Tarachanskaya v. Volodarsky

DAVIS, J. Kira Tarachanskaya, appellant, files this appeal challenging the Judgment Order and reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order rendered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in which the court awarded sole legal and physical custody to appellant of parties’ minor daughter, Greta, and ordered that the child’s father, appellee Mikhail Volodarksy, have no visitation but could visit with his daughter in “a structured, therapeutic setting.” Appellant presents the following questions for our review: I. Based on the credibility and overwhelming weight of the evidence presented at trial, the Trial Court had reasonable grounds to believe that the child, Greta, had been sexually abused by her father and therefore did the Trial Court commit a reversible error of law by failing to make findings pursuant to Section 9-101 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Annotated Code?

II

Did the Trial Court commit a reversible error of law by failing to specifically determine whether abuse was likely to occur if visitation rights were granted to the father?

III

Did the Trial Court commit a reversible error of law by ordering visitation between the minor child and her father without specifying the conditions that would suffi ⁵⁹² ciently assure the safety and the physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the child?

IV

Did the Trial Court commit a reversible error of law by considering testimony and evidence from prior hearings and/or proceedings as well as prior actions of the parties, not admitted as evidence at Trial, in rendering her findings and conclusions at Trial? V. Did the Trial Court commit a reversible error of law by improperly delegating judicial authority to the child’s therapist to determine the visitation parameters for the father and minor child? FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1 Appellant and appellee filed petitions in the circuit court with regard to custody and visitation of their daughter, Greta, age 7, born on January 7, 1999. The court conducted a trial on the merits on February 1-3, March 14 and 15 and May 10 of 2005 and heard testimony in reference to appellee’s Motion for Change of Custody and appellant’s Complaint for Modification of Visitation.

Appellant arrived in the United States in August of 1996 and separated from her husband, Alex Tarachanskaya, in November of 1997, claiming Tarachanskaya was abusive toward her and their son. In March of 1998, appellant and her son moved in with appellee, after which she became pregnant with Greta. Soon after Greta’s birth in January of 1999, appellant reconciled with her husband. The Tarachanskaya household consisted of appellant, her husband, their son Arthur and Greta.

As the trial judge explained, “[t]his case has been specially assigned to me since the first hearings in September 1999” and, the parties’ “cross-petitions are the latest in [a] series of disputes between these parents that have spanned the life of their minor child.” 2 ⁵⁹⁴ The issue presented to the court that was the genesis of the custody and visitation petitions filed in May of 2002 involved cross-allegations of abuse concerning Greta. Appellee alleged that Greta had been sexually abused by Tarachanskaya, while appellant claimed appellee had sexually abused Greta. Appel ⁵⁹⁵ lant had suspended all visitation between appellee and Greta at that time. In its Memorandum Opinion, the court then explained: Contempt proceedings occurred on June 27, 2002.

By that time the Child Protective Services investigations of both sexual abuse referrals were complete. The report of abuse by Mr. Tarachanskaya was ruled out,[ 3 ] and that by [appellee] was deemed unsubstantiated.[ 4 ] Notably, the letter to [appellant] reporting these results stated: “It is my strong recommendation that Greta be appointed her own legal counsel. The repeated allegations of abuse and neglect being made by yourself and [appellee] are clearly not in the best interest of Greta.” Following a hearing On [sic] June 27, 2002, [appellant] was again found in contempt of the visitation order. However pending the modification hearings, overnight visits between [appellee] and Greta were temporarily suspended, ⁵⁹⁶ and a female was required to be present at visits, in an effort to reduce the level of distrust and concern, and to eliminate the potential for unsubstantiated claims.

A referral order for counseling services for the child was entered, along with a referral for psychiatric evaluations of both parents by the Office of the Court Psychiatrist. A report of the psychiatric evaluations was forwarded to the Court on November 21, 2002. The evaluation noted there was nothing in [appellee’s] history to question his fitness as a parent. Similarly, there was no evidence of significant psychopathology to warrant individualized treatment.

