Steward v. State

THIEME, J. On February 22, 2012, Farrah Steward, appellant, was pulled over for a minor infraction while driving a vehicle on Green Street in Havre De Grace, Harford County, Maryland. The officer who conducted the stop checked appellant’s license and discovered that it was suspended. The officer issued appellant a citation for driving with a suspended license. ⁵⁵⁶ On September 24, 2012, following a one-day jury trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County, appellant was convicted on one count of driving with a suspended license. The circuit court subsequently sentenced appellant to serve one year in prison, all but thirty days suspended, to be followed by one year of unsupervised probation.

In her timely filed appeal, appellant raised two questions for our consideration, which we have separated and simplified as follows: 1 1. Was the evidence presented at appellant’s trial sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for driving with a suspended license? 2. Did the trial court commit plain error in instructing the jury regarding the elements of the charged offense? 3. Did the performance of appellant’s trial attorney constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?

Discerning no error of law or abuse of discretion sufficient to compel us to undertake plain error review, we shall affirm the determinations of the circuit court. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE I At trial, appellant did not contest the fact that she was driving a vehicle on February 22, 2012, or that her MVA ⁵⁵⁷ driving record indicates that her license was suspended on that date. The only element of the offense of driving with a suspended license that was at issue in this case was whether appellant had the requisite mens rea at the time she purportedly committed the offense. In the first issue of her appeal, appellant contends that the evidence presented at her trial was not sufficient to demonstrate that she either knew or was willfully blind to the fact that her license was suspended when she undertook to drive a vehicle on February 22, 2012.

Preliminarily, we note that appellant’s sufficiency argument was not properly preserved for appellate review. Maryland Rule 4-324(a) provides in pertinent part: A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts ... at the close of the evidence offered by the State and, in a jury trial, at the close of all the evidence. The defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted. In this case, defense counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case, asserting that the State had failed to produce any evidence that appellant had any knowledge that her license was suspended.

Appellant then testified on her own behalf, effectively withdrawing the motion for judgment of acquittal. See Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 487 , 554 A.2d 1238 (1989)(“When a defendant offers evidence on his own behalf after his motion for acquittal is denied, the motion is withdrawn and not subject to review.”). Defense counsel then made a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, but did not make any particularized argument in support of the motion, and did not expressly renew, submit, or otherwise adopt the arguments he had previously raised. It is clear from the record that the trial court assumed that defense counsel’s motion at the close of all evidence was intended to incorporate and renew the arguments he had presented in support of his previous motion, and the court addressed those arguments in rendering its determination.

Because defense counsel did not make any particularized ⁵⁵⁸ arguments in support of appellant’s motion for judgment at the close of all evidence and did not in any way adopt his previous arguments, the motion did not satisfy the requirements of Md. Rule 4-324(a), and therefore, appellant’s sufficiency argument was not properly preserved for appellate review. Md. Rule 4-324(a); Md. Rule 8-131(a). We are persuaded, however, that there was no confusion on the part of the trial court regarding the basis for defense counsel’s motion for judgment at the close of all evidence, and thus, the purpose of Md. Rule 4-324(a) was served. See Warfield, 315 Md. at 487 , 554 A.2d 1238 (opining that the purpose of the Rule’s particularization requirement, “is to enable the trial judge to be aware of the precise basis for the defendant’s belief that the evidence is insufficient.”).

In the interest of eschewing “magic words” and glorifying form over substance, therefore, we shall briefly address appellant’s sufficiency argument. II When a question before this Court requires our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider, “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Bordley v. State, 205 Md.App. 692, 716 , 46 A.3d 1204 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); accord Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 184 , 999 A.2d 986 (2010); see also Breakfield v. State, 195 Md.App. 377, 392-393 , 6 A.3d 381 (2010) (opining that the limited question before this Court is not “whether the evidence should have or probably would have persuaded the majority of fact finders but only whether it possibly could have persuaded any rational fact finder.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). This Court defers to the “unique opportunity” of the fact-finder to “view the evidence and to observe first-hand the demeanor and to assess the credibility of witnesses.” Bord ⁵⁵⁹ ley, 205 Md.App. at 717 , 46 A.3d 1204 (citing Smith, 415 Md. at 185 , 999 A.2d 986 ). We further decline to second guess any reasonable inferences drawn by the fact-finder, or to reweigh the fact-finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence.

