Supermarkets General Corp. v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We hold that § 534 L and § 534 N of Article 27, Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) are constitutionally valid. The sections are two of the criminal statutes collected under the subtitle “Sabbath Breaking,” composed of §§ 492-534V, which are commonly known as Sunday Blue Laws or Sunday Closing Laws.

Section 534 L concerns Sunday activities in Baltimore County. Subject to exceptions specifically designated, subsection (a) prescribes that “it is unlawful on Sunday for any wholesale or retail establishment to conduct business for labor or profit in the usual manner and location or to operate its establishment in any manner for the general public. It ⁶¹⁴ shall not cause, direct, or authorize any employee or agent to engage in or conduct business on its behalf on Sunday.” Subsection (b) excepts (1) drug stores whose principal business is the sale of drugs and related items, (2) delicatessens, (3) bakeries, (4) gasoline stations, and (5) restaurants. Subsection (c) provides that nothing in the section shall apply to (1) farmers, (2) nurserymen, and (3) “Any business with not more than six (6) persons on any shift on Sunday.” Subsection (d) makes the section inapplicable “to any person who by reason of his religious conviction observes a day other than Sunday as his day of rest and actually refrains from labor or secular business on that day.” The term “a day other than Sunday” is defined as “any consecutive twenty-four hour period.” Any establishment which offers service as its primary business, subsection (e), and industries “where continuous processing or manufacturing is required by the very nature of the process involved,” subsection (f), are allowed to operate on Sunday, and subsection (g) permits all recreational activities, sports, and amusements on Sunday.

Subsection (h) expressly disclaims that the section amends any other provision of law with reference to prohibition of Sunday activities and specifically declares that the section shall not be construed so as to permit new or used car dealer to dispose of any motor vehicle. Subsection (i) authorizes the State’s Attorney of Baltimore County to petition the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to enjoin any violation. Subsection (j) makes any violation a misdemeanor and establishes fines as punishment upon conviction, except that no employee or agent who has been caused or directed by his employer to violate the provisions of the section may be fined. Section 534 N concerns Sunday activities in Anne Arundel and Calvert counties.

It tracks § 534 L with these differences: dealers in boats and boating equipment, and fishing equipment and supplies are added to the exempted businesses, subsection (b) 6; nothing in the section applies to any business with not more than eight persons on any one shift on a Sunday, subsection (c) 3; and the fines authorized upon conviction are different, subsection (j). ⁶¹⁵ I We are called upon to determine the constitutional validity of the two statutes by reason of the convictions of four retail sales establishments for committing misdemeanors proscribed by them. 1 Scott’s Corporation and Stewart and Company were charged with violating § 534 L by operating a business on Sunday in Baltimore County with more than six persons on a shift. Supermarkets General Corporation, trading as Hochschild Kohn Department Store, and Toys “R” Us, Inc., Store 511, were charged with violating § 534 N by operating a business in Anne Arundel County with more than eight persons on a shift. At separate trials in the District Court of Maryland, Scott’s and Stewart were found guilty and fined. Each noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

The cases were consolidated and tried de novo. The defendants were again convicted and fined. We granted their petitions for certiorari. At separate trials in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Hochschild Kohn and Toys were found guilty and fined.

Each noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari before decision by that court and consolidated all four cases. At each trial the contention that the statutes were unconstitutional was duly raised and rejected by the court. With respect to the constitutional issues, each of the appellants challenges the statute under which it was convicted on the grounds that it violates equal protection of the law and due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Maryland.

Toys also contends that the Sunday Blue Laws are laws respecting an establishment of religion prohibited by the First Amendment to the federal constitution and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Scott’s and Stewart ⁶¹⁶ further claim that § 534 L creates a monopoly in contravention of Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. II It is patent that the enactment of Sunday Closing Laws is an exercise of the State’s police power. Throughout this century and longer, both the federal and state governments have oriented their activities very largely toward improvement of the health, safety, recreation and general well-being of our citizens.

