Stoddard v. State

GREENE, J. In this case, we must construe Md.Code (2001), § 10-107 of the Criminal Procedure Article, to determine whether a multiple count indictment, charging various counts of burglary and related offenses, which were allegedly committed at different times, in several locations, and against different people, constitutes a single unit within the meaning of the expungement statute. See Md.Code (2001), § 10-101 et seq. Specifically, ⁶⁵⁷ we must decide whether a defendant’s guilty plea to burglary (count 13) of the multiple count indictment precludes expungement of the remaining charges, which were nol prossed by the State as part of a plea agreement. We hold that, consistent with the plain language of § 10-107, burglary and theft charges that stem from separate and distinct events, although the charges are contained within the same charging document, do not comprise a single unit for purposes of expungement.

Charges arising, however, from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts as the count to which a criminal defendant pleads guilty comprise a single unit, and therefore may not be expunged. Thus, a guilty plea to one count of first degree burglary, contained within a multiple count charging document, does not preclude expungement of the other burglary and theft counts which were nol prossed, unless the other charges arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts to which the defendant pled guilty. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On November 12, 2005, at 2:15 a.m., a police officer working as security for the University Village Apartment Complex in Towson, Maryland, observed a man, later identified as Kevin Tremaine Stoddard (“Petitioner”), walking around inside apartment 2101, and then leaving the apartment by removing a window screen. The officer detained Petitioner, a Towson University student, and arrested him after learning that he did not have permission to be inside that apartment.

After receiving Miranda warnings, Petitioner admitted to entering apartment 2101 and confessed to a series of other burglaries as well. Petitioner was charged with seven counts of first-degree burglary, two counts of fourth-degree burglary, seven counts of theft under $500, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The State chose to consolidate all charges in a single, multiple-count indictment. All charges stemmed from Petitioner’s involvement in a series of burglaries and related criminal offenses involving several individual apartments, located within the University Village Apartment Complex.

The ⁶⁵⁸ crimes occurred over a period of more than two months. A summary of the counts are as follows: Counts 1 and 2: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2104 on October 9, 2004 Counts 3 and 4: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2310 on October 18 and 22, 2004 Counts 5 and 6: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2106 on October 18 and 22, 2004 Counts 7 and 8: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 412 Campus View Dr., Apartment 6102 on October 25, 2004 Counts 9 and 10: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2211 on October 25, 2004 Counts 11 and 12: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 3308 on October 25, 2004 Counts 13-15:First degree burglary, theft under $500, and possession of paraphernalia involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2101 on November 12, 2004 Count 16: Fourth degree burglary involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2204 on November 4, 2004 Count 17: Fourth degree burglary involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2204 on September 4, 2004 On April 4, 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to count 13, charging first-degree burglary, in exchange for the State entering a nolle prosequi as to the remaining 16 counts. Counts 13-15 arose from the same incident, transaction, and set of facts. Those crimes allegedly occurred on November 12, 2004, and involved the burglary and theft of personal property from apartment 2101.

The theft of personal property gave rise to the charge of possession of paraphernalia. The burglaries listed in the remaining counts, ⁶⁵⁹ which were nol prossed, all took place on different days and in different apartment units than did the burglary in count 13. On June 8, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to four-years imprisonment with all but 90 days suspended and the last 30 days to be served on home detention. He also was placed on two-years probation, effective upon release, and was ordered to pay restitution to each of the burglary victims.

In addition, Petitioner was ordered to abstain from alcohol, illegal drugs and abuse of prescription drugs, submit to random urinalysis, and to seek alcohol and drug treatment. The court also ordered that Petitioner have no contact with the victims, their property, or the University Village Apartments. On September 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence, in which he requested that the trial court strike its judgment of guilty and enter probation before judgment. Subsequently, on October 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Expungement, requesting that the court expunge counts 1-12 and 14-17.

In his Petition for Expungement, Petitioner certified that he had not been convicted of any crime, other than a minor traffic violation, since the State nol prossed counts 1-12 and 14-17. On October 25, 2005, the State filed an Answer to the Motion for Modification of Sentence, requesting that Petitioner’s motion be denied. 1 On November 9, 2005, the State filed an Answer to the Petition for Expungement. The Circuit Court held a hearing on January 19, 2006. At that hearing, Petitioner conceded that counts 13-15 all arose from the same incident and that, because he pled guilty to count 13, counts 14 and 15 could not be expunged.

