Stembler & Ford, Inc. v. Mayor of Capitol Heights

Prescott, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question involved in this appeal is a narrow one, and ¹¹⁵ not difficult of solution. It is, as stated by the appellant, “whether the tax sought to be collected [is] valid and constitutional, in the fact of its alleged discriminatory effect.” The case originated as an action at law in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County by the Mayor and Common Council of Capitol Heights (hereinafter called the “Town”) to collect money alleged to be due the Town by Stembler & Ford, Inc., (Corporation) for business personal property taxes for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956. The only question raised was the validity of the taxes.

Testimony was taken before the Court, without a jury. Both parties rested upon the evidence of the Town officials. The Court thereafter ruled that the taxes for each year were valid and collectible, and judgment was entered against the Corporation, which brings this appeal. It is conceded that under Code (1957), Article 81, Section 8, the Town had the authority to levy taxes upon tangible personal property located within the Town for ordinary taxes, and it is pointed out that Section 12 provides that town taxes shall be levied upon assessments made by the County Commissioners of the county in which the town is situated, but the town shall have the right to assess any escaped taxable property within its limits.

The formal actions taken by the Town in levying the taxes were as follows: For 1954, “Mr. Campbell made a motion tax levy be set at $.75 per 100 at present tax rate, real estate and personal property taxes, seconded by Mr. Hochman and carried.” (Emphasis supplied.) For 1955, “Mr. Campbell made a motion the Town maintain the present tax rate of $.75 per 100 for the fiscal year on all real, personal and intangible properly. [No question is raised in this case concerning intangible property.] Seconded by Mr. Ennis. Motion carried.” (Emphasis supplied.) ¹¹⁶ And for 1956, “It was voted to set the tax rate for 1956 at the same rate it has been, $.75 per 100.” The appellant first claims that the Town did not, at any time, arrive at a tax rate by considering its entire taxable base in relation to its revenue needs for the ensuing year and then making its levy according to its needs. This, probably, is true; but, no matter how desirable this course suggested by the appellant might have been, the question was one of legislative policy not to be reviewed by the Courts, unless statutory or constitutional limitations were infringed. The appellant’s main contention is that the levies were made by the Town with the intention that the taxes imposed would only be upon real estate generally, and tangible personal property belonging to incorporated businesses; hence, they were discriminatory, unconstitutional and void, insofar as they applied to personal property.

And, in support of this contention, the Corporation introduced, without objection, the testimony of the Mayor and one Councilman, who stated that it was their understanding that the levies for the years in dispute were not to apply to tangible personal