Station Maintenance Solutions, Inc. v. Two Farms, Inc.

WATTS, J. Appellant, Station Maintenance Solutions, Inc., appeals the Circuit Court for Baltimore County’s entry of a default judgment in favor of appellee, Two Farms, Inc. d/b/a Royal Farms, as a sanction for an alleged violation of a scheduling order by appellant’s insurer, Mid-Continent. Appellant noted an appeal raising five issues, which we rephrase as follows: 1 ⁴⁶⁷ I. Whether the circuit court had authority to enter sanctions against appellant for its insurer, Mid-Continent’s, alleged violation of a scheduling order?

II

Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in entering the sanction? For the reasons set forth below, we answer question I in the negative and question II in the affirmative. We shall vacate the default judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 11, 2010, members of the Ratajczak family (the “Ratajczaks”), as individuals, filed suit against appellee in the circuit court, alleging that approximately 5,400 gallons of gasoline had leaked from appellee’s underground storage tanks at its facility at 7950 Pulaski Highway, Baltimore, Maryland, and contaminated the Ratajczaks’ adjacent single family home property.

On June 28, 2010, the circuit court issued a Scheduling Order, scheduling a settlement conference for April 5, 2011. On August 2, 2010, appellee filed a third party complaint against appellant. 2 Appellee requested “judgment by way of ⁴⁶⁸ contribution and/or indemnification [against appellant] for all sums for which [appellee] may be adjudged liable to the [Ratajczaks], plus attorneys’ fees and all costs and expenses[,]” “plus One Million Dollars ($1,000,000)” for each count alleging appellant’s negligence and breach of contract in failing to maintain and inspect the underground tank which was the source of the leak. On October 22, 2010, appellant filed an answer and a request for a jury trial. On December 3, 2010, the Ratajczaks filed an Amended Complaint adding all third party defendants named by appellee, including appellant, as defendants.

On January 6, 2011, appellee filed an amended answer to the third party complaint. On March 24, 2011, appellee filed an Amended Third Party Complaint against appellant, repeating the pleas from the third party complaint. On March 29, 2011, the parties filed a Consent Motion to change the date of the April 5, 2011, settlement conference to October 18, 2011. On March 30, 2011, the circuit court granted the motion.

The parties agree that, on August 2, 2011, the Ratajczaks and appellee participated in a mediation conference, at which they agreed to settle the Ratajczaks’ claims against appellee for $2,700,000, and the Ratajczaks agreed to assign their claims against appellant to appellee. 3 On August 4, 2011, appellant filed a Crossclaim against appellee, arguing that appellee’s actions proximately caused the injury at issue in the underlying lawsuit, and that, as a result, appellant was “entitled to contribution and/or indemnification from [appellee] for all and/or part of any judgment entered against [appellant].” On August 22, 2011, appellee filed a Motion to Strike Cross-claim, asserting that the Ratajczaks were “in the process of assigning their claims against [appellant] to [appellee,]” and that, as a result, appellant “has no claims for contribution nor ⁴⁶⁹ indemnity as the only claims being asserted against it are by [appellee].” On September 6, 2011, appellant filed an Opposition to Motion to Strike Crossclaim, arguing that, because it was unaware of the release language that would be used in the settlement agreements between appellee and other parties, and of whether appellee intended to pursue its assigned claim from the Ratajczaks, the Crossclaim/Counterclaim was a reasonable method to assert claims of contribution and indemnification against appellee. On August 31, 2011, in response to a joint request by the parties, the circuit court issued a notice of hearing order moving the settlement conference from October 18, 2011, to September 27, 2011. On September 6, 2011, the circuit court issued a second order titled “Order to Attend Settlement Conference,” providing as follows: [Appellee] and [appellant] are hereby ordered to attend a settlement conference before [the circuit court] on Tuesday, September 27, at 9:00 a.m. The following conditions are imposed: A senior officer or employee of [appellant’s insurance carrier [Mid-Continent] must be present, with binding settlement authority up to the full limits of its policy.

A senior representative of [appellant] must be present with full settlement authority. A senior representative of [appellee] must be present with full settlement authority. On September 27, 2011, the settlement conference was conducted in the judge’s chambers, not on-the-record in open court. It is undisputed that both parties and a representative of Mid-Continent attended the settlement conference, and that the representative of Mid-Continent was an independent third-party adjuster, not a “senior officer or employee ... with binding settlement authority up to the full limits of [the] policy” as ordered by the circuit court.

