Stinnett v. Cort Furniture Rental

ADKINS, Judge. The question before us is whether the time for appeal from an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (Commission) runs from the date of the order or from the date of the denial of an unsuccessful motion for a rehearing of the order. We shall hold that Maryland Code (1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 101, § 56(e) mandates the latter result. ⁴⁵⁰ I. The factual context in which the question arises is relatively undisputed. Petitioner Michael L. Stinnett (Stinnett) was employed by respondent Cort Furniture Rental (Cort Furniture).

On 16 November 1981, while so employed, he injured his back. He filed a claim for workers’ compensation. Various proceedings before the Commission ensued. On 24 October 1986, the Commission resolved two claims then before it.

It allowed Stinnett’s claim for temporary total disability (claim 1) but concluded that a cervical spine condition, which had manifested itself after the 1981 injury (claim 2), had not been caused by that occurrence. Stinnett timely filed a motion for rehearing on the denial of claim 2, alleging newly discovered evidence. On 10 February 1987, a hearing on the motion was held. The Commission denied the motion on 19 March 1987, reaffirming its order of 24 October 1986.

Stinnett appealed to the Circuit Court for Calvert County. Of course, by the time Stinnett had noted his appeal, far more than 30 days had elapsed from 24 October 1986. 1 Cort Furniture moved to dismiss the appeal. The Circuit Court for Calvert County concluded that the evidence presented in support of Stinnett’s motion for rehearing was not in fact newly discovered. Relying largely on Ratcliffe v. Clarke’s Red Barn, 64 Md.App. 293 , 494 A.2d 983 (1985), (of which more later), the circuit court held that it, therefore, had no jurisdiction.

It dismissed the appeal. In an unreported decision also based mainly on Ratcliffe, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Stinnett v. Cort Furniture Rental, No. 1638, Sept. Term, 1987 (filed 26 July 1988). At Stinnett’s behest, we issued a writ of certiorari. 313 Md. 689 , 548 A.2d 129 (1988). ⁴⁵¹ II.

Article 101, § 56(e) in pertinent part provides: (i) A motion for a rehearing may be filed within 15 days from the date of the decision of the Commission, only upon grounds of error of law, or newly discovered evidence____ The motion shall be in writing and state the reasons therefor____ (ii) If a motion for rehearing is granted, the Commission shall promptly hold a hearing and issue any order it deems appropriate. (iii) If a motion for rehearing is filed, the time within which an appeal can be taken from the decision shall commence from the time of ruling by the Commission on the motion or, if the motion is granted, from the time an order is issued pursuant to paragraph (ii) of this subsection____ [Emphasis supplied]. Additionally, the Commission’s procedural rules require that if a motion for rehearing is “based upon newly discovered evidence, the party proposing to offer the evidence shall describe it in detail and attach copies of all documents, together with the reasons why the evidence was not known, or could not reasonably have been known at the time of the hearing.” COMAR 14.09.01.10.C. Cort Furniture points to this rule, with which, it alleges, Stinnett did not comply. It points to the fact that both the circuit court and the intermediate appellate court concluded that the evidence Stinnett presented at the hearing on his motion was not newly discovered, but simply a slightly warmed-over version of information previously presented to the Commission.

Cort Furniture then enthusiastically embraces the reasoning employed by the Court of Special Appeals: The Commission was ... correct in denying [Stinnett’s] motion for a rehearing on the grounds that there was no new evidence in support of [his] case. Without new evidence, the motion for rehearing was improperly filed. Therefore, since [Stinnett] is precluded from a rehearing, the time for appeal was not stayed. ⁴⁵² Stinnett, supra, slip op. at 3. This defect (the lack of newly discovered evidence) was apparently viewed as jurisdictional, by the Court of Special Appeals, for it went on to explain that in its decision in Ratcliffe, supra, it had held that a trial court would have no jurisdiction to hear [an appeal after the Commission had improperly reopened a case under Article 101, § 40(c) ] because the statute did not provide that an award could be reopened under the guise of newly discovered evidence, merely to stay a claimant’s right to appeal.