Id. “If the evidence ‘either showed directly, or circumstantially, or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt,’ then we will affirm the conviction.” Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 156 , 982 A.2d 348 (2009) (quoting State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998)). We independently assess the evidence presented in the instant case to determine, de novo, whether it was legally sufficient to sustain appellant’s convictions. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 206 Md.App. 13, 41 , 47 A.3d 590 (2012)(quoting Polk v. State, 183 Md.App. 299, 306 , 961 A.2d 603 (2008), for the proposition, “[a]n assessment of the legal sufficiency of the evidence is not an evidentiary issue but a substantive issue, with respect to which an appellate court makes its own independent judgment, as a matter of law.”). Ill The Maryland MVA tracks drivers’ violations of the motor vehicle laws through a points system.

Md.Code (1977, 2012) § 16-402 of the Transportation Article (“Trans.”). A driver who accumulates five points within a two year period is required to attend a driver improvement program. Trans. § 16-404(a)(2). The MVA may suspend the license of an individual who fails to attend a driver improvement program.

Trans. § 16-206(a)(2)(I). A driver is “presumed to know the law regardless of conscious knowledge or lack thereof, and [is] presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences of [his or her] actions in its light”. Rice v. State, 136 Md.App. 593, 605 , 766 A.2d 663 (2001). Driving with a suspended license is a statutory offense proscribed by Trans. § 16-303(c).

In order to convict a defendant under § 16-303(c), the State has the burden of ⁵⁶⁰ proving, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant was driving a motor vehicle, (2) at the time the defendant was driving, her license was suspended, and (3) that the defendant knew that her license was suspended. Trans. § 16—303(c); Rice, 136 Md.App. at 604 , 766 A.2d 663 . Knowledge is an essential element of driving with a suspended license. See State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 457 , 583 A.2d 250 (1991) (“[M]ens rea is required for the charge of driving while suspended.”).

In order to prove that an individual had the requisite mens rea at the time of the offense, the State must present evidence that the defendant either had actual knowledge that his or her drivers’ license was suspended, or that the defendant was deliberately ignorant or willfully blind to the suspension. Rice, 136 Md.App. at 604 , 766 A.2d 663 (adopting the analysis set forth in McCallum, 321 Md. at 458 , 583 A.2d 250 (Chasnow, J., concurring)). Actual knowledge exists when a person has “an actual awareness or an actual belief that a fact exists.” Id. at 601 , 766 A.2d 663 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McCallum, 321 Md. at 458 , 583 A.2d 250 (Chasnow, J., concurring)). Deliberate ignorance, on the other hand, exists when a person “believes it is probable that something is a fact but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.” Id.

A driver is statutorily required to inform the MVA of any changes in their mailing address within thirty days of moving from the address shown on his or her license. Trans. § 16-116(a). The failure to inform the MVA of an address change in a timely manner may indicate that an individual is deliberately avoiding contact with the MVA. See McCallum, 321 Md. at 456 , 583 A.2d 250 (considering evidence of defendant’s failure to correct address as proof that he was deliberately avoiding contact with the MVA to evade notice of license suspension, and concluding that defendant was deliberately ignorant of suspension (Chasnow, J., concurring)). ⁵⁶¹ IV In the instant case, the record indicates that appellant’s driver’s license was previously suspended in May of 1998 after appellant failed to appear at a hearing in the District Court to contest a citation for driving without a license.

In July of 2009 the MVA reinstated appellant’s license after appellant paid the outstanding ticket and accepted the assessment of five points against her drivers’ license. Because five points had been assessed against appellant’s drivers’ license in less than two years, in August of 2009, at the direction of the MVA, appellant attended a point system conference. 2 Appellant’s drivers’ license was again suspended in December of 2010 after she failed to appear in the district court to contest a speeding ticket. That suspension was lifted on January 3, 2011, after appellant appeared at the courthouse and paid the outstanding fine. The speeding citation resulted in the assessment of another point against appellant’s driver’s license, as a result of which the MVA directed her to attend a driver improvement program.

Appellant’s failure to attend the required driver improvement program led to the third suspension of appellant’s license in February of 2011, which remained in effect at the time she was pulled over on February 22, 2012. At her trial, appellant testified that she did not know that her drivers’ license had been suspended until she was informed of that fact by the officer who pulled her over on February 22, 2012. Appellant explained that she was evicted from her apartment on January 4, 2011, and did not obtain another permanent residence until January of 2012, and therefore, she never received the MVA notices stating that she was required to attend a driver improvement program or that her license was suspended as a result of her failure to attend the ⁵⁶² program. Appellant’s MVA driving record confirms that the notices that were sent to appellant in January and February of 2011 were returned by the postal service.

