Styers v. Dickey

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole question presented in this case is whether Code (1965 Repl. Vol.) Art. 81, § 99A as enacted by Chapter 182 of the Acts of 1964 cures the failure, in a proceeding to foreclose the equity of redemption brought under Code (1965 Repl. Vol.) Art. 81, § 100 et seq., to name as a party defendant an owner at the time of an earlier tax sale.

It is undisputed that Colin Studds acquired the land here in question in 1892. The land was sold on March 5, 1917, to the County Commissioners of Prince George’s County for unpaid 1916 taxes assessed in the name of Studds. The parties have stipulated to the ratification by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of that sale. With the stipulation is filed a certified copy of the order ratifying the sale to the County Commissioners of Prince George’s County, ratification having taken place on February 28, 1919.

Thereafter pursuant to the law then in effect it was sold on September 22, 1919, to Pere Wil ⁵⁵⁴ mer. 1 The then treasurer of Prince George’s County conveyed the land to Wilmer by tax deed dated December, 1922. Certified copy of this deed was filed with the previously mentioned stipulation. This deed recites the earlier ratification. At the tax sale held on March 2, 1959, appellee (Dickey) bought the land which was at that time assessed in the name of Pere Wilmer.

Dickey brought suit to foreclose the equity of redemption. Code (1957) Art. 81, § 103 provides in pertinent part relative to such proceedings: “The defendants in any such proceeding shall be the following: “(a) The owner of the property as disclosed by a search of the land records of the county, of the records of the register of wills of the county, and of the records of any court of law or equity of the county.” A search of the land records disclosed Colin Studds as the owner of the property. Studds was not named as a defendant. In 1965 appellants (Styers) contracted to buy the land from Dickey.

When a title examination revealed that Colin Studds was not named as defendant in the above mentioned suit to foreclose the equity of redemption, Styers brought a suit for a declaratory decree to determine whether Dickey had a fee simple and marketable title to the land in question. Dickey relies on the provisions of Code (1965 Repl. Vol.) Art. 81, § 99A which states : “When any tax sale made prior to January 1, 1944, ⁵⁵⁵ has been finally ratified, then no court of equity or law in this State shall on and after June 1, 1966, entertain any proceedings to set aside or modify any title to any interest obtained in such sale.” The Styers bill of complaint was filed May 25, 1967. On motion for summary judgment the trial judge said in part: “I conclude by the clear language of § 99A that any interest of Studds in the lot was extinguished on June 1, 1966.

The obvious purpose of the legislative enactment was to foreclose by limitations proprietary interests in land sold at tax sales held prior to the effective date (January 1, 1944) of the present tax sale law. The reasons are many, not the least of which is the public interest in upholding the validity of tax sales, and assuring purchasers of a good title with a minimum of litigation. To hold otherwise would be to thwart the legislative intent and render the enactment meaningless. The defendant should have his title declared valid and unfettered by Studds’ ancient interest in the property.” We agree with Judge Powers.

Styers points to Code (1965 Repl. Vol.) Art. 81, § 113 which provides: “No application shall be thereafter entertained to reopen any final decree rendered under the provisions of this subtitle except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the conduct of the proceedings to foreclose,” and contends under the authority of Brashears v. Collison, 207 Md. 339 , 115 A. 2d 289 (1955), and Keefauver v. Richardson, 233 Md. 545 , 197 A. 2d 438 (1964) the trial court was in error. In Brashears residuary devisees under a will who acquired a remainder interest in property sold at tax sale were held to be necessary parties defendant in a foreclosure proceeding. This court held the failure to name them as defendants led to the conclusion that “[a]s to them the court w’as, therefore, with ⁵⁵⁶ out jurisdiction to pass the decree of foreclosure * * Id. at 348 .

In that case, however, in response to an argument with reference to laches this Court observed: “There is no statute which provides any limitation against the right of the owner to redeem his property.” (emphasis added) Id. at 354 . Appellants claim that Keefauver is authority for the proposition that once Dickey chose to foreclose the Studds’ equity of redemption the Studds’ right to redeem continues until finally barred by the Court’s decree of foreclosure. It is true that in Keefauver through Judge Marbury this Court said: