State v. Thompson

³ ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. The issue in this case is whether a defendant, who is committed to a drug treatment center pursuant to Maryland Code (1982, 1990 Repl.Vol.), § 8-507 of the Health General Article and successfully completes the program of treatment, is required to serve the balance of the mandatorily imposed minimum sentence of incarceration prescribed by Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 286(c)(1). We answer, “no,” and, so, affirm the judgment of the circuit court. I. William Thompson, the appellee, a repeat drug offender, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous substances laws, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess cocaine, and conspiracy to solicit the distribution of cocaine.

Counts three, four and five were merged into counts one and two. The court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years’ incarceration on each count, ten years of which, pursuant to Article 27, section 286(c)(1), were to be served without parole. The balance of the sentences were suspended and the appellee was placed on five years probation. As a condition of release, the appellee was committed to Second Genesis, a drug treatment program.

The probation order required the appellee, upon release, to submit to periodic urinalysis as the Department of Parole and Probation requires and participate in such after care programs as it may recommend. The State urged at sentencing that, if the appellee were committed for treatment, upon its completion, he be remanded to the Department of Correction to serve the balance of the mandatory minimum sentence the court imposed, arguing that treatment “does not allow him to avoid the 10 years without parole.” The court rejected the argument and the State appealed. Prior to consideration of this case by the Court of Special Appeals, we issued, on our own motion, a writ of ⁴ certiorari to review this important issue. 329 Md. 601 , 620 A.2d 940 (1993).

II

A. Article 27, section 286(c) provides: (1) A person who is convicted under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section, or of conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years if the person previously has been convicted: (i) Under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section; (ii) Of conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section; or (iii) Of an offense under the laws of another state, District of Columbia or United States that would be a violation of subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section if committed in this State.[ 1 ] (2) The prison sentence of a person sentenced under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section, or of conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section or any combination of these offenses, as a second offender may not be suspended to less than 10 years, and the person may be paroled during that period only in accordance with Article 31B, § 11 of the Code. (3) This subsection does not prevent, prohibit, or make ineligible a convicted defendant from participating in the rehabilitation program under Title 8, Subtitle 5 of the ⁵ Health-General Article, because of the length of sentence, if imposed under subsection (b)(1) of this section.[ 2 ] Section 8-507, in pertinent part, provides: (a) In general. — If a court finds in a criminal case that a defendant has an alcohol or drug dependency, the court may commit the defendant as a condition of release, after conviction, or at any other time the defendant voluntarily agrees to treatment to the Department for inpatient, residential, or outpatient treatment. (b) Prerequisites. — Before a court may commit a defendant to the Department for treatment, the court shall: (1) Offer the defendant the opportunity to receive treatment; and (2) Obtain the written consent of the defendant: (1) To receive treatment; and (ii) For the reporting of information back to the court; and (3) Consult with the Administration. ****** (f) Withdrawal of consent. — (1) A defendant’s withdrawal of consent to treatment shall be promptly reported to the court. (2) The defendant shall be returned to the court within 7 days for further proceedings.

(g) Habeas Corpus. — A defendant who is committed for treatment under this section may question at any time the legality of the commitment by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (h) Duration; extension; termination. — (1) A commitment under this section shall be for at least 72 hours and not more than 1 year. ⁶ (2) On good cause shown by the Administration, the court may extend the time period for providing the necessary treatment services in increments of 6 months. (3) Except during the first 72 hours after commitment, the Director or a designee of the Director may terminate the commitment if the Director or the designee determines that: (i) Continued commitment is not in the best interest of the individual; or (ii) The individual is no longer amenable to treatment. (i) Release. — When an individual is to be released from a commitment under this section, the Director or the Director’s designee shall consult with the court to determine if the individual is to be returned to the court.

(j) Leaving facility without authorization. — In the event an individual committed under this section leaves a treatment facility without authorization, the responsibility of the Department is limited to the notification of the court that committed the individual as soon as it is reasonably possible. (k) Obligation of Administration. — Nothing in this section imposes any obligation on the Administration: (1) To treat any defendant who knowingly and willfully declines to consent to further treatment; or (2) In reporting to the court under this section, to include an assessment of a defendant’s dangerousness to one’s self, to another individual, or to the property of another individual by virtue of a drug or alcohol problem. (l) Credit against sentence. — Any time served by a criminal defendant held for evaluation or committed for treatment shall be credited against the sentence imposed by the court. B. The issue here presented involves discerning legislative intent.

Our inquiry into legislative intent begins with the words of the statute to be interpreted and, ordinarily, also ⁷ ends there. Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145 , 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). When the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, we need not go further. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 755 , 521 A.2d 1225, 1230 (1987); Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284 , 493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985).

