alteration added).

The State argues that both circumstantial and direct evidence support such a finding. In essence, the State argues that the jury was able to infer knowledge of the drugs because respondent was a passenger in the stolen Explorer during the police chase and subsequent crash and the “nature and sheer quantity of the drug paraphernalia” allowed the jury to infer knowledge, and thus constructive possession, of the contraband. Respondent argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain respondent’s conviction for possession of contraband because “[t]he evidence in this case establishes nothing more than [respondent’s] presence as a passenger in a vehicle in which drugs and paraphernalia were found” (alterations added). Respondent contends that the jury could have done nothing but speculate as to whether he knew of the drugs in the car due to the lack of testimony regarding respondent’s location in the car, the location of the contraband prior to the crash and the circumstances surrounding the drug paraphernalia’s suspected use, i.e., when, where and by whom.

We disagree. The jurors logically could have found that the items were located in the open passenger compartment or open cargo area before the crash. Respondent relies on several of this Court’s cases dealing with sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal trial involving possession of contraband. These cases, however, are distinguishable from the case sub judiee.

In Moye v. State, supra, this Court held the evidence to be insufficient to sustain a conviction for the possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS). In Moye , the police responded to a call that a “cutting,” ie., a battery committed by striking another with a knife, was occurring at a private residence in Prince George’s County. The home was occupied ⁴³⁴ by the couple leasing the home, the Bullocks, a man renting the basement, Greg Benson, and the defendant, Moye. Moye was the brother of Mrs. Bullock and had no ownership or lease interest in the basement apartment.

Shortly after the arrival of the police, the Bullocks and Mr. Benson exited the house while Moye remained inside. The police observed Moye moving about the first floor of the house through several of the windows. After a police announcement requesting that Moye exit the house under the threat of police entry with a K-9 unit, Moye was seen looking through a basement window. After several minutes, Moye left the house through a door leading out of the basement area rented exclusively by Mr. Benson.

After arresting Moye, the police entered the basement and discovered three opened or partially opened drawers, which contained several small bags of marijuana, a digital scale with white residue and a dinner plate with a razor blade and white residue on it. Another bag of marijuana and a bag of crack cocaine were found hidden in the ceiling. Moye was convicted of possession of CDS and possession of drug paraphernalia. In finding this evidence to be insufficient to sustain Moye’s convictions, this Court said: “[W]e are left with nothing but speculation as to Moye’s knowledge or exercise of dominion or control over the drugs and paraphernalia found