Stouffer v. Staton

ADKINS, J. This is another chapter in the “arcane” and evolving book of sentence aggregation disputes that have arisen since the Gen ⁵⁸⁸ eral Assembly created two different accrual rates for good conduct credits. 1 As a general rule, for non-violent and non-drug crimes committed after July 1, 1992, sentences accrue good conduct credits at the rate of ten per month; but sentences for certain violent and drug crimes accrue such credits at half that rate—only five per month. See Md.Code (1999, 2002 Cum.Supp.), § 3-704(b) of the Correctional Services Article. . In this episode, the Maryland Parole Commission revoked appellee Andre Staton’s mandatory supervision because he committed a violent crime, and Staton returned to prison to serve the remainder of his original sentences, along with a sentence for the new crime. The question we must answer is: what effect did revocation have on the good conduct credits that Staton accrued before he was released on mandatory supervision? 2 We know what the answer would be if Staton’s mandatory supervision had been revoked after June 1, 2002, because the legislature recently enacted new provisions in the mandatory supervision subtitle of the Correctional Services Article (“CS”).

As of June 1, 2002, such inmates may not use these “past” good conduct credits (i.e., credits that they accrued before being released on mandatory supervision) to reduce the ⁵⁸⁹ sentence they were serving on mandatory supervision. See CS § 7-502(c); § 7-504(c); 2002 Md. Laws, chs. 485, 486. But the answer is not so clear in Staton’s case, because his mandatory supervision was revoked in 1996. We shall hold that the statutory scheme in effect when Staton’s mandatory supervision was revoked created ambiguities that must be resolved in Staton’s favor under the rule of lenity.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS While serving sentences imposed in 1993 for non-violent crimes that accrued good conduct credits at the rate of ten per month, Staton earned 333 good conduct credits. The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) credited Staton -with those and other diminution credits. Staton was released on mandatory supervision on April 22, 1995. 3 His maximum expiration date for these sentences at the time of his release was August 16, 1996. While on mandatory supervision, Staton committed a violent crime—assault with intent to disable. 4 On May 29, 1996, Staton was sentenced to ten years for that new crime, with all but live years suspended.

The new sentence was to be served concurrently with Staton’s outstanding and unserved sentences, beginning on January 15, 1996. As a result of Staton’s new conviction, the Maryland Parole Commission revoked his mandatory supervision on June 11, 1996, and ordered Staton to serve the remainder of his original sentences. The parole commissioner allowed Staton 180 days of street time credit for the period he was on mandatory supervision and announced that he would “take 100” of Staton’s past good conduct credits that he had accrued ⁵⁹⁰ on the original sentences. The Parole Commission’s order did not indicate the number of good conduct credits from which the 100 credits would be subtracted.

On June 19, 1996, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City found that Staton had violated his probation in the cases for which he was originally sentenced. The court executed the previously suspended portion of those sentences, ordering Staton to serve four years and eight months, “consecutive to the last sentence to expire of all outstanding and unserved Maryland sentences.” The DOC recalculated Staton’s maximum expiration date as November 4, 2005. From that date, the DOC applied Staton’s good conduct credits, including his past credits. The DOC, however, recalculated and reduced Staton’s past credits because his new term of confinement included a crime of violence.

It halved the credits that. Staton had accrued on the T993 sentences, then subtracted the 100 days that the parole commissioner revoked. This reduction extended Staton’s incarceration by six months. Staton challenged the DOC’s rationale for recalculating his credits as precisely the type of “blind aggregation” of sentences that the Court of Appeals has disapproved in a series of decisions.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus against Warden J. Michael Stouffer, appellant, alleging that the reduction of his past good conduct credits violated his federal and Maryland constitutional rights. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted Staton’s petition, and ordered Staton’s immediate release from incarceration. Staton was released on the same day the order was entered. When the briefs in this appeal were filed, he remained conditionally free under the supervision of the Division of Parole and Probation.

