Stephens v. State

WOODWARD, J. Appellant, James Adam Stephens, III, was charged in the District Court of Maryland for Frederick County with failure to obey a traffic control device, driving while under the influence of alcohol, driving while under the influence of alcohol per se, and driving while impaired. After appellant requested a jury trial, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, Maryland. Appellant then elected to be tried by the court and was subsequently convicted of failure to obey a traffic control device and driving while under the influence of alcohol per se, with the remaining counts merged. 1 Appellant was sentenced to one year for driving ⁵⁵⁵ under the influence of alcohol per se, with all but ten days suspended, to be followed by two years supervised probation upon release. Appellant timely appealed and presents the following question for our review: Was the evidence insufficient to support [appellant’s] conviction for failure to obey a traffic control device?

For the following reasons, we shall affirm. BACKGROUND On March 12, 2009, at approximately 8:00 a.m., Deputy Daniel Schlosser, of the Frederick County Sheriffs Office, was on patrol on Route 26 near Waterside Drive in Frederick County, Maryland, when he observed appellant driving a vehicle. Deputy Schlosser observed appellant “[sjwerving in and out of his lane.” Route 26 at this location is a three-lane highway, and appellant was driving in the middle lane. Deputy Schlosser saw appellant swerve into both adjacent lanes “[s]everal times.” At one point, appellant swerved into another lane that was then occupied by another vehicle.

As a result, that vehicle was forced to “slow down and pull onto the shoulder.” Deputy Schlosser then stopped appellant’s vehicle. After approaching appellant’s vehicle, Deputy Schlosser “detected alcohol on [appellant’s] breath and [his] person.” Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and his movements were “sluggish and clumsy.” Appellant admitted that he had consumed four beers earlier that evening, and appellant’s speech was “[spurred, thick, [and] slow.” Appellant was ordered out of the vehicle, and Deputy Schlosser administered several field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, ⁵⁵⁶ and the one-leg-stand test. Deputy Schlosser testified, over defense objection, that appellant’s “eyes showed lack of smooth pursuit, distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation.” Deputy Schlosser further testified that appellant exhibited six out of the six possible clues from the nystagmus test. 2 Appellant also could not maintain his balance during the walk-and-turn test, and “[sjtepped off line several times.” Appellant exhibited five clues out of a possible eight during this field sobriety test. Appellant also swayed during the one-leg-stand test, and exhibited two clues out of four in that test.

Deputy Schlosser testified over objection that he believed appellant was under the influence of alcohol. Deputy Schlosser placed appellant under arrest and read appellant the DR-15 advice of rights form regarding an intoximeter test. Appellant agreed to submit to a breath test and Deputy Schlosser transported appellant to police headquarters. Deputy Donald Linares, of the Frederick County Sheriffs Office, testified that he was a certified intoximeter operator.

Deputy Linares saw that there was nothing present in appellant’s mouth, and then waited twenty minutes before administering the test. After explaining the procedures used to test the intoximeter, Deputy Linares testified that the result of appellant’s breath test was “.15 grams of alcohol for 210 meters of breath.” Appellant testified at trial and maintained that he was not swerving prior to being pulled over. He also claimed that he was stopped on Route 26, at a point before the road expanded to three lanes, for failing to stop at a stop sign. Appellant also testified that he signed the form agreeing to a breath test because “everybody tells me to sign it so I can leave.

So of course I’m gonna sign whatever they put in my face.” ⁵⁵⁷ DISCUSSION Appellant’s sole contention in this Court is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for failure to obey a traffic control device under Maryland Code (1977, 2009 Repl. Vol), § 21-201(a) of the Transportation Article (“T.A.”), on the grounds that the marks on the road designating the lanes of traffic are not “traffic control devices” as defined by T.A. § 11-167. Additionally, appellant suggests that, whereas T.A. § 21-309 criminalizes swerving from lane to lane and T.A. § 11-168’s definition of a “traffic control signal” does not include lane markings, “the term ‘traffic control device’ does not refer to the markings on the roadway that designate the lanes themselves.” 3 The State responds that the plain language of T.A. § 11-167 makes clear that “markings” refers to the lane designations on a roadway. The State also contends that T.A. § 21-309, which prohibits swerving from lane to lane, is “complementary, and not irreconcilable” with T.A. § 21-201(a), which prohibits the failure to obey a traffic control device.

The State also asserts that, although all “traffic control signals” are “traffic control devices,” not all “traffic control devices” are “traffic control signals.” We agree with the State. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence following an action tried without a jury, Maryland Rule 8-131(c) provides: When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. ⁵⁵⁸ Further, following a bench trial, the test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether that evidence, if believed, directly or inferentially permits the court to be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt. State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533-34 , 823 A.2d 664 (2003); accord State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998).

In considering the legal sufficiency of the evidence following a non-jury trial, the appellate court must determine whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 479 , 649 A.2d 336 (1994) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). The Court of Appeals also has explained that, “[w]hen the trial court’s order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review.” Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 375 , 879 A.2d 1064 (2005) (quoting Nesbit v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 72 , 854 A.2d 879 (2004)) (quotations omitted). In addition, this Court has stated: An assessment of the legal sufficiency of the evidence is not an evidentiary issue but a substantive issue, with respect to which an appellate court makes its own independent judgment, as a matter of law. This is an area wherein the reviewing court is not at all deferential to the trial court.

