State v. Weddington

Argued Before: Barbera, C.J. Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ. Greene, J. *⁵⁹² In this case, we once again consider under what circumstances a defendant has properly invoked his right to request a discharge of counsel pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-215(e). Respondent Robert C. Weddington was charged and convicted of several counts of sexual abuse of minors. Although Mr. Weddington sent to the Circuit Court two pieces of correspondence in which he expressed dissatisfaction with his counsel, the Circuit Court did not take action on either correspondence until after Mr. Weddington's trials.

After Mr. Weddington's trials concluded, the Circuit Court held two hearings on the Rule 4-215(e) request to discharge counsel. Thereafter, the Circuit Court denied Mr. Weddington's request as well as his motion for a new trial. Mr. Weddington noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which vacated Mr. Weddington's convictions because the Circuit Court failed to hold a Rule 4-215(e) hearing prior to Mr. Weddington's trials. Before us, the State seeks a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on the bases that the trial court must have actual *⁵⁹³ notice of a request to discharge counsel, that a defendant must raise such a complaint at trial, and that any error by the Circuit Court was harmless.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In October 2014, Petitioner State of Maryland charged Respondent Robert C. Weddington ("Mr. Weddington" or "Respondent") with various counts of sexual abuse in relation to two minors, D.H. and R.W. The State proceeded with separate prosecutions against Respondent, with the charges relating to D.H. filed under case number 6299 and the charges relating to R.W. filed under case number 6300. On October 26, 2015, Mr. Weddington appeared before the Honorable Jan Alexander in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for a motions hearing. At that hearing, the trial date was set for November 17, 2015. On October 28, 2015, just two days after his motions hearing, Mr. Weddington mailed a letter addressed to Judge Alexander, in which he stated, "I would like to let [my attorney] go because of her willingness to properly work in my behalf to proove [sic] im [sic] not guilty.

The things I've asked her to do to proove [sic] alibis, wasn't done nor did she do anything I've asked of her." Mr. Weddington requested that he be referred to a panel attorney instead of another public defender. In response to this letter, the Circuit Court held a hearing on November 9, 2015, pursuant to Md. Rule 4-215(e), with the Honorable Robert Cahill, Jr. presiding. At the hearing, Mr. Weddington explained ¹⁰³¹ that he was dissatisfied with his counsel's lack of investigation of defense witnesses as well as her failure to retrieve documents that would support his defense. At the close of the hearing, Judge Cahill ruled that there was "no meritorious reason to discharge counsel" and denied Mr. Weddington's request.

On November 17, 2015, the trial dates were re-set for February 2, 2016. Thereafter, on November 24, 2015, the Criminal Department of the Circuit Court received another letter ("November 24 Letter") from Mr. Weddington, which was addressed to *⁵⁹⁴ Judge Alexander. 1 The letter provided the case numbers for both of his cases. The contents of the letter contained allegations that Mr. Weddington and his attorney were not getting along, that "words have been xchanged [sic] and I'm not trusting her at all" and that his attorney had failed to contact anyone or retrieve information that would establish the motivations of his accusers. 2 The only action taken by the Circuit Court in response to this letter, apparently, was to send a copy to the State's Attorney and the Public Defender. On January 20, 2016, Mr. Weddington sent yet another letter to the Circuit Court ("January 20 Letter").

This letter was also addressed to Judge Alexander and also contained both of Mr. Weddington's case numbers. The letter was date-stamped by the "Criminal Dept." on January 28, 2016. Mr. Weddington expressed in his letter, quoted here without correction: "There is a Great and terrible Injustice Being Done to me and Im writing you Asking for your help? I stand Accussed of some Horendouse CRimes." After expressing general grievances against the prosecutor, the first paragraph concludes, without correction, "And a Public Defender, who is sure of my guilt, dispite the truth and the law that says *⁵⁹⁵ innocent until proven guielty.

That she Refuses to help me And is withholding key material from my Discovery Packet." In the second paragraph, Mr. Weddington claims that his "two vindictive" ex-wives are using three "innocent children" as pawns to exact "rage" on him. The next two paragraphs more specifically explained his complaints against his attorney, provided here without correction: I was offered A Deal of 16 years, going above my guidelines for this matter. When I question my attorney on this, she said my guidelines did'nt matter. Talking down to me like I was guilty.

