Syme v. Marks Rentals, Inc.

BISHOP, Judge. Appellee, Marks Rentals, Inc. t/a Thrifty Rent-A-Car, (Marks Rentals) filed suit against appellant, Randal S. Syme, in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County, seeking recovery for damage to a Toyota Corolla that Marks Rentals rented to Syme. Syme requested a jury trial, and the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, where both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial judge granted Marks Rentals’ motion for summary judgment and denied the motion of Syme.

After a premature appeal was dismissed and Syme’s motion for reconsideration was denied, Syme filed this appeal, asking: I. Is the Physical Damage Waiver provision of a rental car contract voided by lessee’s unintentional violation of a traffic ordinance?

II

Is the language in the rental contract, restricting the Physical Damage Waiver, unconscionable so as to require judgment for Syme as a matter of law?

III

Is Marks Rentals's supporting affidavit so deficient as to require denial of its motion for summary judgment?

IV

Did Syme’s affidavit place material facts at issue so as to require denial of Marks Rentals’ summary judgment? FACTS On March 10, 1985, Randel S. Syme entered into a rental agreement with Marks Rentals for a 1984 Toyota Corolla. At that time, a rental agent of appellee reviewed the terms of the rental agreement and suggested that appellant purchase car “insurance”, to which the agreement referred as Physical Damage Waiver (PDW). According to the agent’s representations, the purchase of PDW would protect appel ²³⁷ lant from all liability resulting from “collision or upset” damage to the rental automobile.

Without the coverage under PDW, Syme remained personally liable for the first $1,500.00 of damage. Based on these representations, appellant purchased PDW for $6.95 per day with the expectation that his premium fully protected him from liability, even if his negligence or error was the cause of the property damage to the car. On March 13, 1985, while driving the rental car, Syme was involved in an accident at the intersection of Satyr Hill Road and Perring Parkway in Baltimore County. Pursuant to the investigation, the Baltimore County Police Department issued to appellant a traffic citation, which he elected to pay rather than contest in court.

Immediately after the accident, when appellant reported the accident by phone, appellee’s rental agent advised him to return the damaged vehicle and pick up a substitute rental car. Because he had purchased PDW, appellant was informed that Marks Rentals would not hold him accountable for the property damage to the rental car. On the next day, Syme and his brother Edmund Syme exchanged the damaged vehicle for another. At that time, Syme informed appellee’s agent that the police had issued him a traffic violation at the time of the accident.

The agent again informed appellant that he was not responsible for the property damage. Several months later, Marks Rentals requested appellant to make restitution for the property damage because Syme’s traffic violation voided his coverage under PDW. On November 12, 1985, Marks Rentals filed a complaint seeking $3,603.69 in damages. Summary Judgment The Maryland Rules provide that “[a]ny party may file at any time a motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to ²³⁸ judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2-501(a).

In interpreting the scope of this rule, courts in Maryland have admonished repeatedly that “the summary judgment procedure is not a substitute for a trial, but a means by which the trial court may determine, summarily, whether a trial is necessary.” Washington Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Development Company, Inc., 281 Md. 712, 716 , 382 A.2d 555 (1978); accord Coffey v. Derby Steel Company, 291 Md. 241, 247 , 434 A.2d 564 (1981); Metropolitan Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 28 , 415 A.2d 582 (1980); Peck v. Baltimore County, 286 Md. 368, 381 , 410 A.2d 7 (1979); Maloney v. Carling Breweries, Inc., 52 Md.App. 556, 560 , 451 A.2d 343 (1982); Egypt Farms v. Lepley, 49 Md.App. 171, 176 , 430 A.2d 122 (1981); Vanhook v. Merchants Insurance Company, 22 Md.App. 22, 25 , 321 A.2d 540 (1974). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must address two separate issues: whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(e). In resolving the first issue of whether a material fact remains in dispute, the Court of Appeals has indicated that the court must accord great deference to the opposing party against whom the motion for summary judgment has been filed.

First, the court should not attempt to resolve any issue of fact or of credibility of witnesses; the resolution of such matters should be left to the trier of fact. Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 325-26 , 389 A.2d 887 (1978); Wolfe v. Lamar & Wallace, Inc., 261 Md. 174, 177-78 , 274 A.2d 121 (1971); White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 279-80 , 123 A.2d 303 (1956). Second, the Court has embraced a broad interpretation of what constitutes a genuine dispute of fact to include disputes both over facts and factual inferences: even where the underlying facts are undisputed, if those facts are susceptible of more than one permissable infer ²³⁹ ence, the choice between those inferences should not be made as a matter of law, but should be submitted to the trier of fact. Fenwick Motor Company v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138 , 265 A.2d 256 (1970); accord McDonald v. Burgess, 254 Md. 452, 454 , 255 A.2d 299 (1969); Reeves v. Howar, 244 Md. 83, 90 , 222 A.2d 697 (1966).

And finally, the court must resolve all inferences against the party who seeks the disposition of the case on summary judgment. Honaker v. W. C. & A.N. Miller Development Company, 285 Md. 216, 231 , 401 A.2d 1013 (1979); McDonald v. Burgess, 254 Md. 452, 454 , 255 A.2d 299 (1969). Even under this deferential standard, we conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that no genuine dispute existed as to the material facts in the instant case. In particular, the parties are in agreement that they entered into a rental agreement; that Syme opted for PDW coverage; that the police issued a traffic citation to Syme at the time of the accident; and even that an agent for Marks Rentals made oral representations to Syme that the purchase of PDW coverage insured Syme against liability for damages to the rental automobile, regardless of fault.

The outcome of this case thus turns on the second issue, i.e. whether the contract language in the rental agreement was so unambiguous that the trial court could rule as a matter of law in favor of the moving party. To resolve this issue, we must examine the relevant language in the rental agreement. Paragraph 14 of the agreement indicates that coverage under PDW is not absolute, but is subject to conditions of paragraph 11. Paragraph 14 provides in pertinent part: Responsibility for Damages.

I am responsible and will pay you for all loss of and damage to the vehicle regardless of who is at fault. Only if the vehicle is operated in accordance with all of the provisions of Paragraph 11, my responsibility for Collision or upset damages shall: ²⁴⁰ (a) Not exceed the amount shown in the area labeled “Physical Damage Responsibility”, on Page 2, if I initialed the box labeled “I do not accept” at the time of the rental. (b) Zero if I initialed the box labeled “I accept” in the area labeled “Physical Damage Responsibility” at the time I rented the vehicle and agreed to pay the additional charge____ Only if the vehicle is operated in accordance with all the provisions of Paragraph 11, I will not be liable for accidental loss or damage ... that are normally covered by comprehensive physical damage insurance policy. From the plain meaning of this language, the import is clear and unambiguous: if the renter accepts and pays for PDW, the liability for damage is waived, provided that the renter operates the vehicle in accordance with all of the provisions of paragraph 11.

Appellee contends that appellant violated paragraph 11(f), which provides that PDW coverage becomes invalid if the operator uses the rental car “for any illegal purpose.” The point of contention between