Stieff Co. v. Ullrich

Henry, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City sustaining a demurrer filed by the appellees ⁶³¹ to a bill of complaint filed by the appellant and dismissing the bill. The allegations are to the effect that a certain Henry Lauritzen died on the 5th day of June, 1908, and that his wife, Eliza Ullrich Lauritzen, died a few months thereafter on October 11, 1908, the latter intestate and the former leaving a will but no estate, and that neither left .a child or children. On January 28, 1904, Henry Lauritzen, who was an old and trusted employee, in the establishment of the appellant, applied to the company for a loan of $2,000 for the purpose of purchasing a house and lot, stating at the time of the. application that he did not desire to encumber the property which he proposed to purchase with a mortgage, but that he would take a deed for the same in his own name, so that it would remain, in the event of his death, as ample security for the repayment of the loan.

At the same time he gave to the appellant a promissory note which reads as follows: “Baltimore, Jany. 28th, 1904. $2,000. Four months after date, I promise to pay to the order of The Baltimore Sterling Silver Company Two Thousand Dollars. It is understood that this amount is to be paid by my services to the Baltimore S. S. Co. from time to time. Value received.

(Signed) Henry Lauritzen." Lauritzen purchased a house and lot on Eulton avenue in Baltimore, the deed for which, showing a consideration of $2,125, was executed, acknowledged and recorded on the 19th February, 1904. But instead of taking the deed in his own name, Lauritzen had the property conveyed to himself and wife jointly, as tenants by the entireties, and the bill* alleges that it was so executed for the purpose of defrauding the appellant and that there was no consideration moving from the wife to the husband for the same. The bill further alleges that knowledge of the manner in which the conveyance was made did not come to the knowledge of the appellant until ⁶³² about June 5th, 1908; that from time to time Lauritzen and his wife acknowledged the existence of the indebtedness, and after the death of the husband, the wife again acknowledged that the loan was made to her husband for the purpose of purchasing a home, that the money was so used and that she would pay it, but shortly thereafter she was taken ill and died without having done so. The administrator of Mrs. Lauritzen sold the property, with knowledge of the claim of the appellant, and being about to distribute the proceeds of sale among the-heirs of the deceased, this bill was filed to annul and set aside the sale made by the administrator, to have the claim of the appellant declared a lien on the property and to enjoin the administrator from distributing the fund until the adjustment of the claim.

By agreement between the parties, filed in the cause, the claim for a lien was waived and released and the same was transferred to the fund in the hands of the administrator, without affecting or prejudicing in any other way the rights of the respective parties. The actual facts of this case may be as stated in the bill, and as admitted by the demurrer. It does not appear altogether unreasonable that Mr. Stieff, the President of the appellant company, having entire confidence in a faithful employee, may have accommodated him with a loan of $2,000 on the terms and conditions as above set forth and may have reposed in the security of feeling that the property to be purchased with the money would remain as a protection to him • for- the repayment of the loan upon demand, or in the event of the borrower’s death. Yet even if this be true, it seems clear to us that the appellant has permitted itself to be deceived and has placed itself in a position from which a Court of equity cannot rescue it.

While always ready, in a proper case, to aid .the vigilant, equity will not enforce stale demands, particularly when made after the death of the parties who may be interested in contesting them. As to what will constitute laches, must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. In the present case a note for $2,000 ⁶³³ was given, as security for a loan, payable four months after date. It does not appear from anything set forth in the bill that the note was presented for payment at its maturity or that any demand for the same was made.

More than four years are allowed to roll by, during which time the appellant paid to Lauritzen a weekly salary of $65 and though the note in terms so provides no deduction appears to have been made from such salary and credited on the note. And it was not until June 1908, after the death of Lauritzen, that the appellant discovered that the deed above referred to had been taken jointly in the names of husband and wife, and sought a settlement of the claim from the wife. The debt was not that of the wife, and no verbal promise of hers could'bind her to pay it. Ho steps were taken to have the wife bind her property for the loan.

The note itself was out of date, except that the