Stouffer v. Holbrook

Opinion by HARRELL, J. This case is about the calculation of diminution credits, a topic that strikes dread into the hearts of many trial and ¹⁶⁷ appellate judges. 1 Fortunately, the panel of the Court of Special Appeals that decided the present case was not terrorized by it and pulled a laboring oar in fashioning a fine opinion. We follow in their wake. For many of the same reasons explained by our appellate brethren, we conclude that Petitioner, the Division of Correction (“the Division”), should have awarded Respondent, Eric Holbrook, good-conduct credits at the rate of ten, rather than five, days a month. Thus, we affirm.

I. The facts accompanying this case, typical of reported cases involving disputes over diminution credits, are extensive, as Holbrook is “no stranger to the Division of Correction.” Sec’y of Pub. Safety and Carr. Servs. v. Hutchinson, 359 Md. 320, 322 , 753 A.2d 1024, 1025 (2000). The year of 1999 was a busy one for Holbrook.

In the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, he was convicted of several non-violent, non-drug offenses. At about the same time, he was convicted also for distributing cocaine. This latter offense, because it involved drugs, is of some importance to this case, a point we shall return to later. These 1999 convictions resulted in combined sentences, including active and suspended time, that expired on 5 May 2009.

The lone drug offense, however, expired much sooner—on 20 October 2003. In April 2003, Holbrook was released on parole and, while on parole, committed an assault in the second degree. According to Maryland Code (2002), Criminal Law Article, § 14-101, second degree assault is not a crime of violence, 2 another ¹⁶⁸ fact that becomes especially pertinent in our analysis to follow. Nonetheless, the Circuit Court found that the assault constituted a violation of the terms and conditions of Holbrook’s parole.

As a result of the parole violation, on 5 May 2006, the court ordered Holbrook to serve five years of “back-up” time. See Benedict v. State, 377 Md. 1, 8 , 831 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2003) (“If the defendant violates the probation .... [t]he court does not ... impose or reimpose the sentence”; it “merely determines how much of the unserved part of the sentence the defendant must serve in prison.”). For the second degree assault conviction, the court sentenced Holbrook, on 14 November 2006, to a three year term, to run consecutively to the back-up time. While re-incarcerated, Holbrook earned certain diminution credits against his original, pre-parole sentences.

The computation of those credits is not at issue here. Trouble arose, however, with the 598 good-conduct credits Holbrook earned against his new, post-parole sentence for second degree assault (computed originally at the time at a rate of ten credits per month). Sometime after May 2007, the Division disallowed half of these credits, reducing them to 299. The Division claimed that, under Md.Code (1999, 2008 Repl.Vol.), Corr.

Servs. Art. (CS), §§ 3-701 3 and 3-704(b)(2), 4 Holbrook should have received just five credits a month. ¹⁶⁹ When a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes, multiple sentences may result. For purposes of determining the actual period of imprisonment, however, these sentences typically are aggregated into a single “term of confinement,” defined as “the period from the first day of the sentence that begins first through the last day of the sentence that ends last.” CS § 3-701. If the term of confinement includes a violent or drug-related offense, the defendant may earn only five, as opposed to ten, good-conduct credits a month.

See CS § 3-704(b)(2). That is true even if the majority of the other offenses are unrelated to violence or drugs. To justify disallowance of the higher rate of accrual in the present case, the Division reasoned that Holbrook served a single, continuous term of confinement because he was never outside its custody or supervision completely. Thus, the single term of confinement included the sentence for the 1999 drug-related crime (distributing cocaine).

The Division concluded, on this basis, that Holbrook was entitled only to the lesser accrual rate of five good-conduct credits a month. In reply, Holbrook charged that the Division used improperly the ambiguous statutory definition of the phrase “term of confinement” as a “device” to deny him the more favorable rate. Holbrook sought habeas corpus relief from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. That Circuit Court found significant that the actual sentence for the 1999 drug conviction—the conviction and sentence upon which the Division relied to disqualify Holbrook from receiving ten good-conduct credits a month—had expired.

Consequently, the court concluded that it was improper for the Division to include that conviction in the calculus of the relevant term of confinement. It ordered the Division to restore the revoked credits. On the Division’s appeal, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed. J. Michael Stouffer, Commissioner of Correction, et al. v. Eric Holbrook, No. 2708, ¹⁷⁰ September Term, 2008 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. February 5, 2010) (Rodowsky, J.).