On brief, appellant contends that a senior officer of Mid-Continent was not available to attend the settlement conference, and that appellant’s counsel contacted appellee’s counsel prior to the confer ⁴⁷⁰ ence to request a continuance, but that appellee’s counsel “would not consent.” Appellant contends that the following occurred at the settlement conference: [The circuit court] asked counsel for [appellee] what sanction he would like the [circuit] court to enter for Mid[-]Continent’s “violation” of the September 6 Order. [Appellee’s counsel] initially requested that the [circuit e]ourt award him attorney’s fees and costs, but then withdrew this request, instead orally moving for a default judgment against [appellant] in favor of [appellee] in the amount of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00). Before granting [appellee’s counsel's oral motion, [the circuit court] requested that counsel for [appellant] contact Mid[-]Continent to inform them that she would be imposing the requested sanction against [appellant]. While [appellant’s counsel] was speaking to a representative from Mid[-]Continent by phone, [the circuit court] granted [appellee’s] oral request for a default judgment against [appellant], entering judgment against [appellant] in favor of [appellee] for one million dollars ($1,000,-000.00). In contrast, appellee contends that the following occurred at the settlement conference: At the settlement conference, [the circuit court] questioned [appellant]^ counsel of record about whether she had, in fact, notified [Mid-Continent] of the court’s order requiring its attendance.

After confirming that Mid-Continent had indeed received' a copy of the order; that it knew it was required to be in attendance; and that it had nevertheless decided it would not send a senior officer or employee to attend the settlement conference, [the circuit court] considered entering a default judgment against [appellant] in the amount of its available insurance. Counsel for [appellee] moved for a default judgment and advised the court that if it could resolve the case on that basis, [appellee] would be willing to accept judgment in the amount of $1 million. The [circuit] court then granted a default judgment against [appellant] in the amount of $1 million, the limits of [appellant]^ policy with Mid-Continent. [Appellant’s] counsel of ⁴⁷¹ record was present at the time the default judgment was entered by [the circuit court]. However, [appellant’s] counsel of record never requested to place the settlement conference “on[-]the[-]record” by having a court reporter attend or by using a mechanical recording system[.] ...

Despite the fact that [appellant’s] counsel was present when [the circuit court] entered the default judgment against [appellant], [appellant’s] counsel never requested to argue “on[-]the[-]record” that the default judgment should not be entered. (Record citations omitted). The circuit court docket entries contain the following information as to the entry of judgment by default in favor of appellee: Sept. 27, 2011 [ ] Settlement Conference Held Today on (Sept 6, 2011) This Court Signed an Order to Attend Settlement Conference. Attorney [ ] Who Represented [appellant] Provided a Copy of The Court Orders to [appellant] and [appellant’s] Insurance Company [Mid-Continent], and Advises That She Has Spoken To [appellant and Mid-Continent] By Telephone and Represents To [the circuit court] That They Are Aware That They Are Requested to be Present Today. [Appellant] Has a Representative Available Here Today [].

A Senior Officer [and] Employee of [Mid-Continent] is Not Present With Binding Settlement Authority Up To The Full Amount of Its Policy. Judgment is Hereby Entered in Favor of [appellee and against appellant] in The Amount of One Million ($1,000,000.00) By Default, [and] Interest At The Legal Rate of Interest And All Open Court Costs. [Appellee] Waives All Claims in Excess of ($1,000,000.00) For Its Claim Against [appellant]. The circuit court did not issue a written order or opinion. 4 On September 27, 2011, appellant filed a Motion to Strike Order of Default and to Recuse. On October 6, 2011, appel ⁴⁷² lant withdrew the motion.