Numerous laws affecting public health, safety factors in industry, laws affecting hours and conditions of labor of women and children, week-end diversion at parks and beaches, and cultural activities of various kinds, now point the way toward the good life for all. Sunday Closing Laws, like those [of Maryland] have become part and parcel of this great governmental concern wholly apart from their original purposes or connotations. [McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-445 , 81 S. Ct. 1101 (1961).] 2 The basic rule . is that there is a presumption of the constitutional validity of statutes. We put it thus in Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422 , 384 A.2d 748 (1978): A statute enacted under the police power carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality and the party attacking it has the burden of affirmatively and clearly establishing its invalidity; a reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality is sufficient to sustain it____ In other words, the legislature is presumed to have acted within ⁶¹⁷ constitutional limits so that if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the constitutionality of the statute, the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the law must be assumed. [Id. at 427.] Accord: Condominium Owners v. Supervisor, 283 Md. 29 , 388 A.2d 116 (1978); Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 69-70 , 344 A.2d 422 (1975), quoting Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 , 553 n. 9, 74 S. Ct. 280 (1954). At the hub of appellants’ equal protection and due process contentions is that the exceptions of the various commodities, businesses and persons from the Sunday prohibitions are without rational and substantial relation to the object of the legislation and, therefore, are arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable.

The standards under which this proposition is to be evaluated with respect to equal protection have been often set forth, although no precise formula has been developed. It is that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.

A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. [McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425-426 .] This statement is in practical effect an iteration of the rational basis test used in equal protection analysis and the Supreme Court’s application of it to Sunday closing laws serves as clear indication that such laws do not involve a fundamental right nor do they operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. See Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 600-603 , 380 A.2d ⁶¹⁸ 1052 (1977), cert. denied, Maryland v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 997 (1978). The test for constitutionality under the due process clause is whether a statute, as an exercise of the state’s police power, bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this state. The exercise by the Legislature of the police power will not be interfered with unless it is shown to be exercised arbitrarily, oppressively or unreasonably. [Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 236 , 335 A.2d 679 (1975).] Thus, the companion contentions of equal protection and due process mesh.

There is no practical distinction between the grounds on which the two contentions are argued, and determination of one will resolve the other. The objective of the Maryland Sunday Closing Laws has been determined. In the McGowan decision of this Court, we said that the basic purpose of such statutes, with their exceptions, is the civil establishment and regulation of a day of rest from work____The legislative plan is plain. It is to compel a day of rest from work, permitting only activities which are necessary or recreational. [220 Md. at 122-123.] The Supreme Court of the United States accepted this Court’s determination that the statutes’ purpose and effect was “to set aside a day of rest and recreation.” McGowan, 366 U.S. at 449 .

In light of the objective of the legislation, we evaluate the constitutionality of the two practically identical statutes under the principles above set out. It would seem that the General Assembly could reasonably find that the exemption of the operation on Sunday of the specified establishments and businesses and the exceptions as to the designated classes of persons were necessary in the counties concerned, either for the health of the populace or for the enhancement ⁶¹⁹ of the recreational atmosphere of the day. The excepted retail establishments are all directly related to health or recreation. The rational basis for excepting industries where continuous processing or manufacturing is necessary by the very nature of the process involved, and for excepting farms and nurserymen whose chores must be performed seven days a week, needs no explication.

The limitation of the number of persons on a shift assures that a number of employees of large establishments will be afforded the day of rest sought by the laws. We see no invidious discrimination in § 534 L and § 534 N. Our view is supported by both our McGowan decision and its affirmation by the Supreme Court. In that case § 521, as then in effect, generally prohibiting retail sales on Sunday, excepted, as to Anne Arundel County, the sale of certain commodities, and the operation of specified businesses, including those with only one employee exclusive of the owner. The law was attacked on equal protection and due process grounds.

We recognized that “[t]here can be, and often are, sharp differences of opinion as to what is necessary and what is proper or preferred recreation, but the answers must be given by the legislature, and if they are not clearly arbitrary or oppressively discriminatory, the legislative choices must be sustained.” 220 Md. at 123. The Supreme Court agreed. It had no difficulty in finding a rational basis for the classifications. 366 U.S. at 425-428 . Cases of this Court since McGowan support our position.

