Sumwalt v. Ridgely

Cochran, J., delivered the opinion of this Court: This suit was brought to recover the amount of a promissory note made by Thomas S. Sumwalt, “Treas. of St.Stephen’s-Episcopal Church Fund.” The evidence contained in the 2nd exception shows, that the note in question was-drawn in- blank and given to J. W. Wilson & Co., in settlement of their account for materials furnished and work done for St. Stephen’s Church, and that afterwards, before its maturity, it was passed by Wilson to the appellee, with whom he had previously been in partnership, in settlement of a debt found to he due to him on their dissolution. It-also appears that the appellee received the note with full knowledge of the debt for which it was issued, and that he* afterwards inserted his own name as payee. The 1st exception, presenting substantially the' same1 questions as the appellant’s 1st and 3rd prayers,, was taken to the admission of the note in evidence, on the ground that it was not the appellant’s obligation, and for that reason did not support the declaration. The note on its face ¹¹⁴ purports to be an individual obligation founded on a! consideration expressed as moving to the maker, and the terms of the promise are not such as show with any sufficient degree of certainty that it was issued for the liability of any other party.

Looking at the note alone, without regard to other evidence in the case, the- appellant would undoubtedly be held liable for its payment. The-established rule seems to be, that an agent in making a-promise for a principal, is liable on the promise, unless it-be..expressed in terms which show that it urns made for and on behalf of the principal, and where an agent makes a promissory note to a third person in terms sufficient to' bind himself as principal, the mere addition of the word agent or other description of his office or capacity, to his signature, does not change or vary the legal effect of the promise itself. Story Prom. Notes, 67, 68, 69.

Byles on Pills, 27, note 1. We think, therefore, that the objection taken cannot be sustained, and that the note was properly admitted as evidence of the appellant’s liability. The 2nd exception appears to have been taken to* the admission of evidence showing that the note was drawn in blank, and passed by the witness Wilson to the appellee,, who afterwards inserted his own name as payee. It is to be observed that this evidence was offered after the appellant had proved, on the cross-examination of that witness, that the note was made and delivered to him in settlement of his account for the work done for St. Ste23hen’s Church.

The real objection to the evidence excepted to is, that its effect was to extend to the ap23ellee a 23i'otection or immunity from outstanding equities of the maker,- which,, as payee of the note, he was not entitled to claim.- Upon a consideration of the whole evidence contained in this exception,- we think the objection is more technical than substantial, for on thequoof that the note -was passed to and received by the appellee, with full knowledge on his part of the transaction in which it originated, he would of necessity take it subject to the equities and defences- of ¹¹⁵ the mater, even if he had taken the note by endorsement and held it as endorsee. The evidence objected to could not have the effect of relieving the note in his hands from the legal defences or the equities of the maker, nor give to him the rights that an endorsee would have had by receiving the note before maturity, without notice of such defences or equities. In our opinion the objection made to the admission of ibis evidence was properly overruled. The material questions in the case are presented by the 3rd bill of exceptions.

The evidence to which we have referred, shows that the note was issued by the appellant for a debt due by St. Step]ion’s Church for materials