On the same day, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the default judgment. On October 10, 2011, appellee’s counsel took the deposition of Robert L. Ferguson, Jr., an attorney retained by appellant. Ferguson testified regarding his communication with Mid-Continent on appellant’s behalf as follows: 5 [Appellee’s Counsel]: ... [H]ave you taken the position with Mid-Continent that Mid-Continent should pay its full policy limits in order to settle the claims being asserted by [appellee] and [the Ratajczaks]? [Ferguson]: Whatever it will take to settle it, up to its policy limits. [Appellee’s Counsel]: And are you familiar with whether there is a substantial excess exposure on behalf of [appellant] in this litigation? [Ferguson]: I understand there to be a significant excess. I understand that [appellee] has settled with the [Ratajczaks] in that case already for $2.7 million, and in addition, has sustained its own damages. [Appellee’s Counsel]: Are you familiar with the fact that a judgment has been entered in this litigation against [appellant]? [Ferguson]: Yes, I am. [Appellee’s Counsel]: To your knowledge, did [appellant] consent to the entry of that judgment? [Ferguson]: It did not consent, to my knowledge. [Appellee’s Counsel]: What is your understanding as to why the judgment was entered? [Ferguson]: My understanding is that the judgment was entered as sanctions for the failure of [appellant’s] insurer, Mid-Continent [ ], to comply with an Order of Court requir ⁴⁷³ ing that a senior member of the company with authority to settle the case attend a settlement conference that had been scheduled by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on September 27, 2011. [Appellee’s Counsel]: Now, are you familiar with the fact that a motion to strike that judgment was filed on behalf of [appellant] by counsel appointed by Mid-Continent? [Ferguson]: Yes. [Appellee’s Counsel]: Have you taken a position, or did you take a position on behalf of [appellant] with Mid-Continent as to whether Mid-Continent should withdraw that motion and allow the judgment to stand? [Ferguson]: Yes, I did. [Appellee’s Counsel]: What position did you take? [Ferguson]: I communicated with Mid-Continent requesting that it withdraw the motion to strike the judgment so that the judgment would stand, and protect its insured from any risk of excess verdict.

I also should add that I asked that the insurer pay the judgment so that it could be entered and satisfied. On October 20, 2011, appellee filed in this Court a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that, because “[t]he claims asserted against Alger by [the Ratajczaks] and [appellee] have not been resolved[,]” the default judgment against appellant was not a final, appealable judgment. On November 9, 2011, appellant filed in this Court a Response to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice. On November 29, 2011, this Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice.

On October 25, 2011, the parties filed a Consent Motion to Order the Entry of a Final Judgment in response to appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal “because there are open and unresolved claims.” On October 25, 2011, the circuit court issued an order directing entry of a final judgment against appellant. On October 26, 2011, appellant filed a second notice of appeal. On October 31, 2011, the circuit court entered the default ⁴⁷⁴ judgment against appellant. On November 22, 2011, appellant filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION I. (a) Contentions Appellant contends that the circuit court lacked authority to impose a “case-ending sanction” against it for the actions of its insurer. Appellant argues that case-ending sanctions are “generally reserved for conduct that is repeated, willful, and egregious, and which causes significant prejudice to other litigants or to the court.” Appellant asserts that it did not engage in such conduct. Appellee responds that the issue is not preserved for appellate review, as appellant failed to preserve on-the-record any objection to the entry of the default judgment and withdrew the motion to strike.

As to the merits, appellee contends that the circuit court had authority to enter the default judgment, as circuit courts have authority to regulate the proceedings before them and may impose sanctions to enforce that authority. Alternatively, appellee argues that any error in entering the default judgment was harmless, as appellant “has not suffered any prejudice as a result of the default judgment because the judgment does not exceed the limits of [appellant]^ commercial general liability insurance policy with Mid-Continent.” In a reply brief, appellant contends that, because the circuit court imposed the sanction summarily in chambers, it lacked an opportunity to object to the default judgment and, thus, did not forfeit appellate review of the default judgment by not objecting on-the-record. Appellant asserts that it did not forfeit the right to appellate review by withdrawing the motion to strike, as it “could not avail itself of [a] motion to set aside the default order” because the circuit court never entered a default order prior to the default judgment as required by the Maryland Rules. ⁴⁷⁵ Appellant contends that the circuit court is prohibited from imposing a monetary sanction as the penalty for violation of a scheduling order and argues that it engaged in no conduct warranting any sanction at all. Appellant asserts that the circuit court’s error in entering the default judgment was not harmless.

