Stisser v. SP Bancorp, Inc.

Leahy, J. This appeal concerns Maryland’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a company headquartered in Texas, as well as the out-of-state directors of another company that was incorporated in Maryland and headquartered in Texas. All relevant activity leading to the merger of companies challenged in the underlying shareholder action occurred outside Maryland except one: the incorporation of a transitory merger subsidiary. Gary W. Stisser and Fundamental Partners (“Appellants”) are not residents of Maryland, but they owned shares of common stock in SP Bancorp, Inc. (“SP”), which was a company headquartered in Texas and incorporated in Maryland. They filed a shareholder class action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City following the merger of SP into a newly formed subsidiary of Green Bancorp, Inc. (“Green”)—a bank holding company incorporated under Texas law with its principal place of business in Texas.

Appellants filed the lawsuit against SP and the individual members of SP’s Board of Directors (“SP Directors”) (collectively, the “SP Defendants”), and against Green and Green’s newly-formed Maryland subsidiary, Searchlight Merger Sub, Inc. (“Searchlight”) (collectively, the “Green Defendants”). 1 Appellants’ primary contention was that the SP Directors breached their fiduciary duty, aided and abetted by Green, in contriving the merger to advance their interests at the shareholders’ expense. The circuit court granted motions to dismiss filed by the SP Defendants and the Green Defendants (together as “Appellees”), finding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the SP Directors and Green, and that, although the court had jurisdiction over SP and Searchlight, Appellants failed to state a claim against them. Appellants noted an appeal to this Court presenting four questions, which we have rephrased as follows: 2 1. By forming Searchlight in Maryland for the purpose of consummating a merger, did Green subject itself to personal jurisdiction in Maryland? 2.

Are the SP Directors subject to personal jurisdiction in Maryland because the Articles of Merger were filed in Maryland? 3. Were SP and Searchlight necessary parties under Maryland Rule 2-211(a)? 4. Does the Complaint state a claim for relief against each of the Appellees? We hold that Green was not subject to specific jurisdiction in Maryland because (1) the quality and quantity of its contacts in Maryland in relation to the merger did not rise to the level of “transacting any business” in Maryland within the meaning of Maryland’s long-arm statute; and (2) Maryland’s exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with traditional notions of due process under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), given Green’s limited and attenuated contacts in Maryland.

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s recent decisions delimiting the authority of state courts to exercise general jurisdiction over nonresident corporations and corporate directors, we also conclude Green was not “at home” in Maryland for purposes of general personal jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., - U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1773 , 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) [hereinafter “Bristol-Myers"]; BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, - U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1549 , 198 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017); Daimler AG v. Bauman, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 746 , 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 , 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011), Consistent with Daimler, we hold that a nonresident parent corporation is not subject to general jurisdiction in Maryland based solely on its incorporation of a subsidiary within Maryland. We also decline to impute SP’s contacts to its directors, and hold that the SP Directors—all nonresidents who never entered Maryland in connection with SP business— did not purposefully avail themselves of the privileges and protections of Maryland law.

In light of these holdings, we do not reach Appellants’ third and fourth questions. BACKGROUND Back in October 2010, SP converted its business structure from a mutually-owned thrift to a stock-based ownership bank holding company. This conversion triggered federal regulations prohibiting the sale of SP for the next three years. 3 SP was incorporated in Maryland and served as the holding company and parent of SharePlus Bank, a Texas-chartered state bank. SP’s principal place of business was in Texas, and the company did not have any offices or employees in Maryland.

Indeed, according to the record on appeal, none of the SP Directors resided or were employed in Maryland. By mid-2012, the SP Directors began entertaining the idea of a possible merger with Green. On August 2, 2012, Mr. Jeffrey L. Weaver, SP’s President, and Mr. Paul M. Zmigro-sky, the Chairman of SP’s Board of Directors, met in Dallas, Texas with representatives from Green, “during which the representatives of Green initiated a high level discussion of a potential reverse merger with SP Bancorp following expiration of the three year restriction.” A. Preliminary Negotiations In July of 2013, SP hired Commerce Street Capital (“CSC”), an investment banking firm, to help find potential candidates to merge with SP. The next month, representatives from SP and Green met again in Texas to discuss a potential merger.

On September 14, 2013, CSC presented SP with an analysis of a merger of equals, using Green as the basis for a merger partner. At this presentation, CSC advised the SP Directors on different growth strategies, including the purchase of a smaller financial institution, a merger of equals, or acquisition by a larger financial institution. Over the next few months, Mr. Zmigrosky and Mr. Weaver held preliminary discussions with several candidates, including a larger bank that the parties referred to as “Party A.” On January 9, 2014, from its headquarters in Texas, Green submitted a letter of intent to purchase SP for $43 million, representing approximately $25.91 per share. In the letter, Green proposed retention agreements for certain members of SP’s senior management and non-compete covenants for the remaining SP Directors.