The psychological assessment did identify slight depression, and somewhat obsessive qualities, noting [appellee] appeared quite guarded and helpless. As to [appellant], the evaluation noted that she has “little insight into her part in the current situation. She sees all of the difficulties as related to [appellee].” The psychological report by Dr. Manne described her as “ relatively manipulative” in order to get her own way, but also noted that she did not demonstrate any significant psychopathology. There was nothing to suggest that [appellant] was unfit, although the report did note that she “does appear to be manipulative to get her own way, particularly when she interprets a threat to her children.” Overall, the report of the Court Psychiatrist noted: It is clear from the history that [appellant’s] use of the Courts will continue.

It is our opinion that this behavior is detrimental to the child. (For example, both parents are now videotaping their interactions with Greta to serve as “proof’ of what is going on). Because of this, it is our recommendation that the child’s attorney evaluate all claims made by either parent and decide if in fact the child’s best interests are being compromised, at which point Court involvement would be appropriate. The report further recommended joint counseling services for the parents. ⁵⁹⁷ While abuse issues were still being alleged, counsel for Greta attempted to obtain an independent assessment and counseling for the child.

That process was complicated by the fact that Greta, then three, did not speak English. An interim custody and visitation arrangement was negotiated between the parties, through counsel, and confirmed on November 22, 2002. Pursuant to that agreement, overnight visitation for [appellee] was to resume, and the parents were to begin Joint Parenting counseling with Jewish Family Services. The parties agreed to stop taping their interactions with the child, and further agreed to enroll Greta in a pre-school program so she could begin to learn English by January 1, 2003.

Trial was postponed until May 2003 to allow these services to begin, and to complete an evaluation of the child. * * * [Appellant] appeared on the first day of trial without counsel. Following a chambers conference, and as trial was about to proceed, [appellant] left the building. Thus the trial proceeded in her absence. The Court heard testimony from Dr. Robert Snow, who had conducted an evaluation and counseling at the request of the child’s counsel.

The Court also received input from the child’s counsel. Thereafter, custody and visitation were modified, by Order dated June 6, 2003, with legal custody awarded to [appellee]. Physical custody was to be split on a 4/3 schedule, alternating weeks, with a shared holiday schedule. Counseling for the parents was to be arranged through Dr. Snow.

Almost immediately after the modified custody Order was entered, [appellant] appeared in District Court for Baltimore County in Catonsville and filed an Ex Parte Domestic Violence Petition seeking relief on behalf of her daughter, based upon allegations of sexual abuse by [appellee]. A Temporary Protective Order was entered, and the matter was again referred to the Department of Social Services for investigation. Interim custody was awarded to [appellant] and a no contact order was entered by the District Court with respect to [appellee]. ⁵⁹⁸ A Joint Motion was filed by the child’s counsel and [appellee] to remove the domestic violence case to the Circuit Court, which was granted. The Protective Order was then also specially assigned to me, and was set for hearing.

(Case No. 03-C-03-06567). Substitute counsel entered an appearance for [appellant] on June 13, 2003, and the Protective Order hearing was held on June 18, 2003. After hearing testimony from [appellant] and a witness, and from witnesses from the Child Protection Unit of the Baltimore County Department of Social Services and the Baltimore County Police Department, the Court denied the Protective Order. Visitation continued in accordance with the established schedule until March 15, 2004.

At that point, [appellant] filed another Petition for Relief from Domestic Violence, alleging sexual abuse of Greta by [appellee]. Although the child had been continuously represented by counsel since July 2002, and [appellee] also had counsel of record, the first notice to either was receipt of the Interim Protective Order signed by Judge Michael J. Pinifter. Thereafter, these proceedings were again transferred to me. As with the June 2003 Protective Order proceedings, the abuse allegations were essentially the same allegations raised in the past.

The significant difference, however, was that Greta was older, her English language skills had developed, and the disclosures had become much more graphic and detailed. The other significant difference was that [appellant’s] new counsel had consulted with Joyanna Silberg, Ph.D. concerning his client’s ongoing complaints of child sexual abuse. ... At counsel’s request, she interviewed [appellant] and conducted a review of various reports and court documents. Based upon the information available to her, Dr. Silberg authored a report indicating that the question of whether Greta is a victim of ongoing abuse had not yet been successfully addressed.

