Sullivan v. Sullivan

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. These appeals are from two orders of the chancellor in the same case. The first dismissed a husband’s bill for divorce on the ground of desertion and awarded the wife alimony of $250 a month. The second order awarded to the wife a counsel fee of $2,500 “as a contribution toward her solicitor’s fees.” It is conceded that the wife left the marital home on March 19, 1956, and never returned.

The chancellor found that her departure was justified by the husband’s misconduct, and although she did not file a cross-bill for divorce, he granted her alimony as prayed in the answer, upon a finding that she would have been entitled to a divorce, if prayed. The parties were married in 1952, and there were no children of the marriage. He was a wealthy business man who had been previously divorced. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 199 Md. 594 .

She had been employed in the office of Senator Carlson of Kansas before the marriage and continued the employment thereafter. The record presents the picture of a man addicted to alcohol, of a quarrelsome, overbearing and jealous disposition. Her testimony, which was fully corroborated, indicates that he repeatedly assaulted and beat her, on slight provocation, so that on numerous occasions she was compelled to flee from the home, or leave hotel rooms where they stayed. When intoxicated, as he frequently was, he also repeatedly called her vile and derogatory names, charging her with infidelity in the presence of guests and in public places.

The situation became so intolerable that on July 7, 1955, she fled from the home. On this occasion he used extreme physical violence against her, necessitating medical attention, and immersed her entire wardrobe in tubs of water. But on August 3, 1955, she returned upon his promise to reform. For a few months thereafter he was sober and contrite, having joined Alcoholics Anonymous and consulted a psychiatrist, but relapsed into his former habits.

In November, 1955, she was forced to leave their hotel room in Greenbay because of his intoxicated condition and threats of violence. On December 20, 1955, he humiliated her by making a scene in a restau ⁷⁷ rant where they were dining with friends, in the course of which he called her a “two-bit whore”, whom he had “picked up off the street”, and charged her with specific acts of infidelity. The same thing happened on February 8, 1956. She testified that these charges were wholly unfounded.

She testified that he also adopted a course of persecution, spying upon her, calling her office to ask “who she was out with”, and blackguarding her to her friends and associates. On March 18, 1956, she testified he followed her home from church. He denied this, and testified that they had marital relations that night. She did not specifically deny that they had marital relations that night.

She testified at one point that she had never refused to have intercourse with him, but she testified that she had become so nervous and fearful of him that she determined to leave the next day. She did not inform him of her decision, recalling his conduct when she had previously left the home. The next morning she moved out, taking her belongings with her. His course of persecution did not stop.

He wrote her numerous insulting letters, interspersed with protestations of affection and offers of gifts, and made almost daily calls to her office in which he addressed insulting remarks concerning her character and behavior to the telephone operators and her associates. Thereafter, he requested that she enter into a separation agreement, but upon her refusal, he filed suit for divorce. The chancellor properly stated the general rule that misconduct, although conditionally condoned, may be revived by subsequent misconduct. He found that the wife made reasonable efforts over a long period of time to save the marriage, and that his conduct was such that for her to continue to live with him would be definitely injurious to her health, safety and self-respect.

We cannot say that his findings were clearly wrong. The books are replete with cases in which unfounded charges of infidelity, especially when coupled with spying, public abuse and physical violence, have been held to entitle a wife to divorce, either on the ground of cruelty or of constructive desertion. In Silverberg v. Silverberg, 148 Md. 682, 691 , Judge Parke, for the Court, said: “No form of cruelty is so intolerable as to make a wanton and public ⁷⁸ charge of infidelity against a wife under circumstances which expose her to shame and contumely.” See also Poole v. Poole, 176 Md. 696 (unreported), 6 A. 2d 243, 245 ; Robertson v. Robertson, 187 Md. 560, 565 ; Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 202 Md. 375, 380 , and Pohzehl v. Pohzehl, 205 Md. 395, 407 . The appellant contends, however, that all of his acts of misconduct were condoned by her action in continuing sexual relations up to the time of her departure.

In Duckett v. Duckett, 143 Md. 551, 556 , Chief Judge Boyd, for the Court, said that “the rule is that sexual cohabitation after acts of cruelty cannot be considered as condonation in the sense in which it would be after an act of adultery. * * ■* It