The SP Directors met the next day at their headquarters in Texas to discuss Green’s offer as well as the preliminary negotiations with Party A. At the meeting, the SP Directors decided to form a mergers and acquisitions subcommittee (“Committee”), composed of Chairman Zmigro-sky and Directors Carl Forsythe, P. Stan Keith, and Jeff Williams. The Committee, in part, served to shield Mr. Weaver from merger negotiations due to the concern that, as President, Mr. Weaver was likely to be offered continued employment post-merger. Throughout February, the Committee negotiated with and considered offers from Party A and a third entity. The most valuable offer came from Party A for approximately $23.78 per share comprised of cash and Party A stock.

After learning of Party A’s offer, Green revised its own offer, and increased the original offer price by approximately 21%. Ultimately, the Committee determined that Green’s second offer was the best option, and on February 27, 2014, the Committee recommended that the full board of SP Directors accept Green’s offer. In response, the SP Directors instructed the Committee to terminate negotiations with Party A and execute Green’s non-binding letter of intent. B. SP and Green Negotiate the Merger Green and SP, through outside counsel, continued negotiations and conducted due diligence in Texas and in New York over the course of the next month.

Then, on March 28, 2014, Mr. Weaver met with representatives from Green in Dallas to discuss the possibility of his post-merger employment with Green. Three days later, CSC disclosed to SP that it owned a 3% share in Green. The Committee met with its legal counsel to discuss CSC’s potential conflict of interest and determined that CSC had no existing commercial relationship with Green but, to avoid any potential impropriety, the Committee decided to engage Mercer Capital Management, Inc. as an independent advisor to render a fairness opinion on the merger. On April 24, 2014, the SP Directors met with counsel, CSC, and Mercer to discuss Green’s proposal.

At this meeting, Mercer offered its preliminary conclusions from its fairness inquiry, indicating a “strong comfort level” that the merger met or exceeded SP’s fair market value. Then, on May 1 and 5, 2014, the SP Directors met in Texas with legal counsel and the two financial advising firms to consider the merger. On May 1, the Committee provided the SP Directors with their recommendation to approve the merger. On May 5, Mercer issued its opinion that the merger was fair.

Using multiple measures, Mercer valued SP in a range between $16.20 and $32.05 per share. Green’s final proposed offer would pay $29.55 per share, which put the purchase price in the 96th percentile of Mercer’s valuation—a 24,26% increase from Green’s initial offer and approximately 40% over the price at which SP’s shares closed the day prior, This 40% difference between purchase price and market price of the shares represented the approximate cash payout for shareholders. 4 Mercer concluded that the merger with Green was “fair, from a financial point of view, to [SP’s] shareholders.” At the meeting’s conclusion, on May 5, the SP Directors voted unanimously to approve the merger agreement, SP announced the merger agreement that same day and set August 15, 2014, as the record date for its special meeting, at which point then-current owners of SP common stock would be entitled to a vote at the special meeting. The special meeting, scheduled for October 8, 2014, in Plano, Texas, required a quorum of eligible voters, in person or by proxy, representing a majority of SP’s 1,602,313 outstanding shares of common stock. Of those voting shareholders, the merger agreement required a bare majority for its approval.

C. Shareholders Institute a Class Action Following SP’s announcement, Mr. Stisser and Fundamental Partners filed class actions on June 10 and 12, 2014, respectively, on their own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated, against the Appellees and CSC in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 5 The circuit court thereafter granted the Appellants joint motion to consolidate their claims into a single action. On August 25, 2014, SP filed its definitive proxy statement with the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and sent copies of the statement from Texas to its shareholders, informing them it would hold a special shareholder meeting in Texas. Just over two weeks later, on September 10, the Appellants filed a motion for preliminary injunction in Baltimore, asking the circuit court to enjoin the merger. Meanwhile, in Texas, Green offered Mr. Weaver a position post-merger.

On October 3, 2014, SP filed a supplement to its original proxy, which it sent to the SEC and all shareholders. The supplement disclosed, among other things, that in 2013, SP “sold certain market rate loans made by SP [ ] to certain of its directors and officers to Green.” It also explained that, as early as March 28, 2014, Green’s President and CEO, Mr. Geoffrey D. Greenwade, expressed his intention to employ Mr. Weaver post-merger. For this reason, the supplement explained, Mr. Weaver “was expressly excluded” from the Committee. Additionally, it disclosed the basis and methodology of Mercer’s fairness opinion, including the factors Mercer considered in predicting SP’s potential growth rate.

Additionally, it explained the basis of the approximately 21% increase in Green’s proposal, that Party A had expressed difficulty competing with a cash offer, and that Party A’s second offer was “substantially equivalent to [its] prior proposal.” Accordingly, the Committee believed Party A’s offer would be “economically dilutive to [SP] stockholders and subject to significant execution risk[,]” and the Committee broke off negotiations with Party A because Green’s offer “presented more value to [SP] stockholders^]” SP postponed its special shareholder meeting from October 8 to October 15 “in order to provide stockholders with additional time to consider the supplemental disclosures.” Back in Maryland, three days after SP supplemented its proxy statement, the circuit court held a conference call with the parties to discuss the status of the Appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction. Following that call, Appellants sent the court a letter stating that they believed their claims were still viable, but conceding that it would “be difficult, if not impossible to demonstrate the requisite irreparable harm and balancing of the equities[]” necessary to support a preliminary injunction. Consequently, Appellants asked the court to remove the next day’s oral argument from the court calendar. SP convened its special meeting in Texas on October 15, 2014, and 99.5% of the SP shareholders who voted cast their votes in favor of the merger, with 75.8% of the total outstanding shares voting in favor of the merger.