As Dr. Silberg stated: [I]n my professional opinion based on years of involvement in cases like this, it is simply impossible to explain ⁵⁹⁹ the level of symptoms that Greta is suffering from, her repeated disclosures to multiple professionals and family members as documented in the records I reviewed, without being very very alarmed at the possibility that this child is seriously at risk of abuse with the current arrangement. Accordingly, Dr. Silberg recommended an immediate cessation of visits with Mr. Volodarsky, psychotherapy for Greta, and a thorough reassessment of the sexual abuse allegations. The Protective Order hearing was scheduled before me on March 29, 2004, at which point all parties, through counsel, agreed that Greta would commence with regular psychotherapy sessions with Dr. Snow, that Dr. Silberg would conduct a separate evaluation of the sexual abuse allegations, and that visitation would continue pursuant to the June 2003 Order. At the initial assessment meeting with Greta, she made more graphic sexual disclosures.

Greta also exhibited significant distress whenever in her father’s presence, in sharp contrast to prior behavior. Thereafter, [appellant] sought to suspend all visitation, based upon the recommendation of Drs. Silberg and Snow, and that request was set for an emergency hearing. The day before that hearing, [appellee’s] counsel agreed to suspend visitation voluntarily, based upon the recommendations of the therapists, until the sexual abuse investigation was completed.

It was contemplated that the investigative process would be relatively brief. Ultimately, Dr. Silberg completed her investigation and finalized a report dated July 24, 2004, which was circulated to parties and counsel shortly thereafter. That report detailed numerous, explicit disclosures by Greta of sexual abuse by her father and concluded that Greta is very frightened of her father. It also concluded that the nature and details of the child’s disclosures were “so vivid and accurate that only real experience could produce these reports.” Accordingly, Dr. Silberg recommended that Greta have no ongoing contact with her father, that she have ⁶⁰⁰ ongoing therapy, and that reunification occur only under a highly structured process to ensure that the child is and feels safe in his presence.

After receiving the report, the Court conducted a follow up hearing concerning interim visitation. As a result, Greta was placed temporarily in her mother’s physical custody, with a requirement that she remain in regular, ongoing counseling. No visitation between Greta and her father was to occur, pending trial on the merits. Dr. Silberg’s report and conclusions concerning abuse were forwarded to the Baltimore County Department of Social Services in October 2004, prompting a new investigation by the Family Crimes Unit which assigned Rosalind Dizard, LCSW.

Ms. Dizard had not been involved in any of the prior abuse investigations concerning these parties. Ms. Dizard conducted an investigation, including an unscheduled interview with the child at her school on Monday, October 25, 2004. Follow-up interviews were conducted with counsel and the parties. Ultimately, Ms. Dizard finalized a report dated January 4, 2005, in which she concluded that the allegations of sexual abuse by [appellee] were “ruled out” as defined in COMAR 07.02.07.12 to mean “there is no credible evidence of an incident involving sexual molestation or exploitation having occurred.” Rather, Ms. Dizard concluded that “parental alienation is the primary dynamic within this family system and that it is more likely that she was not sexually abused by [appellee].” The court heard evidence adduced at trial mainly from the evaluations and opinions of Dr. Silberg, Dr. Snow and Dizard, as well as testimony from appellee.

Upon considering the evidence, the court found the following in its Memorandum Opinion: It is difficult to reconcile the conflicting opinion of the experts. All are experienced and credible, and gave careful consideration to difficult evidence. Overall, the Court is persuaded that this child has been exposed to sexual behavior. The Court is not, however, convinced by a preponder ⁶⁰¹ anee of the evidence that Greta has been a victim of sexual abuse, or that her father has perpetrated sexual abuse.

This child has been enmeshed in high levels of parental conflict since the day she was born. Conflicting allegations of abuse, both physical and sexual, have been made by both parents. From the earliest assessments, professionals have noted the need to de-escalate the parental conflict and avoid immersing the child in loyalty conflicts, but that never occurred. It is noteworthy in the history that the significant and detailed abuse allegations occurred after the 2003 change in custody.