After conducting an extensive canvass of diminution credits jurisprudence (mostly cases of this Court), the intermediate appellate court did not find particularly meaningful the expiration of the sentence on the drug conviction. Rather, it concluded that the “predomina[nt] legislative intent, under the rule of lenity” demands that “inmates who are serving sentences for non-violent, non-drug offenses earn [good-conduct credits] at the rate of ten days per [month].” Id., slip op. at 10. We issued a writ of certiorari, on the Division’s petition, to consider whether: Corr. Servs.

Article Sec. 3-704(b)(2)[,] which provides that an inmate whose term of confinement includes a sentence for a crime of violence or a drug crime is to receive good conduct credits at the rate of only five days per month over the term of confinement, permit[s] an award of ten good conduct credits per month on sentences in the term of confinement for non-violent, non-drug crimes? Stouffer v. Holbrook, 413 Md. 228 , 991 A.2d 1273 (2010). To the extent that “the general direction to aggregate multiple sentences into a single term of confinement” would “den[y] inmates the benefit of a law that the General Assembly intended be applicable to them,” we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 330 , 753 A.2d at 1029 (clarifying the holdings of Md. House of Corr. v. Fields, 348 Md. 245 , 703 A.2d 167 (1997), and Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1 , 706 A.2d 608 (1998)).

II

We begin with a discussion of diminution credits. Diminution credits are credits which can be “earned by inmates to reduce the lengths of their confinements.” See, e.g., Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 128 , 647 A.2d 106, 107 (1994). “Assuming an inmate does not forfeit diminution credits as the result of a disciplinary hearing, the inmate can earn the right to be released on a date much sooner ¹⁷¹ than that designated by his or her original term of confinement.” Frost, 336 Md. at 128 , 647 A.2d at 108 (citations omitted). Once the inmate accumulates “sufficient credits to earn entitlement to release, the inmate is deemed released under ‘mandatory supervision.’ ” Id. Fields, 348 Md. at 261 , 703 A.2d at 175 .

Under CS § 7-501(a), mandatory supervision is “a conditional release from confinement [granted] to an inmate who is serving a term of confinement of more than 18 months ... to the jurisdiction of the Division of Correction ... and [who] has served the term or terms, less diminution credit[s].” There are four types of diminution credits: good-conduct, work (or industrial), educational, and special project credits. Art. 27, § 700 [now CS § 3-701 et seq.]; see also Frost, 336 Md. at 128 , 647 A.2d at 107 . Good-conduct credits, which are the subject of this appeal, are different from other diminution credits in that they are deducted “in advance from the inmate’s term of confinement, subject to the inmate’s future good conduct.” Art. 27, § 700(d) [now CS § 3-704(a) ]; see also Frost, 336 Md. at 128 , 647 A.2d at 107 . Prior to October 1, 1992, inmates, upon incarceration, were prospectively awarded five days of good-conduct credits for each month of their sentenced regardless of the nature of their sentence.

Md. Ann.Code Art. 27, § 700(d)(2) (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.) ]. Fields, 348 Md. at 261 , 703 A.2d at 175-76 . In 1992, Art. 27, § 700 [now CS § 3-701 et seq.] was amended by Ch. 588 of the Acts of 1992. Under the amendment and its current iteration (Art. 27, § 700(d)(3) and CS § 3-704(b)(l)(ii), respectively), inmates may be awarded now ten, rather than five, good-conduct credits per month.

If their term of confinement “includes a consecutive or concurrent sentence for a crime of violence ... or a crime of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing a controlled dangerous substance,” however, Art. 27, § 700(d)(2) (now CS § 3-704(b)(2)) limits their credits to five a month. At the Division’s behest, the Legislature limited the amendment’s impact, ¹⁷² making only those “ ‘terms of confinement imposed on or after October 1,1992’ ” eligible for the more favorable rate. Fields, 348 Md. at 262 , 703 A.2d at 176 (quoting Ch. 588 § 2 of the Acts of 1992). The amendment did not alter, however, the definition of the phrase “term of confinement.” It meant (and continues to mean) “the period from the first day of the sentence that begins first through the last day of the sentence that ends last----” CS § 3-701.