SP, along with Searchlight, Green’s newly formed subsidiary in Maryland, filed articles of merger with the Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation on October 17, 2014 (“Articles of Merger”). 6 As explained in the proxy statement, Searchlight Merger Sub Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Green, [was] a newly formed Maryland corporation created solely for the purpose of engaging in the transactions contemplated by the merger agreement and ha[d] not carried on any activities other than in connection with the merger. The address of the Merger Sub [wa]s 4000 Greenbriar St., Houston, Texas[.] When SP and Searchlight effected the merger, Searchlight merged into and was subsumed by SP. D. The Underlying Complaint On November 7, 2014, Appellants filed an amended consolidated complaint (“Complaint”) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Complaint stated that the circuit court had jurisdiction over each SP Director for the following reasons: (a) [each Director] created continuing obligations invoking the benefits and protections of Maryland law between [himself/herself] and SP Bancorp, which was incorporated in, and hence a resident of, this State at the time of the actions challenged herein; and (b) [each Director’s] improper conduct alleged in this Complaint occurred in substantial part, was directed at, intended to have its primary effect in, and/or culminated in purposeful actions in, this State.

The Complaint alleged that collectively, the SP Directors, acting deliberately, dishonestly, breached their fiduciary duties to SP Bancorp’s public shareholders by acting to cause or facilitate the [Merger] Agreement[.] ... The [Merger] Agreement was not in the best interests of SP Bancorp’s shareholders, but was, and is, in the best interests of the Individual Defendants. This is particularly true of Mr. Weaver, who received significant personal profits as a result of the [Merger] Agreement and fully expected to be employed by the surviving company following consummation of the [Merger] Agreement. The Complaint also asserted that to “exert influence” over the SP Directors, Green purchased SP’s outstanding loans to Directors Williams, Forsythe, and Cozby during the summer of 2013.

Additionally, Appellants suggested that the SP Directors were self-interested in the merger agreement because it entitled them to cash payments for unvested stock options as well as a “change in control” severance payment. Counts I—III alleged that the SP Directors breached their fiduciary duties; aided and abetted Mr. Weaver’s breaches of loyalty, fair dealing, and due care; 7 and breached their duty to disclose all material facts in the proxy statement. In Count IV, Appellants alleged that Green aided and abetted the SP Directors’ alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by (1) promising Mr. Weaver post-merger employment; (2) discussing the merger within the three-year period following SP’s conversion from a mutually-owned thrift, during which federal regulations prohibited SP from negotiating a merger; (3) purchasing loans owed by the SP Directors to exert undue influence over them; (4) concealing from the SP Directors that CSC was a shareholder in Green; (5) soliciting a No Solicitation Clause; (6) negotiating the merger with an intent to exploit the SP Directors’ conflicts of interest; (7) negotiating a termination fee should the merger break down; and (8) agreeing to indemnify the SP Directors. Finally, in Count V, the Complaint asserted a claim against CSC for aiding and abetting the SP Directors’ alleged breaches of fiduciary duties.

E. Motions to Dismiss On December 19, 2014, the SP Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint against them, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the SP Directors and that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against the SP Defendants. The motion included an affidavit of Director Williams, in which he attested that he was an SP Director prior to the merger and: 3. SP Bancorp, Inc. has at all times since its formation had its corporate offices in Plano, Texas. SP Bancorp, Inc., has not had any branch or office in Maryland, and has not conducted any corporate business in Maryland. 4.

The banks previously owned and operated by SP Ban-corp, Inc. were all located in the greater Dallas, Texas area, Louisville, Kentucky and Irvine, California. 5. The meetings of the SP Directors took place in Plano, Texas or sometimes by phone from Plano, Texas. 6. The SP directors all live in Texas. Paul Zmigrosky also has a residence in Michigan.

Carl Forsythe also has a residence in Massachusetts. 7. On January 10, 2014, the SP Directors formed a Strategic Review Committee ... to consider potential strategic transactions involving SP Bancorp. I was a member of that committee. The [ ] committee held its meetings in Texas, or by phone from Texas.

The SP Defendants refuted Appellants’ claim that SP was sold under value by pointing out that the merger was approved unanimously by all ten SP Directors, and that each owned substantial stock in the company and, therefore, had a personal interest in achieving the maximum sale price for the sale of SP. They also contended that other than Mr. Weaver, none of the remaining nine Directors were alleged to have any potential role in the surviving bank and, “like the other SP Bancorp shareholders, the SP Directors’ ownership interest was completely extinguished by the cash-out Merger.” Therefore, the Appellants based their Complaint “on the implausible assertion that all nine of the disinterested SP directors approved a merger that was contrary to each of their financial interests solely because Mr. Weaver might obtain a job with the surviving bank.” Regardless, they argued, the SP Directors were not subject to jurisdiction in Maryland because SP is a “phantom” corporation, with none of its operations taking place in Maryland—it’s headquartered in Texas and operates in Texas, Kentucky, and California. The Green Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss the claims against Green for lack of personal jurisdiction, and to dismiss the claims against both Green Defendants for failure to state a claim. They asserted that Maryland lacked personal jurisdiction over Green because all of the conduct on which Appellants based their claims occurred outside of Maryland and Green had no other connection to the forum.

