Sumrall v. State of Maryland Central Collection Unit

MURPHY, Chief Judge. On August 21, 2001, in the Circuit Court for Somerset County, David A. Sumrall, appellant, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in which he sought the following relief: It is prayed this Honorable Court ORDER the Central Collections Unit for the State of Maryland to CEASE AND DESIST any and all attempts to collect the Criminal Restitution in Criminal case Sumrall v[.] State of Maryland CT 2394 as being unconstitutional. To Restore petitioners tax returns, and to completely leave petitioner alone in this matter, in the future. And or any other relief this Honorable Court may deem appropriate.

On March 6, 2002, the Honorable Daniel M. Long filed an Order that stated: Upon consideration of Defendant’s Answer to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, any response thereto, and upon finding that plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested in his Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, and that the referral of plaintiffs indebtedness under the December 7, 1981 order of the Circuit Court for Allegany County was proper, it is this 6th day of March, 2002 by the Circuit Court for Somerset County, Declared, Determined, and ORDERED that the relief requested in plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory Judgment is denied and this case is dismissed. This appeal followed. Appellant presented one question for our review, 1 which we have divided and rephrased as follows: ²⁹⁴ I. DOES ARTICLE 27 OF MARYLAND’S DECLARATION OF RIGHTS PROHIBIT A COURT FROM ORDERING A DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION AS PART OF HIS SENTENCE?

II

DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR WHEN IT DETERMINED APPELLANT’S RESTITUTION OBLIGATIONS WERE PROPERLY REFERRED TO MARYLAND’S CENTRAL COLLECTION UNIT FOR COLLECTION, AFTER APPELLANT STOPPED MAKING PAYMENTS TO THE DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION? For the reasons that follow, we shall answer “no” to each question above and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Factual Background On September 10, 1981, appellant entered pleas of guilty to two counts of assault with intent to murder. On December 7, 1981, he was sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections. 2 As part of appellant’s sentence, he was required to pay a total of $110,854.67 in restitution to his victims.

The judgment provided that, upon his release from confinement, appellant was obligated to make the restitution through the Division of Parole and Probation (“Division”). When appellant was paroled, he began to make payments in conformity with the judgment of the sentencing court. On July 15, 1997, however, appellant’s parole was revoked. Shortly thereafter, appellant stopped making restitution payments to the Division.

On July 23,1998, the Division referred the balance of appellant’s restitution obligation to the CCU. On August 29, 2000, the CCU sent a letter to appellant stating that his outstanding balance of restitution owed by him was $97,343.39, that a 17% collection fee (amounting to $16,548.37) was added to the original amount, and that the total amount of his restitution obligation was $113,891.76. ²⁹⁵ Discussion A declaratory judgment is one that declares the rights of the parties and does not necessarily involve executory process or coercive relief. Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 389 , 37 A.2d 880 (1944). The declaration of judgment in such a manner is within the sound discretion of the court.

Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406 , 347 A.2d 842 (1975); see also Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F.Supp. 304, 313 (D.Md.1995). The court is not required to enter a declaratory judgment in every case. Society of Am.

Foresters v. Renewable Natural Resources Found., 114 Md.App. 224, 238 , 689 A.2d 662 , (1997); Marriott Corp. v. Village Realty & Inv. Corp., 58 Md.App. 145, 153 , 472 A.2d 510 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 316 , 477 A.2d 1195 (1984). Md. Const, art. 27 (“Article 27”) provides “[t]hat no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.” According to appellant, this provision prohibits the CCU from attempting to collect his remaining restitution obligations. Although neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has interpreted this provision, we have the benefit of case law from other jurisdictions that have an identical or a very similar provision in their constitutions.

In Wellner v. Eckstein, 105 Minn. 444 , 117 N.W. 830 (1908), the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered the question of whether the children of a man who was murdered by his wife could claim an interest in real property owned by their father at the time of his death and thereafter sold by the widow-murderess following probate of the deceased’s estate. The Minnesota Constitution included a provision that “no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate,” and that provision was invoked in support of the proposition that the sale was valid. Without relying upon — or interpreting— that provision, a majority of the court held that the District Court for Nicollet County had ruled correctly in sustaining the purchaser’s demurrer to the children’s complaint. Justice Elliot, however, filed a dissenting opinion that included the following analysis: ²⁹⁶ The invocation on [the widow-murderess-seller’s] behalf of the constitutional provision that no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate rests upon a misapprehension of the scope and purpose of that provision.