I am sure cause of the nature of the charge and her gender, She is completly Bias towards me and not working in my best interest on this case At All. ¹⁰³² She lied to me About her putting my bail review in, she's gotten up in the middle of And interview walked out into another room, twice then end the interview. I asked her to see if the State would give the girls moms and them a lie detector test to prove who's lying.... Also I begging the court To Reasign me a Attorney or Allow me to get my own? The only notation on this letter was the case number 6299 circled and the trial judge's name written below it.

For reasons unknown, the trial judge did not become aware of the January 20 Letter until February 16, 2016, well after Mr. Weddington's trials. 3 On February 3, 2016, a jury convicted Mr. Weddington of sexual abuse of a minor and second-degree child abuse in case number 6300. On February 5, 2016, a separate jury convicted Mr. Weddington of three counts of second-degree rape and one count of sexual abuse of a minor in case number 6299. Post-Trial Hearings in the Circuit Court On March 14, 2016, the Circuit Court held a hearing, during which the court asked Mr. Weddington to explain his reasons for requesting a discharge of his counsel as well as his reasons *⁵⁹⁶ for not bringing that request to the trial judge's attention at the time of trial. Mr. Weddington insisted that his counsel did not seek what he believed were potentially exculpatory records, such as his medical records and vehicle title.

Mr. Weddington also complained that his counsel gave conflicting advice about whether to testify at trial. The Circuit Court deferred making a ruling because the trial judge wanted to read the transcript of the previous Rule 4-215(e) hearing held on November 9, 2015 before Judge Cahill. On March 23, 2016, the Circuit Court reconvened. At the start of the hearing, the hearing judge acknowledged that Mr. Weddington's January 20 Letter was not in the Court's file prior to his February 2, 2016 trial. 4 The judge explained that there was "no explanation for that [other] than the Clerk's office is backed up." The court again pressed Mr. Weddington for an explanation as to why he did not bring up the existence of his letter with the judge prior to trial.

The trial judge also asked Mr. Weddington's counsel, specifically, whether she followed up appropriately in order to prepare for trial. The judge denied Mr. Weddington's request to discharge counsel, explaining: Well, I've had an opportunity to review the file, I remember the case, I've reviewed the discussion you had with Judge Cahill. Your assertion-that-there's a Harford County case, the name escapes me offhand, where-where the Court talks about the fact that the defendant sent a letter to the Court concerning discharge of counsel. The Court did not conduct an inquiry in that case.

Ultimately, the case was reversed. That's not the situation here. You sent a letter to Judge Cahill, that letter that Judge Cahill read into the record of October the 28 th , 2015. Then he allowed you the opportunity to express your reasons why you wanted to discharge counsel.

Judge Cahill, based on all the information provided, denied your request to discharge counsel. Although he told you he couldn't make you keep *⁵⁹⁷ Ms. Aist, if you wanted to represent ¹⁰³³ yourself, you could. You continued with her representation. The subsequent documents that you submitted, one of which was not in the file when Court commenced trial, you-you can't simply sit back on your laurels and not make a-some sort of effort to let the Court know that you were dissatisfied, especially since you wrote subsequent to your interview or the-the discussion with Judge Cahill.

In spite of all that, none of the information that I have considered, in terms of your discussion with Judge Cahill and the contents of the letter, would make any difference. You know, in terms of [your counsel's] preparation, I think Judge Cahill commented she is one of the more experienced lawyers that this Court has the-the pleasure to have before it. You were very lucky to have such a-a well experienced attorney. So this Court finds as a fact that nothing contained in your subsequent written request or the dialogue you've had with this Court would warrant the discharge of counsel, so your request to discharge counsel is denied.

Thereafter, Mr. Weddington's motion for new trial was denied. Subsequently, Mr. Weddington noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Appellate Court Proceedings In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court. The intermediate appellate court concluded that this Court's opinion in Williams v. State , 435 Md. 474 , 79 A.3d 931 (2013), was directly on point with the facts of the instant case.

Focusing on the contents of the January 20 Letter, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the letter sufficiently described Mr. Weddington's desire to discharge his trial counsel and, thus, triggered Rule 4-215(e). As such, the intermediate appellate court determined that the Circuit Court was required to hold a timely hearing on the January 20 Letter, and not doing so was reversible error. Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals expressly rejected the State's contention that the trial court's post-trial *⁵⁹⁸ hearings cured the Rule 4-215(e) violation because "a defendant has no opportunity post-trial to decide whether he wants to discharge counsel and represent himself." The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgments of the Circuit Court and remanded the case for new trials. The State petitioned this Court for certiorari and presented one question for our review.