Additionally, they argued that Appellants failed to state a claim against Searchlight, because they “d[id] not make a single allegation about any conduct, let alone wrongful conduct,” by Searchlight. Included with their motion was an affidavit by Mr. Greenwade, who attested that Green was incorporated and headquartered in Texas with “no offices or employees in Maryland.” He further attested that Green does not solicit business in Maryland, “has no local address or local telephone number[,]” and “no agent to accept service in Maryland.” In regard to the merger, he specified that no merger negotiations occurred in Maryland; that Green sent the letter of intent from Texas to the SP Directors in Texas; that SP responded by sending a letter to Green in Texas; that the parties negotiated in Texas and through counsel in New York; that Green conducted due diligence at SP’s offices in Texas; that Green offered employment to Mr. Weaver by telephone in Texas; that Green signed the merger agreement in Texas and that he (Greenwade) believed that SP did as well; that the SP shareholders voted at a meeting in Texas; and that Green purchased the loans of several SP Directors from its offices in Texas. Appellants countered that the SP Directors were subject to jurisdiction in Maryland because they “transacted business” in the forum by causing the merger between SP and Searchlight to be consummated in Maryland with the filing of the Articles of Merger. Appellants also contended that the SP Directors were subject to jurisdiction because the alleged tortious conduct—breaching their fiduciary duties—was not complete until the merger was consummated in Maryland.

Exercising jurisdiction would satisfy due process, Appellants argued, because the SP Directors chose to consummate the merger in Maryland and chose Maryland law to govern the merger. Appellants insisted that “the formation of a Maryland corporation to acquire another Maryland corporation and the consummation of that acquisition in Maryland is precisely the sort of ‘significant activity’ in Maryland that supports long arm jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction would comport with due process, according to Appellants, because Green purposefully availed itself of Maryland law by choosing to organize Searchlight under Maryland law rather than the law of another state. The circuit court held a hearing on Appellees’ motions on March 27, 2015. Subsequently, in a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on April 8, 2015, the court dismissed the actions against Green and the SP Directors for lack of personal jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim, and dismissed the actions against Searchlight and SP for failure to state a claim.

The court began with some general observations: neither SP nor Green had offices in Maryland or solicited business within the state; none of the SP Directors resided in Maryland; Green initiated merger negotiations in Texas; Green sent the letter of intent from Texas to SP in Texas; SP responded by sending its own letter to Green within Texas and negotiations continued in Texas and New York; and Green conducted due diligence in Texas. The court ruled that Green was not subject to general jurisdiction in Maryland based on its incorporation of Searchlight in the state and that the Appellants otherwise “failed to show a ‘substantial connection’ between Green and Maryland, as they have not demonstrated that Green engaged in ‘significant activities’ or ‘created continuing obligations’ in Maryland.” Appellants, according to the court, provided no substantive support for their “principal-agent” theory between Green and Searchlight, only “vaguely allud[ing]” that Green was Searchlight’s alter ego. Further, the filing of the Articles of Merger, which incorporated Searchlight, was not a “purposeful tortious act” under Maryland’s long-arm statute, and no injury was felt in Maryland because Searchlight’s incorporation was not central to the case. The court noted that “Searchlight did not exist until after the parties agreed to the Merger.” Green did not “invoke” the benefits of Maryland law, the court continued; instead, it selected Delaware law to govern the merger and purchased a business that did not operate within Maryland.

The court concluded that Maryland has neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction over Green, after observing the following: Plaintiffs have provided no support for their argument that forming a subsidiary is a “significant activity” that supports long-arm jurisdiction. Green has not engaged in “significant activities” or “created continuing obligations” in Maryland, Green is incorporated in Texas and has its headquarters in Houston. All of its branches are in Texas, except a branch in Kentuckyt,] which was established subsequent to the Merger. Green has no local offices in Maryland nor does it conduct, transact, or solicit business in Maryland.

Furthermore, it has no employees, addresses, telephone numbers, or agents for service of process in Maryland. No merger negotiations occurred in Maryland, and all of the meetings between Green and SP [] occurred in Texas, except for negotiations by counsel in New York. Turning to the SP Directors, the court ruled that Appellants failed to prove that the Directors purposefully availed themselves of the laws of Maryland. The court ruled that mere acceptance of a directorship is not enough to subject the SP Directors to personal jurisdiction, reasoning that, unlike states such as Delaware, Maryland has not adopted a statute subjecting corporate directors to personal jurisdiction based on their acceptance of a directorship.

Further, the court held, SP’s conduct was not attributable to its Directors. It was SP—not the SP Directors—that signed and filed the Articles of Merger in Maryland. All of the SP Directors’ conduct—the directors’ meetings, shareholder meetings, and merger negotiations— occurred in Texas and New York. Consequently, the court concluded, the SP Directors lacked minimum contacts in Maryland.