The State argued that because all 17 of the counts constituted a single unit, Petitioner’s guilty plea to count 13 prevented all of the counts from being expunged. The Circuit Court denied the Petition for Expungement. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 2 On June 7, 2006, ⁶⁶⁰ while the case was pending in the intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion. Stoddard v. State, 393 Md. 242 , 900 A.2d 749 (2006).

DISCUSSION The parties dispute whether, under § 10-107 of the Criminal Procedure Article, all of Petitioner’s charges, when consolidated within a single charging document, constitute a unit, such that Petitioner’s guilty plea to count 13 precludes the expungement of any of the remaining counts. Notably, because Petitioner pled guilty to count 13, that count cannot be expunged, and that issue is therefore not before this Court. See § 10-105(a) (limiting expungement for charges that resulted in a finding of guilt to a person who has been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor and who was convicted of only one criminal act that was not a crime of violence). The expungement of counts 14 and 15 is also not at issue in this case because Petitioner conceded that because those counts arise out of the same incident as count 13 they all constitute a unit, preventing their expungement.

Aside from this concession, Petitioner contends that the remaining counts do not constitute a single unit because the other burglaries are separate and distinct units. The State contends, however, that because all of the burglaries occurred in a limited time frame, in only two apartment buildings, all for the purpose of supporting Petitioner’s drug habit, they constitute a unit within the meaning of § 10-107. This issue is therefore a matter of statutory interpretation. ⁶⁶¹ A. Statutory Interpretation We recently summarized the rules of statutory interpretation in Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 571-73 , 911 A.2d 427, 431-33 (2006): “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Mayor and Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316 , 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006) (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Mayor of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 11 , 874 A.2d 439, 445 (2005); Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452 , 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005); O’Connor v. Balt.

County, 382 Md. 102, 113 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128 , 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000). As this Court has explained, “[t]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.” State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 348 Md. 2, 13 , 702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 , 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994); see also Chow, 393 Md. at 443 , 903 A.2d at 395 (stating that “[statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology”) (citations omitted). We do so “on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.” Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525 , 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002). “When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature’s intent.” Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 445 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997). “If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” ⁶⁶² Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 , 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994). In addition, “[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.” Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181 , 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001); see Chow, 393 Md. at 443 , 903 A.2d at 395 . “If there is no ambiguity in th[e] language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends.... ” Chow, 393 Md. at 443-44 , 903 A.2d at 395 .

If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then “courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration].” Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174 , 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). We have said that there is “an ambiguity within [a] statute” when there exist “two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.” Chow, 393 Md. at 444 , 903 A.2d at 395 (citations omitted). When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, “the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal.” Id.

If the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia — among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. ⁶⁶³ Witte, 369 Md. at 525-26 , 801 A.2d at 165 . In construing a statute, “[w]e avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.” Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213 , 909 A.2d 1020 (slip op. at 12) (2006) (citing Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462 , 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005)); see Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). In addition, “the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears.” State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133 , 669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (citations omitted). As this Court has stated, [bjecause it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered.

Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. Gordon Family P’ship v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138 , 702 A.2d 753, 757 (1997) (citations omitted). We now turn our attention to the statute at issue in this case. B. The Criminal Record Expungement Statute The General Assembly enacted the Criminal Record Ex-pungement Statute, § 10-101 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Article, in 1975 “[for] the purpose of providing for the expungement of certain police and court records, providing procedures for such expungement, prohibiting certain practices concerning criminal charges not resulting in conviction, and relating generally to criminal records.” 1975 Md. Laws, Chap. 260; See also In the Matter of the Expungement of Records of Diane M., 317 Md. 652, 653 , 566 A.2d 108 (1989).

