State v. Wheeler

CATHELL, Judge. The State of Maryland appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County that sentenced the defendant, in violation of Md.Code (1954, 1996 RepLVol.), Art. ¹⁴⁴ 27, § 286(f), to a twenty year term of incarceration, suspended the sentence, placed the defendant on supervised probation for five years, then committed the defendant to a drug treatment program pursuant to Md.Code (1982, 1994 Repl-Vol., 1996 Supp.), § 8-507 of the Health-General Article. The State, alleging that the sentence imposed was improper, appeals pursuant to section 12-302(c)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides: “The State may appeal from a final judgment if the State alleges that the trial court failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code.” We shall vacate the sentence imposed by the trial court. The Facts Dilante Antonio Wheeler, appellee, pled guilty to distribution of over sixteen ounces of phencyclidine (PCP) in violation of Article 27, Section 286(f)(l)(vi) and to use of a handgun in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of Article 27, Section 281A(b) of the Maryland Code.

At a 13 April 1995 hearing, appellee pled guilty to the distribution and handgun charges. He agreed that if the case were to go to trial, the State would be able to prove the facts contained in the Statement of Probable Cause. The Statement of Probable Cause provided: On 11/10/94, at approximately 4:40 PM., TF[0] Paulk arrived at the predetermined location at the Exxon gas station located at the intersection of Forestville Road and Marlboro Pike, Prince Georges County[,] MD. At approximately 4:45 PM the defendant ... arrived at this location and met with TFO Paulk.

The defendant produced from within his clothing a 16 oz. quantity of PCP which was exchanged with TFO Paulk for the sum of $5,200.00. The defendant ... then fled the area and w[as] subsequently arrested. The defendant was found to be in possession at the time of the narcotic transaction a semi auto .25 cal. handgun. TFO Paulk knows the above schedule II drug to be phencycl[i]dine (PCP) from his training and experience.

While the def. ¹⁴⁵ was fleeing from the arrest team he discarded the handgun. The handgun was then seized. The State’s Attorney supplemented these facts at the hearing, adding that the substance purchased from appellee was in fact phencyclidine and the amount seized was sixteen and one-half ounces. The State’s Attorney also noted that the handgun seized from appellee was operable.

Appellee was sentenced on 10 January 1997. The trial court sentenced appellee to twenty years’ imprisonment on each count, suspended the sentence, and placed appellee on supervised probation for five years. The court also found appellee to be drug dependent and committed him to an inpatient drug treatment facility pursuant to section 8-507 of the Health-General Article. The State presents a single issue on appeal: “Did the court below render an illegal sentence?” Discussion In order properly to resolve the case sub judice, we must examine two closely related questions: A. May a trial court sentence a defendant to twenty years imprisonment for violating section 286(f) of Article 27 and then suspend all of the sentence?

B. Does a trial court have the discretion to commit a defendant who violated section 286(f) of Article 27 to drug treatment prior to the imposition of the mandatory sentence? We answer both questions in the negative and shall vacate the trial court’s sentence. The resolution of these two questions involves the construction of section 286(f) of Article 27. The ultimate goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effect the intent of the Legislature.

Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 56 , 673 A.2d 221 (1996); Clark v. State, 115 Md.App. 208, 211 , 692 A.2d 949 , cert. granted, 346 Md. 632 , 697 A.2d 915 (1997). In determining legislative intent, we first examine the language of the statute itself. Armstead, 342 Md. at 56 , 673 A.2d 221 ; State v. ¹⁴⁶ Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 6-7 , 629 A.2d 731 (1993). The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and common meaning. “Giving the words their ordinary and common meaning in light of the full context in which they appear, and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence,’ normally will result in the discovery of the Legislature’s intent.” Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946 (1993) (quoting Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 170-71 , 596 A.2d 648 (1991)); see also McNeil v. State, 112 Md.App. 434, 451, 685 A.2d 839 (1996)(quoting Harris).

We may also consider extrinsic evidence of legislative intent such as amendments that took place to the statute during the legislative process, the statute’s relationship to prior legislation, judicial interpretation or treatment of other statutes dealing with a similar subject matter, and “other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal.” Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539 , 546 A.2d 465 (1988)(quoting Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987)). With these principles in mind, we shall examine section 286 and in particular subsection f. A. Suspension of the Sentence The pertinent provisions of section 286 provide: (a) Except as authorized by this subheading, it is unlawful for any person: (1) To manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or to possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance.... (b) Any person who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section with respect to: (2) Phencyclidine ... is guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $20,000, or both. ¹⁴⁷ (f)(1) If a person violates subsection (a)(1) of this section and the violation involves any of the following controlled dangerous substances, in the amounts indicated, the person is subject to the penalties provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection upon conviction: ...

