Stevens v. Milestone

Collins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Harold W. Stevens and Mildred L. Stevens, his wife, appellants here, entered suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against Sadie Milestone, Philip Milestone, and David Milestone, appellees here, and known as “Glenview Builders,” on the common counts and on a special count for payment for certain improvements which they claimed the appellees agreed to provide in the construction of a house purchased by the appellants from the appellees and which were not'furnished. A verdict was returned in favor of the appellants in the amount of $1500. The appellees then filed a motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto (N.O.V.), a demurrer prayer having been previously offered, and for a new trial.

The trial judge granted the motion N.O.V. and also granted a new trial if the judgment N.O.V. be overruled by this Court on appeal. Rules, “Practice and Procedure”, adopted by this Court November 1, 1945, Part 3, ⁶⁴ subd. Ill, Trials, Rule 8 (c) (1). A judgment was then entered in favor of the appellees for costs.

From thát judgment the appellants appeal. On the demurrer prayer the evidence must be set out in some detail in a manner most favorable to the appellants. Mr. and Mrs. Stevens testified that about August 22, 1945, they were attracted to a sub-division of dwelling houses being constructed in Glenview, Montgomery County. They said they observed a sign “Glenview Builders”, and also a sign “For Sale, Dreisen & Freedman, Colesville Pike”.

They later visited Dreisen & Freedman in Silver Springs, and signed a contract with the appellees for the purchase of two lots “with improvements thereon” for a price of $8000. The improvement on the lots purchased was to be a dwelling house. The written contract did not mention or describe the house or contain any provision for building it. At the time the contract was signed the property consisted of the two lots with a hole in the ground for a cellar.

Although no specifications of the house were provided in the contract signed by the parties hereto, it is admitted by the appelles that, with their consent, the appellants were furnished plans and the appellees orally agreed to build a dwelling house on these two lots in accordance with those plans. The house was not completed. until about July 1, 1946. The appellants testified that they were refused admission to the house for a period of several weeks prior to settlement. Appellees contend that the reason for this refusal was that the floors were being finished and they did not wish anyone to come in.

On the morning of July 2, 1946, the appellants visited the house and observed it from the outside but were unable to get inside. Later that day the appellants and at least one of the appellees met. A deed to the property was executed to the appellants and the balance of the purchase price of $8000 was paid to the appellees. Appellants claim in their special count, and also testified, that certain improvements promised by the appellees both ⁶⁵ inside and outside of the house have never been furnished by them.

This is denied by the appellees. The appellees further contend that any contract, written or oral, merged into the deed when final settlement was made, that by the acceptance of the deed and the payment of the purchase money any deficiency in the performance of the contract to build the house was waived, and that thereby there was accord and satisfaction between the parties. In general by the execution and acceptance of a deed in pursuance of an agreement for the sale of land, such agreement of sale thereby becomes null and void, except where the agreement contains covenants collateral to the deed and where the deed appears to be only a partial execution of the contract. Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 418 ,142 A. 598; Levin v. Cook,