The court then dismissed the claims against Searchlight and SP, ruling that Appellants failed to state a claim against those defendants because the Complaint asserted no allegations against either Searchlight or SP. For about six months following Appellees’ dismissal from the action, Appellants’ litigation continued against CSC until Appellants agreed to dismiss with prejudice their claim against CSC. Appellants then noted their timely appeal of the court’s decision to dismiss Appellees from the case. DISCUSSION I. Legal Framework We examine whether the circuit court was legally correct in dismissing the underlying action against Green and the SP Directors for lack of personal jurisdiction.

CSR, Ltd. v. Taylor, 411 Md. 457, 472 , 983 A.2d 492 (2009) (citations omitted). In deciding whether a Maryland court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the court must examine whether jurisdiction is established under Maryland’s long-arm statute and whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 464 , 983 A.2d 492 . The Supreme Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.

Int'l Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 311, 321 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 , 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877). In the seminal case of International Shoe, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause limits a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign or out-of-state defendant to circumstances in which a defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940) (other citations omitted)). Recently, in Bristol-Myers, supra, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[i]n determining whether personal jurisdiction is present, a court must consider a variety of interests[,]” including those of the forum state “ ‘and of the plaintiff in proceeding with the cause in the plaintiffs forum of choice.’ But the ‘primary concern’ is ‘the burden on the defendant.’ ” 137 S.Ct. at 1780 (internal citations omitted). This burden includes not just the practical and logistical aspects of litigation but “the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a state that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question.” Id.

In this way, “restrictions on personal jurisdiction ‘are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective states.’ ” Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). Still, following International Shoe, “ ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States ... became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.’” Daimler, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 754 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)).

Thereafter, courts applying the concept of “fair play and substantial justice” developed two categories of personal jurisdiction in cases involving out-of-state corporate defendants: general (or all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (or case-linked) jurisdiction. Id.; see also Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1779-80 ; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 . General jurisdiction over a company exists only in “instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 , 66 S.Ct. 154 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has recently explained general jurisdiction by way of analogy to an individual defendant’s domicile: general jurisdiction exists when a corporation is “at home” in the forum state.

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 . “The ‘paradigm’ forums in which a corporate defendant is ‘at home,’ ... are the corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1558 (quoting Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 n.19). A court with general jurisdiction over a company may hear any claim against that company, even if all of the activity that gave rise to the claim occurred in a different state. Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1780 ; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 . “Specific jurisdiction is very different.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1780 .

Specific jurisdiction exists only when the claim “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum[.]” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 , 414 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 1868 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). A defendant corporation is subject to specific personal jurisdiction only if it can be demonstrated that (1) the defendant has “purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum”; (2) the plaintiffs claims “arise out of or relate to” those activities directed at the state; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would “comport with fair play and substantial justice” so as to be constitutionally reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 476 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also CSR, Ltd., 411 Md. at 477 , 983 A.2d 492 ; Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 388 Md. 1, 26 , 878 A.2d 567 (2005).

In determining what is reasonable under the Due Process Clause and would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , we consider several factors. Those factors are “the burden on the defendant, the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 113 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 , 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987). We must emphasize that when based on specific jurisdiction, a court’s adjudicatory authority is limited to those “ ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’ ” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 (citation omitted).

This “category [of jurisdiction] is represented by International Shoe itself, a case in which the in-state activities of the corporate defendant ‘had not only been continuous and systematic, but also g[a]ve rise to the liabilities sued on.’ ” Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 764 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ). “[T]he commission of certain ‘single or occasional acts’ in a State may be sufficient to render a corporation answerable in that State with respect to those acts” without rendering the corporation subject to jurisdiction more generally “with respect to matters unrelated to the forum connections.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ). This means that continuous activity of only “some sorts” within a state “ ‘is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity,’ ” Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1781 (citation omitted). In its more recent cases, the Supreme Court has cautioned against blending the general jurisdiction analysis with that of specific jurisdiction, explaining that a corporation’s ties that would “serv[e] to bolster the exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 (emphasis added) (noting that the North Carolina Court of Appeals “elided the essential difference between case-specific and [all-purpose] general jurisdiction”). Several months ago, the Supreme Court reiterated this point.

In Bristol-Myers, the Court held that the “settled principles” of specific jurisdiction “provide no support” for a “sliding scale” approach that treats personal jurisdiction as if it exists on a continuum, permitting states to exercise specific jurisdiction over corporations not at home in the state based off of the volume of general forum contacts the corporation has unrelated to the claim at issue. 8 137 S.Ct. at 1780.

II

Green Appellants contend that Maryland has jurisdiction over Green based on both modalities of personal jurisdiction. First, they maintain that Green is subject to general jurisdiction in Maryland because of Searchlight’s presence in the state, given that Searchlight is Green’s mere instrumentality. Second, they claim Maryland can exercise specific jurisdiction over Green by way of its long-arm statute because the company “transacted business” in the state when it formed Searchlight under Maryland law and consummated the merger in Maryland. A. General Jurisdiction Appellants do not contend that Green is “at home” in Maryland.