We are not, however, precluded from looking at the purpose of the statute, “other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative goal or purpose,” Harris, 331 Md. at 146 , 626 A.2d at 950 , quoting Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539 , 546 A.2d 465, 468 (1988), quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987) and comparing the results. Sabatier v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 323 Md. 232, 250 , 592 A.2d 1098, 1107 (1991); Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73 , 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991); Baltimore County Coalition Against Unfair Taxes v. Baltimore County, 321 Md. 184, 203 , 582 A.2d 510, 519 (1990); Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989); Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15 , 525 A.2d at 632-33 .

In this case there are two statutes to be construed. Two statutes which deal with the same subject matter are in pari materia, should be construed together and, to the extent possible, harmonized. State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93 , 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 690 , 516 A.2d 976, 982 (1986); Unnamed Physician v. Commission on Medical Discipline, 285 Md. 1, 10 , 400 A.2d 396, 401 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 , 100 S.Ct. 142 , 62 L.Ed.2d 92 (1979). Full effect should be given to each, Bricker, 321 Md. at 93 , 581 A.2d at 12 ; Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank of Hagerstown v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 61 , 507 A.2d 172, 178-79 (1986); Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363, 375 , 488 A.2d 171, 178 (1985); Management Personnel Servs., Inc. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341 , 478 A.2d 310, 314 (1984); Bd. of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 62 , 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982), neither adding, nor deleting, words to obtain a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used.

Lendo, 295 Md. at 63 , 453 A.2d at 1189 ; Smelser v. Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 389 , 444 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1982); Pappas v. Pappas, ⁸ 287 Md. 455, 465 , 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980). Moreover, each statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense. D &Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538 , 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319 , 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985); Erwin and Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 304 Md. 302, 315 , 498 A.2d 1188, 1194 (1985).

III

The State maintains that the trial court erred when it refused to order that, upon completion of the drug treatment program to which he was ordered committed, the appellee be remanded to the Department of Correction to serve the balance of the ten year sentence mandated by section 286(c)(1) and properly imposed by the court. It asserts that an interpretation of section 8-507 that would permit a defendant to avoid the mandatory sentence prescribed by Art. 27, section 286(c)(1) and (2) simply by being committed to a drug treatment center and successfully completing the program there would constitute “a most egregious flout of legislative intent, in the face of plain language in a statute evidencing an intent to deal harshly with repeat drug offenders.” A proper interpretation of section 8-507 and, indeed, the only reasonable one, the State argues, is that “the time spent in rehabilitation by a repeat offender sentenced under Article 27, section 286(b)(1) should be followed by a return of that offender to the court for a determination of the amount of time remaining to be served on the mandatory term imposed under section 286(c)(1).” In other words, the State’s position is that, while the defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in drug treatment, once that credit is given, he must serve the balance of his sentence. That is consistent, the State contends, with the legislative intention that a repeat drug offender sentenced under section 286(b)(1) be both eligible for drug treatment and subject to the harsh penalty prescribed for such violations. Conceding that section 286(c) requires a second time drug offender to be sentenced to imprisonment for at least ten years, without parole, the appellee urges that commitment to a ⁹ drag treatment center and completion of the treatment program may be in lieu of the mandatory sentence.

As the appellee sees it, the trial court is clothed with discretion to determine the proper disposition for a repeat offender who has successfully completed the drug treatment program to which he or she had been committed. That discretion extends to ordering the offender to serve all, or a portion of, the balance of the mandatory sentence or to order his or her release on probation, on such terms as the court may prescribe.

IV

A. Article 27, section 286(c)(1) mandates that repeat drag offenders convicted a second time of violating sections 286(b)(1) or (2) be sentenced to imprisonment for at least ten years. Subsection (c)(2) makes clear that the minimum 10 year sentence shall be without parole. Subsection (c)(3) on the other hand, does not make a repeat drug offender sentenced pursuant to section 286(b)(1) ineligible to participate in the drug rehabilitation program under section 8-507. The Court of Special Appeals, in Collins v. State, 89 Md.App. 273 , 598 A.2d 8 (1991), considered whether a repeat drug offender sentenced pursuant to section 286(b)(1) remained eligible to participate in drug rehabilitation prescribed by section 8-507, notwithstanding the mandatory minimum sentence mandated by section 286(c)(1).

It held that a trial court has the discretion, under section 286(c)(3), to commit a second time drug offender to treatment prior to the imposition of the mandatory sentence. 3 Id. at 288 , 598 A.2d at 17 . To ¹⁰ arrive at this holding, the court reviewed the legislative history of sections 286(b) and (c). It concluded from that review: Prior to 1988, all subsequent offenders were treated equally with respect to both sentencing and eligibility for drug treatment. In amending § 286, the Legislature increased the mandatory penalties for third and fourth offenders and eliminated their eligibility for drug treatment.

The mandatory sentence for second offenders, however, remained the same and the only conclusion that can be drawn from the retention of the language now in subsection (c)(3) is that a second offender’s eligibility for drug treatment remained unchanged as well. To read the statute differently would render the current version of subsection (c)(3) meaningless. Id. at 292, 598 A.2d at 17 (citation omitted). Since, in other words, section 286(c)(3), unlike sections 286(d) and (e), pertaining to third and fourth time drug offenders, does not exclude commitment for treatment pursuant to section 8-507, as an option, when, pursuant to section 286(c)(1), a sentence is imposed on a second time drug offender under section 286(b)(1), the trial court, in its discretion, may commit such second time drug offenders to drug treatment centers.

We agree with this analysis. The State does not challenge the intermediate appellate court’s analysis and, in fact, like the appellee, concedes that the trial court’s exercise of discretion to commit the appellee to Second Genesis was proper. The issue, then, is whether the treatment ordered is in lieu of, or, as the State argues, in addition to, the mandatory sentence. The Court of Special Appeals in Collins , while acknowledging it as a potential issue, did not address “whether the mandatory sentence must be served following ... treatment.” Id. at 293 n. 8, 598 A.2d at 18 n. 8.

It observed, we think correctly, “[b]ecause appellant may not be committed for treatment and, even if she is, there is no guarantee she will complete the program successfully, we express no opinion as to the proper disposition of her mandatory sentence if she should, in fact, complete a drug treatment program successful ¹¹ ly.” Id. at 294 n. 8, 598 A.2d at 18 n. 8. We hold that, when a defendant successfully completes the drug treatment program, whether he or she must serve the remainder of the mandatory ten year sentence, imposed pursuant to section 286(c)(1), is within the trial court’s discretion to determine. Once it has been determined that section 286(c)(3) provides the trial court with discretion to utilize section 8-507 as a sentencing option, what happens to a defendant committed pursuant to that section is controlled by the procedure therein prescribed. The language of section 8-507 is clear and unambiguous.

The court may commit a defendant with a drug dependency to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, see § 1 — 101(c), for inpatient, residential, or outpatient treatment. Section 8-507(a). The minimum commitment is 72 hours and the maximum, one year, and such additional period, in increments of six months, as to which the Alcohol and Drug Administration, see § 8-101(b), is able to show good cause. Section 8 — 507(h).

The court may not commit any defendant prior to consulting with the Administration or who has not consented in writing to treatment and to the reporting of information back to the court. Section 8-507(b). The Director of the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration, see § 8-101(h), or his or her designee, must “consult with the court to determine if [an individual who is to be released from commitment] is to be returned to the court.” Section 8 — 507(i). Thus, consultation with the court is required when the Director or a designee terminates a defendant’s commitment upon determining that the defendant is no longer amenable to treatment or that continued commitment is not in the defendant’s best interest.

Section 8-507(h)(3). Because it may not be in the best interest of a defendant who successfully completes the treatment program to have his or her commitment continued, in addition to the situation in which treatment is unsuccessful, section 8 — 507(h)(3)(i) necessarily has applicability in the situation in which the defendant successfully completes the treatment program. When a defendant leaves a treatment center without authorization, the Department must notify the committing court “as soon as it is reasonably possible.” Section ¹² 8-507(j). Moreover, the Administration is not obliged to include in any report to the court an assessment of the defendant’s dangerousness either to himself or to the person or property of others as a result of his drug dependency.

Section 8-507(k). Finally, a criminal defendant committed for treatment is entitled to have the time spent in the treatment facility credited against the sentence imposed by the court. Section 8-507(7). Section 8-507(i) does not distinguish between the successful completion of treatment and the termination of a commitment before treatment is complete.

It is clear from its terms, however, that, in neither circumstance is it mandatory that the defendant be returned to court or that further proceedings occur; rather, it is only necessary that the Director consult with the court to determine what the court’s wishes are in that regard. This is to be contrasted with section 8 — 507(f). That section recognizes that a defendant may, after commitment, withdraw his consent to treatment. Should that occur, it requires the prompt reporting of that fact to the court and the return of the defendant “to the court within seven days for further proceedings ”.

Section 8 — 507(f)(2) (emphasis added). Reading section 8-507(i) with section 8-507(0, the State asserts, leads to the conclusion that “the time spent in rehabilitation by a repeat drug offender sentenced under Art. 27, § 286(b)(1) should be followed by a return of that defendánt to the court for a determination of the amount of time remaining to be served on the mandatory term imposed under section 286(c)(1).” To arrive at that conclusion, the State must read subsection (i) contrary to its plain language, to require a defendant who is to be released from commitment to be returned to court. This reading of subsection (i) attributes an intention to the