Appellant further attested that she had never received any notice prior to the previous suspension of her drivers’ license in December of 2010, after she failed to appear for a hearing in the District Court, attesting that she went to the court and paid the outstanding fine on January 3, 2011, of her own volition. After appellant was cited for driving on a suspended license on February 22, 2012, she contacted the MVA and made arrangements to complete the required driver improvement program, which she did, on March 7, 2012. On March 8, 2012, appellant notified the MVA of her new address. Also on March 8, 2012, the suspension on appellant’s drivers’ license was withdrawn and her license was reinstated.

Based on the evidence presented regarding the previous suspensions of appellant’s drivers’ license and her attendance at a point system conference in August of 2009, a jury could reasonably infer that appellant knew that if she acquired any more points on her license within a two year period, she would be required to attend a driver improvement program. The jury could also infer that appellant knew that her drivers’ license would be suspended if she failed to attend the required program. Based on evidence that on January 3, 2011, appellant appeared at the courthouse and paid the speeding ticket she had received on July 4, 2010, the jury could conclude that appellant knew that an additional point had been assessed against her drivers’ license. Based on appellant’s failure to notify the MVA regarding her change in address for more than a year, the jury could infer that appellant was deliberately avoiding contact with the MVA.

Once appellant paid the fine and had the additional point assessed against her, she had reason to believe that the MVA would take action, first to require her attendance at a driver improvement program, and should she fail to do so, to suspend her driving privilege. Appellant’s intervening homelessness does not negate her knowledge that there would be conse ⁵⁶³ quences attendant to her accumulation of an additional point on her license. Though we are persuaded that appellant did not have actual knowledge of her suspension because she did not receive mail at her former address following her eviction, her failure to contact the MVA to inquire about the status of her license or to timely notify them of her new address indicates that her failure to know the status of her drivers’ license was a result of her own intentional inaction. Therefore, despite appellant’s arguments to the contrary, we are persuaded that based on the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was willfully ignorant of the fact that her driver’s license was in a “suspended” status when she undertook to drive a vehicle on February 22, 2012, and therefore, she was guilty of the offense of driving with a suspended license.

We acknowledge that appellant’s favored interpretation of the evidence is also reasonable, i.e., that because of her eviction and subsequent homelessness, appellant had not received any of the notices sent by the MVA and therefore, had no knowledge that she was required to attend a driver improvement program and that failure to do so would result in the suspension of her drivers’ license. See Neal v. State, 191 Md.App. 297 , 991 A.2d 159 (2010) (“ ‘Generally, if there are evidentiary facts sufficiently supporting the inference made by the trial court, the appellate court defers to the fact-finder.... ’ ”). Indeed, defense counsel appropriately made arguments supporting appellant’s interpretation of the evidence to the jury in his closing statement. Subsequently, the jury deliberated and made factual determinations that were contrary to appellant’s favored interpretation, ultimately concluding that appellant was guilty of the charged offense.

It is axiomatic that such factual determinations are best left to the jury. See, e.g., Smith, 415 Md. at 185 , 999 A.2d 986 (“Because the fact-finder possesses the unique opportunity to view the evidence and to observe first-hand the demeanor and to assess the credibility of witnesses during their live testimony, we do not re-weigh the credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.”). “Although the jury could have ⁵⁶⁴ drawn an inference more favorable to appellant, it was not required to do so.” McDonald v. State, 141 Md.App. 371, 380 , 785 A.2d 836 (2001). Discerning no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, we decline to overturn appellant’s convictions on this basis. JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING KNOWLEDGE ELEMENT OF OFFENSE I At the close of all evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the law applicable in the case.

As part of the jury instructions, the court gave the following jury instruction regarding the elements of the offense of driving with a suspended license: The defendant is charged with driving a motor vehicle on a suspended license and privilege. I will now describe the elements of this crime, and your function is to determine whether the elements of this crime have been proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, and a Verdict Sheet will be provided to aid you in your deliberations. For this offense, in order to convict a person of driving while the person’s license to drive is suspended, the State must prove the following things: (One) that the person who is charged was driving a motor vehicle. (Two) that the person’s license to drive was suspended at the time of the incident; and (Three) that the person had actual knowledge or should have known of the suspension.

Neither appellant nor her attorney raised any objection to the instruction at trial and appellant concedes in her appeal that this issue was not properly preserved for appellate review. See Md. Rule 4-325(e) (providing, “No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs ⁵⁶⁵ the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.”). Appellant, nonetheless, urges this Court to exercise our discretion and review the instruction provided by the trial court for plain error. See Md. Rule 4-235(e) (delineating this Court’s power to “take cognizance of any