Instead, they claim that Green is subject to general jurisdiction in Maryland by virtue of its ownership of Searchlight. According to Appellants, Green formed Searchlight as an instrumentality, or alter ego, for the sole purpose of engaging in the merger, and exercised complete control over Searchlight until the merger was completed, at which point Searchlight ceased to exist. Appellants maintain that Maryland law permits courts to attribute a subsidiary’s actions to its foreign parent corporation when the parent is “closely allied” with the subsidiary and exercised “actual supervision and control” over its activities. Harris v. Arlen Props., Inc., 256 Md. 185, 199-200 , 260 A.2d 22 (1969); Thomas v. Hudson Sales Corp., 204 Md. 450, 454, 463, 466 , 105 A.2d 225 (1954)).

Green responds, quoting from Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 754 , that Appellants must show that Green’s contacts in Maryland were so “ ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home” here. 9 Green advances several reasons why Appellants cannot rely on the presence of Green’s subsidiary in Maryland as a basis for general jurisdiction over Green. First, Green contends that its formation of a subsidiary in Maryland is insufficient under Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 759-60 , to subject it to general jurisdiction here. Second, Green observes that Appellants failed to allege any facts that would have allowed the court to pierce the corporate veil between Searchlight and Green. And, citing to Daimler again, Green points out that even if we were to impute Searchlight’s contacts to Green, such contacts alone are still insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over it.

Until recently, the Supreme Court addressed general jurisdiction infrequently. In fact, from 1952 to 2011, the Court issued only two opinions in which general jurisdiction was the central issue. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418 , 104 S.Ct. 1868 (holding that “mere purchases [made in the forum state], even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State’s assertion of [general] jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions” (footnote omitted)); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 , 72 S.Ct. 413 , 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) (holding that a foreign corporation was subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio, its principal, albeit a limited-wartime place of business, and that it did not violate due process for Ohio to adjudicate a controversy that did not arise in that forum).

In the intervening 60 years, the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, consistent with International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros, examined Maryland’s ability to exercise general personal jurisdiction over corporations based on the companies’ “continuous and systematic” contacts in the state. See, e.g., Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); CSR, Ltd., 411 Md. at 477-78 , 983 A.2d 492 (further explaining that the defendant must have also “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State,” and then once minimum contacts are established within the forum state, those contacts must be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with ‘fair play and substantial justice” (citations omitted)). Then, in 2011, 2014, and again just this year, the Supreme Court revisited the general jurisdiction doctrine. See BNSF By.

Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1558-59; Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 760-62 ; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923-29 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 . The Court in Daimler explained that the proper “inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic[;]’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’” 10 Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 ). The plaintiffs in Daimler were 22 residents of Argentina who brought suit in federal district court in California against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (“Daimler”), a German company. Id. at 750-51.

Plaintiffs alleged that Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina (“MB Argentina”), collaborated with State security forces during Argentina’s 1976-1983 “Dirty War” to “kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina workers, among them, plaintiffs or persons closely related to plaintiffs.” Id. The plaintiffs predicated jurisdiction on a theory of general jurisdiction based on the California contacts of another Daimler subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”), which was incorporated in Delaware and principally located in New Jersey but did business in California. Id. at 751. The federal district court granted Daimler’s motion to dismiss, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the theory that a state can exercise jurisdiction over a parent corporation if its subsidiary performed “sufficiently important” services within the forum state.

Id. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit “looked to whether the parent enjoys ‘the right to substantially control’ the subsidiary’s activities.” Id. at 760 n.15 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court, however, rejected both the “sufficiently important” and “substantial control” test. Id. at 769-60 & n.15.

The Court explained that “in no event” could the Ninth Circuit’s analysis be sustained because it would “subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ [the Court] rejected in Goodyear.” Id. at 759-60 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 ), The Court disapproved of the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation “in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” reasoning that such a formulation was “unacceptably grasping.” Id. at 760-61 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Daimler expressly rejected an approach that would subject a foreign corporation to general jurisdiction based on its control of a subsidiary resident in the forum state. 11 Id. at 759-60; see also Vitro Elecs. v. Milgray Elecs., Inc., 255 Md. 498, 502 , 258 A.2d 749 (1969) (observing that “numerous cases [] hold that a foreign corporation is not construed as doing business within a state merely because of its ownership of all of the shares of stock of another corporation doing business in the state.” (citations omitted)). And in BNSF Ry. Co., the Supreme Court underscored that “in-state business, as we clarified in Daimler and Goodyear, does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims ... that are unrelated to any activity occurring” in the forum state.

BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1559 . Applying the foregoing legal precepts to the facts before us, we hold that Green cannot be said to be “at home” in Maryland with no contact in Maryland save for the fleeting existence of its merger subsidiary, Searchlight. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 760 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923 , 131 S.Ct. 2846 ).