They were accompanied by the child’s expressions of fear of losing her mother, rather than concerns relating to continued abuse by her father. Once the child made disclosures,[ 5 ] there was an immediate alliance with her mother, to the complete exclusion of her father, in sharp contrast to what occurred before. ⁶⁰² Another fact that I find persuasive is that the initial abuse claims, however unfounded, were made by [appellee] against Mr. Tarachanskaya. It is inconceivable to me that he would initiate a sexual buse investigation at a time when he himself was sexually abusing this child. Another factor that weighs in my conclusion is the lack of documented symptomology that the child has been a victim of abuse.

Although the symptoms that a child might experience after victimization can range significantly, none are clearly or independently documented in this child. In fact, other than the expressed fear of her father which began only after the child made graphic disclosures, [appellant] is the only person who relays concerns of other symptoms. It would appear that Greta is generally a happy, well-adjusted child. At no time in this process has she demonstrated any difficulties at school.

Teachers and independent observers have not noted any unusual behaviors or preoccupations. Until 2004, the child did not apparently exhibit any problematic behaviors in her father’s care. Rather, the tensions occurred during transitions, which became increasing [sic] tense and difficult. Quite frankly, this escalation in tension when caught between her parents is something that has been building, and that every expert that evaluated this case in early years noted to be a cause for concern.

Once this hit a breaking point, the dramatic and absolute shift in loyalties to her mother, to the complete exclusion of her father, is quite telling. Dr. Silberg clearly found [appellant] to be a credible source of information, motivated only by concerns for protection of her child. However over the course of the past nearly six years of these proceedings, there have been numerous occasions when I have found [appellant’s] fears and projections to be without basis, particularly in the very early years of these proceedings. The underlying conflict between these parents is longstanding, and for [appellant], it is exacerbated by the tension that also exists between her husband and [appellee]. [Appellee] has clearly aggravated this tension by his own behaviors which, at times, have been manipulative. [Appel ⁶⁰³ lant’s] life would be greatly simplified if [appellee] simply was not part of the picture.

However well-intended she may be as a parent, this has colored her behavior and, in my judgment, her perceptions throughout Greta’s life. I do not find or believe that [appellant] consciously coached the child to fabricate abuse allegations, or that she purposefully set out to create this serious of a rift. I do believe that both parents have contributed to the atmosphere of distrust and tension, to the detriment of their child. Both have demonstrated a lack of insight into their own roles in this deterioration.

The other significant factor is the lack of detail in disclosures made to Dr. Dizard [sic], once Greta had been removed from the tension between her parents for some period of time. The inconsistency in detail is another factor that, in my judgment, undermines the believability of the allegations. For all those reasons, I simply do not find, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that [appellee] has sexually abused his daughter. Regardless of the findings on the abuse, we still have a child who is, at present, totally alienated from her father.

As a result of the breakdown of the parental relationship between Greta and her father, there is a material change in circumstances. It is clear that the parents are unable to communicate or reach shared decisions in any respect, so joint custody is not an option. Accordingly, I find it is in Greta’s best interest to place her in the legal and physical custody of her mother, [appellant]. However it is imperative that this child remain in therapy, and that such therapy include a plan for reunification services to repair the damage to the child’s relationship with her father.

This must be addressed in a therapeutic setting. The schedule for ongoing therapy shall be provided to [appellee] and his counsel, and to Greta’s counsel. Further, the child’s therapist must be asked to provide recommendations for reunification services, to include ongoing family therapy with Greta and each of her parents. Visitation between Greta and her father is ⁶⁰⁴ to occur only in a structured, therapeutic setting at present, and will be reassessed upon progress in therapy.

In a separate Order, the court directed that Greta be placed in the legal and physical custody of appellant and that Greta continue with regular therapy sessions. The court stated that “[t]he therapist shall be asked to provide a plan for reunification services to repair the damage to the child’s relationship with her father____” Appellee was to have no visitation with Greta but was “permitted to visit with his daughter in a therapeutic setting, under conditions to be explored with the current treating therapist.” Both appellant and appellee were required to “participate in counseling and to reduce or eliminate parental conflict....” In addition, the court ordered that “[a] report shall be filed setting forth the parameters of the reunification plan within 90 days, and a review of progress towards reunification may be set, upon request, after six (6) months.” The court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order were dated July 8, 2005 and entered July 13, 2005. Appellant’s timely appeal followed. LEGAL ANALYSIS Appellant’s first assignment of error is that the court, as a matter of law, failed to find, based on the “overwhelming weight of evidence,” that Greta had been sexually abused by appellee.