In the context of the statute, “ ‘[ejxpungement’ with respect to a court record or police record” means “removal from public inspection.” § 10-101(e). This removal can be achieved in one of three ways: (1) by obliteration; ⁶⁶⁴ (2) by removal to a separate secure area to which persons who do not have a legitimate reason for access are denied access; or (3) if access to a court record or police record can be obtained only by reference to another court record or police record, by the expungement of it or the part of it that provides access. Id. One of the General Assembly’s purposes in providing for an expungement procedure was to help protect individuals seeking employment or admission to an educational institution, by entitling them to expungement of unproven charges, so that those individuals could avoid being unfairly judged during their application processes. § 10-109. 3 To further this purpose, the General Assembly expressly prohibited potential employers and academic institutions from requiring applicants to disclose information about expunged criminal charges, sub ⁶⁶⁵ jeet to a heavy penalty for violation.

Id. 4 Section 10-105 provides the authority for expungement of criminal records, and outlines the situations in which a criminal defendant may petition for such expungement. Section 10-105, entitled “Expungement of record after charge is filed,” states, in relevant part: (a) Petition for expungement.- — -A person who has been charged with the commission of a crime, including a violation of the Transportation Article for which a term of imprisonment may be imposed, may file a petition listing relevant facts for expungement of a police record, court record, or other record maintained by the State or a political subdivision of the State if: (1) the person is acquitted; (2) the charge is otherwise dismissed; (3) a probation before judgment is entered, unless the person is charged with a violation of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article or Title 2, Subtitle 5 or § 3-211 of the Criminal Law Article; (4) a nolle prosequi or nolle prosequi with the requirement of drug or alcohol treatment is entered; (5) the court indefinitely postpones trial of a criminal charge by marking the criminal charge “stet” or stet with the requirement of drug or alcohol abuse treatment on the docket; (6) the case is compromised under § 3-207 of the Criminal Law Article; (7) the charge was transferred to the juvenile court under § 4-202 of this article; or (8) the person; ⁶⁶⁶ (i) is convicted of only one criminal act, and that act is not a crime of violence; and (ii) is granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor. (Emphasis added.) Most relevant to our analysis in this case is § 10-107, entitled “Charges arising from same incident, transaction, or set of facts,” which provides: (a) Multiple charges as unit.— (1) In this subtitle, if two or more charges, other than one for a minor traffic violation, arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, they are considered to be a unit. (2) A charge for a minor traffic violation that arises from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts as a charge in the unit is not a part of the unit.

(b) Effect on right to expungement.— (1) If a person is not entitled to expungement of one charge in a unit, the person is not entitled to expungement of any other charge in the unit. (2) The disposition of a charge for a minor traffic violation that arises from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts as a charge in the unit does not affect any right to expungement of a charge in the unit. (Emphasis added.) To resolve the issue now before us, we must discern the General Assembly’s meaning of the word “unit,” as used in § 10-107(a)(l), at the time that it enacted this statute. Specifically, we must determine whether several burglaries, committed on various days, in several apartments, against different victims, constitute a single unit within the contemplation of § 10-107, such that a guilty plea to one charge would preclude the expungement of the other charges under § 10-107(b)(l).

The State’s main argument rests on the premise that if Petitioner’s burglary charges arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, or were part of a continuing ⁶⁶⁷ scheme, his guilty plea to count 13 precludes expungement of the rest of the charges because the charges then constitute one unit. The State first contends that the General Assembly’s “expungement scheme” was not designed to expunge charges that were consolidated with, or related to, the charge on which a guilty finding was made. According to the State, the term “unit” must be read broadly so that when a person is found guilty of one charge, he or she is not entitled to have expunged other charges that are consolidated with the charge on which he or she was found guilty. The State avers that the plain language of § 10-107 “compels the conclusion that if a petitioner is found guilty of one charge, and then seeks expungement of the other consolidated charges which have been dismissed, he is not entitled to expungement.” The State finds additional support for this argument in the language of Maryland Rule 4-203(a), which provides, in relevant part: Two or more offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or any combination thereof, may be charged in separate counts of the same charging document if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

The State also cites to Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1 , 752 A.2d 606 (2000), for the proposition that this Court recognized that a transaction is not limited to a single act, but may be in the nature of a continuing transaction involving more than one act. The State argues that we should therefore read the language of § 10-107 to preclude expungement when charges are part of a continuing scheme, in addition to when they constitute a single unit. Petitioner contends that the face