Consistent with Daimler, we hold that a nonresident parent corporation is not subject to general jurisdiction in Maryland based solely on its incorporation of a subsidiary within Maryland. Appellants seek to distinguish Daimler by pointing to the fact that they allege Searchlight is an alter ego, while the plaintiffs in Daimler made no similar allegation. On this limited point, Appellants are correct—they have, in fact, alleged Searchlight is an alter ego, but they have failed to establish either the validity or the relevance of that allegation. They make no showing (or argument), for example, that Searchlight was fraudulently incorporated 12 or that Green and Searchlight failed to keep “separate records, separate and distinct accounting procedures, separate corporate books, and held separate directors’ meetings.” See Vitro, 255 Md. at 504-06 , 258 A.2d 749 (refusing to pierce the corporate veil and “adopt a doctrine which ... would have the effect of breaking down observed distinctions between parent and subsidiary corporations, where fraud or deception is not present”).

More importantly, however, regardless of whether Searchlight was Green’s alter ego, Appellants’ general jurisdiction argument would still fail under Daimler. Appellants urge us to pierce the corporate veil of Searchlight to reach Green. Were we to do that, we would be back to examining Green’s jurisdictional contacts in Maryland—of which its incorporation of Searchlight is the only one. Even if Green created a Maryland corporation as its alter ego, Green would remain subject to general jurisdiction only where it is “at home,” which is normally its “place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” BNSF Ry.

Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1552 (citation omitted). Appellants’ concession that “Searchlight ceased to exist after the merger” only underscores the point that the evanescent existence of Searchlight in Maryland could not have created even one continuing contact or affiliation by Green in Maryland. B. Specific Jurisdiction Appellants argue that forming a Maryland corporation to acquire another Maryland corporation and consummating that merger in Maryland is “significant activity” bringing Green within reach of Maryland’s long-arm statute. To support the point that Green invoked the protection of Maryland law by creating Searchlight, Appellants rely mainly on Delaware cases, such as Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1123 (Del. 1988), which they contend are consistent with this Court’s decision in Sleph v. Radtke, 76 Md.App. 418, 429 , 545 A.2d 111 (1988).

Appellants claim that the fact that Green was a party to the merger agreement, which called for the filing of the Articles of Merger in Maryland, is controlling and that it is irrelevant that the merger was negotiated outside of Maryland and that Green did not sign the Articles of Merger. Appellants assert that Maryland has a substantial and legitimate interest in providing a forum to resolve claims involving the corporate fiduciaries of Maryland corporations. Although Appellants again cite Delaware case law to support this proposition, Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, 794 A.2d 1211, 1230 (Del. Ch. 2001), they seek to incorporate Maryland law by contending that this interest is consistent with the “internal affairs” doctrine, which dictates that Maryland corporation law is the province of Maryland courts.

Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 397 Md. 37, 52 , 915 A.2d 991 (2007) (“ ‘[Ojnly one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.’ ” (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 , 102 S.Ct. 2629 , 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982)). Green insists that its single contact with Maryland does not subject it to specific jurisdiction here. Relying in large part on Vitro, supra, Green asserts that Appellants do not and cannot claim that the act of incorporating Searchlight or the filing of the Articles of Merger were themselves wrongful or that these were the acts giving rise to their substantive claims. It is telling, Green suggests, that Appellants rely on unpublished Delaware decisions rather than the rules the Supreme Court has enumerated.

For example, Green contends that applying the Burger King analysis, Appellants “have not, and cannot, show a ‘substantial connection’ between Green and Maryland, because Green has not engaged in ‘significant activities’ or ‘created continuing obligations’ in Maryland.’ ” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 . Green contends, citing Aphena Pharma Solutions-Md. LLC v. BioZone Labs. Inc., 912 F.Supp.2d 309, 315 (D. Md. 2012), that “transacting business” in Maryland has been applied narrowly to companies that engage in significant negotiations and/or intentional advertising and selling in Maryland. Green points out that it is a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in Texas and that SP’s only non-Texas branch that Green acquired was in Kentucky.

Therefore, Green’s transaction with SP did not “create continuing obligations invoking the benefits and protections of Maryland law,” because all of SP’s offices and branches were in Texas and Kentucky—despite its past incorporation in Maryland. Green maintains that all the misconduct alleged in the Complaint occurred in Texas: (1) Green representatives met with SP in Texas; (2) Green purchased the loans from SP in Texas; (3) Green’s alleged discussions concerning Mr. Weaver’s future employment occurred wholly within Texas, where Mr. Weaver is employed; and (4) the parties executed the merger agreement in Texas. 13 Maryland has construed its long-arm statute to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction “to the full extent allowable under the Due Process Clause.” CSR, Ltd., 411 Md. at 473 , 983 A.2d 492 (citation omitted). The statute is found in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), and provides: § 6-103.

Cause of action arising from conduct in State or tortious injury outside State. (a) Condition,—If jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause of action arising from any act enumerated in this section. (b) In general,—A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by an agent: (1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State; (2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in the State; (3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State; (4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the State; (5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property-in the State; or (6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within the State at the time the contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing. 14 Pertinent to this appeal, Appellants allege only that § 6-103(b)(1) applies, conferring personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when the plaintiff(s) can prove that the defendant “[transacts any business” in the state. 15 We begin, then, by analyzing whether Green’s contacts amount to “transact[ing] any business” in Maryland within the meaning of our long-arm statute. In so doing, we apply the three-pronged inquiry, supra, for determining whether the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants in this case would comport with due process.