It found its way into the federal constitution in connection with the punishment for treason. It was adopted in the constitutional convention with little discussion as a precautionary measure suggested by the history of the English law of treason. An early act of congress (section 24, c. 9, Acts 1790, 1 St. 117) made the prohibition general by providing that “no conviction or judgment for any of the offenses aforesaid, shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate.” Similar provisions are found in the constitution of several states. Stimson, Federal & State Constitutions, p. 182, note 6.

By the common law a person convicted of a felony was by operation of law placed in a state of attainder, which resulted in forfeiture of estate, corruption of blood, and civil death. This result followed, not from the commission of the crime, but as a result of the conviction thereof. The attainted person was not divested of his land until after [the person was convicted]. So, in the, case of goods and chattels, forfeiture had relation only to the time of conviction, and after the commission of a felony' and before conviction the guilty party could make a valid sale or assignment of his personal property.

These provisions abolish the common-law rule by which corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate resulted from the conviction of a felony. Corruption of blood rendered the felon incapable of inheriting or of transmitting property by inheritance. Forfeiture of estate transferred his property to the state. The heirs were thus deprived of their inheritance and the treasury enriched, and it was to prevent the manifest wrong and injustice to innocent persons which resulted from this doctrine that these constitutional provisions were adopted. 117 N.W. at 840 (citations omitted).

Seventy two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated: ²⁹⁷ Article III, § 3, c. 2 of the Constitution[ 3 ] was supplemented by the first congress, which enacted 1 Stat. 112 , 117 (1790), presently codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3563 . Currently, that sections reads: “No conviction or judgment shall work corruption of blood or ány forfeiture of estate.” ... Under early English law, the complete forfeiture of all real and personal property followed as a consequence of conviction of a felony or treason. In fact, the term “felony” was defined under English law as “an offense which occasions a total forfeiture of either lands or goods or both.” In addition, when convicted of treason or a felony, the defendant’s “blood was corrupted” so that nothing could pass by inheritance through his line.

This sweeping imposition of forfeiture, which disinherited men because they were kindred to felons, may not have been wholly irrational in a feudal society in which land and property were ultimately held through the crown, and the commission of a felony (particularly treason) constituted a serious breach of the original bond of allegiance to the king, the offender’s feudal lord, and to society. As English society changed, however, the broad forfeitures imposed at common law were modified by statute. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, it appears that forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood were still imposed in England for some of the more serious felonies and for treason. In 1814, the English Parliament abolished corruption of blood as a punishment for all felonies except murder (although forfeiture of estate for serious felonies seems to have survived for some time thereafter), and a statute limiting forfeiture for treason to the life of the offender was enacted in the early nineteenth century.

Forfeiture of estate found little favor in the American Colonies. Although forfeiture practices varied substantially from colony to colony, they were never as severe as those prevalent in England during the American colonial period. ²⁹⁸ In 1787, the imposition of forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood for treason was banned by the Constitution. Three years later, the first congress abolished that penalty for all ■ convictions and judgments. The legal significance of this historical background is that nothing contained therein suggests that either article III or the 1790 statute was intended to prohibit anything other than corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate as imposed at common law.

To the contrary, it is clear that both article III and the subsequent statute contemplated broad forfeitures incident to attainder as a traitor or felon, i.e., total disinheritance of one’s heirs or those who would be one’s heirs and forfeiture or all of one’s property and estate. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1037-39 (4th Cir. 1980). (citations omitted)(footnotes omitted). In State v. Young, 63 Wash.App. 324 , 818 P.2d 1375 (1991), the defendant was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide.

Id. at 325 , 818 P.2d 1375 . He was sentenced to serve twelve-months for each count in a work release program, and to pay restitution in the amount of $250 per month. Id. The defendant argued that this restitution obligation was unconstitutional under Article 1, section 15 of the Washington Constitution. 4 The Court of Appeals of Washington held that this argument had no merit, explaining: When the United States Constitution was being drafted, its framers wanted to limit the perpetual aspect of forfeitures for treason....

The framers’ intent was manifested in U.S. Const, art. 3, § 3, cl. 2. It provides: The congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attained.... Article 1, section 15 of the Washington Constitution is related to U.S. Const, art. 3, § 3, in that both deal with ²⁹⁹ forfeitures. Const, art. 1, § 15, however, prohibits more than just the perpetual aspect of forfeitures.

It provides: No conviction shall work corruption of blood, nor forfeiture of estate. Still, when construed in light of its common law history, Const, art. 1, § 15 only prohibits forfeiture of a convict’s estate on the ground that he or she is incapacitated from owning property