Statom v. Board of Commissioners

Prescott, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. After the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County sustained demurrers, to, and dismissed, their amended bill of complaint (the bill), by which they sought to enjoin the use of certain public facilities by the Prince George’s County Boys’ Club (Club), until the Club should admit Negro boys to a non-segregated participation in its activities, the plaintiffs below, in a class suit, have appealed. The question presented is whether the well-pleaded allegations of the bill set forth a denial by the appellees, or any of them, of the constitutional rights of the appellants to equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed to all citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 2 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The bill, in substance, alleges that the plaintiffs are boys of the Negro race, who are eligible by age, health, character, interest in athletics, and similar and legitimate qualifications, for membership and activity, together with, and on the same basis as, boys of the Caucasian and other races, in the sports and on the teams promoted and sponsored by the Club.

The number of boys in the same class as plaintiffs, eligible for membership and activity in the Club, but barred from membership or participation on an integrated basis solely because of their color, is too large practicably to bring before the Court. Therefore plaintiffs sue on behalf of all the members of said class as well as themselves. Defendant, Board of County Commissioners of Prince George’s County is a governmental body, and is responsible, under the laws of the State of Maryland, for the use of the pub- ⁶⁰ lie resources" and facilities, including public buildings and school premises and property, of the County. Defendant, Board of Education of the County, is a governmental body, and is responsible, under the laws of the State and the laws and ordinances of the County, for the maintenance and use in the County of public school premises and property.

The bill then names the individual defendants constituting said Boards. Defendant, William H. Schmidt, is the Superintendent of Schools of the County, and is responsible for the maintenance and use of the public school premises and property of the County. Defendant, Mayor and Council of the Town of Cheverly (Town), is a public body existing under and by virtue of the laws of Maryland. The bill then names the individual defendants constituting the Mayor and Council, and alleges that defendant Harris is responsible for the use of the parks of the Town.

Defendant, Club, is a membership corporation organized and operated by virtue of the laws of Maryland, and, in general, is devoted to providing a properly supervised boys’ athletic and guidance program by sponsoring town teams, games and competition, during at least the baseball, football and basketball seasons, and in other ways promoting the welfare of the boys of the County. In its activity and functioning the Club serves a public function and purpose, namely, recreation and youth guidance. Defendant, Joseph W. Vernon, is the Executive Director of the Club, a full-time, paid position. The office of Vernon is located on and in public property, the County Service Building located in Hyattsville, Maryland.

It is made available without the payment of rent, or for utilities, for maintenance or for similar costs or expenses to the County; and the use thereof is with the knowledge and consent of the Commissioners and each individual member thereof. The Club makes use of' the playgrounds, premises, and property of the County public schools for the practice and competitive games of its players, teams and leagues, and related and other uses and activities. Such use by the Club is with the knowledge, permission and approval of each and all the defendant public officials heretofore alleged to be charged with the duty of controlling and caring for said playgrounds, premises, ⁶¹ and property, as well as the other defendants. The Club makes use, with the knowledge of the officials of the Town, of the public park of the Town for the practice and competitive games of its players, teams and leagues, and related and other uses and activities.

On or about May 13, 1961, plaintiffs were solicited for membership in the Club, and received membership application forms, within or on the premises or grounds of the Tuxedo-Cheverly School, (plaintiffs being students therein) a public school in the Town, but operated by the County. On information and belief, each and all the defendants were officially and actually aware of, and the public-official defendants sanctioned and approved of, the use of the public school premises and grounds for this purpose of the Club’s distributing information about itself and soliciting members. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs and their parents completed the application blanks, submitted them with the requisite fees, which fees have never been returned, and seemed to have been accepted for membership in the Club. Thereafter, they practiced and played baseball on an integrated basis on a team or teams of the Club, without discord, incident, or question.

On or about June 8, 1961, however, plaintiffs were prevented from continuing to play on said team or teams. Defendants Club and Vernon officially advised them that the Club policy was racial segregation, so that they would never be permitted to play on any of the Club team or teams on an integrated basis, at any time, in any sport or activity, solely because they were Negroes. Plaintiffs have made efforts to be accepted as members of the Club, and have made repeated requests and demands of defendants without avail, that they cease their course of conduct, that either the Club cease its policy of segregation and discrimination and admit plaintiffs and permit them to participate fully and on the same basis as boys of the Caucasian race, or that the Club be denied the use of the County Service Building, the County public school playgrounds, premises and property, and the Town park, and any other public property, resource or facility for its offices, for the play or practice of any of its players, teams or leagues, or for any other Club purpose ⁶² or activity, until and unless the Club shall admit plaintiffs to equal and integrated membership and participation. And unless enjoined, each and all of the defendants will continue to permit the use, or use, public property, resources and facilities for Club purposes and activities, as alleged in the bill, unlawfully and unconstitutionally.

The bill further alleges that as citizens of the United States and of Maryland, plaintiffs are entitled, and have been entitled throughout the times referred to therein, to use public property, resources and facilities, and to have public property, resources and facilities used, on the basis of equality of rights, privileges, and immunities of the various races; and plaintiffs have, and have had throughout the times referred to therein, the right, privilege and immunity not to be segregated or discriminated against by public officers, groups, or agencies, or private individuals, institutions, corporations, or other groups acting in concert with or as beneficiaries of public officers, groups, or agencies, making use of public property, resources or facilities in practicing such unlawful and unconstitutional discrimination and segregation. The bill prays that the public-official defendants be enjoined “from directly or indirect!y permitting, approving or sanctioning the use” by the Club of any public property, “unless and until said Club shall admit plaintiffs and all others eligible except for said policy of racial segregation and, discrimination into membership and participation on a full, equal and integrated basis”; and until such time, the Club and Vernon be enjoined from using said public property. The Fourteenth Amendment, inter alia, provides that, “no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (Emphasis added.) Hence it is seen that the Amendment inhibits State action, but it does not proscribe private or individual conduct, even though such conduct be discriminatory, wrongful, arbitrary or capricious. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Pkg.

Auth., 365 ⁶³ U. S. 715 (1961); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U. S. 244 (1963). The appellees argue that the Club is a purely private, nonprofit corporation, whose affairs and operations are conducted by private individuals without State interference or supervision ; consequently the conduct of the Club does not fall within the purview of the action prohibited by the Amendment. The bill does not allege that the Club is a public corporation; therefore we may safely assume it to be a private one. But, in order to determine whether this, alone, answers our question and is the sole test to be applied to appellees’ activities to determine their validity from a constitutional viewpoint, it is necessary that we examine the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, whose rulings on federal constitutional questions are binding on this and all of the other States in the Union.

Before taking up the Supreme Court decisions, we shall discuss, briefly, several cases decided in the lower Federal Courts, some of which we find difficult to reconcile completely with the holdings of the Supreme Court. In Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, D. C., 157 F. Supp. 101 (U.S.D.C., D.C. [1957]), a case very similar on its facts to the case at bar, it was held that the boys’ club therein involved was a purely private corporation; that the use by the Club of District of Columbia facilities, the active participation of paid District police