(b) Standard of Review “[W]here [a trial court] order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [an appellate court] must determine whether the [trial] court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Jackson v. 2109 Brandywine, LLC, 180 Md.App. 535, 567 , 952 A.2d 304 , cert. denied, 406 Md. 444 , 959 A.2d 793 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). (c) Law (i) Sanctions Maryland Rule 2-504 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Order required. (1) Unless otherwise ordered by the County Administrative Judge for one or more specified categories of actions, the court shall enter a scheduling order in every civil action, whether or not the court orders a scheduling conference pursuant to Rule 2-504.1. (b) Contents of scheduling order.

(2) Permitted. A scheduling order may also contain: (C) a specific referral to or direction to pursue an available and appropriate form of alternative dispute resolution, including a requirement that individuals with authority to settle be present or readily available for consultation during the alternative dispute resolution proceeding, provided that ⁴⁷⁶ the referral or direction conforms to the limitations of Rule 2-504.1(e); (F) a further scheduling conference or pretrial conference date; [and] (I) any other matter pertinent to the management of the action. The Rule was enacted to enable circuit courts “to expedite and control the orderly flow of civil litigation[.]” Tobin v. Marriott Hotels, 111 Md.App. 566, 572 , 683 A.2d 784 (1996). “[Although the Rule does not, by its terms, provide for sanctions, the case law of Maryland makes the imposition of sanctions for the violation of a scheduling order appropriate.” Manzano v. S. Md. Hosp., 347 Md. 17, 29 , 698 A.2d 531 (1997) (citations omitted); see also Dorsey v. Nold, 362 Md. 241, 256 , 765 A.2d 79 (2001) (“Just as there are sanctions for the violation of the discovery rales, sanctions are available for the violation of directives in scheduling orders, although they are not specified in any rule.” (Citation omitted)). “For a trial court to permit a party to deviate [ ] from a scheduling order without a showing of good cause is, on its face, prejudicial and fundamentally unfair to opposing parties, and would further contravene the very aims supporting the inception of Rule 2-504 by decreasing the value of scheduling orders to the paper upon which they are printed.” Naughton v. Bankier, 114 Md.App. 641, 654 , 691 A.2d 712 (1997). “Indeed, if our courts could not enforce their scheduling orders through the threat and imposition of sanctions, the entire process of expedited case management would be at risk.” Manzano, 347 Md. at 29 , 698 A.2d 531 . In Tobin, 111 Md.App. at 567, 577 , 683 A.2d 784 , this Court reversed the imposition of a $750 sanction against a party’s counsel in the underlying litigation, payable to opposing counsel, for failure to attend a mediation conference ordered by the ⁴⁷⁷ circuit court under Maryland Rule 2-504. 6 In the order imposing sanctions, the circuit court stated that “Tobin, ... is hereby sanctioned, assessed and shall pay the sum of seven hundred fifty dollars ($ 750.00), as attorneys’ fees[.]” Id. at 570 , 683 A.2d 784 .

Although finding that the circuit court has authority to “insist on at least substantial, if not strict, compliance with their scheduling orders[,]” this Court held that the sanction was improper because it took the form of attorneys’ fees. Id. at 573, 575 , 683 A.2d 784 . We explained the history of Rule 2-504 as follows: The Committee was aware that a somewhat similar scheme had been adopted by the federal courts through revisions to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 and that, as part of the federal approach, sanctions were expressly authorized. Rule 16(f) provides, in relevant part, that, if a party or an attorney fails to obey a scheduling order, the court, in addition to or in lieu of other sanctions authorized under Rule 37(b)(2), “shall require the party or the attorney representing the party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with the rule, including attorney’s fees, unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justi ⁴⁷⁸ fied or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Notwithstanding this information, the Court of Appeals declined to adopt such a mechanism, apparently preferring to see if the new procedure would work effectively without such sanctions.

There is no indication in the record of the proceedings before the Court that it believed a comparable authority was inherent or implicit and thus did not need to be expressed. The court was certainly aware that, in instances when it desired to permit reimbursement of expenses and attorneys’ fees as a sanction for violating a court order, it conferred that authority expressly. See,- e.g., Md. Rules 2-433 and 8-206(e), allowing an award of attorney’s fees for failure to comply with orders or procedures governed by those rules. Id. at 574-75 , 683 A.2d 784 .

