Supreme Conclave v. Miles

Jones, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: This suit was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City against the appellant, a Mutual Benefit Association, duly incorporated under the laws of Maryland, by one Nathan J. P. Tull to recover the amount of a benefit certificate issued by the said corporation to one Miles Tull, a son of the plaintiff, and made payable to the plaintiff. Pending the suit the said plaintiff died, and the appellees here, upon suggestion of his death, became parties plaintiff as administrators of his estate. The narr. in the case consisted of two counts, in each of which, after setting forth matter of inducement, it was alleged that the defendant made and delivered to said Miles Tull its certificate in writing and under seal by which it promised and bound itself to pay to the plaintiff out of its benefit fund, within sixty days from the receipt of satisfactory proof of death of the said Miles Tull, and upon the terms and conditions stated in said benefit certificate, the sum of five thousand dollars. It was then ⁶¹⁹ alleged that the said Miles Tull had died while a member in good standing of said corporation, and that proof of his said death had been furnished the defendant in accordance with the requirements of said benefit certificate, but the defendant had refused payment of the sum so agreed to be paid.

The defendant pleaded: ist, that it did not promise as alleged; 2nd, that it was not indebted as alleged; 3rd, that it did not make its certificate of insurance as alleged; 4th, that the death of said Miles Tull was “caused by one of the causes exempting said defendant from liability” ; 5th, that “said Miles Tull came to his death by a pistol shot deliberately aimed by his own hand, the manner of which death exempts the defendant” from liability under said benefit certificate ; 6th, that defendant never undertook by the said benefit certificate to pay the sum therein named to the beneficiary named, or to any one else upon the death of Miles Tull, if his “death was produced by his own unlawful act,” and that said Miles Tull came “to his death in an unlawful manner by his own hand,” and the defendant was therefore exempt from liability on account of said benefit certificate ; 7th, that defendant denied that it had promised and bound itself to make payment as alleged to the plaintiff, but that said promise was made upon the implied condition that the death of Miles Tull should result from causes which he could not control, and that his death was caused by his own deliberate, unlawful act, wherefore the defendant was released from every obligation on account of said benefit certificate, and the same was rendered null and void. The plaintiff joined issue on the first, second and third pleas, traversed the fourth plea, and replied to the fifth, sixth and seventh pleas that the defendant is a mutual benefit association incorporated under the laws of the State, the object and purpose of which is to “provide an endowment fund to be paid to the family or friends of a deceased member” ; that by the benefit certificate, the cause of action in the case, the defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $5,000 as stipulated therein ; that there is nothing ⁶²⁰ expressed in the certificate “whereby suicide or any other cause of death should exempt the defendant from liability” thereunder, and “there was -no implied condition that the said Miles Tull should come to his death from causes which he could not control, or that if he came to his death by his own unlawful act, the defendant should be released and exempted from liability” to the beneficiary named in the certificate, and “therefore the obligation or promise of the defendant was not rendered null and void by the manner in which the said Miles Tull is alleged to have come to his death.” The defendant joined issue upon the plaintiff's replications. No question was made upon the pleadings, and therefore they are not the subject of criticism here ; but they have been referred to because they make more distinct the propositions upon which the Court must pass in disposing of questions subsequently presented. The plaintiffs offered in the trial of the case proof of the benefit certificate declared upon in the narr. as the cause of action, the charter, constitution and by-laws of the defendant^ the application of Miles Tull for membership in the defendant corporation, proof of his death and of notice thereof sent to the defendant as required by its by-laws; and that at the time of his death he was a member of the defendant corporation in good standing as defined in said laws.

The defendant offered no evidence in denial or contradiction of that offered on the part of the plaintiff, but directed its proof to establish the averment of its pleas that Miles Tull had died by his own hand; and in that connection offered some evidence as tending to prove that he had made application for membership of the defendant corporation and become a member thereof, and obtained the benefit certificate therefrom upon which the suit was brought, with the intent to commit suicide. The plaintiffs offered evidence in rebuttal of this last mentioned evidence on the part of the defendant. It nowhere appeared in the evidence that there was any condition annexed to, or made a part of, the benefit certificate sued on here, either by its own terms, or by any express provision in the charter, ⁶²¹ constitution or by-laws of the defendant corporation, that suicide should exempt the defendant from liability thereunder; nor was there evidence going to show, and it is not claimed, that Miles Tull was not of sound mind at the time of his death. Upon this state of proof the Court below instructed the jury in substance on behalf of the plaintiffs that if they found the facts offered in evidence by the plaintiffs they were entitled to recover, notwithstanding they might find that Miles Tull committed suicide, unless they should believe that at the time he made application for the benefit certificate sued on he did so with the intention of committing suicide, and that the burden of proving such intention was upon the defendant.

The main contention in the case is in regard to the proposition of law so asserted. Before making further reference to the instructions of the Court, however, the exceptions appearing in the record will be reviewed in their order. There were three exceptions taken on the part of the defendant to the admissibility of testimony. The first of these was to the action of the Court in allowing the plaintiff to offer in evidence what is styled the preliminary application of Miles Tull to be admitted to membership in the defendant corporation.