Through Warden Stouffer, 5 the DOC asks us to reverse the habeas court. Renewing its single term of confinement ratio ⁵⁹¹ nale, the DOC argues that the court erred in holding that Staton was entitled to past good conduct credits that he accrued at the higher rate. DISCUSSION To resolve this appeal, we must examine the interplay between two subtitles in the Correctional Services Article— section 3-700 et seq., governing diminution credits, and section 7-500 et seq., governing mandatory supervision. Under the diminution credits subtitle, each inmate “is entitled to a diminution of the inmate’s term of confinement as provided under [the diminution credits] subtitle,” subject, however, “to § 3-711 ... and Title 7, Subtitle 5” of the Coirectional Services Article.

CS § 3-702. Once an inmate has accumulated enough good conduct and other diminution credits to earn entitlement to release, “the inmate is deemed released under ‘mandatory supervision.’ ” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 128 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994). Section 3-711 in the diminution credits subtitle specifically addresses what happens to an inmate’s past good conduct credits when he or she commits a new crime while on parole: If an inmate is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a crime committed while on parole and the parole is revoked, diminution credits that were awarded before the inmate’s release on parole may not be applied toward the inmate’s term of confinement on return to the [DOC]. In contrast, the mandatory supervision provisions now codified in Title 7, Subtitle 5 did not explicitly address the topic of past credits until very recently.

Inmates sentenced to serve more than 12 months are “grant[ed] a conditional release from confinement” once they have “served the term or terms, less diminution credit[s][.]” CS § 7-501. When released on mandatory supervision, they “remain[ ] in legal custody” until their “full term” expires. CS § 7-502(a). In addition, they are ⁵⁹² “subject to ... all laws, rules, regulations, and conditions that apply to parolees[.]” CS § 7-502(b).

The good conduct diminution credits with which we are concerned in this case accrue as a matter of law, rather than at the discretion of correctional authorities. See CS § 3-702, § 3-704. Good conduct credits are a behavioral incentive and a means of reducing prison overcrowding. See Md. House of Corr. v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 264 , 703 A.2d 167 (1997); Frost, 336 Md. at 139 , 647 A.2d 106 .

For those reasons, good conduct credits are applied as “a deduction in advance from the inmate’s term of confinement.” 6 CS § 3-704(a). From 1989 until 1999, revocation of mandatory supervision was governed by former Article 41 section 4-612 of the Maryland Code. In 1996, subsection (e) provided that “[t]he Parole Commissioner presiding may rescind all diminution credits previously earned on the sentence or any portion thereof in the revocation proceedings.” Md.Code (1957, 1993 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.), Art. 41 § 4-612(e). ⁵⁹³ During that same time period, in 1991, the General Assembly adopted the “term of confinement” concept as part of the diminution credits provisions, which at that time were in Article 27 section 700 of the Code. See 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 354.

See, e.g., Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Hutchinson, 359 Md. 320, 329 , 753 A.2d 1024 (2000) (reviewing legislative history of provisions relating to revocation of credits in conjunction with revocation of mandatory supervision); Frost, 336 Md. at 141-42 , 647 A.2d 106 (same). An inmate’s term of confinement is “the period from the first day of the sentence that begins first through the last day of the sentence that ends last[.]” CS § 3-701(2).

The reason for the change from calculating diminution credits against a sentence to calculating them against a term of confinement was “ ‘to ensure that inmates serving more than one sentence at a time [would] not receive good-conduct credits for more than one sentence.’ ” Fields, 348 Md. at 264-65 , 703 A.2d 167 . The next year, in 1992, the legislature created the rate differential for good conduct credits by amending Article 27. See Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr.