(vi) 16 ounces or more of phencyclidine in liquid form.... (3)(i) A person convicted of violating paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced as otherwise provided for in this section, except that it is mandatory upon the court to impose no less than 5 years’ imprisonment, and neither that term of imprisonment nor any part of it may be suspended. In the case sub judice, the trial court sentenced appellant to a twenty-year term of incarceration for violating section 286(f) of Article 27. The court then suspended that sentence and placed appellee on supervised probation for a period of five years.

The State contends the trial court erred in failing to impose the mandatory sentence under section 286(f)(1). We agree. Appellee pled guilty to possessing over 16 ounces of PCP with intent to distribute in violation of section 286(f) of Article 27. A person found to have violated section 286(f) “shall be sentenced as otherwise provided for in this section, except that it is mandatory upon the court to impose no less than 5 years’ imprisonment, and neither that term of imprisonment nor any part of it may be suspended.” Art. 27, § 286(f)(3)(i).

A person who violates section 286(f), by violating section 286(a)(1) in specified drug amounts, is sentenced pursuant to the other applicable provisions of section 286. Section 286(b)(2) is the applicable sentencing provision for distribution of PCP. Under this section, a violation of section 286(a) is punishable by up to twenty years’ imprisonment, or a $20,000 fine, or both. Section 286(f), however, provides that at least five years of any prison sentence imposed under section 286(b)(2) is mandatory if the violation of section 286(a) involves sixteen ounces or more of PCP.

The plain language of ¹⁴⁸ the statute indicates the Legislature intended to punish more severely persons who are manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing certain controlled dangerous substances in large quantities. We note other evidence that is in accord with the legislative intent gleaned from the plain language of the statute. In Anderson v. State, 89 Md.App. 712, 717-18 , 599 A.2d 861 (1991), we noted: Section 286(f)(l)(v) is part of the “Drug Kingpin Act” of 1989. The impetus for the bill, SB 400/HB 502, came from the Governor’s office.

Section 286(f)(l)(v) is part of “The Distribution of Large Quantities Component.” The Briefing Document that accompanied SB 400/HB 502 states, at p. 5: “This component recognizes that there needs to be some distinction made between the individual who handles a substantial volume of drugs as compared to the person who handles a minimal amount. It also attempts to give the courts guidance with regard to the severity of possessing a certain level of a controlled dangerous substance. To help law enforcement officers have an impact upon the volume drug dealer, this component does the following: —It distinguishes the volume drug dealer from the street corner dealer by establishing a mandatory minimum penalty of 5 years in jail for the possession of certain threshold quantities of a controlled dangerous substance. The substances identified in the legislation are the same as those currently included in the Drug Importation Statute.” [Footnote omitted.] As the plain language of the statute and the extrinsic evidence point out, section 286(f) of Article 27 was enacted to punish more severely persons who engage in the manufacture or distribution of a high volume of drugs.

Appellee, who was a high volume dealer of PCP under the statute, was subject to a minimum, mandatory five-year prison sentence in accordance with section 286(f)(3)(i). The trial court erred in failing to sentence appellee to a mandatory five years’ imprisonment. ¹⁴⁹ We shall, accordingly, remand this case to the circuit court for Prince George’s County in order for the trial court to impose a sentence in conformity with section 286(f)(3)(i) of Article 27. Although such a remand would normally be dispositive of an appeal, we nevertheless shall address the second important issue presented by the State in order to provide guidance on remand. B. Sentencing to Drug Treatment The more important issue we address is whether the trial court had the discretion to commit appellee to a drug treatment facility prior to the imposition of the sentence mandated by section 286(f)(3)(i) of Article 27.

The statute providing for commitment to drug treatment facilities in criminal cases is contained in the Health-General Article. The relevant provision provides: If a court finds in a criminal case that a defendant has an alcohol or drug dependency, the court may commit the defendant as a condition of release, after conviction, or at any other time the defendant voluntarily agrees to