In Richards Furniture v. Board, 233 Md. 249 , 196 A.2d 621 (1964) the attack on § 521 was renewed on equal protection and due process grounds because of an amendment which provided that “every market or department store in which stalls or departments are rented or concessions given to individual merchants or vendors shall be considered as one establishment.” We noted that McGowan found the basic portion of the act to be constitutional and believed that, with the amendment, it still conformed to the Maryland scheme. “The operation of large commercial markets or department stores on Sunday would materially interfere with the recreational atmosphere of the day, while small retail ⁶²⁰ operations will not. And we think the classifications prescribed by the Act are reasonable and proper and are not of an invidious nature,... being designed to prohibit on Sundays large commercial operations____” Id. at 263-264. In Rebe v. State’s Attorney, 262 Md. 350 , 277 A.2d 616 (1971) we considered the constitutional validity of § 534 H, as then in effect, which pertained to Prince George’s County. It was in substance the same as present §§ 534 L and 534 N and included as subsection (c) 3 the exemption of a “[s]mall business with not more than six (6) persons on any one shift with the exception of persons or retailers engaged in the sale of automobiles.” We relied on the constitutional principles enunciated in McGowan and Richards in concluding that the classification of § 534 H (c) 3 was reasonable and proper, not of an invidious nature, and well calculated to achieve the legislative purpose of providing a day of rest for working persons and an atmosphere of tranquility in which to enjoy it.

Id. at 358. We cited Rebe with approval in Giant of Md. v. State’s Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 517 , 298 A.2d 427 , appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 915 (1973). Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15 , 320 A.2d 266 (1974) dealt with § 534 J, as then in effect, relating to Sunday activities in Montgomery County, and which was similar to the sections now before us and to former § 534 H, the subject of Rebe . We disposed of the constitutional issue summarily with the assertion that “[provisions comparable to that contained in Section 534 J have consistently survived attack on constitutional grounds.” Id. at 20.

Appellants do not profess to quarrel with McGowan’s holdings. In oral argument before us they stated that it was important to emphasize what these appeals were not; they declared that the appeals were “not an attempt to reargue or overturn McGowan.” It seems that the appellants are content to consider McGowan as sound law with respect to the Blue Laws as they then existed. They urge, however, that McGowan was not dispositive of their equal protection, due process and establishment of religion issues at the time they were convicted because amendments subsequent to that decision had materially changed the Blue Laws with respect ⁶²¹ to many of the counties. They contend that they were denied equal protection and due process because the conduct for which they were found to be criminally liable in Baltimore County and Anne Arundel County is permitted as lawful in Montgomery, Prince George’s, Worcester and Dorchester counties.

They point to the great and ever increasing number of exceptions in the Blue Laws and suggest that the classifications now rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objectives, rendering the statutes arbitrary and capricious as having no rational basis. This notion is without merit. A comparable contention was presented in McGowan, namely that a statutory arrangement which permitted only certain Anne Arundel County retailers to sell specified merchandise was contrary to equal protection because it discriminated unreasonably against retailers in other Maryland counties. 366 U.S. at 427 . The Court, fully cognizant of the “myriad of exceptions for various counties, districts of counties, cities and towns throughout the State,” id. at 424 , commented in answer to the contention: But we have held that the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as such, rather than between areas and that territorial uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite.

With particular reference to the State of Maryland, we have noted that the prescription of different substantive offenses in different counties is generally a matter for legislative discretion. [Id. at 427.] It found “no invidious discrimination here.” Id. This view is buttressed by the realization that there is no doubt that Maryland could validly grant home rule to each of its 23 counties and to the City of Baltimore to determine the extent of Sunday closings by local option. 3 ***⁸ See Salsburg v. State of ⁶²² Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 552, 74 S. Ct. 280 (1954). It is true that with one exception, Maryland had not, in fact, granted home rule powers in regard to Sunday closings. We have found that the General Assembly did not include the enactment of Sunday Blue Laws in the Express Powers Act (Code, 1957,1973 Repl.

Vol., 1979 Cum. Supp.) Art. 25A, § 5, enacted pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment, Art. XI-A, Md. Const. The power has been granted specifically to only one home rule subdivision, the City of Baltimore, by Acts 1931, ch. 287. Steimel v. Board, 278 Md. 1, 10-11 , 357 A.2d 386 (1976).

Therefore, the matter of Sunday closings remains in the General Assembly. But, of course, it “may itself determine such an issue for each of its local subdivisions, having in mind the needs and desires of each.” Salsburg, 346 U.S. at 552 .