Talbott v. Suit

Bryan, J., after stating the case as above, delivered the-opinion of the Court. The bankrupt law is set, forth in the Bevised Code of the United States. By sec. 5119 of this Code it is provided that, subject to certain limitations which are not now im ⁴⁴⁶ question, a discharge in bankruptcy shall release the bankrupt from all debts, claims, liabilities and demands which were or might have been proved against his estate in bankruptcy. A creditor whose name 'is omitted from the schedule may, nevertheless, prove his debt and is, therefore, barred by the discharge.

This question has been so ruled in a great number of cases, as may be seen in the notes to this section of the statute in Bump’s Bankruptcy. It is, however, provided in sec. 5110 that a discharge shall not be valid in either of the ten cases therein specified. One of these excepted cases is where the bankrupt has wilfully sworn falsely in his affidavit annexed to his petition, schedule or inventory in relation to any material fact. In ■sec. 5120, it is provided that any creditor who has a provable debt may at any time within two years after the discharge, contest its validity on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained.

He must apply to the Court which granted it, and set forth in his application the grounds of avoidance ; and if the Court finds that the alleged fraudulent acts are proved, and that the creditor had no knowledge of them until after the granting of the discharge, then it must be annulled; but otherwise its validity is to remain unaffected. Independently of the general rule that a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally impeached in another Court, it seems clear that Congress intended by this section to designate the rhode by which the discharge might be impeached, and to exclude all other modes. Its authority over the subject of bankruptcies, and everything connected with obtaining, authenticating and invalidating a discharge is confessedly paramount. Not to dwell on the manifest propriety and convenience of appointing a special tribunal where the validity of the discharge might be decided once for all, and the great hardship and injustice of requiring the bankrupt to meet and contest allegations in every Court where his discharge should be pleaded, with the probability of con ⁴⁴⁷ flicting decisions in different Courts, it maybe sufficient do say, that the authorities are quite uniform in maintaining the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankrnpt Court on this question.

Many of them are collected in the notes on this section in Bump’s Bankruptcy. It, therefore, seems to us that on the supposition that the claim sued on was a provable debt, it was absolutely barred by the defendant’s discharge, and that the Court’s ruling was unduly favorable to the plaintiffs. The remaining question is whether this claim is a provable debt. If the bankrupt was