The court, according to appellant, applied the incorrect “burden of proof’ under Family Law § 9-101 in reaching its conclusions. Appellant asserts that the court also abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Snow and Dizard as experts, admitting their opinions, and failing to “properly evaluate the credentials, experience, expertise and credibility of Dr. Silberg.” Additional errors, as averred by appellant, include the court’s failure to determine whether abuse would likely occur if appellee were granted visitation and the failure to establish specific conditions under which Greta could visit appellee that “would sufficiently assure the safety and the physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the child.” Appel ⁶⁰⁵ lant also contends that the court committed reversible error by delegating judicial authority to Greta’s therapist to decide on “visitation parameters” for appellee and Greta and by ordering a reunification plan from the therapist. Finally, appellant claims that the court based its conclusions on testimony and evidence from previous hearings. I a.

Reasonable Grounds to Believe Md.Code (2004 Repl.Vol., 2005 Supp.), Fam. Law (F.L.) § 9-101 provides: § 9-101. Rejection of custody or visitation if abuse likely Determine if abuse or neglect is likely (a) In any custody or visitation proceeding, if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that a child has been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding, the court shall determine whether abuse or neglect is likely to occur if custody or visitation rights are granted to the party. Deny custody or visitation if abuse likely (b) Unless the court specifically finds that there is no likelihood of further child abuse or neglect by the party, the court shall deny custody or visitation rights to that party, except that the court may approve a supervised visitation arrangement that assures the safety and the physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the child.

The Court of Appeals has recently explained that “[djecisions concerning visitation generally are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and are not to be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” In re Billy W., 387 Md. 405, 447 , 875 A.2d 734 (2005) (citations omitted). In light of § 9-101, “[bjecause the trial court is required to make such determinations in the best interests of the child, visitation may be restricted or even denied when the child’s health or welfare is threatened.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, when “a court has reasonable grounds to believe ⁶⁰⁶ that neglect or abuse has occurred ... custody or visitation must be denied....” Id.

(quoting § 9-101). Appellant claims that the court committed reversible error by using the preponderance of evidence burden of proof when any analysis under § 9-101, appellant avers, requires that the court apply the “reasonable grounds” standard. Appellant maintains that § 9-101 requires courts to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented under the reasonable grounds standard, which has been characterized as akin to the term “probable cause,” and that the standard of preponderance of the evidence is a “more stringent standard” than reasonable grounds. Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 682, n. 2 (N.D.1994)(Supreme Court of North Dakota construing that state’s criminal code section 12.1-81.2-01, which grants a court the power to temporarily restrain conduct when it finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe an individual engaged in disorderly conduct).

As a result, the court’s finding that Greta did not suffer sexual abuse by appellee, based on a preponderance of evidence, is legally incorrect. We agree. In construing § 9-101, we are mindful that ... the primary goal of [ ] [statutory interpretation] is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. We first look to the text of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.

If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry into the legislature’s intent is complete. If, however, ambiguity exists, we turn to surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history and the purpose behind the statutory scheme as a whole, to determine legislative intent. 6 ⁶⁰⁷ Ford v. Douglas, 144 Md.App. 620, 624 , 799 A.2d 448 (2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We have previously examined the reasonable grounds standard in a different context within the area of domestic abuse. In Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md.App. 317, 322 , 762 A.2d 198 (2000) vacated as moot, 365 Md. 122 , 775 A.2d 1249 (2001), where appellant challenged the entry of a protective order against him pursuant to the State Domestic Violence Act, codified at Family Law Article §§ 4-501 et seq., we held that, if the wife’s basis for the protective order was “fear of imminent serious bodily harm, the fear must be reasonable and .. . the relief must be tailored to the situation being addressed.” We explained generally: [A]llegations of domestic violence are very serious, and the issuance of a protective order normally carries with it grave consequences for the perpetrator.

If a protective order is issued without a sufficient legal basis, those consequences frequently cannot be erased. In that situation, the alleged perpetrator may suffer unfairly from the direct consequences of the order itself, which may include removal from his or her home, [or] temporary loss of custody of his or her children.... Id. at 335, 762 A.2d 198 . We then related the outcome of a protective order proceeding alleging abuse to the effect of child custody or visitation under § 9-101, noting: In making child custody determinations, a court weighs numerous factors, including the fitness of the parents, the character and reputation of the parties, and the length of separation of the child from the natural parents.

A trial ⁶⁰⁸ court might consider the issuance of a protective order against one parent when looking at any of these factors. Furthermore, ... if a trial court has reasonable grounds to believe that a child has been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding, the court must specifically find that there is no likelihood of further child abuse or neglect by the party in order to award custody or visitation rights to the party, except for a supervised visitation arrangement. F.L. § 9-101. A protective order issued by a court that states that one parent abused his or her child pursuant to F.L. § 4-501 would give a trial court reasonable grounds to believe that the child had been abused.

Id. at 336-37, 762 A.2d 198 (citation omitted). Although the Court of Appeals vacated our judgment as having been moot due to the expiration of the subject protective order, the Court exercised its discretion and explored further the relationship between the issuance of a protective order and subsequent litigation concerning a family. [Ojnce a court has found from the evidence that abuse has occurred and that a protective order is needed to provide protection for the petitioner or other person entitled to relief, the court’s focus must be on fashioning a remedy that is authorized under the statute and that will be most likely to provide that protection. If ... the court believes that protection of the petitioner requires that the parties be physically separated and that the respondent vacate the home, it should not hesitate to order that relief, along with any ancillary relief provided for in the statute, regardless of any potential impact on future litigation.... [A] determination either to exclude the perpetrator from the family home ... will, in most instances, require the court to provide, among other things, for the temporary custody of any minor children, their support, the support of the victim, and visitation arrangements. It is likely true, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, that the issuance of a protective order and the provision of ⁶⁰⁹ this kind of relief in it may have consequences in other litigation.

A judicial finding, made after a full and fair evidentiary hearing, that one party had committed an act of abuse against another is entitled to consideration in determining issues to which that fact may be relevant. Living arrangements established as the result of a protective order may have relevance in determining custody.... Id. at 136-37, 762 A.2d 198 . We hold that the court erred by failing to apply the reasonable grounds standard to the facts of the case sub judice.

Notably, reasonable grounds was the standard articulated by the General Assembly when it drafted § 9-101. More significant to the discussion at hand are the previous pronouncements of this Court and the Court of Appeals concerning abuse allegations and the standard under which the allegations should be considered. Under settled case law, the factual bases for protective orders, based on physical abuse, must be reviewed under the objective standard of reasonableness. No logical reason exists, in light of the explicit language of § 9-101, for us to uphold application, by the lower court of the more stringent standard.

Whether appellee sexually abused his daughter should have been determined by the reasonable grounds standard. Consequently, we vacate the Order of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court shall reassess the evidence to discern if that evidence satisfies the lower threshold of reasonable grounds to believe that Greta was sexually abused by appellee, pursuant to § 9-101. b. Expert Testimony Appellant next assigns error to the court’s findings and conclusions concerning the qualifications of the expert witnesses, Dr. Snow and Social Services Investigator Rosalind Dizard at trial, admission of the opinions of Dr. Snow and Dizard as to whether Greta was sexually abused and the manner in which the court evaluated Dr. Silberg.

Upon our review of the lower court’s proceedings and perceiving no ⁶¹⁰ clear abuse of discretion, we shall affirm the court’s conclusions with respect to receipt of the expert testimony at trial. Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony. Md. Rule 5-702 (2006).

Regarding expert testimony, we have explained: It is a time-honored rule of evidence that in order to qualify as an expert, [one] should have such special knowledge of the subject on which he is to testify that he can give the jury assistance in solving a problem for which their equipment of average knowledge is inadequate. Broad discretion is vested in the trial court with regard to expert testimony, and that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent an error of law or fact, a serious mistake,