Servs. v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 451-52, 442 , 718 A.2d 1150 (1998). But no related changes were made to the language of Article 41 section 4-612(e) until 1999, when the new Correctional Services Article was enacted, and section 4-612(e) was recodified as CS section 7-504(a). See 1999 Md. Laws, ch. 54, § 1 (effective Oct. 1, 1999). The new mandatory supervision subtitle used the “term of confinement” concept for the first time, providing that “[t]he commissioner presiding at an individual’s mandatory supervision revocation hearing may revoke any or all of the diminution credits previously earned by the individual on the individual’s term of confinement.” See former Md.Code (1999), § 79-504(a) of the Correctional Services Article.

The Revisor’s Note stated that “[t]his section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 41, § 4-612(e)[.]” In 2002, the General Assembly substantively amended both section 7-504 and section 7-502 to extend the same prohibition against the use of past credits after revocation of parole under ⁵⁹⁴ section 3-711 to revocation of mandatory supervision. See 2002 Md. Laws, chs. 485, 486. We set forth current sections 7-502 and 7-504, with the provisions added by the 2002 amendment in boldface type: § 7-502. Legal custody.

(a) In general.—An individual on mandatory supervision remains in legal custody until the expiration of the individual’s full term. (b) Applicability of laws, rules, regulations, and conditions relating to parolees.—Am individual on mandatory supervision is subject to: (1) all laws, rules, regulations, and conditions that apply to parolees .... (c) Application for diminution credits.—If an inmate is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a violent crime committed while on mandatory supervision and the mandatory supervision is revoked, diminution credits that were awarded before the inmate’s release on mandatory supervision may not be applied toward the inmate’s term of confinement on return to the Division. § 7-504. Revocation of mandatory supervision; diminution credits.

(a) “Term of confinement” deñned.—In this section, “term of confinement” has the meaning stated in § 3-701 of this article. (b) Diminution credits previously awarded.—(1) ' The commissioner presiding at an individual’s mandatory supervision revocation hearing may revoke any or all of the diminution credits previously earned by the individual on the individual’s term of confinement. (2) Nothing in this section affects the prohibition against the application of diminution credits under § 7-502 of this subtitle to the term of confinement of an inmate convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a crime committed while on mandatory supervision. (c) New diminution credits prohibited.—After an inmate’s mandatory supervision has been revoked, the inmate may ⁵⁹⁵ not be awarded any new diminution credits on the term of confinement for which the inmate was on mandatory supervision.

For consistency, our discussion will refer to the subsections in sections 7-502 and 7-504 as they are currently numbered. The obvious effect of the 2002 amendments was to prohibit inmates who, like Staton, had their mandatory supervision revoked because they committed another crime while on mandatory supervision, from using any of the past diminution credits that they accrued before being released. But these new additions to sections 7-502 and 7-504 were not a part of the statutory scheme in 1996, when the Parole Commission revoked Staton’s mandatory supervision. And the DOC tacitly concedes that, under those prior provisions, Staton is entitled to at least half of the good conduct credits that he accrued before being released on mandatory supervision.

In the absence of explicit language authorizing the DOC to recalculate and reduce Staton’s past credits, the DOC relies on a strict application of the concept and definition of “term of confinement[.]” The DOC used the following formula to halve Staton’s past credits, on the theory that, under section 3-704, once Staton’s term of confinement included a violent crime sentence, his original sentences were no longer eligible for the higher ten credit per month rate: 333 GCC (credits Staton accrued before MSR) 4- 2 (divided by two, to adjust rate from 10 GCC/mo. to 5 GCC/mo.) = 167 (equals remaining credits) - 100 (minus credits revoked by MPC) = 67 (equals surviving credits) Staton believes that revocation had no effect on the past good conduct credits he accrued before mandatory release. His formula for calculating his surviving credits is therefore simple: 333 GCC (credits Staton accrued before MSR) - 100 GCC (minus credits revoked by MPC) = 233 GCC (equals surviving credits) In Staton’s view, the habeas court correctly determined that he was entitled to these credits because (1) the DOC had no ⁵⁹⁶ authority to alter the results of the Parole Commission’s decision regarding how many of his past credits to revoke, (2) the DOC cannot aggregate the original sentences with the new sentence due to the break in DOC custody while Staton was released on mandatory supervision, (3) the DOC’s new administrative interpretation of these statutory provisions violates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, and (4) the DOC’s interpretation of the diminution credits and mandatory supervision subtitles violates the rule of lenity. We found no reported decision addressing the past credits issue presented here—the effect of revoking mandatory supervision on credits that an inmate accrued before release under the statutory scheme that was in effect in 1996. But the Court of Appeals has considered the “single term of confinement” concept in several diminution credits disputes, and its resolution of those conflicts is instructive.

