Stockley v. Jacob Thomas & Son

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The bill in this case was filed by Jacob B. Thomas and others, trading as Thomas and Son, for themselves and other ⁶⁶⁵ Maryland creditors, against the People’s Mutual Live Stock Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, asking for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the assets of the defendant and to collect the debts due it within this State and apply the same, after reducing them to cash, to the payment of the claims of Maryland creditors. The bill alleges that the defendant company issued to the plaintiffs a policy insuring for the term of three years the life of a gelding owned by the plaintiff, and refers to said policy and makes it a part thereof; it also alleges that the animal so insured was, while said policy was in full force, with the consent of the defendant, destroyed, because it had contracted an incurable disease; that in accordance with an agreement which is filed and made part of the bill, the plaintiffs agreed under seal to accept in full settlement of all claims, &c., under said policy, the sum of one hundred dollars ; that the defendant company being a Pennsylvania corporation, was, by an order of Court of that State of competent jurisdiction, placed in the hands of the appellant as receiver on the 2nd May, 1898 ; that the defendants have not received the said sum or any part thereof due under said policy, and that they are therefore creditors of the defendant corporation ; that the said corporation is insolvent and has assets in this State and owes debts to the plaintiffs and others, who like them are citizens of this State, and that the assets of said company, within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, are applicable first to the payment of Maryland creditors. In addition to the policy of insurance on which, together with the agreement referred to, the plaintiff bases his claim, there were filed with the bill and made part of it, the said agreement, and a letter from the Pennsylvania receiver informing the plaintiffs that he had been by the order of the Pennsylvania Court so appointed.

An order of publication in the usual form was passed on the 10th January, 1899, by the Circuit Court of Baltimore, requiring the defendant to appear and show cause why a decree should not be passed as prayed, and on the same day such an order ⁶⁶⁶ was passed. A few days thereafter the Pennsylvania receiver — the appellant, filed his answer, and on the 25th ot same month moved to rescind the order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City appointing a receiver. This motion was overruled, and this appeal was taken by Frank B. Stockley, the Pennsylvania receiver, from both the order appointing a receiver and also from the order refusing to rescind. It is conceded, however, that the appeal from the latter order must be dismissed.

Hull v. Caughy, 66 Md. 104 . The only question, therefore, presented is whether the bill and the exhibits which form a part thereof present a proper case for the appointment of a receiver. Undoubtedly a Maryland Court of Equity will in a proper case appoint a receiver here to take charge of and sell the property of an insolvent foreign corporation to pay, first, the debts of Maryland creditors, and if there be any balance remaining to turn it over to a receiver appointed in another State upon á proper application made here for that purpose. Day et al. v. Postal Tel.

Co., 66 Md. 354; Failey v. Fee, 83 Md. 83 ; Castleman v. Templeman, 87 Md. 546 ; Southern Bldg. Asso. v. Price, 88 Md. 155 . But, before the jurisdiction of a Court of Equity can be successfully invoked, it must clearly appear that the receiver who is to be appointed will be able to exercise the powers proposed to be conferred on him. The bill filed in this case, while alleging that the defendant company has assets within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, fails to state the nature of such assets, whether consisting of real or personal property or both, or entirely dioses in adion.

It seems to be conceded, however, that the only corporate assets of the defendant within this State are alleged debts due to it by citizens of this State. How would it be possible for the Maryland receiver to enforce these claims while the evidences of the debts are in the possession of the Pennsylvania corporation, or in the hands of its receiver, who doubtless has been authorized by the Pennsylvania Court to sue for and recover them. But, in addition to this difficulty, it must be remem ⁶⁶⁷ bered that the debt due the plaintiffs, and which is the foundation of their bill, is not