We concluded that “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary case, the Court has been consistently unwilling to allow [circuit] courts to shift litigation expenses based on relative fault, and in those cases in which it has chosen to do so on a systematic basis, it has made express provision in the rules.” Id. at 575 , 683 A.2d 784 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the circuit court had “neither a general inherent authority nor any specific authority under Rule 2-504” to impose “sanctions of this kind”—i.e. attorneys’ fees. Id. at 575-76 , 683 A.2d 784 . In Naughton, 114 Md.App. at 647, 658-59 , 691 A.2d 712 , we reversed a sanction of $350 in attorneys’ fees levied on a party for the failure of his insurance company to send an agent to a settlement conference.

In Naughton , we did not address the circuit court’s authority to sanction a party for the violation of a Rule 2-504 scheduling order by an insurer. Rather, our holding was confined to the propriety of “the settlement judge’s imposition of attorney’s fees” as a sanction. Id. at 659 , 691 A.2d 712 . In Manzano, 347 Md. at 27, 29-30 , 698 A.2d 531 , the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of a medical malpractice claim, holding that, although the chair of an arbitration panel ⁴⁷⁹ possessed “the authority to sanction Petitioner for violating the scheduling order[,]” a sanction must be proportionate to the corresponding violation, and as a result, case-ending sanctions are disfavored. 7 The Court stated that “[t]he dismissal of a elaim[ ] is among the gravest of sanctions, and as such, is warranted only in cases of egregious misconduct such as willful or contemptuous behavior, a deliberate attempt to hinder or prevent effective presentation of defenses or counterclaims, or stalling in revealing one’s own weak claim or defense.” Id. at 29-30 , 698 A.2d 531 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 8 In Dorsey, 362 Md. at 259-60 , 765 A.2d 79 , the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s exclusion of a witness’s testimony as a sanction for violation of a scheduling order requiring all expert witnesses to be identified by a specified date.

The Court held that the circuit court’s classification of the excluded witness as an expert whose opinion was developed in preparation for litigation was inaccurate. Id. The Court reasoned that, because the witness in question, although a medical expert, had developed his opinion regarding the cause of death while performing an autopsy on the petitioners’ deceased child without the consideration of future litigation, the petitioners’ failure to inform the respondent that they wished to call the witness by the date listed in the scheduling order for compliance with Maryland Rule 2-402(e)(l) 9 was not ⁴⁸⁰ a violation of the scheduling order. Id. at 245, 259-60 , 765 A.2d 79 .

Although “sanctions are available for the violation of directives in scheduling orders,” the Court of Appeals determined it inappropriate for the circuit court to impose sanctions in that case. Id. at 256, 260 , 765 A.2d 79 . In Maddox v. Stone, 174 Md.App. 489, 497, 508-09 , 921 A.2d 912 (2007), this Court reversed the circuit court’s exclusion of an expert witness as a sanction for violation of a scheduling order. 10 We held: [Although] the governing principle [in imposing sanctions] is that the appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary[,] ... the more draconian sanctions, of dismissing a claim or precluding the evidence necessary to support a claim, are normally reserved for persistent and deliberate violations that actually cause some prejudice, either to a party or to the court. Id. at 501 , 921 A.2d 912 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Noting that “[s]cheduling orders are but the means to an end, not an end in and of themselves[,]” we concluded that case-ending sanctions “should be reserved for egregious violations of the [circuit] court’s scheduling order, ⁴⁸¹ and should be supported by evidence of willful or contemptuous or otherwise opprobrious behavior on the part of the party or counsel.” Id. at 507 , 921 A.2d 912 . (ii) Contempt “When a party or circuit court is confronted with an uncooperative party, the party or circuit court may seek to compel the party’s cooperation, or punish the party. Specifically, the party or circuit court may pursue direct [or constructive] civil or criminal contempt sanctions!.]” Fisher v. McCrary Crescent City, LLC, 186 Md.App. 86, 113 , 972 A.2d 954 (2009), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 637 , 178 L.Ed.2d 476 (2010). In Hermina v. Baltimore Life Ins.

Co., 128 Md.App. 568, 580 , 739 A.2d 893 (1999), this Court explained the distinction between civil contempt and criminal contempt as follows: A civil contempt proceeding is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to orders and decrees primarily made to benefit such parties. These proceedings are generally remedial in nature and are intended to coerce future compliance. Thus, a penalty in a civil contempt must provide for purging. On the other hand, the penalty imposed in a criminal contempt is punishment for past misconduct which may not necessarily be capable of remedy.