See Beyond Sys., 388 Md. at 22 , 878 A.2d 567 (“Because we have consistently held that the reach of the long arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction delineated under the due process clause ..., our statutory inquiry merges with our constitutional examination.” (citing Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 657 , 370 A.2d 551 (1977)). 1. “Purposeful Availment” and “Arising Out of” The Supreme Court has instructed that when a state seeks to exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, the defendant must have “purposefully directed” activities “at residents of the forum,” and the litigation at issue must “result[] from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations omitted). The “ ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’ ” Id. 471 U.S. at 475-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations omitted). Therefore, when a defendant has “ ‘deliberately’ engaged in significant activities within a State” or created “continuing obligations” there, the defendant has assumed the privilege of conducting business in the forum. Id.

(citations omitted). And because these activities enjoy the benefits and protections of the state’s laws, “it is presumptively not unreasonable to require [the defendant] to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.” Id. (citations omitted). In order to illustrate what is meant by the requirement that the litigation must result from alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” activities “purposefully directed” at the forum state, the Burger King Court provided the following examples: Thus “[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State” and those products subsequently injure forum consumers.

Similarly, a publisher who distributes magazines in a distant State may fairly be held accountable in that forum for damages resulting there from an allegedly defamatory story. And with respect to interstate contractual obligations, we have emphasized that parties who “reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state” are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other State for the consequences of their activities. Id. at 472-73 (internal citations omitted). See also Walden v. Fiore, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1119-120, 1124 , 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (When asked to decide whether a court in Nevada could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Georgia police officer on the basis that he knew that confiscating funds found on petitioners while travelling through Georgia would cause harm to the petitioners in Nevada where they lived, the Supreme Court held that the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction because no part of the officer’s conduct occurred in Nevada and a plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.) Under Maryland’s long-arm statute, “[a] nonresident who has never entered the state, either personally or through an agent, may be deemed to have ‘transacted business’ in the State within the meaning of [CJP § 6—103(b)(1) ] as long as his or her actions culminate in ‘purposeful activity’ within the State.” Sleph, 76 Md.App. at 427 , 545 A.2d 111 (citations omitted). “The quality and quantity of contacts required to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction will depend upon the nature of the action brought and the nexus of the contacts to the subject matter of the action.” Id. at 428 , 545 A.2d 111 (citing Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 312 Md. 330, 333 , 539 A.2d 1107 (1988) [hereinafter “Camelback //”]).

Thus, a single tortious contact with the state may create specific jurisdiction, but several contacts related to the cause of action only tangentially may not. Id. According to the Court of Appeals, to satisfy the “purposeful availment” requirement, there must be so substantial a connection between [the defendant] and the forum state that having to defend a lawsuit there would be foreseeable. In Maryland, a substantial connection will be established if [the defendant] either engaged in significant activities in the State, or created continuing obligations with the State’s residents, thus taking advantage of the benefits and protections of Maryland law.

CSR, Ltd., 411 Md. at 464-65 , 983 A.2d 492 . In CSR, Ltd., the defendant-petitioner, Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. (“CSR”), was an Australian company that acted as the exclusive U.S. distributor for its wholly-owned subsidiary, which was also an Australian company. Id. at 465 , 983 A.2d 492 . CSR sold asbestos to customers outside of Maryland, but some of its product passed through the Port of Baltimore.

Id. The plaintiff-respondents were the personal representatives of two men who worked as stevedores at the Port and eventually died from mesothelioma, which they contended was caused by asbestos exposure at the Port. Id. at 464 , 983 A.2d 492 . CSR challenged whether its conduct fell within the scope of Maryland’s long-arm statute, arguing that it never purposefully directed its goods toward the state; it “never conducted or solicited any business in Maryland;” it was “never incorporated or licensed to do business in Maryland;” it “never appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service of process in Maryland;” and it “never maintained an office, telephone listing, mailing address, or bank account in Maryland, nor did it own, lease, or possess an interest in property in the State.” Id. at 466-67 , 983 A.2d 492 .

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, insisted that CSR transacted business in Maryland by utilizing the Port of Baltimore, and specified that at least three CSR shipments that went through the Port were “Cost, Insurance, Freight” arrangements, meaning that CSR retained responsibility for the cargo until it was unloaded in Baltimore. Id. at 468-69 , 983 A.2d 492 & n.5 Plaintiffs also noted that CSR advertised its product regularly in a trade magazine that was distributed in Maryland. Id. at 469 , 983 A.2d 492 . The circuit court found these contacts insufficient and dismissed the claim against CSR for want of personal jurisdiction.

Id. at 469-70 , 983 A.2d 492 . The Court of Appeals granted CSR’s petition for certiorari and reversed this Court’s interim decision in which we concluded that the shipment of asbestos to Maryland established minimum contacts. Id. at 470-71 , 983 A.2d 492 . The Court of Appeals held that the exercise of jurisdiction over CSR would have offended the Due Process Clause, reasoning that CSR’s shipments through Baltimore “d[id] not satisfy the