This application does not conform to the requisites prescribed for an application for membership by the by-laws of the defendant, nor does it appear that authority is conferred upon a subordinate conclave of the order to prescribe any additional or different form of application from the one required in these by-laws. The offer of this preliminary application may therefore have been unnecessary, or of itself may not have been the proper evidence of application for membership. It is not perceived, however, how the defendant was injured by the admission of this evidence. It was followed up by the offer in evidence of the official and authorized application for membership upon which the member in question was admitted to the defendant order, and upon which the benefit certificate sued on was issued to him ; and the fact that Miles Tull made application in the prescribed form and thereupon became a ⁶²² member of the defendant corporation is not controverted.

Obviously, therefore, no injury was done to the defendant by admitting evidence of this preliminary application because the same was unnecessary or was not in the prescribed form. It was but cumulative testimony to an uncontroverted fact. Again this preliminary application was dated July 13th, 1898. It appears to have been received by the subordinate conclave of which the applicant became a member, and to which it was addressed on the 27th, of the same month.

The official application was dated August 1st, 1898, and on the 3rd of the same month the applicant was duly elected a member of the order. It was therefore a circumstance leading up to, connected with, and reflecting upon, the execution by. the applicant of the official application and his admission to membership of the order. At the time that this evidence was offered no question had been made in the cause as to Miles Tull having applied for the benefit certificate, which is the cause of action, with a view to suicide. As has been seen, this issue was not made in the pleadings.

But after this preliminary application had been admitted in evidence the defendant offered in evidence acts and declarations of the said applicant with the purpose of showing (and so tending) that the benefit certificate had been taken out by him with a view to suicide. These acts and declarations were all subsequent to the date of the official application. The facts in connection with the preliminary application thereupon became legitimate matter for the consideration of the jury, who were entitled to have all the facts and circumstances connected with the applicant’s becoming a member of the defendant corporation before them in passing upon this question of intention. This being so, the fact that it was introduced into the case at a time when the propriety or necessity for it had not become apparent worked no injury to the defendant.

The defendant cannot fairly claim, as was suggested on its behalf, that it was prejudiced by this evidence because of the terms of the instruction which has been referred to as granted on behalf of the plaintiffs, to the effect that the suicide of Miles Tull was not a bar to recovery by the plaintiffs in this ⁶²³ case unless the jury found “ that at the time ” he “ made application ” for the benefit certificate sued on “ he did so with the intention of committing suicide,” because the jury may have been misled thereby into believing that the intention to commit suicide must have antedated the preliminary application offered in evidence. It is not apparent how the jury could have been so misled. This preliminary application was not offered, and could hardly have been understood as having been offered, as the effective application in procuring the benefit certificate in question to be issued. The effective and official application was in evidence, and it was distinctly testified to before the jury that it was upon this last-mentioned application that the benefit certificate was issued.

The other was spoken of as a preliminary application, and was distinguished by the witness who produced it from the “ regular applications.” Upon this state of evidence before the jury it cannot be said that they were misled into supposing that the language of the instruction which has been quoted required them to have reference to the date of the preliminary application as the time, when the intention of the applicant to commit suicide, if they found such intention must necessarily have been formed. There is, therefore, no ground for reversal in the defendant’s first exception. The defendant’s second exception was to the ruling of the Court in admitting in evidence a letter written to N. J. P. Tull, the beneficiary named in the benefit certificate sued on, by the supreme secretary of the defendant order, and dated at the office of the supreme secretary in Baltimore, which acknowledged the receipt by the said secretaiy of “the official proof of death of Miles Tull,” and purported to be in reply to a letter of the said beneficiary. It is not necessary to notice this ground of exception further than to say that whatever view may be taken of the admissibility of the evidence excepted to the defendant was not injured by the action of the Court in admitting it.

The supreme secretary himself was the witness who identified and proved the letter. He, under the by-laws of the defendant, was the officer to whom the proofs of the ⁶²⁴ death of a member were to be transmitted. The letter was produced in connection with his oral testimony to the effect that he had with him the proofs of death of Miles Tull which he exhibited. No question seems ever to have been made of the fact of proof of death having been forwarded, or of its sufficiency under the by-laws of the defendant.

What possible harm therefore could the admission contained in the letter excepted to have done the defendant? This exception, therefore, cannot be sustained. The same is to be said of the third and last exception to testimony. This was taken to the ruling of the Court in allowing an inquiry by the plaintiffs of a witness offered by them in rebuttal as to the apparent condition of Miles Tull when seen by the witness the day before his death.

The defendant, with a view to showing that the said deceased when he made application to become a member of the defendant corporation, did so with the intention to commit suicide, had offered evidence of the acts, declarations and conduct of the deceased from the time of his making the application to the time of his death. The plaintiffs in rebuttal produced a witness who had seen and had opportunity to observe the acts and conduct of the deceased during the period covered by this testimony of the