It makes the same determination on the same basis as does the trial court. In assessing legal sufficiency, we will look only at that which was formally received in evidence. Polk v. State, 183 Md.App. 299, 306 , 961 A.2d 603 (2008); accord Burlas v. State, 185 Md.App. 559, 568 , 971 A.2d 937 , cert. denied, 410 Md. 166 , 978 A.2d 245 (2009). T.A. § 21-201(a) provides: (a) Obedience required. — (1) Subject to the exceptions granted in this title to the driver of an emergency vehicle, ⁵⁵⁹ the driver of any vehicle, unless otherwise directed by a police officer, shall obey the instructions of any traffic control device applicable to the vehicle and placed in accordance with the Maryland Vehicle Law.

(2) The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection controlled by a traffic control device may not drive across private property or leave the roadway for the purpose of avoiding the instructions of a traffic control device. (Emphasis added). A “traffic control device” is defined under T.A. § 11-167, as follows: “Traffic control device” means any sign, signal, marking, or device that: (1) Is not inconsistent with the Maryland Vehicle Law; and (2) Is placed by authority of an authorized public body or official to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. (Emphasis added).

Both parties agree that the issue with respect to the instant case is the meaning of the term “marking.” Appellant contends that “the term ‘marking’ does not include the marks on the road that designate the lanes themselves.” The State responds that “the lane designation marks on a roadway are ‘markings,’ as they are placed on the roadway to regulate and guide traffic.” Because this issue is a question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the principles that guide our analysis: We have stated the controlling principles of statutory construction so often that only the briefest exposition is necessary. Our predominant mission is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent, which is to be derived, if possible, from the language of the statute (or Rule) itself. If the language is clear and unambiguous, our search for legislative intent ends and we apply the language as written and in a commonsense manner. We do not add words or ignore those that are there.

If there is any ambiguity, we ⁵⁶⁰ may then seek to fathom the legislative intent by looking at legislative history and applying the most relevant of the various canons that courts have created. Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571 , 880 A.2d 343 (2005). The Court of Appeals has stated: “Ordinary and popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of terminology within legislation.” Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484 (2004). Consequently, in order to determine the plain meaning of “marking,” “[w]e may consult a dictionary to discern the generally understood meaning of a word.” Hackley v. State, 161 Md.App. 1, 14 , 866 A.2d 906 , aff'd, 389 Md. 387 , 885 A.2d 816 (2005).

A dictionary definition of “marking” is as follows: 1: the act, process, or an instance of making, placing, or assigning a mark ... 2 a: a mark made ... Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1383 (3d ed. 1986) (examples omitted). The same dictionary defines the noun “mark” in a myriad of ways. Id. at 1382-83.

Pertinent to our discussion, a “mark” is defined as: b: something placed or set up to serve as a guide or to indicate position: as (1): a conspicuous object of known position serving as a guide for travelers <a ~ for pilots > (2) : something (as a line, notch, or fixed object) designed to record position ... Id. at 1382. In addition, the verb “mark” can mean: 1 a (1): to fix or trace the bounds or limits of: locate the boundaries of — usu. used with out ... b: to set apart by or as if by a mark or boundary — usu. used with off ... Id. at 1383 (examples omitted).

To “mark” may also be defined as “[2 b] (2): to indicate, express, or show by a mark or symbol ... [2] d: to serve as an indication of the position or course of <a sign ~ing the city limits ... >.” Id. (examples omitted). ⁵⁶¹ Given these standard definitions, we are persuaded that a “marking” under T.A. § 11-167 is a making or placing of “marks.” “Marks” can be symbols, objects, or lines placed in a manner to designate boundaries and to serve as guides for, among others, travelers and drivers on roadways. Accordingly, we conclude that the lane designation marks on a roadway, such as Route 26 in Frederick County, Maryland, are “markings,” and therefore, “traffic control devices” under T.A. § 11-167. Appellant’s failure to obey these markings, ie., traffic control devices, was a violation of T.A. § 21-201(a).

Furthermore, even though the statute is unambiguous, our conclusion is supported by looking to legislative intent. As the Court of Appeals has explained: “In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always ‘to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.’ ” Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 404 , 978 A.2d 736 (2009). Our research suggests that a version of the term “traffic control devices” was added to the Maryland Code in approximately 1943 as part of the revision and reenactment of Article 66)6 on “Motor Vehicles.” See Folck v. Anthony, 228 Md. 73, 78 , 178 A.2d 413 (1962) (noting that Chapter 1007 of the Acts of 1943 made an overall revision to the motor vehicle laws, based on recommendations of the Commission on the Revision of State Motor Vehicle Laws). However, there is little in the legislative history, beyond plain language, suggesting the meaning of the phrase “markings.” Turning then to a consideration of the entire statutory scheme, we conclude that our understanding of the plain language of “marking” and “traffic control devices” is consistent with the overall legislative purpose of the transportation laws.

See Ray, 410 Md. at 405 , 978 A.2d 736 (“When the statute is part of a larger statutory scheme, it is axiomatic that the language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation; rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole considering the ‘purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body,’ and ⁵⁶² attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.” (citations omitted)). According to T.A. § 25-104, the State Highway Administration (“SHA”) is required to adopt a manual for a uniform system of traffic control devices that “shall correlate with and, as far as possible, conform to the system set forth in the most recent edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.” The Federal Highway