In Md. House of Corr. v. Fields, 348 Md. 245 , 703 A.2d 167 (1997), the Court resolved complaints by inmates whose terms of confinement included sentences imposed both before and after the legislature raised the monthly rate for good conduct credits from five to ten for certain crimes. The Court concluded that “it would be impossible to say that a single ‘term of confinement’ was imposed either before or after [the date of the rate change] because, in fact, ‘the term of confinement was imposed both before and after that date.’ ” Henderson, 351 Md. at 444 , 718 A.2d 1150 (quoting Fields, 348 Md. at 266 , 703 A.2d 167 ). As a result of the ambiguity in how to treat the inmates’ terms of confinement, the Court “invoke[d] the rule of lenity, requiring that the ambiguity be construed ‘against the state and in favor of the [inmate].’ ” Id. (quoting Fields, 348 Md. at 267 , 703 A.2d 167 ).

In Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1 , 706 A.2d 608 (1998), the Parole Commission revoked mandatory supervision after Wickes committed a new crime. Wickes complained that the DOC refused to recognize good conduct credits that he accrued at the higher rate because his term of confinement included a sentence that was not eligible for that higher rate. ⁵⁹⁷ As in Fields, the Court of Appeals relied on the rule of lenity in rejecting the DOC’s single term of confinement rationale for using the lower rate. See Henderson, 351 Md. at 451-52 , 718 A.2d 1150 . 7 The Court emphasized the ambiguity arising from the statutory provisions creating a single term of confinement and those creating the differentiated rate for good conduct credits. “[T]o the extent that the device of a single term of confinement would frustrate [the General Assembly’s] direction” that inmates accrue ten days per month for nonviolent, non-drug sentences imposed on or after October 1, 1992, “an ambiguity was created—an ambiguity that the rule of lenity required be resolved in favor of the inmate.” Id. In Henderson , the Court rejected the converse formula for calculating good conduct credits—that all sentences must be treated separately for purposes of accruing such credits.

See id. at 452 , 718 A.2d 1150 . The DOC had interpreted the Fields and Wiekes decisions as a mandate to calculate good conduct credits separately against each sentence. In Henderson’s case, the DOC’s recalculation resulted in the DOC reincarcerating him after he had been released on mandatory supervision. The Court of Appeals held that the DOC should not have done so, because aggregation of Henderson’s sentences, both of which accrued good conduct credits at the lower rate, was consistent with the legislative mandate.

See id. at 452-53, 718 A.2d 1150 . Thus, “Henderson’s reincarceration was unlawful because it was not authorized by statute, and he was entitled to be released for that reason.” Id. at 452 , 718 A.2d 1150 . In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the appellate mantra that governs every decision regarding whether the single term of confinement concept requires aggregation of sentences for purposes of calculating diminution credits: ⁵⁹⁸ [A]ll sentences that overlap or run consecutively do not need to aggregate “for all purposes to a single term of confinement.” Henderson, 351 Md. at 452 , 718 A.2d 1150 (quoting Fields Xitalics in Henderson ; bold added). In Sec’y of Pub.

Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Hutchinson, 359 Md. 320 , 753 A.2d 1024 (2000), the Court of Appeals resolved another single term of confinement argument in a case involving mandatory supervision. Hutchinson committed a drug offense while he was released on mandatory supervision. In 1996, the Parole Commission revoked his mandatory supervision and all of his past good conduct credits.