We recognized in Fields that, when it enacted the 1992 amendment, “it appears ... the Legislature gave little thought to the definition of ‘term of confinement’----” 348 Md. at 264 , 703 A.2d at 177 . The legislative history indicates only “that it was designed to ensure that inmates serving more than one sentence at a time [would] not receive good-conduct credits for more than one sentence.” Id. at 264-65 , 703 A.2d at 177 (citing legislative history of Ch. 354 of the Acts of 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although following the 1992 amendment the Legislature reorganized the Maryland Code, including re-organizing then-existing provisions of Article 27, into a new article entitled “Correctional Services,” the substantive import of the provisions relevant to our analysis did not change.

III

We turn now to a survey of our interpretation and application of CS §§ 3-701 and 3-704(b)(2) in the relevant line of cases. A. Fields Fields involved a defendant who was sentenced for daytime housebreaking and heroin possession in 1988. Before 1992, there was no difference in accrual rates for earning good-conduct credits—regardless of whether these offenses were non-violent and non-drug, a defendant received a maximum of five credits per month. Eventually, Fields earned release on mandatory supervision.

It was revoked, however, when ¹⁷³ Fields was convicted and sentenced in 1994 for theft and malicious destruction of property offenses. The effective date of the 1992 legislative changes notwithstanding, the Division prevented Fields from earning the new rate of ten credits a month against his post-1992 nonviolent, non-drug offenses (ie., theft and malicious destruction of property). The Division argued that the amendment’s favorable rate was reserved only for those “term[s] of confinement imposed on or after October 1, 1992.” See Fields, 348 Md. at 263 , 703 A.2d at 176 (referencing indirectly Ch. 588 § 2 of the Acts of 1992). Because Fields’s term of confinement began before 1992, the Division claimed he was ineligible for the higher rate.

Deeming the phrase “term of confinement” ambiguous, we found—“[i]n light of the legislative history of the 1992 amendment ... [and] the applicability of the rule of lenity”—that not “all sentences that overlap or run consecutively must aggregate for all purposes to a single term of confinement.” Fields, 348 Md. at 267-68 , 703 A.2d at 178 . B. Wickes The year following the filing of our opinion in Fields , we decided Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1 , 706 A.2d 608 (1998). Like Fields, Wickes was serving a pre-1992 sentence when he was released on mandatory supervision, only to be re-incarcerated for post-1992 offenses. Unlike Fields, however, Wickes’s pre-1992 sentence was for a violent crime (ie., rape).

In denying Wickes the more favorable good-conduct credit rate installed by the 1992 amendment, the Division did not rely upon the fact that Wickes’s term of confinement was imposed pre-1992, similar to the position it took in Fields . Rather, it stressed the fact that Wickes’s pre-1992 sentence was for a crime of violence. It combined Wickes’s pre- and post-1992 sentences into a single term of confinement under the aggregation principle of Art. 27, § 700(a). Then, it disallowed Wickes from earning the more favorable rate under the limiting provision in Art. 27 § 700(d)(2) (“inmatefs] whose term[s] of confinement inelude[ ] a ... sentence for ... a ¹⁷⁴ crime of violence____”).

Wickes, 349 Md. at 4 , 706 A.2d at 609 . We disagreed with the Division, holding that Wickes was entitled to receive the more favorable rate for his post-1992 non-violent, non-drug sentences. Once again, we rejected the principle that “ ‘all sentences that overlap or run consecutively must aggregate for all purposes to a single term of confinement.’ ” Wickes, 349 Md. at 9 , 706 A.2d at 612 (quoting Fields, 348 Md. at 267-68 , 703 A.2d at 178 ). C. Henderson Before Wickes was decided, the Division employed a unified approach to administering the good-conduct credits scheme.

Under this approach, all sentences aggregated for all purposes into a single term of confinement. In Wickes , we disapproved of this approach, stating definitively that “[w]here a defendant is released on mandatory supervision and later commits and is sentenced for a new crime ... the new sentence and the old sentence ... do not aggregate to form one term of confinement for the purpose of [Art. 27] § 700 [ (now CS § 3-704(b)(2)) ].” Wickes, 349 Md. at 9 , 706 A.2d at 612 (emphasis supplied). A few months after Wickes , this Court was compelled to confront, in Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438 , 718 A.2d 1150 (1998), its holding in Wickes . Based on Wickes , the Division re-evaluated (and re-calculated) the sentence and release dates for “about 2,000 inmates serving multiple sentences, one or more of which was imposed before a release on mandatory supervision or parole and one or more of which was imposed for conduct occurring while the inmate was on mandatory supervision or parole.” Henderson, 351 Md. at 446 , 718 A.2d at 1154 .

