State v. Wynn

⁴⁰ Powers, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by the State from an order by Judge Robert B. Watts in the Criminal Court of Baltimore granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss several indictments against him on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial. The indictments which were dismissed were returned on 9 January 1974, charging violation of the narcotics laws, conspiracy, and maintaining a common nuisance house. The motion to dismiss was heard and decided in April 1974, and the State took this appeal.

The criminal offenses are alleged to have occurred on 13 December 1969. Wynn was arrested at that time and a few days later was released on bond. Three indictments were returned against him in January 1970. Several times when the cases were called for trial, continuances were granted to the State on its representation that it was unable to locate the witnesses necessary to prove the case.

At a scheduled trial date on 14 December 1972, the State again explained that it had been unable to locate necessary witnesses, and entered a nolle pros, as to each indictment. Defendant’s counsel stated on the record at that time that the entry of the nolle pros, was in no way to be considered as a waiver of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. At the hearing on the motion now on appeal the State had no explanation for the three year lapse of time between the arrest and the nolle pros, other than the bare statement that the witnesses had not been located. The State candidly informed the hearing judge that when a newly formed investigative unit in the State’s Attorney’s office was assigned the task of locating the witnesses, some four years after the offenses, the witnesses were located in five days.

We said in State v. Hunter; 16 Md. App. 306 (1972) at 310: “The right to a speedy trial is relative, and the time within which the trial must be had depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Barker v. Wingo, [ 407 U. S. 514 (1972)]; State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220, 227 , 283 A. 2d 160 (1971); ⁴¹ Stevenson v. State, 4 Md. App. 1, 10-11 , 241 A. 2d 174 (1967). The facts and circumstances in each particular case should be viewed in the light of four factors: (1) The length of the delay, (2) The reason for the delay, (3) Prejudice to the accused, and (4) Waiver by the accused.” In State v. Jones, 18 Md. App. 11 (1973) we said, at 23: “If, upon preliminary examination, we may determine that there has been no ‘delay’ of ‘constitutional dimension’ — if the claim of ‘speedy trial’ denial is clearly frivolous — if the passage of time is patently not inordinate — we are relieved of all necessity to make further analysis. If this threshold of ‘constitutional dimension’ has not been crossed, there is no need for the delicate weighing of social values in order ‘to balance the right of the individual to obtain a speedy trial against the right of society to punish those