Subsequent Injury Fund v. State Roads Commission

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole question to be answered in this case is whether the Subsequent Injury Fund’s liability under Md. Code, Art. 101, § 66, may be satisfied and discharged pro tanto or in full when the employer furnishes a pension benefit to the claimant under the provisions of Md. Code, Art. 101, § 33. Factually, it will suffice to relate that the claimant, Edward F. Jarzynski, was an employee of the State of Maryland through the State Roads Commission and was injured in that capacity. Because of physical impairments from a prior disability, he was entitled to and received an award from the Subsequent Injury Fund pursuant to § 66, as well as from his employer, the State Roads Commission, through its insurer the State Accident Fund.

The Workmen’s Compensation Commission denied the State Accident Fund and the Subsequent Injury Fund the setoff to which the employers set forth in Md. Code, Art. .101, § 21 (a) (2) are entitled pursuant to § 33. 1 An appeal was taken to the Baltimore City Court which reversed that holding as to the State Accident Fund by granting summary judgment in favor of the employer and insurer against the claimant, relying on Nooe v. City of Baltimore, 28 Md. App. 348 and Mazor v. Dep’t of Correction, 30 Md. App. 394 . As to the Subsequent Injury Fund, however, the court denied its motion for summary judgment and granted claimant’s motion against the Fund. The court held that it was not the intention of the Legislature to include the Subsequent. Injury Fund “within the parameters [sic] of Article 101 § 33.” We do not agree.

On February 8, 1977 the Court of Appeals affirmed the ³⁵⁵ opinion written for us by Judge Menchine in Mazor, supra. Mazor v. Dep’t of Correction, 279 Md. 355 (1977). The Court, through Judge Levine, said, inter alia, that § 33 was constitutional and that the insurer, as distinguished from the employer, was also entitled to a discharge under that section. Although in footnote 8 of its opinion the Court expressly declined to decide the question of § 33’s applicability to the Subsequent Injury Fund because that issue was not properly before it, we find the reasoning of that case most persuasive that the Subsequent Injury Fund is entitled to the benefits of § 33.

Citing abundant authority which we shall omit, the Court set forth six principal guidelines of statutory interpretation: “[T]he cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain and carry out the real intention of the Legislature. . . . The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself. . . . And in construing a statute we accord the words their ordinary and natural signification. . . . If reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless. . . .

Similarly, wherever possible an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not lead to absurd consequences. . . . Moreover, if the statute is part of a general statutory scheme or system, the sections must be read together to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature.” Id., slip op. at 5. We will therefore look first at the words of the statute to glean the Legislature’s intention. The key words indicative of intent all appear in the same sentence.

First we look for what it is that will satisfy the obligation. Section 33 tells us: “the . . . benefits . . . furnished by the employer shall satisfy and discharge . . .” ³⁵⁶ the obligation. We know from § 66 (2) that the Subsequent Injury Fund is financed by payments from the employer or the employer’s insurer of 5% on all awards rendered against the employer for permanent disability and death. We will judicially notice (if common sense does not suffice to tell us) that any such payments by an insurer will be reflected in the premiums paid by the employer.

Thus the Fund is a benefit “furnished by the employer”. The Legislature’s use of that phrase in connection with the term “benefit” was obviously designed to avoid attempting to anticipate and list each benefit which is directly or indirectly derived from the employer and chance a restrictive interpretation by a court resorting to the rule of ejusdem generis. That conclusion is reemphasized by what we find the Legislature expressly stated is to be satisfied in the latter part of the relevant sentence in § 33 (c). We are told that the pension payments shall satisfy and discharge: “the liability or