State v. Thornton

WILNER, Justice. The State has filed an application for leave to appeal an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reducing the amount and conditions of bail for a defendant awaiting trial on criminal charges. We shall deny the application on the ground that no appeal by the State will lie from such an order. The underlying facts are straightforward.

Hazel Thornton was charged by indictment with various offenses under the controlled dangerous substance laws. On April 16, 1990, she appeared before Judge Angeletti for a bail review hearing. Judge Angeletti set bail at $500,000 and required that it be posted in cash. Thornton thereupon filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking relief from that bail.

On June 12, 1990, Judge Ross issued the writ, ordering that Thornton be released upon posting bail of $250,000 “corporate bond only.” Judge Ross found that the $500,000 cash bail ordered by Judge Angeletti “in light of all of the facts in this case, [was] tantamount to denial of bail and is therefore excessive.” The application for leave to appeal is from the writ of habeas corpus issued by Judge Ross. In Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 652 , 574 A.2d 898 (1990), the Court confirmed that Md.Ann.Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. art., § 12-301, authorizing appeals from final judgments does not apply to habeas corpus cases and that “[a]n appeal may be taken from a final order in a habeas corpus case only where specifically authorized by statute.” The Court identified four statutes that permit appeals or applications for leave to appeal in habeas corpus cases—Cts. & Jud.Proc. art., § 3-707, applicable to the “denial of relief in habeas corpus cases regarding the right to bail or allegedly excessive bail,” id. at 652, 574 A.2d 898 ; art. 41, § 2-210 applicable to the denial of habeas corpus relief in extradition cases; Cts. & Jud.Proc. art., § 3-706, applicable where a writ is issued on the ground that the law under which the petitioner is held is unconstitutional; and art. 27, § 645A(e), which is part of the Post Conviction Procedure Act. ³¹⁴ Of these four statutes, it is clear beyond cavil that Cts. & Jud.Proc. art., § 3-707 is applicable and that § 3-706 and art. 41, § 2-210 are not. This case involves the setting of bail; it does not involve extradition and no statute has been held unconstitutional.

Section 3-707 is part of the subtitle dealing with habeas corpus. Section 3-702(a) provides that “A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any person in his behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus to the end that the cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint may be inquired into.” This person, who files such a petition, is thereafter referred to in the statute as the “petitioner.” See §§ 3-702(b)(l) and 3-703(a). Section 3-706 then provides, in relevant part: “(a) In general.—If a judge refuses to issue a writ of habeas corpus sought for the purpose of determining the right to bail, or if a judge sets bail claimed to be excessive prior to trial or after conviction, but prior to final judgment, a petitioner may apply to the Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal from the refusal. (b) Application to be filed within ten days.—(1) A petitioner shall file the application for leave to appeal within ten days after the denial or