Therefore, such a penalty does not require a purging provision but may be purely punitive. In [Maryland], to these factors must be added the degree of proof required to establish a contempt—a civil contempt need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, while a criminal contempt must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citation omitted). “ ‘Direct contempt’ means a contempt committed in the presence of the judge presiding in court or so near to the judge as to interrupt the court’s proceedings.” Md. R. 15-202(b). “Any contempt that is not a direct contempt—‘where the judge must look at extrinsic evidence to determine that a contempt has been committed’—is a constructive contempt.” ⁴⁸² Fisher, 186 Md.App. at 115 , 972 A.2d 954 (citations omitted); see also Md. R. 15-202(a) (“ ‘Constructive contempt’ means any contempt other than a direct contempt.”). “[I]n constructive contempt proceedings, the court must give the accused contemnor an opportunity to challenge the alleged contempt and show cause why a finding of contempt should not be entered.” Fisher, 186 Md.App. at 119 , 972 A.2d 954 (citation omitted). Maryland Rule 15-206 controls the procedure for constructive civil contempt.

In Fisher, 186 Md.App. at 117 , 972 A.2d 954 , we explained when a constructive civil contempt proceeding may be brought, stating: A party, the Attorney General, or the court may institute a constructive civil contempt proceeding when (1) the movant intends to file or filed the proceeding as a continuation of the original action, as opposed to a separate and independent action; (2) the movant seeks relief to benefit themselves or a party instead of punishing the alleged contemnor; (3) the acts complained of do not of themselves constitute crimes or conduct by the defendant so wilful or contumacious that the court is impelled to act on its own motion; and (4) the contempt is not a direct contempt. (Footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). “Unless the court finds that a petition for contempt is frivolous on its face, the court shall enter an order providing for (i) a prehearing conference, or (ii) a hearing, or (in) both. The scheduled hearing date shall allow a reasonable time for the preparation of a defense and may not be less than 20 days after the prehearing conference.” Md. R. 15-206(c)(2). “The order, together with a copy of any petition and other document filed in support of the allegation of contempt, shall be served on the alleged contemnor pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 2-121 [controlling service of process in the circuit court] or, if the alleged contemnor has appeared as a party in the action in which the contempt is charged, in the manner prescribed by the court.” Md. R. 15-206(d). ⁴⁸³ The procedure for constructive criminal contempt is controlled by Maryland Rule 15-205. In Fisher, 186 Md.App. at 120-21 , 972 A.2d 954 , we explained: The court, the State’s Attorney, the Attorney General, or the State Prosecutor, depending on the circumstances, may institute a constructive criminal contempt proceeding when (1) the movant intends to file or filed the proceeding as a separate action as opposed to a continuation of the original action; (2) the alleged contemnor willfully violated or attempted to frustrate a court order, such that the alleged contemnor offended the dignity or process of the court; (3) the act was not a direct contempt; and (4) the movant seeks to punish the alleged contemnor for his act.

(Citations omitted). “An order filed by the court ... shall contain the information required by Rule 4-202(a)[, controlling the contents of a charging document.] The order or petition shall be served, along with a summons or warrant, in the manner specified in Rule 4—212[, controlling service of a summons,] or, if the proceeding is in the Court of Appeals or Court of Special Appeals, in the manner directed by that court.” Md. R. 15-205(d). Pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-207(d)(l) and (2), in all proceedings for contempt for actions other than failure to pay spousal or child support, [w]hen a court or jury makes a finding of contempt, the court shall issue a written order that specifies the sanction imposed for the contempt. In the case of a civil contempt, the order shall specify how the contempt may be purged. In the case of a criminal contempt, if the sanction is incarceration, the order shall specify a determinate term and any condition under which the sanction may be suspended, modified, revoked, or terminated.

In Betz v. State, 99 Md.App. 60, 69, 62, 65-66 , 635 A.2d 77 (1994), we reversed the circuit court’s summary imposition of criminal contempt sanctions for violation of a scheduling order against a party’s attorney in a civil action for failing to submit “a written statement containing or addressing 10 enumerated ⁴⁸⁴ categories of information” at least five days prior to a pretrial settlement conference, holding that the violation of the order could not be considered direct contempt.