After disaggregating the multiple sentences into two terms of confinement—before and after the release of the prisoners on mandatory supervision or parole—the Division determined that approximately ninety inmates had been released prematurely because of erroneous calculations of good-conduct credits. It deemed these inmates “escaped prisoner[s].” Henderson, 351 Md. at 447 , 718 A.2d at 1155 . ¹⁷⁵ Henderson was one such prisoner. Originally, he was sentenced in 1975 for a conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon. Once paroled, he committed, and was convicted and sentenced for, a separate offense, possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute.

As both of his sentences—pre- and post-parole—were drug-related, he was “clearly ... not eligible for the ten days a month good conduct credit.” Henderson, 351 Md. at 446 , 718 A.2d at 1154 . The only saving grace of Henderson’s predicament, as it turned out, was the aggregation principle. If the two ineligible sentences were aggregated, to the surprise of many, he could be released from prison earlier. Had Wickes’s holding—that pre- and post-release sentences be disaggregated—been followed, it would have worked against Henderson’s interest.

We concluded—based on the plain meaning of the statute, in these circumstances—that the Division should have aggregated Henderson’s sentences into a single term of confinement, leading to the earlier release date. We explained that Wickes’s “expanded ‘holding’ ... was not necessary in order to reach the result in Wickes.” Henderson, 351 Md. at 451 , 718 A.2d at 1157 . Indeed, “all that we needed to say in Wickes ” and “all that we said in Fields ... was that all sentences that overlap or run consecutively do not need to aggregate for all purposes to a single term of confinement.’ ” Henderson, 351 Md. at 451-52 , 718 A.2d at 1157 . By enacting the diminution credit statute, the Legislature decided that qualifying prisoners should be accorded certain benefits.

In Fields and Wickes , “[aggregation ... [would have] denied [those] inmates a legislatively mandated benefit.” Henderson, 351 Md. at 452 , 718 A.2d at 1157 . In Henderson , we “learn[ed]” that disaggregation may cause the same denial. Henderson, 351 Md. at 451-52 , 718 A.2d at 1157 . With the benefit of hindsight, we should have relied, as we had in Fields , upon the legislative history and the rule of lenity, as these “would have dictated the same result in Wickes ... [and] Fields and also confined the [disaggregation approach] to those situations in which strict application of the ... definition of ‘term of confinement’ would preclude inmates ¹⁷⁶ from receiving the benefit of the 1992 [amendment]____” Henderson, 351 Md. at 445 , 718 A.2d at 1154 .

D. Hutchinson Just two years after Henderson , we decided the heretofore most recent diminution credit case decided by this Court, Hutchinson . Hutchinson was in and out of prison multiple times, beginning in 1970. Relevantly, in 1993, he was sentenced for a conviction of possession with intent to distribute heroin. Ultimately, he was released on mandatory supervision, but that relative freedom was short-lived.

In 1996, he was convicted and sentenced for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Hutchinson argued for aggregation, claiming that his multiple sentences, imposed both before and after mandatory supervision, should constitute a single term of confinement for purposes of the diminution credit statute. See Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 327-28 , 753 A.2d at 1028 . His aim was to earn greater credits against his old, disqualifying sentence.

See id. The Division disagreed, explaining that Hutchinson’s approach would lead to the absurd result of an inmate who commits a new crime and receives a new sentence while on mandatory supervision serving less time upon revocation of the mandatory supervision than an inmate who does not commit a new crime and receives no new sentence but whose mandatory supervision is revoked for other reasons. Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 328 , 753 A.2d at 1028 . The Division also relied upon the language of CS § 7-504(b) (now CS § 7-504(c)), which provided that “an inmate may not be awarded any new diminution credits after the inmate’s mandatory supervision has been revoked.” Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 327 , 753 A.2d at 1028 .

The Division maintained steadfastly that CS § 7-504(b) meant “diminution credits may be awarded against a new sentence, but not until the ‘old’ sentence has been fully served.” Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 327 , 753 A.2d at 1025 . ¹⁷⁷ We rejected both parties’ perspectives. Hutchinson’s approach did not prevail because, despite CS § 7—504(b)’s ambiguity, one thing was clear—the “General Assembly did not intend for there to be any future diminution credits applied against the sentence(s) the inmate was serving when placed on mandatory supervision.”