We granted the State's request to answer the following questions, which we have re-phrased for clarity: (1) Did Mr. Weddington's letters in which he expressed dissatisfaction with his counsel trigger the requirements of Rule 4-215(e) when the Circuit Court clerk's office received the letter prior to trial but the trial judge did not become aware of it until after trial? (2) Did Mr. Weddington waive his request to discharge counsel by failing to repeat his dissatisfaction to the judge prior to or during trial? State v. Weddington , 456 Md. 80 , 171 A.3d 611 (2017). 5 We hold that Mr. Weddington's ¹⁰³⁴ November 24 and January 20 Letters triggered the requirements of Rule 4-215(e), and that Mr. Weddington did not waive his request to discharge counsel when he failed to bring that request orally or in open court. STANDARD OF REVIEW Our interpretation of the Maryland Rules is a question of law.

Williams , 435 Md. at 483 , 79 A.3d at 936 . To determine if the trial court properly complied with *⁵⁹⁹ Rule 4- 215(e), we review its ruling de novo . State v. Graves , 447 Md. 230 , 240, 135 A.3d 376 , 382 (2016). DISCUSSION The State contends that this Court should cabin the application of Rule 4-215(e) to circumstances when the Circuit Court is on actual notice of a request to discharge counsel because the Rule cannot be triggered if the court does not know about a defendant's Rule 4-215(e) complaint.

The State acknowledges that Williams v. State, 435 Md. 474 , 79 A.3d 931 (2013), is applicable when the trial court is on notice of a defendant's request to discharge his counsel but suggests that here the letter was sent too close to the trial date to effectively put the trial court on notice. 6 As an alternative argument, the State requests that this Court read into Rule 4-215(e) a requirement that the defendant voice his continuing concerns at trial, when given the opportunity to do so. Thus, the State contends that Mr. Weddington waived his right to invoke Rule 4-215(e) when he did not express his dissatisfaction with his counsel to the trial judge prior to, or during, either of his two trials. Finally, the State asserts that the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 4-215(e) was rendered harmless by two post-trial hearings, after which the Circuit Court concluded that there was no meritorious reason for Mr. Weddington to discharge his counsel. Mr. Weddington responds that both of the date-stamped letters, the November 24 Letter and the January 20 Letter, unequivocally expressed Mr. Weddington's desire to discharge his counsel and that each letter, separately, triggered Rule 4-215(e).

Relying on this Court's opinions in State v. Graves , 447 Md. 230 , 135 A.3d 376 (2016), as well as Williams , Mr. Weddington argues that Rule 4-215 is a "precise rubric" that demands "strict compliance" once a request is made. Mr. Weddington urges this Court to reject the State's implicit request to overturn Williams by requiring a defendant to *⁶⁰⁰ make an oral request to discharge counsel at some point before or during trial. Mr. Weddington, of course, cautions against that outcome. Finally, Mr. Weddington warns that applying the harmless error doctrine to Rule 4-215(e) violations would be a "sea change" in this Court's interpretation of the Rule.

Maryland Rule 4-215(e) provides: Discharge of Counsel-Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the ¹⁰³⁵ defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel.

If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(1)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior compliance. As we explained in Williams , "the purpose of Rule 4-215 is to 'protect that most important fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel, which is basic to our system of criminal justice.' " 435 Md. at 485 , 79 A.3d at 938 (citing Parren v. State , 309 Md. 260 , 281, 523 A.2d 597 , 607 (1987) ). The fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel, along with the right to counsel of one's choice, is guaranteed by the United States Constitution as well as by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Graves , 447 Md. at 241 , 135 A.3d at 383 .

Due to the nature of the rights protected, Rule 4-215(e) requires "strict compliance" with its mandates. Pinkney v. State , 427 Md. 77 , 87-88, 46 A.3d 413 , 419 (2012). A *⁶⁰¹ trial court's failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 4-215 constitutes reversible error. Williams , 435 Md. at 486 , 79 A.3d at 938 .

This Court has espoused a broad interpretation of what constitutes a request to discharge counsel. Graves , 447 Md. at 241 -42 , 135 A.3d at 383 . The request "does not need to be in writing or worded in a particular manner." Id. at 242 , 135 A.3d at 383 . Once the request is made, however, the court has an affirmative duty to inquire into the reasons for the request to discharge counsel.

Id. The trial court's inquiry will "dictate how the court proceeds under the