Ratcliffe, 64 Md.App. at 301 [, 494 A.2d at 987 ]. In the case sub judice, we cannot, as we could not in Ratcliffe , allow a party to thus create appellate jurisdiction where the Legislature did not so intend. Id. at 3-4. This reasoning is tantamount to saying that a party’s failure to produce enough support to succeed on a motion is a jurisdictional defect for purposes of § 56(e); it must be treated as though no motion had been filed at all.

Because that is not the law, we must reverse the Court of Special Appeals. 2 III. Both parties argue strenuously about whether the documents Stinnett produced in support of his motion for ⁴⁵³ rehearing were, in fact, newly discovered evidence. We intimate no view whatsoever on this question, for it is completely irrelevant to the issue before us. Section 56(e)(iii) does not stay the time for appeal pending Commission action on a successful motion for rehearing, nor does it operate only when a motion for rehearing is supported by some facial or preliminary showing that there is newly discovered evidence.

In paragraph (i) of subsection (e), the statute authorizes the filing of a motion for rehearing of a Commission decision on the ground of, among other things, newly discovered evidence. Paragraph (iii) unequivocally provides that “[i]f a motion for rehearing is filed, the time within which an appeal can be taken from the decision shall commence from the time of ruling by the Commission on the motion — ” [Emphasis supplied]. Stinnett filed a motion for rehearing and asserted that it was based on new evidence. That is all the statute requires in order to stay the running of the time for filing an appeal.

An examination of the history of the statute demonstrates that this conclusion is consistent with the apparent legislative purpose. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987). What is now subsection (e) of § 56 was enacted as § 57(e) by Chapter 814, Acts of 1957. Except for the time within which the motion had to be filed (seven days then as opposed to 15 now), the 1957 language and the present language are virtually identical.

That same identity exists between the statutory language and the verbiage proposed by the Second Report of the Commission to Study the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Laws (1957) (W. Albert Menchine, Chairman). The Commission recommended that provisions be made for motions for rehearing upon grounds of error of law or newly discovered evidence. We believe that such a procedure would operate to reduce the number of appeals. We believe that the proposed ⁴⁵⁴ method of procedure as outlined in sub-section (e) contains adequate safeguards to all parties for the prevention of any abuses under the proposal.

That portion of subsection (e)(iii) postponing the commencement of the time for appeal from the underlying decision until the Commission’s ruling on the motion for rehearing is completely consistent with the objective of reducing the number of appeals. This goal is advanced by making it clear that the movant need not be concerned with an appeal until after the disposition of the motion. Success on the motion, of course, would obviate the need for any appeal. This prudent promotion of judicial economy stands in stark contrast to the situation that existed in the courts in 1957.

At that time, Rule 625 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure provided: For a period of thirty days after the entry of a judgment, or thereafter pursuant to motion filed within such period, the court shall have revisory power and control over such judgment. In Tiller v. Elfenbein, 205 Md. 14 , 106 A.2d 42 (1954), this Court considered the predecessor to that rule. The court likened the procedure to a motion for rehearing. Tiller, 205 Md. at 19 , 106 A.2d at 44 .

The filing of an appeal while a motion under the rule was pending did not “strip the trial court of its revisory power in a proper case____” Id. at 21 , 106 A.2d at 45 . But “unless the appeal is dismissed when the motion comes on for hearing, the appellant must elect between his motion and his appeal.” Id. The requirement of election between the motion and the appeal was clarified in Eisenbeiss v. Jarrell, 52 Md.App. 677, 683-685 , 451 A.2d 940 (1982), cert. denied, 295 Md. 301 , cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 , 104 S.Ct. 83 , 78 L.Ed.2d 93 , (1983), and cases there cited. This doctrine worked against the reduction of appeals, since the filing of a motion under the rule did not extend the time for an appeal.

See Radvan-Ziemnowicz v. Comm’n on Med. Disc., 302