Hutchinson was returned to the DOC to serve the remainder of the sentence for which he had been released on mandatory supervision, as well as a new sentence. See id. at 323 , 753 A.2d 1024 . At that time, section 4—612(f) stated simply that inmates on mandatory supervision “may not earn any new diminution credits once the mandatory supervision has been revoked.” See former Md.Code (1957, 1993 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.), Art. 41 § 4-612(f); Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 322 , 753 A.2d 1024 . All agreed that this provision, and its successor at current CS § 7-504(c), “preclude[d] the award of any future diminution credits against the sentence(s) the inmate was serving when placed on mandatory supervision.” Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 327 , 753 A.2d 1024 . “The question [was] whether it also preclude[d] the award of [future] credits against any new sentence imposed” before the inmate completed the remainder of his original sentence.

Id. Hutchinson complained that the DOC was not crediting him with any new good conduct credits on his new sentence until he served his original sentence in full, thereby preventing him from accruing all of the credits to which he was entitled. See id. He “urge[d] that credits may be awarded against the new sentence from the time of its imposition.” Id.

Applying the statutory definition of “term of confinement” to current section 7-504(c), Hutchinson argued that his sentences were aggregated into a single term of confinement and he therefore ⁵⁹⁹ should be permitted to apply credits that were accruing against the new sentence to his term of confinement, “which would have the effect of applying them to the ‘old’ sentence as well.” Id. at 328 , 753 A.2d 1024 . This time the DOC opposed aggregating Hutchinson’s sentences into a single term of confinement for the purpose of calculating credits. It argued that Hutchinson’s strict application of the term of confinement concept to current section 7-504(c) “would lead to the absurd result of an inmate who .commits a new crime and receives a new sentence while on mandatory supervision serving less time upon revocation of the mandatory supervision than an inmate who does not commit a new crime and receives no new sentence but whose mandatory supervision is revoked for other reasons.” Id. The DOC posited that “diminition credits may be awarded against a new sentence, but not until the ‘old’ sentence has been fully served.” Id. at 327 , 753 A.2d 1024 .

The Court of Appeals rejected both approaches, in favor of an interpretation that was consistent with what it viewed as the legislature’s “abundantly clear” intent to prevent inmates from accruing any new diminution credits against the sentences they were serving when placed on mandatory supervision. See id. at 328-31 , 753 A.2d 1024 . The Court found a “common sense way” to read section 7-504(c) to carry out “the legislative intent without presenting the anomaly posited by the [DOC].” Id. Writing for the Court, Judge Wilner began by “noting the obvious” lack of any solution in the language of the Correctional Services Article: Neither § 7-504[e] nor any other statute that can be read in context with it clearly states, one way or the other, whether the prohibition applies to new sentences after an inmate is released on mandatory supervision.

The statute itself is silent in that regard. Id. at 328, 753 A.2d 1024 . Legislative history was similarly unenlightening. See id. ⁶⁰⁰ The Court turned instead to the contextual history of section 7-504 for clues to whether the legislature intended the interplay that Hutchinson envisioned between the term of confinement, diminution credit, and mandatory supervision provisions.

If there is an inference to be drawn, it would arise from reading former §§ 4-612(e) and (f)—current § 7-504[b] and [c] ... together, in light of the circumstances existing at the time of their enactment. Section 4-612(e)—current § 7-504[b}—permits the Parole Commission, upon revocation of mandatory supervision, to rescind all diminution credits previously earned, which can apply only to the sentence(s) being served when the inmate was placed on mandatory supervision. Section 4—612(f)—current § 7-504[c]—can then be read as complementing that provision by making clear that no new credits may be applied against that sentence. It is not always the case that there will be a new sentence, and it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature’s focus was only on the sentence still being served by the inmate while on mandatory supervision.

The penalty for